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Summary
Metaphors in the Educational Narratives 
since 1945 with particular reference 
to the Conservative Party
This study seeks to provide both a methodology and an application of that 
methodology in its account, partly historical, partly philosophical, of the 
metaphors in the educational narratives since 1945. It considers, in particular, 
selected texts of the Conservative Party and focusses on the paradigm shifts in 
the educational narratives in 1945 and again in 1979.
The study deconstructs these narratives, teasing out their constitutive 
metaphors: their characteristic representations of educational identities, realities 
and relationships. The ideological subtexts of these representations are 
described, as is the process by which they came to represent the ‘common 
sense’ of education as the metaphors which constituted them became 
literalised. The thesis, as a consequence, is intimately concerned with the 
politics of education and, in particular, the rhetoric used to ‘spin’ the desired 
educational story.
The first chapter contains much of the justification of the methodology 
followed in the study. In effect what this thesis does is to offer a narrative itself, 
or rather a meta-narrative. It does not offer, however, the kind of narrative that 
the Conservative Party, or indeed the Labour Party, has offered. They, the study 
will argue, offered dramas of self realisation, of life as a trial, leading to a final 
resolution in which the hero finds either salvation or some compromise in 
which there is contentment: a kind of hermeneutic epiphany in which the hero 
finds a way of interpreting the dominant, cultural narratives in order to find 
identity and some sense to life. As a consequence, the recurrent motif in the 
Conservative narratives described is the distinction between appearance and 
reality linked to an epic theme of personal salvation which is essentially 
individual, imperialist and moralistic. Dickens’s Great Expectations is, in many 
ways, their paradigm text.
There are, however, other kinds of narrative, particularly in the continental 
tradition of Foucault and Baudrillard, and the American pragmatist tradition of 
Rorty. Though these philosophers would disagree on just about everything, yet 
they share something of a coifimbft narrative approach. The purpose of their 
narratives is their analysis of the conflicts ;and tensions between the reader and 
the text, a dramatic interplay not seeking resolution in self realisation but rather
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a kind of reflexive, consciously ironic re-description of the self as the object, 
not the subject, of the text. The texts considered in this thesis, are what 
Jean-Francois Lyotard calls the ‘legitimation narratives' of education: the 
masked ideologies and the ‘common sense’ literalised metaphors which have 
fixed educational identities and relationships and formed educational desires in 
accordance with particular hegemonic cultural configurations. It is this kind of 
narrative the present study offers, not the closed position of what Henri Bergson 
called ‘the illusions o f retrospective determinism' but rather the open, 
essentially tentative, ironic and inconclusive narrative of philosophy. It is a 
narrative which offers a different and, it is hoped, valuable perception, analysis 
and critique of recent educational history and educational theory rather than 
having, in itself, a closed theoretical position.
The thesis considers the Butler consensus on education in some detail, 
deconstructing from it its ideological subtexts and the way these subtexts were 
masked. It describes how in his narrative, metaphors of nature, ability and types 
of child became the common sense of education and educationalists, fixing 
educational identities and relations into a particular overall cultural hegemony.
The iconography of the grammar school and its status as the ‘preferred’ 
education in the Butler narrative is discussed and the subsequent tensions in the 
Conservative narrative analysed as the incipient egalitarianism of the 1960s 
began to create a desire for greater democratisation. The paternalistic 
Conservative ideologies, and in particular the Butler educational narrative 
which was an important reason for their continuing hegemony, was eventually 
to succumb to this desire and a period of narrative chaos was to occur. The 
traditional aspiration of the Conservative Party to act as the keepers of British 
Culture, as representing the ‘host’ narratives, came under great stress.
The Butler consensus was eventually broken and the thesis describes the 
dynamics of the paradigm shift. The narrative breakdown, what Jurgen 
Habermas called a ‘legitimation crisis ', is described, beginning with the effect 
of the metaphorical redescription of education by the egalitarian 
counter-narrative of the Labour Party; though, it is argued, Labour’s 
commitment to comprehensivisation was always ambiguous at best. However, 
the egalitarian narrative’s threat to their continued hegemony was to create in 
the rhetoric of the Conservatives the virulent propagation of a sense of crisis in 
education. The success of the counter-reformation rhetoric of the reactionary 
voices of the Conservative Party, exemplified in the Black Paper writers of the 
late 1960s and 1970s, was however, a double-edged victory. There was to be no 
simple re-invention of Butler’s classification.
The final breakdown of the Butler narrative was followed by the accession of 
the Thatcher narrative. The dramatic and spectacular decline and fall of Butler 
and the gradual accession of the Thatcher narrative - called in this study, 'the 
bourgeois narrative' - is described. Her use of rhetoric and her individual, 
heroic style were vital to the success of the project. The use of ‘soundbite’ 
rhetoric to gain popular support for her reforms was an important ingredient of 
Thatcherism and was to have profound effect on subsequent social and
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educational reforms. The metaphorical re-description of schools, teachers and 
pupils and the relationship of education and the state contained in this new 
narrative is analysed and the impact of the vocabularies of consumerism on 
fundamental educational identities and relationships is described.
The process by which the reforming bourgeois narrative and its metaphors 
gradually became the common sense of education is a central feature of the 
thesis. Thatcher’s curriculum reform and the pivotal part played in this by the 
1988 Educational Reform Act is discussed and the masked ideological 
underpinnings of this Act are made visible. The vital role in promoting this shift 
played by Thatcher herself and the nature of what was to become her 
narrative’s distinctive rhetoric of society and of education is examined, in 
particular her re-description of teachers and the effect of that on the concept of 
teacher professionalism.
The study, using as a framing metaphor Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, 
describes the creation, through regimes of isolation, surveillance and control, of 
a new consensus. The keywords of the new educational narrative, freedom, 
choice, accountability and management are placed in the centre of this new 
consensus. Particular emphasis is placed on the maintenance of a popular sense 
of crisis in education in the media to enable the reforms, and on the creation of 
Ofsted as a means of policing and establishing the new narrative.
Finally the study considers the current state of the educational narrative under 
New Labour. It describes the new ‘post-ideological consensus’ claimed by 
politicians of both major parties. It examines the means by which New Labour, 
using the discourse of skills, appropriated the consumerist, bourgeois 
metaphorical redescription of society as Communitarianism and re-invented the 
Conservative bourgeois narrative in its own image.
This would not have been possible without Loma. Thank you.
My most sincere thanks also to Dr. Walter Humes, my supervisor, 
and to all the staff of the Department of Education at Glasgow University who 
provided such a friendly and stimulating atmosphere.
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Part 1
The Respectable Story
"In every culture, what does the imaginative conservative aspire to 
conserve? Why, to conserve order: both order in the soul and order in 
the state. With Luke, the man o f  conservative impulses says to himself, 
'No man having drunk old wine straightaway desireth new; for he 
saith, The old is better.' Out o f the deep well o f the past comes
order...
From revalation, from right reason, from poetic vision, from much 
study, from experience o f the species - so the conservative argues - we 
human beings have learned certain ways and principles o f order. 
Were we lacking these, we would lie at the mercy o f will and appetite - 
in private life, in public concerns. It is this order, this old safeguard 
against private and public anarchy, which the conservative refuses to 
surrender to the evangels o f Progress."
Russell Kirk, The Portable Conservative Reader 
(New York: Viking Penguin, 1982) pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
1Chapter 1
Language, Truth and Metaphor: 
The Stories of Education
"Where to start is the problem, because nothing begins when it 
begins, and nothing is over when it is over, and everything 
needs a preface; 
a preface, a postscript and a chart o f simultaneous events.
History is a construct" ^
1: O f Metaphors and Meta-Fictions
"Any narrative is a phenomenon which extends considerably 
beyond the scope o f literature; it is one o f the essential 
constituents o f  our understanding o f reality. From the time we 
begin to understand language until our death, we are 
perpetually surrounded by narratives, first o f  all in our family, 
then at school, then through our encounters with people and
reading"
Educational debate is not about facts. Rather it is about the interpretation of 
facts, the understanding of them and their relative importance and position 
inside their frames of reference: narratives and their constitutive metaphors, 
their means of representing of reality. It is this philosophical position, which 
furnishes the broad methodology of this study, which is the topic of this first 
chapter. What this study seeks to provide is a meta-narrative, providing an 
exposition and critique of the paradigm shifts in the educational narratives 
since 1944. In particular, for reasons which will be made clear later, the 
study will generally confine itself to the educational narratives of the 
Conservative Party. Further, the study will limit itself to the English
* Margaret Atwood, The Robber Bride (London: Virago, 1993) p.4
^Michel Butor, The Novel as Research, in Malcolm Bradbury (ed) The Novel Today.
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), p.48.
2educational system though there will be an occasional reference to Scottish 
education.
Statements, to reiterate, are not true simply by their correspondence to some 
vague undifferentiated concept like ’reality'. Reality is ineffable; it is 
represented metaphorically by language - the instrument of human 
intentionality - which attempts to describe it and probe its secrets. It is the 
narrative which provides the context and it is in terms only of context that 
truth may be ascertained - by correspondence to the view of ‘reality’ the story 
provides, by the internal coherence of the story and, pragmatically, by the 
usefulness of the ‘fact’ to the story as a whole.
British philosophy and social thought has been long in the grip of a bleak 
empiricism, a reductive pragmatic positivism. Yet Richard Rorty^ points out 
that the idea of a positivist philosopher is a kind of contradiction in terms. 
Taking science as the paradigm of intellectual activity, such philosophers 
attempt to discover the truth about the world, suggesting that the 'truth' is in 
some way 'out there' waiting to be discovered. The positivist philosopher is 
in effect stating that 'truth' is not a matter for philosophy at all but for other, 
'fact' based, disciplines, relegating philosophy to the dubious status of a 
discipline for 'clarifying' language. Gilbert Ryle, for example, claimed that 
philosophy was to reveal the 'real form o f facts' in effect its purpose was 
to provide nothing much more than destructive and derisory critiques of 
non-positivist philosophers and to assert the primacy of ‘common sense’.
This study takes a different view. Like Neitzsche it offers philosophy as the 
'physician o f culture' ^ where the philosopher is a critic of ways of life, 
offering critiques of what he or she sees as morbid features of the culture, 
providing the sand of dissent to create the pearl of a more vigorous culture. 
For philosophers like Ayer, however, philosophy does not value its patient; 
philosophy rather is either oblivious to the wider culture or destructively 
criticises elements of it - more like a butcher in an abattoir than a physician 
dedicated to preserving the health of her patient. As Ayer, with derisive irony, 
remarks: "Thus we offer the theist the same comfort as we gave the moralist.
Richard Rorty Contingency. Ironv and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) pp 3-23 and passim.
4John Passmore, A Hundred Years o f Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957 revised 
1966) p.443 
^ibid. p.99
3His assertions cannot possibly be valid, but they cannot be invalid either. As 
he says nothing at all about the world, he cannot justly be accused o f  saying 
anything false..." ^
n
W.V.O. Quine, in Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951) , made a polemical 
attack on the narrowness of this kind of philosophy. He shows that the 
anti-metaphysical stance of the positivists actually conceals a rigid 
metaphysic in its apparent reification of 'logical truths'. This, argued Quine, 
though it had rather "less to it than meets the eye", was still a crude 
metaphysic - a 'myth of meaning'. In Quine's view a scientist brings to an 
experiment a set of propositions, 'cultural posits' in his terms, as ingredients 
of the test of experience. In his model of scientific theory, beliefs are caught 
up in an interconnected web with no one belief immune to revision in the 
light of experience, and no one experience demanding the falsification of a 
belief. Consequently individual experiments, and individual statements, are 
meaningless. Meaning attaches only to the story taken as a whole, not to 
individual sentences.
For Quine, science is a narrative: "the unit o f  empirical significance is the 
whole o f science" and consequently the concept of truth becomes more 
flexible: "..statements, apart from an occasional collectors' item for
o
epistemologists, are connected only deviously with experience" and the 
positivist desire to place empirical knowledge on a firmer foundation 
becomes a demand for an unobtainable, "fanciful fanciless medium for  
unvarnished news" ^ . Quine proposed pragmatic criteria for truth: that, "our 
statements about the external world face the tribunal o f experience not 
individually but as a corporate body".
Truth, Richard Rorty argues, is distinct from ’reality', the world 'out there'. It 
is a relation of the cultural production of meaning, of the common use of 
language based on a common way of life:
"Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently o f  the 
human mind - because sentences cannot so exist, or be out
^A.J. Ayer, Language Truth and Logic (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1936, reprinted 1971) 
E-153
in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point o f  View fNew York: Harper and Row, 1961) 
pp.20-46: references are from this essay unless otherwise indicated.
W.V.O. Quine, Methods o f Logic fNew York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951) 
^W.V.O. Quine Word and Object ( Cambridge Mass.: M I T. Press, 1960)
4there. The world is out there but descriptions o f the world are 
not. Only descriptions o f  the world can be true or false. The 
world on its own - unaided by the describing activities o f  
human beings - cannot. " ^
In this Rorty follows Wittgenstein's theory of language. Given Quine's theory 
of the indeterminancy of translation and interpretation: individual statements 
are meaningless unless they recognised as part of a context, a narrative. 
Wittgenstein's ‘language games’ proposed the same sort of criteria for 
meaning. Meaning is dependent on the use of the sentence within the context 
of a particular activity or way of life.
The correspondence between language and reality is metaphorical, a 
Magrittean relationship between a picture and what it represents. Above all, 
it is a relationship mediated by human intentionality - by collective human 
purpose. The world has no preferred descriptions of itself; the preferences of 
human beings provide descriptions of the world. It is people who put form on 
the void. There is no one language game - or vocabulary - that provides any 
greater verisimilitude than any other. Language games are made, not 
discovered, and evolve as they are used in unpredictable ways as the social 
and cultural needs of the users change, as they need to adapt to different 
circumstances. The Ptolemaic vocabulary was 'superseded' by the Copemican 
because the Copemican was more useful and better met the needs of people, 
not because it was 'truer'. Rorty *  ^ points out that we should think of the 
distinction between 'fact' and 'meaning' the way Ryle taught us to think about 
the metaphysically corrupt distinction, forged by mentalistic language, 
between' mind' and 'body': as fundamentally a category mistake. Language 
does not come between us and 'reality', rather 'reality' is constructed and 
framed by language.
The claim that language is mind-dependent, rather than 'reality dependent', is 
open to the objection that it seems to suggest a kind of epistemological 
anarchy which might degenerate into solipsism. However the claim here is 
that it is not so much 'mind-dependent' as 'minds-dependent' or 'culture 
dependent'. Wittgenstein showed that the notion of entirely private languages 
descends into absurdity. Interpretation and synonymy are dependent on
1 °Rorty (1989), p. 5 
 ^* Rorty (1989), p. 15 and passim
5shared ways of life: shared history, shared social and cultural life, shared 
conceptions of what is important and what is not, what is valuable and what
i o
is not, what is sane and what is not. It depends on what Davidson calls 
'convergence' - the conjunction of the cultural stories with which people 
collectively describe their worlds. The shared language game is the 
framework against which the 'truth' of individual sentences or propositions 
are assessed. In this sense criteria for truth demand a sentence is both 
correspondent and coherent, not to 'reality' but to interpretations of reality, 
framed in narratives, which have evolved during our social and cultural 
history.
Ultimately there is no fixed reality, only narratives about the world, each a 
relatively consistent network of beliefs about the world, embodying 
valuations which take the form of statements which make claims about what 
is 'true' and what is important. These narratives are, however, fictions: 
relatively plausible, and widely accepted, but still stories about the world and 
how it works. There are many such stories, some bound to particular cultures 
or to particular historical periods. Indeed the adoption of a particular story or 
group of stories, is, perhaps, close to what is meant by 'culture'.
We do not inhabit the world, but narratives about the world. These narratives 
provide us with our 'common-sense' interpretations of events. Narratives, 
once established, seem to have considerable cultural inertia. They become 
resistant to re-interpretations and attempts to provide counter-narratives, to 
reshape 'common sense', become full of tensions. It is this 'common sense', as 
we shall see, that the British empiricist tradition of interpretation trades on 
and which has bred such a distrust of theory in British educational narratives.
At the heart of these narratives are metaphors, so often uncritically used that 
they have become literalised, dead metaphors. This will become the main 
expository argument later in this and in succeeding chapters, but, as a brief 
example, Hobbes' social theories are firmly rooted in mechanical metaphors 
even though he proclaimed a violent distrust of metaphor as 'ignes fatui': 
"Seeing life is but a motion o f  limbs, the beginning whereof is 
in some principall part within: why may we not see that all 
Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and
12Donald Davidson, Thought and Talk in Samuel Guttenplan (ed): Mind and Language. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)
6wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is 
the Heart but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Springs; 
and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the 
whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? ... (So too) 
by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a 
COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE which is but an Artificiall 
Man..." 13
This metaphor represents not so much the universe as the then new and 
dynamic science of mechanics, so important socially and economically at 
that time. Such use of metaphor was so obvious and so commonly used that 
it had become literalised. This literalisation, however, masks the ideological 
dimensions and values of the narrative - in Hobbes' case, the forms of social 
organisation it takes for granted and so legitimises.
Analogous metaphors, such as the clockwork universe, were at the heart of 
traditional narratives of science of the time - arguing from machines to 
society as Hobbes did, though it could also be reversed, arguing from society 
to machines. Newton, for example, wrote in the clockwork tradition but ran 
into trouble in trying to explain gravity which had apparently no detectable 
mechanism. To describe the motion of masses towards each other he used 
metaphors from the social world, metaphors of 'attraction' and 'sociability' , 
and then coined the word 'gravity', less obviously a personification than 
'sociability', to explain the apparent mechanism. ^
Even scientific language games are as contingent on human intentionality, as 
minds-dependent, as any other language game. Thomas Kuhn attempted 
to provide a meta-narrative of the history of science. Using both religious 
and political metaphors in his analysis, Kuhn describes progress in science as 
through revolutionary changes, basing his interpretation on sociological and 
cultural analyses of scientific communities. Science progresses in cycles: - 
'normal' science - crisis - revolution - reformed 'normal’ science - crisis and 
so on. 'Normal science' is scientific activity governed by a shared narrative: a
1 1Thomas Hobbes (1651), Leviathan : ed. C.B. MacPherson (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin/Pelican 1968) p. 81
^ A s discussed by David E. Leary in Psyche's Muse, in Leary (ed): Metaphors in the History 
of Psychology. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 8-10
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1970)
7structured and coherent theory about the world. What makes scientific 
narratives different from others is their claim to relative strictness and 
completeness. Kuhn calls it the 'paradigm'. The paradigm - the theory core, 
the constructive central metaphors which constitute the 'reality' of the theory 
- is resistant to falsification; falsifying experiences are regarded as 
anomalies, indicating some incompleteness remaining in the paradigm. The 
scientist, trained in the paradigm, inhabits the paradigm and is 'committed' to 
his story.
'Crisis' occurs when the paradigm seems to be unable to contend with 
competing narratives and causes scientists periods of 'pronounced 
professional insecurity'. Kuhn quotes the physicist Wolfgang Pauli, in despair 
in face of the apparent contradictions of quantum physics in 1924: "At the 
moment physics is again terribly confused. In any case, it is too difficult for  
me, and I wish I had been a movie comedian... and had never heard o f  
physics." 1 ^
This kind of characterisation of the scientist is not what the positivists like
Popper portray. For them the scientist is the high priest of culture, dedicated
to revealing sacred truths about the world, in the service of a higher authority.
Yet Kuhn, when describing scientific 'revolution', explains that a scientist’s
switch of'allegiance' from the old paradigm to its rival is more like a political
revolution: "Just as '...political revolutions aim to change the political
institutions in ways those institutions themselves prohibit...' and 'political
recourse fails' so the choice 'between competing paradigms proves to be the
17choice between incompatible modes o f community life'."
Kuhn blurs the distinction between scientific narratives and other kinds: 
'scientific knowledge, like language, is intrinsically the common property o f
JO
a group or else nothing at all. . It is not the case, he argues, that the 
switch from one paradigm to the other is simply because it 'explains' the 
world better: he is sceptical about simple myths of ‘progress’. Kuhn contends 
that no argument can be compelling to switch allegiance. The switch is more 
political and more radical than that. Revolution is not caused by the 
defection of one individual but of the 'conversion' of the scientific
^ibid p.84 
^ibid pp93-4 
18ibid p.210
8community, more or less as a whole. Given sufficient anomalies to 
undermine the old paradigm, and given that the explanatory power of the 
rival paradigm is sufficiently and rhetorically persuasive, then there may be a 
shift in allegiance to include the majority in the scientific community. 
Scientists, like politicians, Kuhn's analogy suggests, have a primary interest 
in retaining the power and influence they have, and this power is vested in 
the narrative power of the paradigm itself. What the struggle with the rival 
narrative may create is close to what Habermas ^  calls a legitimation crisis.
While apparent anomalies or contradictions do provide narrative tension and 
may prevent closure, they are not in themselves sufficient reason for the 
breakdown of a story. Those authorised with the power a story brings have a 
vested interest in maintaining that story. In science, for example, anomalies 
in certain circumstances may breed entirely new stories because the demand 
for logical consistency, completeness and coherency is very high in scientific 
narratives. Either the Boeing 747 flies or it doesn't. The kind of social and 
cultural stories which are being discussed in this study, however, are not 
quite like the stories of science. They do not require quite such a rigorous 
logic or fine detail. Science may determine what may be done, but other 
stories, like those which will be discussed here, determine what ought to be 
done. These stories do not conceive nuclear weapons, though these are the 
stories which might demand their use.
Habermas argues that parliamentaiy democracy depends on the political 
inertia, or civil privatism, of the majority of the society - of their relatively 
uncritical acceptance of the current narrative. However economic and social 
changes, perhaps even partly caused by government policy, 'anomalies' to 
return to Kuhn's metaphor, may create conditions in which government 
policy is seen to interfere with the normal lives of the people. Add to that the 
rhetorical attacks of a rival narrative then this can create a legitimation crisis.
This study will identify and discuss legitimation crises in the educational 
narratives since 1944 and argue that the switch of allegiance from one story 
to another was made largely for hegemonic reasons: the rival narrative 
configured social and political relations differently, locating positions of 
power and influence differently, by claiming to rescue the community from
^Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis . (London: Heinemann Educational, 1973)
9crisis. The winning narrative reinterpreted or redefined the core educational 
and social metaphors - the re-identification of the relation of people to the 
state may change, from citizen to consumer, for example.
New metaphors do not just constitute new stories or re-interpret them in new 
ways, rather they signal a changing hegemony. A new culture is created, with 
new narratives writing over the old stories and consigning them to history. 
The succeeding chapters of this exercise will be intimately concerned with 
the changing educational metaphors and the narratives they constitute. The 
history of culture is, in effect, the history of metaphor.
Changes from one narrative to another are what Mary Hesse calls
'metaphoric redescriptions' and such changes, she claims, are accidental
rather than necessary. They are not dictated by a better or more refined
insight into the nature of reality, not 'designed' to bring narratives 'closer' to
reality, not more 'true', rather they stem from what is socially or culturally
important at any particular time, by the contingencies of history:
"...think o f  the history o f language, and thus o f  culture, as
Darwin taught us to think o f the coral reef. Old metaphors are
constantly dying o ff into literalness, and then serving as a
platform and fo il for new metaphors. This analogy lets us
think 'our language' - that is, o f the science and culture o f
twentieth century Europe - as something that took shape as a
result o f a great number o f sheer contingencies. Our language
and our culture are as much a contingency, as much a result
o f thousands o f small mutations finding niches (and millions o f
others finding no niches), as are the orchids and the 
70anthropoids.
The story and its metaphors provide a context and frame which allows for 
some understanding of otherwise bewildering chains of events; it provides 
some overall rationale, perhaps authorship, ordering experience and 
interpreting it. It also provides some drama and excitement, arenas for 
conflict and resolution. It provides a background for locating personal and 
social identity. It governs what is possible and what is not, what is sane and
^^Mary Hesse: The Explanatory Function o f  Metaphor, in Hesse Revolutions and 
Reconstructions in the Philosophy o f Science (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980)
p. 16
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what is insane. Finally it provides an eschatology: a sense of an ending, a 
culmination of and a purpose for existence. The story becomes a form of life; 
its metaphors are lived and they give meaning to experience. Fact and 
meaning are not logically separable and are located in Nietzsche's ‘mobile 
army o f  metaphors'. This stresses the essentially socially constructed and 
competitive nature of claims for truth - claims for the ascendancy of one 
story rather than another as rival stories and rival interpretations clash.
Rorty makes the point that it is not the 'world' which decides which
descriptions are true but rather the 'vocabularies' in which these sentences are
framed. Different vocabularies, different language games in Wittgenstein's
terms, provide different interpretations of the world, different narrative
frames of reference. It is not a question of which provides better or worse
interpretations - what Popper calls 'greater verisimilitude' - as this suggests
that there are some external criteria by which to assess them. The adoption
of a language game, Rorty states, is not a matter of specific criteria, but nor,
however, is it arbitrary or really a matter of choice. Rorty states that it is a
matter of the cultural and historical accidental tendency of using certain
words and that the shift from the use of one language game to another is not
a matter of choice or decision, but of losing 'the habit o f using certain words
91and gradually acquiring the habit o f using others.' 1
Ways of life are thus represented in not just intellectual, but also emotional 
commitment to a narrative and its metaphors. All this is persuasive but what 
both Hesse and Rorty tend to miss is the intimate connection between the 
narrative and power. Truth is story contingent, and contingent also on the 
widespread adoption of the story. Cultural narratives and their framing 
metaphors are intimately concerned with power. This study hopes to emulate 
the purposes of cultural analysis and criticism that Edward Said succinctly 
describes when he writes:
'We live in a world not only o f commodities but also o f  
representations, and representations - their production, 
circulation, history and interpretation - are the very element 
o f culture. In much recent theory, the problem o f 
representation is deemed to be central, but rarely is it put in 
its fu ll political context, a context that is primarily imperial.
2 'Rorty (1989), p.6
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Instead we have on the one hand an isolated cultural sphere, 
believed to be freely and unconditionally available to 
weightless theoretical speculation and investigation, and, on 
the other, a debased political sphere, where the real struggle 
between interests is supposed to occur. To the professional 
student o f  culture - the humanist, the critic, the scholar - only 
one sphere is relevant, and, more to the point, it is accepted 
that the two spheres are separated, whereas the two are not 
only connected but ultimately the same.
A radical falsification has become established in this 
separation. Culture is exonerated o f  any entanglements with 
power, representations are considered only as apolitical 
images, to be parsed and construed as so many grammars o f 
exchange, and the divorce o f  the present from the past is 
assumed to be complete. And yet far from this separation o f 
spheres being a neutral or accidental choice, its real meaning 
is an act o f complicity, the humanist’s choice o f a disguised, 
denuded, systematically purged textual model over a more 
embattled model, whose principal features would inevitably 
coalesce around the continuing struggle over the question o f  
empire itself ’
What narratives provide are discursive arenas: vocabularies of influence and 
power, which initiate some into the structures of power, which allow some to 
speak and which force others, to remain silent or ineffectual. The discourse 
determines the 'real' world: only in the discourse does the speaker have 
meaning: to be excluded is effectively to be denied the power of meaning. 
Power is meaning, and meaning power. The vocabularies generated by the 
narrative and its constituent metaphors create the discursive domain - an 
empire - and consequently demand that those who would be speakers in the 
discourse share the same interpretation of the world that the stories and their 
ideological sub-texts provide. Consent is defined by the shared use of the 
vocabularies of power; dissent is an attempt to question or to revise these 
vocabularies, or to attempt to introduce a different vocabulary which would
22Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism fLondon: Vintage, 1994) pp. 66-67.
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alter the patterns of domination and consequently to disempower those who 
have vested interests in maintaining the dominant story and its metaphors.
Prior to Butler’s revision of the educational narrative, the Conservative Party 
had a fairly uncomplicated view of the purposes and form of education. This 
view had been the established, dominant educational narrative in the pre-war 
years. What follows is an analysis and critique of that narrative, partly to give 
some substance to the theory which has so far been expounded and partly to 
provide a grounding to the discussions of Conservative educational narratives 
which form the content of the rest of this study.
2. The Respectable Conservative and Human Nature: 
What Every True Englishman believes...
"It is remarkable how the custodians o f culture
j ' l
reach for their Nature when under threat.
Levi-Strauss in The Savage Mind ^  uses the term bricolage to describe how 
primitive man, the savage, relates to the world around him. The savage's 
unrefined perceptions provide the foundations of what Levi-Strauss calls a 
science o f the concrete which authorises the ordering of experiences through 
the classification and arrangement of it into structures - myths - through 
which to interpret his experience and give it significance. These mythical 
structures, he argues, are essentially the savage's improvised and arbitrary 
responses to his environment, a bricolage, which establishes metaphorical 
analogies - working on the twin axes of representation and metonymy - 
between the representation of nature and the ordering of society:
'The savage mind deepens its knowledge with the help o f  
imagines mundi. It builds mental structures which facilitate 
an understanding o f the world as much as they resemble it. In 
this sense savage thought can be defined as analogical 
thought.' ^
21 Terry Eagleton in a review o f  ’The Story o f  Britain' by Roy Strong 
in The Guardian 26/9/96
2  ^Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966). 
25 ibid., p. 236
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Through these fictions the world is explained and made a comfortable place 
in which to live and they offer a means by which culture and nature can be 
made to mirror each other, the one logically justifying and authorising the 
other. The ’savage' mind operates on analogical thought, through metaphorical 
transformation in what Levi-Strauss calls 'totemic mode', the totem being the 
means by which the world is classified.
Such orderings of nature are not restricted to primitive societies. It was 
commonplace in renaissance times, for example, that the world could be 
represented hierarchically as a great chain or ladder of being. The King was 
head of state, then his nobles and so on. In cosmology, the Sun was sovereign 
with the other planets ordered under it. The Lion was the Lord of the Beasts. 
The father was head of the household. In Plato's Myth of Metals, Gold was 
superior to Silver and Silver superior to the base metals. Analogical 
metaphors representing the King as the sun, or the father of the nation, or the 
Lionheart maintained the 'naturalness' of the social order, the common sense. 
The Sermon of the State of Matrimony from The Elizabethan Church Book of 
Homilies said: 'Let women be subject to their husbands, for the husband is 
the head o f the woman as Christ is the head o f  the Church \
Such analogical thought is the common sense of culture and makes the social 
orderings it demands appear 'natural'. Its metaphors predicate consensus and a 
unity of experience. As literary figures, metaphors may provide some 
unexpected insight or they may challenge 'normal' perceptions, but as Hawkes 
points out: 'Metaphors affirm, in the end, as much as they challenge. We 
might even conclude that i f  they sometimes seem to rattle the bars o f our 
cage, it is often only to demonstrate how firmly, how comfortably, these are 
fixed.' 26
Analogical inversions of the 'natural' order were used to represent evil and 
pernicious ideas. Walter Raleigh, for example wrote in his Preface to The
History o f the World: ' ..the greatest and most glorious kings have gnawn the
77grass o f the earth with beasts for pride and ambition towards God. A  
metaphor works by contrasting and comparing: it allows an object to be 
allocated its place in the accepted order of things, or it may exclude that
9 f\ Terence Hawkes, Metaphor (London: Methuen, (1972)) p. 91.
^  in. (ed.) A.M.C. Latham, Selected Prose and Poetry (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965) p. 
183.
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object as foreign. It is like the culture's immune system: ejecting what it sees 
as harmful ideas or stories. Discussing Levi-Strauss's contrast between what a 
culture classifies as 'edible' and 'inedible' as a means of glimpsing the 
distinctive way of life a culture and how it perceives the 'natural' world, 
Hawkes ^  describes that the use of the metaphor 'frogs' to deride the French 
has its source in the classification of frogs as 'inedible' in English culture. To 
eat frogs is to be un-English and consequently suspect.
This study will concern the bricolage of the Conservative Party, in particular 
their myths of 'nature' and 'human nature' and their use in justifying a 
particular social order. The pre-war educational narrative, a discussion of 
which follows, was influential in the creation of Butler’s narrative and 
provides something of the narrative tension in the educational discourses 
which followed Butler.
Before Butler's time, and indeed during it, the Tory Party was dominated by
99what Andrew Roberts has described as 'The Respectable Tendency' . They 
were the patrician wing of the party, old fashioned, One-Nation Tories, for 
whom politics was a duty rather than a career, or at least that was their public 
presentation of themselves, perhaps yet another fiction. It was a guilelessly 
presented philosophy of service, loyalty and personal non-aggrandisement. It 
is part of the narrative rules of this One Nation Toryism that those in power 
should not enjoy it, or at least be seen to enjoy it; that rhetoric should not be 
too high flown, but low key though obviously sincere; that standards in public 
life should be seen to be irreproachable; and above all that the traditional 
values and institutions vital to the preservation of their way of life, such as 
patriotism, the essential distinctions of class, property, education, and the 
Church, are held sacred - and any other values which conflict with these, such 
as egalitarianism , made profane.
The 'Respectable' Conservative's rhetoric was typically presented as a 
'common-sense', a transparently obvious, pragmatic description of people and 
society. "So far as philosophy or doctrine is concerned, the wise
T A
Conservative travels light" wrote Ian Gilmour, stressing the typical distrust
28 Hawkes (1972), p. 87
2  ^ Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians (London: Phoenix, 1994) Chapter 3 and passim.
Ian Gilmore in , (ed) Zig Henry Leyton, Conservative Party Politics (London: MacMillan, 
1980) Foreword, p. xii.
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of abstract theory and traditional essentially anti-expert, anti-intellectual 
stance of the Conservative Party - or at least of the 'Respectable Tendency' of 
the old style One Nation Toryism. Lord Salisbury warned:
'No lesson seems to be so deeply inculcated by the experience 
o f life as that you should never trust experts. I f  you believe the 
doctors, nothing is wholesome. I f  you believe the theologians, 
nothing is innocent. I f  you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe.
They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a large 
measure o f common sense.' ^  *
Even Butler himself, when he exhibited some disturbing intellectual 
pretensions, was warned by Stanley Baldwin that "the sin o f intellectualism 
was worse than death." . The 'Respectable Tendency' are characterised by
this lack of a specific, and to them potentially restrictive, philosophical or 
political doctrine: Arthur Balfour, when asked what his political principles 
were replied: "I suppose the principles o f  common sense. " . A.J. Davies
describes the source of this 'common sense':
"...as early as July 1793 that grand Tory, Samuel Johnson, 
assured Boswell that 'human experience, which was constantly 
contradicting theory, was the great test o f  truth'. This 
emphasis on Experience, on Tradition and Authority, is a 
feature o f British Conservative thought, even if  it does not 
address the question o f  which Experiences, Traditions or 
Authority are to take priority" ^
The 'test of truth' of the 'Respectable' Conservative's science o f  the concrete 
was, then, how far their own immediate experience, mediated by their trust in 
the authority of traditional epistemological and cultural values and, crucially, 
their desire to maintain those values, confirmed a belief: a test which 
threatens to become circular, if not solipsistic. Since Respectable 
Conservatism had, at its core, the maintenance of culture and traditions - the 
'authorised' and 'established' stories - and those cultural institutions which 
nurtured them so well, then it is unlikely that they will find meaningful, never
 ^* Lord Salisbury, cited in Andrew J. Davies, We. The Nation: The Conservative Party and 
the Pursuit o f Power fLondon: Abacus, 1995) p. 49 
^  cited in Andrew J. Davies (1995) p. 42.
^  David Dilks in 'Batwin and Chamberlain’ in Lord Butler (ed), The Conservatives (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1977) p. 273.
^  Andrew J. Davies (1995), p. 42/3.
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mind truthful, a belief in a social narrative that would threaten the stability of 
the stories, the institutions and social structures which maintained that 
culture. Certainly it is a test that is unlikely to lead to any radical change.
Their own understanding of their experience is itself a product of the culture 
which nurtured them, and their desire for the authority of particular 
'established' cultural stories is what gives their experience meaning. What is 
granted truth, and thereby meaning, is what is granted power to change the 
narratives and their discourses of society - intellectually, socially, 
economically and politically: but at the bottom of this Conservative well of 
'Truth' lies desire for the authority of the culture and its institutions, such as 
the nuclear family, the church and the hierarchical social order of education 
and schooling.
The 'naturalness' of a hierarchical social order is central to the 'Respectable 
Tendency' of Conservative desire and 'realist' thinking. And, at the core of 
such thinking are what might be described as necessary fictions about human 
nature and society. Quintin Hogg came close to making an explicit 
reference to these stories which underpin this thinking, fictions which he 
believed were necessary due to the inevitable tension between the need to 
maintain of some kind of social order and the essential 'individuality' of 
people and their 'natural' resentment of restrictions on their freedom. Hogg's 
book begins with the fall of Rome and the French Revolution and it is the 
fairly constant allusion to such social turbulence that maintains the narrative 
tension.
Zygmunt Baum an^ writes of how the focus imagmarius of a particular 
narrative, its constituting metaphors, provides a kind of ideal experiment 
which, though it will never be achieved, nevertheless provides the structure, 
purpose and context of the narrative. This focus is a filter through which 
experience and observation are counterfactually sifted to justify claims for 
knowledge. The focus imaginarius embodies and characterises the theory core 
of the narrative, its ideology and epistemology and provides its vocabulary. It 
also provides the terrain for the discursive dynamics of the narrative,
*5 C
Quintin Hogg, The Case for Conservatism (West Drayton: Penguin, 1947) Chapter 3 and 
passim.
Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations o f Postmodemitv (London: Routledge, 1992) pp. 217 and 
passim.
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organising and directing the critique of observed reality - or another 
competing narrative - in terms of how far it is from the ideal. The focus is 
metaphor, an representation of the world from a particular frame of reference 
which structures the narrative. Tension is generated though the metaphor, by 
perceived similarities and differences between the observed reality and the 
hermeneutic overlay which the fiction generates.
Hogg's fictions of society are rooted in the desire to avoid immanent anarchy,
' i n
by "preserving the mystique o f traditional authority" . The focus 
imaginarius of Hogg's narrative is the England of a pre-war Agatha Christie 
novel, an idealised class ordered England, with each class following its own 
traditional pursuits, the society itself at the pinnacle of its evolution:
"Our ancestors had a simple expression... they called it 
'progress', and by this singular phrase they meant in the 
broad a theory o f  the history o f the last six hundred years 
which on the whole has been true.
O f all the things we recognise nowadays as being on the side 
o f the angels the greatest part have had their origin at a 
comparatively recent point in time.
Hospitals, schools, religious institutions o f all sorts, friendly 
societies, debating societies, art and music circles, athletic 
clubs, sporting associations, social centres - yes, and the small 
sweet and tobacco shop round the corner - none o f these
TO
existed, except in rudimentary form, in the Dark Ages....
There remains a tension in the Conservative narrative between accepting the 
continuing, gradual processes of evolutionary social change and the 
presentation of England as having reached the perfection of something like 
Hogg's cosy picture here and consequently that all that was required was the 
maintenance of that order. Hogg does accept slow changes in the social order 
and he does not denigrate the rising bourgeois class or the aspirations of the 
working class, rather he appears to embrace them and their respective cultural 
pursuits, albeit at a distance and with more than a suspicion of a patronising 
tone.
^ H ogg  (1947) p.27 
ibid. p. 83/4
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In the 1940s, the political climate was dominated by the need to satisfy the 
public desire for greater equality and it was not politic to acknowledge 
directly their privileged existence. When he does go on to discuss what he 
calls 'the ruling classes' he is careful to state that 'men are born equal in the 
sight o f  God' ^  and then to remark that though the class system exists - and 
that he ingenuously argues is a historical reality which cannot be altered - it 
so happens England is uniquely fortunate to have a very honourable, 
dedicated and decent aristocracy who take their responsibilities and duties as 
the ruling class very seriously indeed.
Hogg's view of society is of an organism and his discussion of society is 
pseudo-Darwinian. His use of this biological metaphor allows him to discount 
'socialist' planning which, he argues is too mechanistic, but which, at the same 
time does, he thinks, allow him to theorise about how a scientific study of the 
society could allow that its members "be bred for certain characteristics, or 
trained in certain aptitudes" ^  and that the society itself may be 'operated' 
upon to cure it of defects. The society can only change healthily if such 
change "is in accordance with its acquired and inherited character and at a 
given rate" Unrest in society, grievances and protests, are to be 
understood as 'symptoms' and should be treated - but in the 'treatment' of such 
social ills the government must never lose sight of the essential, natural 
'character' of a 'healthy' society in any proposed reform or it will risk resultant 
chaos.
It is not hard to see why such metaphors are attractive to politicians. Such 
medical metaphors narrow the scope of political discussion and thinking. The 
initial statement of a symptom immediately limits the discussion, narrowing 
the agenda and the perception of the state to specific things that might have 
gone wrong, rather than considering that the problem might be an inherent 
part of the constitution as a whole - that children do not learn is because of 
the feckless teacher rather than built in class disadvantage in education, for 
example.
The statement of symptoms guides the political activity into a narrow 
empirical search for relatively simple clinical signs of cause and effect
•^ibid p. 146 
^ibid p.25 
 ^^  ibid p.25
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leading to an 'informed' diagnosis and cure. That the 'cure' does not work can 
be blamed on the patient rather than the treatment - politically motivated 
education authorities, for example, refuse to act over incompetent teachers. 
The impersonality of the doctor might suggest that politicians also have a 
kind of detached view of the world and, while they may hold strong beliefs, 
they have an even stronger attachment to reason and logic. The identification 
of the politician with the doctor also perhaps grants politicians some more 
respectable status and might give greater weight to their 'professional' 
knowledge and practices. Further it creates the image of the busy and 
pressurised practitioner, whose time is valuable and who should not be 
bothered by trivial complaints.
What Hogg calls 'the mystique o f  a traditional authority' is the fiction which
preserves and defends the 'national character'. It is a kind of sanitising filter
which may be used to sift out potentially harmful aspects of any proposed
constitutional or cultural change. Only such reform that will preserve the
'national character' will be allowed to affect the constitution of the state.
'Constitution' is to be understood not as a legal term but a medical one: and
any change must be: "sanctified by traditional authority and institutions...
and must be effected in a manner conformable to the traditional methods o f
procedure... by a group o f  men known to be devoted to the traditions o f their 
,4?country... ^
Hogg, however, rather dimly recognises the circularity of his story. What is 
authorised is what every true Englishman believes, and what every true 
Englishman believes is what is authorised. What Hogg does is to identify the 
authorised Culture with national character in a transitive relationship, they are 
to all intents and purposes indiscernible: anyone who might disagree with any 
substantial part of the 'traditional culture' is no 'true Englishman' and what 
makes a 'true Englishman' is the acceptance of traditional authority. Hogg 
makes it clear that only Conservatives, almost by definition, accept traditional 
authority and consequently they alone are 'true Englishmen'. While this kind 
of crude propaganda was one of the manifest purposes of Hogg's book, he is 
clearly aware that this 'true Englishman', character is also a fiction, as is the 
story of Conservatism that he relates, but it is, in his terms, a necessary
^ ib id  p. 27
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fiction: it is the fiction upon which society rests and without which society 
will, he firmly believes, be destroyed:
History records many examples o f  the circle unwinding itself 
and what we call civilisation descending into barbarism or 
savagery...
Conservatives claim to see in the history o f  progress two 
factors which make it possible - the factor which brings into 
the world good things which are new and which we call 
enterprise, and the factor which enables us to preserve them 
when brought in. This second factor we call continuity. " ^
Though this 'history' is a fiction, it has mythic power. Through it meaning and 
identity are conferred, the purpose of society is made clear, power is located 
and the social order - an attenuated great chain of being - is justified. 
Ironically, it is this fiction that lies at the heart of Respectable Tory 'realist' 
thinking and their pragmatic 'common-sense': and it is on this paradox that 
Hogg's story of Conservatism stands. His pseudo-biology, history and 
metaphysics ultimately provide an epic story that can be sold to the public at 
the same time promising and yet resisting social reform.
Yet at the same time this is not an entirely cynical exercise. The story is held 
in the metaphysical and epistemological limbo of unfalsifiable fictions, by the 
willing suspension of disbelief, for example, that is so characteristic of how 
certain Anglican clergy apparently hold their Articles of Faith. It is not a true 
story, nor is it particularly consistent or coherent, but it grants purpose, 
meaning and identity and it is uplifting, dramatic, patriotic, comfortable and 
flatteringly convincing to those who share it and towards whom it is directed. 
Hogg states that what is important to maintain is not simply the authority of 
these cultural stories, but, crucially, the 'mystique' of the 'traditional' authority.
The 'true Englishman' fiction exists to maintain the Conservative narrative 
and to gain public acceptance of the elite social order of Conservatism which 
is the object of desire that lies at the root of the Respectable Conservative 
story. The formation of desire to maintain the 'natural' class-structured social 
order, rather than truth, is what is important. The fiction preaches the 
importance of class, class distinctions, class privilege and, consequently,
4^ibid p. 84
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forms the desire for social advancement. Kipling caught the essence of 
Conservatism in Pagett MP\
"The toad beneath the harrow knows 
Exactly where each tooth-point goes;
The butterfly upon the road 
Preaches contentment to that toad."
Hogg's The Case for Conservatism provides the ideological sub-texts of the 
story of Conservatism. The 'traditional authority and institutions', iconically 
represented by chapters on religion, country, empire, law and order, 
individual liberty, property, enterprise, competition and incentives, profit, the 
Land, selective education and public schools - are justified in terms of a 
pseudo-Darwinian fiction - an idealised representation of the unique 'English' 
character and its culture as it has 'evolved' through history, with the 
underlying imperialist sub-text that this character is somehow superior to 
others.
This is not just the triumph of an evolutionary process, but of a special 
evolutionary process which, because of the stability of the religious, political 
and cultural stories that have been maintained over the centuries, uniquely has 
had a most fertile cultural environment and a healthy, sturdy stock with which 
to work. This evolutionary process was assisted by the careful breeding 
programme that was, in metaphor, the class ordering of society. This was 
expressed by Stanley Baldwin ^4 for example, in farming metaphor: the 
politician as an avuncular gentleman farmer, who cares for his stock. The 
historical, traditional and 'natural' hierarchical social order is, Hogg claims, 
responsible for the creation and maintenance of this prime stock, particularly 
through the cultural processes of the education of the ruling classes:
"Wealth and power inevitably breed narrowness and 
arrogance. But, subject to this, the British ruling class was 
probably less narrow, less arrogant and less selfish than any 
other that has ever existed. For this very largely the public 
school must receive the praise. So far from manufacturing a 
generation o f little snobs, as is so often charged against them, 
the public schools took a generation o f small boys whose 
position and means would inevitably have turned them out
^  as described in A.J. Davies (1995), p. 51 and passim.
22
little snobs i f  the public schools had not got hold o f them and 
dinned into them the truth that, since men are born equal in 
the sight o f  God, wealth and position carry duties as well as 
privileges, and in the end can be justified only by the example 
o f public service and honour presented by those who have 
them. This was the doctrine o f the public school.... they 
instilled into those they taught a greater measure o f humility 
and decency than any Christian aristocracy has been able to 
achieve before."
Education, in its purest form, transmits the culture of the ruling classes, the 
farmers of the state. The derisive use of the metaphor 'manufacturing' here is 
in opposition to Hogg's preferred organic metaphors of society and education; 
the ideal model for the education of the upper classes, is described in 
quasi-religious terms. The 'natural growth' metaphor allows for gradual social 
change but at the same time denies justification for state intervention in social 
matters, considering them 'unnatural', 'artificial' and 'mechanical'. The 
danger lies in thwarting the ’natural’ outcome of the evolutionary process, and 
denying England its ultimate, and glorious, destiny which comes closest to 
defining the Respectable Conservative narrative's sense of an ending. 
Ironically, however, the metaphor of evolution tends to be seen as a 
mechanical process, a form of social engineering. Hogg's view of evolution 
has no blind watchmaker, however, rather the process is mediated by the 
breeding programmes of the stockmen of the elite classes with a clear social 
design in mind.
Hogg sees the Gradgrind production line model of schooling as antithetic to 
maintaining the cultural hegemony of the upper classes - though appropriate 
to the 'lower' classes - and contrary to their characteristic aristocratic 'natural' 
disdain for utilitarian or vocational education. The gentleman farmer does not 
soil his hands with his livestock, he employs the lower classes for this. He, 
more importantly, presides paternally over the process, ensuring the 
maintenance of the well being of his stock and protecting the process from 
harmful influences which would agitate them and affect their yield. Hogg's 
plea is not to throw away what he sees as self-evident political, social and 
cultural advantages in the search for greater equality, a quest which he 
considered had so enfeebled other nations. Hogg uses the excesses of the
45 Hogg (1947), p. 145/6
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French Revolution to illustrate this 'enfeeblement' of the 'national character', a 
narrative motif which originated with Burke and which has been echoed by so 
many right-wing theorists since.
It is 'realist' thinking which, Hogg argues, has maintained the social stability 
of England throughout the past', and he urges that 'common-sense' be the basis 
of educational policy. It is not 'common sense' to demand greater social 
equality, what he calls 'identity o f opportunity but rather to seek 'equality o f  
opportunity' ^  though this is to be understood as opportunity for everyone to 
aspire to the ruling elite - the maintenance of hope of betterment' was a 
powerful means by which to maintain control over the narrative of class; that 
only a few could hope to achieve an advancement in their station made the 
control only more solid, like the smallness of the chance of winning the 
National Lottery is the necessary condition of selling more tickets. Even then, 
he points out that this narrow sense of equality of opportunity is only part of 
what education is about.
The 'real' purpose of education "is primarily moral, and only secondarily 
s e c u l a r His use of religious language in this chapter underlines the 
'mystique' of the traditional institution of education - its part in the greater 
story. Though schools are there to provide 'secular' education, they also have a 
significant part to play in the building of the 'English character' and through 
this, by definition, maintaining the traditional cultural values and institutions 
of the Conservative state. At the same time, however, education makes visible 
some tensions in the Conservative story: "Conservatives regard society as 
composed o f  families and individuals, which, however much they may be 
subordinated to the authority o f the state, remain the foundation upon which 
civilised society rests, and must retain their independence and variety o f  
outlook i f  a national community is to develop its fu ll richness and variety o f
AQ
human experience."
Equality of opportunity applies only to 'secular', vocational education, the 
moral education of a child is not primarily the responsibility of the state 
except insofar as the state insists on a 'adequate moral background' for each 
child, but will directly intervene only when dealing with the feckless: in the
4 i^bid. p. 144 
4 i^bid. p. 145 
48ibid. p. 144
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case of "orphans and the children o f criminals and such like... and ... those 
who to a greater or less degree neglect the moral education o f their 
children." *9 While stressing the virtue of individual liberty and the cultural 
enrichment a 'variety’ of beliefs might bring, there is only so much divergence 
from the 'traditional' cultural stories that will be allowed: "the state has means 
and methods o f  ascertaining or prescribing a moral minimum". However, 
rather than using brute state coercion to demand homogeneity, Hogg is 
relatively liberal, relying on the 'mystique' of the traditional stories, and the 
incentives that acceptance of these stories brings, to ensure broad cultural 
conformity.
It is not, however, vital that everyone be uniformly inducted into these 
cultural stories. A degree of cultural divergence is acceptable in the 'lower' 
classes. Hogg conceals the elitism of his story, that only those admitted into 
the freemasonry of the 'mystique' will have access to the places where the real 
power and glory lies. It is interesting, and ironic, that in his discussion of 
public schools he stresses their fundamental role as the nursery of the ruling 
class, providing the moral and spiritual development of their children, yet the 
focus of state schooling is to be fundamentally vocational. The wealth and 
social position of the children of the elite will, he tacitly accepts, place them 
eventually and irresistibly in the ruling class. Consequently, narrow 
vocational education will not be appropriate for them: they have to learn 
'humility and decency' and the 'duty' of 'public service'. ^ ^  For Hogg it is of 
vital importance that the up-and-coming ruling classes be thoroughly inducted 
into the traditional values of the culture - the Respectable Conservative story: 
to fail to develop this 'mystique' among them is to risk the continuity of the 
preserving cultural stories and, ultimately, the very stability of the state.
That such education is so exclusive, that some children 'get a better start' 
than others is 'nothing to get hot and bothered about'. The state education 
sector, Hogg piously asserts, is striving to provide the best (vocational) 
education it can and all children will, eventually, have the same equality of 
opportunity. He then closes the chapter on a portentous note, reiterating the 
old Conservative chestnut about the freedom of the individual to choose - or 
at least to buy - a place in the social hierarchy of England, or even, in keeping
4 i^bid. p. 144 
■ i^bid. p. 145 
 ^* ibid. p. 146
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with the religious tone of the chapter, Heaven itself: "...there is no law o f  
nature or man which permits a man to buy his child lollipops or nice clothes, 
and forbids him to buy what he regards as the best preparation o f body and 
soul for this life and the next."
At the heart of Hogg's story is indeed a law of'nature' - that everyone has their 
place, knows their place and is broadly content with that, given Hobbes' 
anarchic alternative in which life is solitary, nasty, brutish and short: "The 
plain fact about unemployment, war, poverty, persecution, and most disease, 
is that they are caused by a deliberate disregard o f  the natural law.." The 
'mystique' of traditional values and institutions, the desire for their 
preservation, is at the heart of Hogg's story. As Enoch Powell puts it: "The 
greatest task o f  the statesman... is to offer his people good myths and to save 
them from harmful myths." ^
■ i^bid. p. 146 
ibid p.22
Enoch Powell, cited in Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State 
(London: MacMillan, 1988/1994) p. 69.
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3: The Looms o f  Language
Read and committed to the flames, I call 
these sixteen lines that go back to my roots 
my Cahier d'un retour au pays natal, 
my growing black enough to fit  my boots.
The stutter o f  the scold out o f the branks 
o f condescension, class and counter-class 
thickens with glottals to a lumpen mass 
o f Ludding morphemes closing up their ranks.
Each swung cast-iron Enoch o f Leeds stress 
clangs a forged music on the frames o f Art, 
the looms o f  owned language smashed apart!
Three cheers for mute ingloriousness!
Articulation is the tongue-tied's fighting.
In the silence round all poetry we quote 
Tidd the Cato Street conspirator who wrote:
Sir, I Ham a very Bad Hand at Righting.
Tony Harrison On Not Being Milton
This study is intimately concerned with the ownership and control of 
language. The metaphor translates the ineffability of the world into 
customised, manageable and, eventually, through time and use, into familiar 
narratives. The narrative - and the hegemony it naturalises - ceases to appear 
ideologically determined as the metaphors become literalised through time 
and use. It all seems just common-sense. What becomes lost to sight is that 
the world does not generate these narratives, and their metaphors and 
vocabularies: instead it is the narratives which generate the world. The 
narrative is the loom on which the world is knitted.
The deconstruction of any narrative will show how the world is distorted by 
them though, ironically, without stories the world is an undifferentiated, 
amorphous conglomeration of, to paraphrase David Hume, just one damn 
thing after another, without pattern or meaning. Hume in An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (1748,) acknowledged the importance of 
analogy, the metaphorical representation of the world, "All arguments from  
experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural 
objects". Hume the empiricist, the master of reducing the argument from
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analogy to absurdity, had to acknowledge the essentially fictive nature of 
epistemological claims. Even Jeremy Bentham, no metaphysician, 
acknowledged that any interpretation of the world required stories: "In the use 
made o f language, fiction... becomes a necessary resource". This is the 
point made by Burke:
"As the documents o f science pile up, are we not coming to see 
that whole works o f  scientific research, even entire schools, 
are hardly more than the patient repetition, in all its 
ramifications, o f a fertile metaphor? Thus we have, at 
different eras in history, considered man as the son o f God, as 
an animal, as a political or economic brick, as a machine, 
each such metaphor, and a hundred others, serving as the cue 
for an unending line o f data and generalisations.
The focus of these narratives is metaphor, an examination of which is the 
central concern of this study. This definition of metaphor is a wide one: 
metaphor is considered as a kind of meta-fiction, and justification for this 
definition, it is hoped, will be made clear. It is a definition similar to that put 
forward by David Leary J ' in his analysis of the metaphors of psychology, 
though the method of analysis here is rather different in that Leary was 
content to examine the overtly ideological function of metaphors in the 
vocabularies of psychology but here the metaphors are also placed historically 
and structurally as the roots of the discourses and social narratives that give a 
meaning to the world, both rationally and, more importantly for this exercise, 
intuitively.
Indeed intuitive knowledge, the feeling that something is right or wrong is, in 
these terms, simply a knee-jerk response to the cultural embeddment of 
particular stories, the literalisation of particular metaphors. Lobachevsky's 
non-Euclidean geometry 'feels' wrong because Euclid's story has achieved 
such a dominant position that it has ceased to be recognised simply as a likely 
story, but has become the only story: it has become, in Rorty's terms, 
literalised and the discourse has become closed.
^  Jeremy Bentham (1841): Essay on Language in E. Bowring (ed) The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham. (Russell and Russell: New York, 1962), p. 331.
^  Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (New York: New 
Republic, 1935/1965), p.95.
^  David E. Leary, Psyche's Muse, in David E Leary (ed) (1990), pp.1-79,
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The metaphor gives meaning though it, in itself, is nothing more than a 
representation of another likely story. Abrams continues to argue that such 
metaphors are constitutive: they "select and mould those 'facts' which a 
theory c o m p r e h e n d s Facts then are perhaps better understood as likely 
fictions, not discovered truths. Incidental to this, this argument also throws 
open to question the 'fact value' gap so beloved of British empirical 
philosophy in its quest to present its theory as ideologically free. The view 
expressed here, in effect, makes everything ideological, asserting that perhaps 
there should be a test - a critique of rhetorical technique - to establish the 
persuasiveness of a propositional sentence or statement, rather than a 
principle of verification or falsification to determine whether or not it is true.
The metaphors at the core of narratives, their focus imaginarious, may, as we 
have seen in Hogg’s account of the Respectable Tory narrative, become 
hardened into mythic formations, insisting on their own completeness, 
demanding closure. This distinction between metaphor and myth is made by 
Frank Kermode: ‘It is also why literary fictions die, lose their explanatory 
force; and why fictions that do not change never even begin to live but sink 
into myths and satisfy nobody but critics who lack the critic's first 
qualification, a scepticism, an interest in things as they are, in inhuman 
reality as in human justice ’. ^
Yet, at the same time, it is not the intention of this exercise to build a 
metaphysical dimension to this method. In many respects the method is as 
literary as it is philosophical. A bram s^ states that metaphysical systems are 
in themselves essentially metaphor. Plato's world of Forms can be understood 
as fiction, as a myth of explanation. This study rather ironically half agrees 
with Plato's assertion that the noumenal world is only a half-reality, a fictional 
representation of the eternal Forms which are, in principle, unknowable. It 
agrees that the world we inhabit we only know as a likely story; but rather 
than add another layer to an already crowded metaphysic, it argues that we 
only get to our shadowy half truths through the fictions we construct and live 
- not through higher ‘realities’ like Plato's Forms but through meta-fictions -
CO
M.H. Abrams. The mirror and the lamp: Romantic theory and the critical tradition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1953), p31
^  Frank Kermode, The sense o f an ending: studies in the theory of fiction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), p. 64.
^  M.H. Abrams (1953), p. 31.
29
like Plato's forms. Kermode acknowledges the discomfort of the realisation 
that the ‘reality’ of the world is not, in principle, ever able to be established: 
that the sense of an ending in representations of reality is something 
necessarily endlessly deferred: ‘It is not that we are connoisseurs o f  chaos, 
but that we are surrounded by it, and equipped for co-existence with it only 
by our fictive powers. This may be, in the absence o f a supreme fiction or the 
possibility o f  it, a hard fa te ...' ^
This study is in itself a meta-fiction, but that is merely another way of 
defining philosophy. It does not demand or even seek closure, nor does it 
attempt to mask its own ideological position, but rather it attempts to offer a 
critique of stories and, reflexively, of itself. In Rorty’s terms it seeks to 
provide an open, ‘edifying’ discourse, essentially ironic in nature:
7 shall define an ‘ironist ’ as someone who fulfills (sic) three 
conditions:
1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final 
vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been 
impressed by other vocabularies taken as final by people or 
books she has encountered;
2) she realises that argument phrased in her present 
vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve those doubts;
3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does 
not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, 
that it is in touch with a power not herself.' ^
The opposite of irony, Rorty describes, is ‘common sense’: the shibboleth of 
those who uncritically use the ‘final’ vocabulary of the narratives to which 
they have become habituated. Such habituation might be unconscious as in 
the vocabularies of Hogg and, as we shall see, Butler and Thatcher, who had 
so absorbed the vocabularies of the narratives they had grown up with and 
been initiated into that they could not see the ideological and hegemonic 
dimensions of their ‘common sense’ ideas about society and nature: or it 
might be conscious, as in the egalitarian narratives of Bowles and Gintis, for 
example, for whom the vocabulary of a fairly crude Marxism, was axiomatic.
^Frank Kermode (1966), p.64
^  Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
1989), p.73
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It is this method, a mixture of philosophical, cultural and literary analysis, 
which is used in this exercise. There is apparently, a keenly felt temptation 
that writing about cultural matters requires a highly specialised vocabulary of 
its own in order to mimic and compete with the authoritative vocabularies of 
science. However it is the intention here to avoid becoming ‘constipated by 
the minutiae o f  theory\ as Robert Hughes ^  puts it, and to resist as much as 
possible the blandishments of the seductive but ultimately sterile vocabularies 
of post modernism which seem bound up more in the processes of academic 
capitalism than in providing any real contribution to the discourse^. It is, for 
example, at least arguable that recent educational analyses - such as Stephen 
Ball’s Education Reform or Ian Stronach and Maggie MacLure’s Educational 
Research Undone ^  - though full of valuable insight are both rather 
obfuscated by the esoteric vocabularies of academic post-modernism. This 
exercise will attempt to avoid, as far as possible, the abstract neologisms and 
technicalities of these vocabularies in the interests of clarity.
The study will concentrate on the educational narratives of the Conservative 
Party because of their determined effort in to represent their stories of social 
reality and human nature as the ‘host narrative’, as EP Thomson called it. 
They consistently represented themselves as speaking for everyone, 
attempting to incorporate ‘Britishness’ and ‘Conservatism’ as one and the 
same story, as has been illustrated by Hogg in this chapter. The study will 
illustrate how indeed they have had considerable success in representing 
themselves in this way - as the only ‘common sense’ social and educational 
story.
In effect, this study analyses educational debate as concerning changing 
educational and social narratives and their core metaphors. This interpretative 
process is rendered more difficult by narratives which have become 
literalised, obscuring their fictive origins behind a narrow vocabulary and a 
curtain of intuitive 'common sense1 claims to truth. The analysis will attempt 
to illustrate how certain educational narratives have gradually lost their
^Robert Hughes, The Culture o f Complaint (London: Harvill, 1993) p. 64
^ a s  argued by, for example, Harold Fromm, Academic Capitalism & Literary Value ( Athens,
Ga: University o f Georgia Press, 1991)
^Stephen Ball, Education Reform (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994); Ian Stronach 
and Maggie MacLure, Educational Research Undone (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1997)
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rhetorical force and how the function of educational debate, and the nature of 
educational theory, has gradually become narrowed in the quest for the power 
that comes from the commitment shown towards a currently dominant story, 
not necessarily an educational one, where neither scepticism, nor an interest 
in how things are, nor an interest in human justice are required nor, indeed, 
have they become entirely welcome.
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Chapter 2
Butler’s Story: 
The 1944 Education Act
‘There was a huge erosion o f class differences...
In terms o f income, in terms o f consumption offood, in terms ofjobs and
hours o f work,
in terms o f taxation, there was a tremendous levelling which reached,
I suppose, its extreme point in 1944-5, and the fact that it worked I think did 
have a great effect on public opinion. People felt that i f  these things could be 
done in wartime, why shouldn't they, at any rate the best o f them, be done in
peacetime. ’ ^
j
J.G. Ballard “ points out the social narratives founded in the immediate 
post-war period have laid the blueprint for the world we now live in and the 
vocabularies through which we describe it. The narrative of education and 
society which underlies the Butler 1944 Education Act, it will be argued, 
marked a paradigm shift in the educational narrative of the Conservative 
Party and for years dominated educational thinking in England. This, and 
subsequent chapters, will attempt to analyse the discursive impact of this 
narrative on educationalists and policy makers and the power of its central 
metaphors on shifting paradigms of educational thinking, discourse and 
policy making up to the present time.
By the end of World War 2, conditions had become ripe for an educational 
reformation. A legitimation crisis in the prevalent educational narratives had 
been created by a general, popular sense of dissatisfaction with the existing 
wider social and economic narratives. This reformation, it will be shown, 
was not brought about through one of Rorty's or Habermas’s 'domination-free 
conversations': the emergent discourse of education was not an 'edifying' one
 ^ Douglas Jay, cited in Paul Addison, Now The War Is Over: A Social History of Britain 
1945-51 (London: Pimlico, 1985/1995) p. 8.
^In The Observer. Sign o f the Times, 31/12/95
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in Rorty’s terms; though it seemed to encourage open and free discussion and 
it did appear to seek to maximise consent. The creation of the post-war 
'consensus' on social and educational policy, an examination of which will 
form the central part of this chapter and the next, it will be argued, is, in 
effect, a discourse of containment and control.
1. A  Narrative o f  Hope
■5
' a victory fo r  the massed ranks o f  social democracy'
What makes the 1944 Education Act the preferred starting point in this study 
is that this Act refined and rigidly established the vocabulary of education, 
firmly locating the discursive domain of then and future educational debate, 
fixing the real world of education and the realm of the ‘possible’. It had, and 
still retains, significant rhetorical power. It has crucially affected the course 
of educational thinking in Britain, not simply through the reforms of 
educational policy it proposed, but in the grand narrative of society that 
discursively underpinned those reforms and the manner in which the Act was 
created by Butler, in particular how consent for it was claimed. The Act has 
since achieved a kind of mythic status. It has become an icon of consensus 
and national unity of purpose: to illustrate this many references to the Act in 
this chapter will be taken from current media coverage of Butler and his Ac t .
Butler’s Act more closely defined and, crucially, institutionalised the 
purposes and types of schooling and education and tied the story of education 
closely to the dominant economic and social aspirations of the time. There 
was nothing particularly new about tying the story of education to the needs 
of the state, but what was different then was how the rising social 
expectations for what education could accomplish, allied with greater state 
control and an expansion of educational administration and bureaucracy, 
gave the emergent story an added tension and yet, as we will see, at the same 
time closed down the boundaries of the ‘possible’, narrowing and fixing the 
vocabulary of educational theory and educational discourse inside 
increasingly rigid permissible limits.
3 Addison (1985/1995) p. 10/11
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Popular confidence in the old social and educational narratives had been 
brought to crisis by the Second World War. The popular response to the war 
was that the debt to the old economic and social structure, with all its 
inequalities in wealth, education, housing and health, had been paid. It was 
this popular mood which is reflected in the Beveridge Report (1942) which 
identified, in a clearly demotic and populist story, those areas in the life of 
ordinary people which were no longer tolerable. Silver* describes how the 
1944 Education Act was the product of a heroic period, a time of the people's 
newly restored confidence in political structures to provide a new world, of 
opportunity, employment and welfare. It was a time of renewed moral and 
political confidence and optimism. Addison argues that it was through the 
popularity of the Beveridge Report that many of the post-war reforms owed 
their existence. Beveridge held out the promise of a New Jerusalem at the 
end of the war and that promise was redeemed by the people with the 
election of the Labour Government in 1945 but in the meantime, Butler's 
Educational Reconstruction was published in 1943 and laid the groundwork 
for the 1944 Act.
Tony Benn, in a typically unironic, optimistic socialist analysis of the 
election win, locates the victory of the Labour Party in 1945 in the popular 
will for change, stemming from the intolerable social conditions for ordinary 
people of the time and their realisation that socialism was their only answer. 
In a speech to the troops on a transport ship back to Britain, while he was still 
a serving officer in the Air Force, Benn gave a clear, if terse, description of 
the Labour Party manifesto and the narrative of hope and reform it contained:
1After the war the needs o f reconstruction, too will call for 
tremendous efforts. But i f  the problems o f economic planning 
are not faced, a great slump will follow that boom and we 
shall all over again witness all the misery that it involves.
The Labour Party's policy is simple - take over coal, power, 
transport and steel, which employ such a large number o f our 
people: by directing investment all along the peaks and 
depths o f the vicious trade cycle it can gradually be ironed 
out. By maintaining employment at a steady relative level the 
ensuing prosperity will gradually raise the absolute level. The 
incentive o f work under these conditions would be far greater
 ^Harold Silver, Education as History (London: Methuen, 1983) p.264.
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than under the old system - when the role o f an employee was 
to enrich his employer in booms and live on the dole in 
slumps.
Opportunities fo r  bettering yourself would be just as great, 
with the added advantage o f an assured job and the 
knowledge that your efforts were directed to raising o f  the 
general standard - our oldfriend, the spirit o f service. ’ ^
From a different perspective, the politicians of the right also acknowledged 
the need for reform. For them, however, the process of reform was perhaps 
driven more by fear than any narrative of justice or social progress: it was as 
much a matter of avoiding revolution as for any altruistic motives. Lord 
Woolton, the Minister for Food in 1940, for example, wrote in his diary:
'We are telling them now that they are heroes for the way in 
which they standing up to the strain o f the mighty 
bombardment - and it's true. I think they will keep on being 
heroes, but when the war is over they will demand the 
rewards o f heroism: they will expect to get them very soon...
I think there's going to be grave trouble, and the danger is 
that i f  the machine o f government which can spend money so 
recklessly in engaging in war, fails to be equally reckless in 
rebuilding, there will be both the tendency and the excuse for  
revolution. ’ ^
It is this Grail Quest for a fairer society which provided the rhetorical impact 
of the popular social narrative which led up to the 1945 election victory and 
which provided the narrative backdrop for the 1944 Education Act. It was, 
however, more a rather vague and thin popular narrative than ever it was 
socialist one; it had little depth of political philosophy and not much beyond 
the immediate rhetorical and discursive power of a politician's electioneering 
speech. The source of the narrative of hope was partly, perhaps even largely, 
located in the war-time government's desire to create through the popular 
media, a climate of the expectation of a prosperous future to outweigh 
current constraints and sacrifices and to promote an ethos of national unity to
 ^ Tony Benn (edited by Ruth Winstone), Tony Benn: Years of Hope: Diaries. Papers and 
Letters 1940-1962 (London: Arrow, 1995) pp. 94/5.
Lord Woolton, Diary for 1st November 1940, Bodleian Library: cited in Addison 
(1985/1995) p.55
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aid the war effort. Artefacts of popular culture, in particular the cinema were, 
quite guilelessly, purveyors of this message of hope: in Sherlock Holmes 
Faces Death^. Holmes says to Watson in the traditionally propagandist, 
upbeat, patriotic ending: ‘There's a new spirit abroad in the land. The old 
days o f  grab and greed are on the way out. We are beginning to think o f  what 
we owe the other fellow, not just what we are compelled to give him. The 
times are coming, Watson, when we shan't be able to fill our bellies when 
other folk are going hungry, or sleep in warm beds while others are sleeping 
in the cold... ’
This kind of propaganda helped form the popular narrative of hope for a 
better, more just society which became so characteristic of the times. That 
this narrative later backfired on the Conservative Party in the 1945 election is 
an irony that to this day has not been lost on them, but that is a matter for a 
later chapter. The popular depiction of the stagnancy and debilitating 
inequality of the pre-war social landscape, in this narrative context, was the 
result of the neglect of the state, its culture, its institutions, its people and 
their aspirations, by a moribund political and institutional leadership which, 
like the Fisher King, sat idly by while the country degenerated into a 
wasteland. The new narrative called for a fairer, more equal society and a 
greater distribution of wealth and social benefit through an expansion of 
opportunity for all.
o
Addison charts the pre-war politics of education. He describes how, prior to 
the 1944 Act, educational provision in England had been differentiated along 
quite strict class boundaries. The upper classes sent their children to the 
public schools. Children of the working class would attend an elementary 
school until they were fourteen and then the vast majority of them went on 
directly to work. The middle classes paid for their children to attend 
grammar schools. A small number of free places were available in grammar 
schools for working class children who showed some exceptional talent. 
Addison's account centres on the inequities of the pre-war system. He, for 
example, describes the double standard of the grammar schools: the limited 
number of scholarships to working class children denied many bright 
working class children the opportunities that were afforded to the children of 
the middle classes who entered grammar school, not as a result of the
7
Sherlock Holmes Faces Death (Directed by Roy William Neil for Universal Pictures, 1943) 
^Paul Addison (1985/95) Chapter 6, pp. 140-170
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intensive competition the working class children had survived but because 
their parents could pay the fees. Education was entrenched in the class 
system and the public perception of the best education was the public school 
system.
The educational system prior to Butler's Act had been unashamedly elitist 
and had paid only lip service to attempts to widen access. Such small reforms 
as had been instituted had done nothing much to strike at the heart of the 
system. The popular will to reform was a desire to widen access to the 
educational system, for universal health services, for better housing and so 
on. Bowen^ describes how the 1944 Act emerged as the product of popular 
economic and social demand. The dominant story of economics at the time 
was, though not undisputed, the Keynesian one, with its central metaphor of 
the social market and the command economy - a metaphor which became an 
important feature of Butler's Act. Bowen describes how victory in the War 
had given fresh dynamism to the story of market capitalism - and added 
dynamism to the story of education which emerged from it. Liberal 
democracy and the economics of the market had become identified with each 
other as the saviours of the West. In response to the perceived threat from the 
East, the metaphor 'the Free World' had been coined and Education was seen 
to have a central role in preserving and maintaining it, and forming a first 
line defence against totalitarianism and the communist menace.
Mannheim^, for example, argued that education was a first-line defence 
against totalitarianism, though the sociology of knowledge which 
underpinned his argument was more complex than the anti-Communist 
rhetoric of the politicians. Mannheim aimed to extend the traditional Marxist 
vocabulary of society. Mannheim's contribution was to argue that the nature 
of knowledge was often unconsciously conditioned by ideology - by the 
determining influence of particular narrow interests and desires which were a 
product of the structure of society. These interests and desires were not, in 
Mannheim's view wholly reducible to just the economic relations of the class 
structure of capitalism, though these were important, but also a result of other 
'life conditions', religious, biological and psychological.
^James Bowen A History o f Western Education: Vol 3 The Modem West (London: 
Methuen, 1981) p. 526 and passim.
1 ^ Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia ( London: Routledge, 1936/1960)
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To this theory he characteristically excepted the claims to knowledge of 
science - science won the war as graphically illustrated in the ruin of 
Hiroshima and held out marvellous prospects for an idyllic future - 
maintaining that they were not open to sociological analysis. However, 
Mannheim believed that his view of the social construction of knowledge 
was a liberating one, potentially delivering people from their unconscious 
subservience to hidden forces and allowing them to make ideologically free, 
rational and responsible choices for themselves. This sociology of 
knowledge, he claimed, could arm people against often harmful totalitarian, 
anti-democratic myths, like the Nazi Aryan myth, and if an educational 
system could be devised with this as its principle then it could produce a kind 
of cultural de-toxification, allowing free discussions about the nature of 
society and guiding political action in a true democracy. By its nature, such 
an education would be necessarily elitist, creating a kind of Gramscian class 
of intellectuals; but Mannheim's elite would be, he expected, essentially 
classless, able to rise above the ideological mire of current political and 
cultural narratives and who would then be free to plan the evolutionary, not 
revolutionary, progress of society towards a social utopia. For Mannheim, 
this narrative, was not an ideology; he reserved this term to describe, always 
pejoratively, conservative idea systems.
Mannheim's theory was predicated on the state taking an active role in social 
planning and demanded an expansion of the role of the state in directly 
managing economic and social conditions and progress. This active role for 
the State was the focus of the political narrative of the Labour Party of the 
time and also the focus for dissension within the Tory Party in the 1940's. 
This modernist, structural approach to society placed education as a central 
focus of both social progress and change. Education was seen as a means to 
eradicate social evils and to socialise the young and to foster the right values 
and habits: in Durkheim's phrase, 'to instil inclination for the collective life', 
to develop a morality informed by the social, collective interest. Social 
cohesion was the central metaphor of this narrative, and the role of the 
teacher was thus to serve first the state and the state planners and only 
secondarily the individual interests of the pupils.
Butler's Act was primarily concerned to maintain social cohesion and to 
create an educational narrative that could be perceives as reflecting the 
public demand for increased opportunities in line with their increased
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expectations. He was constrained to place education much more within the 
public domain, but he was also at the same time determined to undercut the 
collectivism of the socialist narrative, to retain traditional forms of schooling 
and at the same time to provide a diversity of educational provision.
2: Butler's Metaphors
'The central Ministry shall not only gird on the sword o f  resolution, 
but shall hold aloft the torch o f  true le a r n in g  ^^
In Addison's interpretation of the education policy of this period, he identifies 
it as the history of a popular and political struggle for increased justice and 
the widening of educational opportunity. These two central themes of the 
struggle were, however, not altogether fused in the Butler Act. Michael 
Barber identifies the central concern of Butler's proposed reforms:
'Only one-in-five elementary school leavers received any
kind o f  further education after 14. Britain's class-ridden
society in the first half o f the 20th century wasted talent 
17monumentally.
Rather than the rhetoric of justice, however, Barber's interpretation focuses 
on Butler's rhetoric of 'waste' and the economic commodification of 
education which he interpreted, for rhetorical reasons perhaps more pertinent 
to the present than to Butler, as characteristic of the emergent discourse of 
the time. Butler did not seem to take such a narrow view. Butler did have 
some concern for justice, as we shall see shortly a paternalistic desire for a 
more humane system was a sub-text of the Act. It is clear, however, that the 
rhetoric of economic necessity and renewal was more convincing, especially 
to many on the rather sceptical right wing of the House.
The rhetoric of economic renewal and growth of Butler's discourse, a 
rhetoric which was a result of his concern with practical political necessity,
^R . A. Butler to the House o f Commons, January 19/20 1944 in "Bill o f  rights fo r a  better 
world": the text o f the second reading o f the Education Bill by R. A. Butler to the House of 
Commons, January 19/20 1944: Times Educational Supplement (Scotland) fTESSl: 6th May 
1994, sec. 'The 1944 Act; 50th Anniversary' p.vi.
^  Michael Barber, "1944 and all that," The Guardian 18/1/94, sec. Education Guardian: p.2.
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did however relegate the theme of social justice to a lower priority. The 
consequent demands on the emerging story of education were twofold: the 
need to supply a literate and adaptable working class to meet the needs of the 
market, which was driven by the economic imperatives of mass production 
and expanding consumption and which required a more highly skilled and 
more adaptable workforce; and, secondly, to re-interpret the existing cultural 
and ideological structure of society to accommodate, if not to exploit, the 
popular demand for reform and to re-instate it as the preferred way of life. 
The role of education had gained a sharper and more dynamic sense of 
purpose and immediacy.
The war had shown the virtue of a command economy and close partnership
between the state and industry, and education, it was envisioned, would also
become an integral part of that partnership: 4...education will oil the wheels
o f industry, and will bring a new efficiency - the fruit o f  modern knowledge -
1 ^to aid the ancient skill o f farm and field. . Butler ruthlessly used the 
rhetoric of partnership between the individual and the state to push through 
his reform though, ironically, his reform saw the state take more control over 
education than before: ‘As the reforms... are made effective, we shall develop 
as never before our most abiding assets, our richest resources - the character 
and competence o f a great people; and, as I believe, in a manner not 
unworthy o f our people's greatness. ’ ^
While the metaphors 'assets' and 'resources' emphasise the positive side of the 
proposed reform though they carry also the clear implication that the old 
educational system did encourage waste. At the same time these economic 
metaphors are rhetorically linked to a patriotic and imperialist slogan. To do 
less than approve the Bill would be unpatriotic. Earlier attempts at reform 
had foundered on the question of cost. The knee-jerk response of many 
Tories to Beveridge, for example, was that he was, ‘a sinister old man, who 
wishes to give away a great deal o f people's money' ^  and they needed 
convincing that the money would be well spent. The advantage Butler's Act 
had was that the popular will to social and institutional reform allied to the 
sharp focus that the war brought to the concept of democracy and the
^  TESS: 6th May 1994, op.cit., p. viii 
^ibid., p.ix
^  as cited by Michael Barber in, The prime ofR. A. Butler, TESS 14/1/94, sec. Review: p.2
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enthusiasm with which many educationalists greeted Butler's White Paper 
gave politicians little choice.
At the beginning of his address to the House, Butler, a good classical scholar, 
quoted Plato: education had as its aim, ‘...to make the citizens as happy and 
harmonious as possible ’ The rhetoric of the 1944 Act was of social 
cohesion and economic growth through the expansion of educational access. 
The phrase 'equality of opportunity' was the code by which the reforms had 
been popularly promulgated:
‘The phrase on everybody’s lips today is 'equality o f 
opportunity'... What does it mean?...Do we really desire it?
The fact is that the educational system we have built up has
been a most efficient safeguard o f the social stratification we
in all our heart o f hearts bow down to and worship... All the
reasons against granting equality o f opportunity will be
fought for: openly, subtly, or, most dangerous o f all,
17unconsciously. ’
Dent very clearly identifies the rhetoric of social equality which was current 
in the reformist narratives of the time, and he was not unaware of the 
difficulties to be faced in creating it. This concept was coded by the more 
opaque phrase, 'equality of opportunity’, in Butler’s Act. There was in the 
resultant Act, however, no consideration granted to any real prospect for 
greater social equality: ‘The rhetoric was o f 'Equality o f Opportunity', but
there were no illusions that this was the same as 'Equality'. Another phrase 
was translated from the French - 'the career open to talents' - which instantly 
spoke o f meritocracy rather than equality. Wartime idealism did not exclude 
wanting a better-prepared workforce: wider opportunity also meant better
7 0
vocational and technical education. ’ Maclure continues to point out, the 
rhetoric of the act was firmly based in the hierarchical class structure of 
Britain. It is clear that Butler was concerned to preserve traditional
^  TESS 6/5/94 op. cit. p.vi.
^  Harold Dent, June 28th, 1941: in Patricia Rowan, Journalist with a  hand in history, TESS 
9/5/94, extracts from the Times Educational Supplement leaders of former editor, Harold 
Dent. p.x.
^  Stuart Maclure, Act o f  faith amid the heat o f  battle, TESS 6th May 1994, sec. The 1944 
Act: 50th Anniversary supplement: p. ii.
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educational privileges and to maintain the differentials in cultural capital 
which they represented.
‘In the new attitude to secondary education we have two main 
objectives: first that provision o f many varying types should 
become accessible to all, and, secondly, that standards and 
traditions so far evolved should, so far as possible, be 
preserved.' ^
Rather ingeniously, Butler re-inforced these privileges by pretending that his
Act could be seen to threaten them. He began by anticipating criticisms,
acknowledging the apparently controversial nature of some sections of the
Act. He claimed, for example, that the Act could, mistakenly, be seen as an
attempt to widen access at the expense of standards or to attack the high
standards of existing grammar schools. He looked forward to 'discussions on
the best method o f preserving the standards and traditions o f our secondary
schools' suggesting that wide discussions on educational provision were
possible but adding that he had, however, inserted a caveat in the Act that
compelled the Minister to 'have regard to the manner in which the school has
been conducted heretofore'. He closed the discourse with the unambiguous:
90'Thus there is to be no breaking with tradition'.
His appeal was to tradition but the only tradition he seemed to find worthy of
preservation was the public school and its imitator, the grammar school. For
example, Butler was not going to make a 'heavy handed' decision to prohibit
fee paying in all direct grant schools. This, it was considered, would be
counter productive: ‘We intend to preserve tradition and variety, and for that
purpose to keep in existence a direct grant list. At the same time, these
91schools must be accessible to all... ’ 1 Butler's fear was, he claimed, that
such schools would then move out of the state sector altogether and raise 
their fees to compensate for the lack of a direct grant. At the same time, 
showing a pale spark of even-handedness, Butler announced that public 
schools would be registered and would be compelled to be inspected.
^TESS 6/5/94 op. cit. p.viii.
2®ibid., p.viii ? 1 •ibid., p.viii.
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Butler's stated intention was to avoid decisions which would: 'accentuate
77social divisions and widen the gap between schools’ . The perception of 
class, however, was so built in to the concept of schooling that there was 
never any real chance that the gap between schools would be narrowed. His 
appeal to tradition disguised his intention to leave, more or less intact, the 
existing system with all its social inequalities, in particular ensuring that the 
social cachet, prestige and autonomy of the public schools were left at least 
intact, if not actually re-inforced through his, admittedly tempered, eulogies.
The second class nature of the technical schooling he proposed is a corollary 
of his consistent implication that the public schools and their pale echoes, the 
grammar schools, provided a more desirable and prestigious education. His 
justification for preserving traditional privilege hinged on the notion of 
desert: children who were more able deserved to be included in the ranks of 
the privileged elite, those who were less able deserved something more 
appropriate to their future, more subordinate, role in society. Consequently 
only those children who had the 'natural capacities' to take advantage of the 
opportunity were offered it. The educational vocabulary that emerges from 
the Act is an ideological construction from a complex story in which justice 
in education is justified by reference to essential features of human nature 
and character.
Butler introduced his Act to the House in his 'modest' proposal that the 
framework of the educational system proposed by his Act would 'permit o f  
the natural growth and development not only o f  the children but o f the 
national policy itself . Butler's metaphorical use of 'nature' here is 
complex and ambiguous. It is used both psychologically and biologically to 
characterise and essentialise the person in order to justify a highly selective 
educational system which maintained all the traditional educational 
privileges and inequalities while claiming to create greater opportunity for 
all. In the new system the 'nature' of the child determines the education that 
he or she can derive some benefit from: it is a kind of theory of natural 
justice or desert. The respective 'nature' of the child creates an obligation on 
the part of the state to provide an appropriate education. However 'nature' is 
used at other times to refer to the nurturing of the child and to the processes 
of the moral, social and cognitive development and maturation of the child,
9 9 -ibid., p.viii
91 ibid., p.vi to ix.
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and at yet at other times he uses it to categorise or classify the child by type 
or, to extend his metaphor, genus. Moreover, along with the botanical 
metaphors he refers to 'progressive development ^  meaning at times the 
discrete stages of a child's development and at other times implying a kind of 
evolutionary progress which he then links by analogy to the evolutionary 
progress of state itself - a conceptual leap characteristic of the discourse of 
late 19th century social Darwinism.
Plants are relatively simple organisms, easy to manage and closely dependent 
on clear and unambiguous growing conditions. Furthermore, it is easy to 
predict their potential for growth and when they may be harvested. As a 
metaphor for children this has obvious attractions: it makes the educational 
process the relatively simple matter of matching the child to the correct 
nurturing regime and in making sure that the gardener is sufficiently well 
skilled to make the garden bloom. That the child may not bloom, or only 
blooms in a small way, is not the fault of the skilled gardener; growth is 
ultimately conditioned, all other factors being equal, by environmental and 
biological determinants outside direct control.
This paints an attractive and picturesque portrait of the educational process,
one which is easy to understand and easy to manage. Moreover it is a
wholesome image, removed from the cynicism of political intrigue,
ideological debate and thorny issues of teacher's pay and the control of the
educational processes. Through this metaphor, education is in effect removed
from the material and political world and, at least at first sight, it is
seemingly innocent of ideological or hegemonic connotations. It conjures an
idyllic picture, an anti-type of Eden and of classical pastoral myths, a
Miltonic picture: 7 will point you out the right path o f a virtuous and noble
education: laborious indeed at first ascent, but else so smooth, so green, so
75fu ll o f goodly prospect and melodious sounds...
The image created is the antithesis of socialist narratives of class struggle 
and is a world removed from the harsh educational realities of post-war inner 
city squalor and rural poverty it was intended to rehabilitate. The botanical 
metaphors suggest education is a process which can be nurtured up to a point
^ ib id ., p.vi.OC r
John Milton (1644) Areopagitica and Letter on Education (London: Cassell & Co., 1891)
pp. 121/2.
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but which is in important ways essentially outside direct control. Taking a 
generous interpretation of this metaphor, it suggests that while the 
development of the child will occur, as in a plant, anyway, through 
interventions this growth may be nurtured to create the most healthy and 
vigorous plant possible, given the innate potential the plant has, the relative 
fertility of its location and skill of the gardener.
The metaphor borrows its rhetorical impact from its foundation in a romantic 
view of the world, of nature as a vast, unified organism where each person 
may find his or her place to thrive and to contribute to the overall growth of 
the entire organism. This may imply an active, rational and enlightened 
process, as in Rousseau's Emile where the child wakes from 'the sleep o f  
reason' by learning through observing and experiencing the world and 
interacting with it under the essentially non-interfering guidance of a mentor: 
learning through nature. However it may also, as it does in Butler's Act, 
suggest a much more passive and more organised process in which the pupil's 
experience is not so much guided as controlled, as the gardener may choose 
to plant in the sun or in the shade, feed or neglect his plants. The wider 
aspects of education are reduced to a much more mechanical system of 
'natural' selection for different kinds schooling, where the pupils receive their 
treatment in a relatively passive, non-reciprocal relationship with the teacher. 
The children do not learn through nature but rather their learning potential is 
conditioned by their 'natural' capacities.
Crucially, at the root, so to speak, of these botanical metaphors of growth and 
development is the notion of 'natural' capacities or 'natural' abilities: limiting 
conditions for potential growth through selective descriptions which 
essentialise and which in turn may be used to categorise the child. The 
critical feature of the educational process is the innate capacity for growth of 
the child - the gardener can only do so much. Different plants require 
different conditions and treatments to thrive. Consequently Butler's Act 
makes imperative that children are identified by a vocabulary of ’natural’ 
selection, through talk of 'natural' capacities, dispositions and abilities. The 
state intervenes but can only hope to nurture growth as far as the natural 
capacities of the subjects will allow: the secondary stage will be
designed, not to provide an academic training for the select few, but to give
46
equivalent opportunities to all children over 11 making the most o f  their 
9 ftnatural aptitudes. ’
The critical identification of potential can then allow the state to give the
correct quality and quantity of treatment appropriate to the efficient and
effective growth of the child. Consequently how vigorously a child will grow
depends on what the 'natural' capacity of the child is. Each child should
97receive ‘...an education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude . If 
children could be grouped and classified by genus, to extend Butler's 
metaphor, then the whole process would work more efficiently: there would 
be little need to consider the needs of each child individually.
This classification of children was viewed unproblematically. Butler's
concern was that 'children may pass to whatever kind o f secondary
98education may be most suitable for them. ’ , adding in a rather portentous
tone, in which can be discerned the shadows of British imperialist ambitions,
that the reorganisation of educational provision was necessary ‘...to make our
9 9children healthy, happy and worthy o f  their destiny ’ .
He was concerned, apparently quite genuinely, to provide the best kind of 
system possible. Butler implies parity of esteem for each part of the tripartite 
system of education he has instituted and which he had taken uncritically 
from the Norwood Report.
‘The evolution o f  education has in fact thrown up certain 
groups, each o f which can and must be treated in a way 
appropriate to itself. Whether such groupings are distinct on 
strictly psychological grounds, whether they represent types 
o f mind, whether the differences are in kind or in degree, 
these are questions it is not necessary to pursue. Our point is 
that rough groupings, whatever may be their ground, have in 
fact established themselves in general educational 
experience, and the recognition o f such groupings in
^^TESS 6/5/94 op. cit. p.vi. 
^ibid., p.vi.
O O  r
ibid., p.viii90 .
ibid., p.vi.
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educational practice has been justified both during the period 
o f education and in the after-careers o f the pupils.' ^
The vocabulary of 'natural' capacities, notwithstanding this partial disclaimer, 
was a central feature of the typology of the Norwood Report where children 
were differentiated in terms of their essential nature. It differentiated by 
behavioural criteria: the 'grammar school' pupil would, ‘be able to grasp an 
argument...(be) interested in causes... (be) sensitive to language... be
T 1
interested in the relatedness o f related things.., ; 'he' would also have 
distinctive character traits, 'he can take a long view and hold his mind in 
suspense... he will have a capacity to enjoy, from an aesthetic point o f view
IT
the aptness o f a phrase...' , and furthermore 'he' can be distinguished, in a
curiously retrospective logic, by the kind of career 'he' will follow later, in
'the learned professions or... higher administrative or business posts .
Certain other categories of children - and girls are explicitly admitted only in 
this section - are similarly classified into 'those whose interests and abilities 
lie markedly in the field  o f applied science or applied art and they are 
destined by their 'nature' to go to technical schools where they might be 
prepared, fo r taking up certain crafts - engineering, agriculture and the 
like', adding in justification a direct appeal to 'natural capacities' '...it is 
usual to think o f the engineer or other craftsman as possessing a particular 
set o f interests or aptitudes by virtue o f which he becomes a successful
i t
engineer or whatever he may become °  Rousseau's story of 'nature' was 
benign if nothing else: his claim was that, 'life is the trade I teach'\ it is 
ironic that this part of Butler's Act might be summed up as 'trade is the life I 
teach...'
The third category consisted of those children who would go to secondary 
modem schools. The use of the word 'modem' was largely euphemism, a 
rhetorical disguise for an education that was far from new and which
10Report of the Committee o f the Secondary Schools Examination Council on Curriculum 
and Examinations in Secondary Schools (The Norwood Report) (1943). section: Tripartite 
Organisation, in J. Stuart Maclure Educational Documents England and Wales. 1816 to the 
present day (London: Methuen, 1965), p. 201 
ibid., p.201 
■^ibid., p.201 
•^ibid., p.201 
■^ibid., p.201 
•^ibid., p.202
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followed the traditional path of education for the masses - it was relatively 
cheap, it was widely available, it went little beyond elementary level and it 
provided no real or transferable qualifications. Such children are identified 
by their innate incapacity to think logically in anything but the most simple 
and concrete terms. The language of selection here concentrates not on the 
ability of the child but on the child's perceived disability: a negative selection 
- an identification not of limited ability but of specific or general inability - 
as opposed to the positive selection for the grammar school. 
Characteristically this child cannot defer gratification: ‘Because he is only 
interested in the moment he may be incapable o f a long series o f  connected 
steps; abstractions mean nothing to him...he must have immediate returns for  
his effort....his horizon is near... ’ ^
The preferred vocabulary of educational selection and classification of the 
time appeared to be a rather curious metaphorical mixture of Plato's Myth of 
Metals and a simplified sub-Piagetian vocabulary all bound up in a mesh of 
the 'common sense' perceptions generated by the middle class, public school 
backgrounds of the Ministry politicians and officials, and given 'scientific' 
justification by the IQ test which had gained much prestige in wartime. Toby 
Weaver, in 1946, a civil servant in the new formed Ministry of Education, 
sums up the prevalent doctrine of the 'natural' differentiation of children by 
aptitude and ability:
'There was a general belief I believe totally false, that 
children were divided into three kinds. It was sort o f Platonic.
There were golden children, and silver children, and iron 
children. The golden children were capable o f going to a 
grammar school, they had minds, they could have abstract 
thinking. The technical children, the silver children so to 
speak, were technically oriented, and all the rest, they 
couldn't handle ideas, they had to have concrete notions. ’
Consequently, at a very early stage, the child is labelled, typed and 
categorised, then provided with an kind of education which was deemed 
appropriate to the perceived 'natural' capacity the child has, and this provision 
is then justified retrospectively by the kind of occupation the child later goes
3^ibid., p.202
37cited in Paul Addison (1985/95) p. 146/7
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on to take up - an occupation that has been largely determined by the
T O
education the child has received. Michael Apple refers to this type of 
classification citing the justice system of the Red Queen from Lewis Carroll's 
Through the Looking Glass, where punishment is ruthlessly applied before 
the trial, and before the crime has been committed. The punishment is 
justified by reference to the greater common good, since the persons so 
punished would then not commit the offences it is judged that they would 
inevitably have perpetrated, and society was therefore better off. The 
identification by the state of the potential to be criminal was sufficient reason 
to punish. The argument hinges on the questions of what criteria are used for 
the identification, how persuasive this identification is and, granting that 
these questions are sufficiently answered, who should have the authority to 
judge. According to the traditional tenets of natural justice which both 
Norwood and Butler would accept, such judgements should be made openly 
and impartially and be applicable to all: consequently a further, more critical 
question would have to be asked, are these judgements just and in whose 
interests are they made? In Carroll's case the criteria are arbitrary and the 
judge is clearly deranged.
Applied by analogy to their educational system, in Butler's and Norwood's 
argument, the State, through its educators, would have the authority to select 
and to determine the future educational provision to which the child had 
entitlement: that was a clear intention of Butler's Act. The criteria of 
selection was the common sense categorisation of the 'natural' ability of the 
child which would be objectively and scientifically ascertained by the IQ 
testing of the child at eleven years old, criteria which were at that time 
thought to be generally persuasive. However, the selection process was never 
applicable to everyone and the testing regime was certainly biased in favour 
of the more fluent and verbally proficient children of the middle classes. The 
process could be side-stepped altogether if the parents could afford to pay 
public school fees and even though Butler abolished fee paying, the hidden 
costs of a grammar school education - uniform, games equipment, musical 
tuition - would have been prohibitive for many. It is on the question of justice 
that Apple bases his objection to labelling theories. He exposes the 
ideological roots of the process through a discussion of Williams and 
Gramsci, arguing that common sense categories often disguise economic and
18 Michael Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge, 1990) Chapter 7, pp. 
123-153.
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political manipulations of social realities, allowing for one story of society to 
dominate alternative narratives. He shows how discourses which appeal to 
nature characteristically appeal to common sense.
For example, Butler and Norwood might attempt to refute the charge that 
they were representing the hegemonic interests of a cultural and economic 
elite, by claiming to offer an education to each child appropriate to his or her 
potential. The Norwood Report made a claim to be child-centred: ‘The time 
has come, we believe, when the real meaning o f secondary education, the 
significance o f child-centred education, the value o f  the Grammar School 
tradition, the difficulties o f the present Secondary Schools should all be 
admitted and recognised... Accordingly we would advocate that there should 
be three types o f education, which we think o f as the secondary Grammar, 
the secondary Technical and the secondary Modern... '
It is not, however, clear how 'child-centred' this system could be when the 
categorisation was to be made using such an inflexible vocabulary, especially 
when the categorisation criteria were so vague and so reliant on the 
traditional perceptions of a system which, ironically, even Norwood had 
shown to be flawed. Apple points out how the claimed neutrality of such 
apparently objective classification systems were used to develop ‘categories 
and modes o f  perception which reify or thingify individuals so that they (the 
educators) can confront students as institutional abstractions rather than as 
concrete persons... ‘ ^  and through such categorisation to obscure the 
perception that there could be other material and social factors which might 
inhibit educational success.
Indeed selection became a fundamental part of schooling, perhaps even the 
fundamental aim with 'streaming' as the central organising metaphor. Apart 
from the academic 'streaming' by ability into the grammar school, children 
were selected into sub-'streams' both in grammar and secondary modem 
schools. John Partridge in Life in a Secondary Modem School describes 
streaming within a secondary modem school where children were streamed 
by their relative disability:
~^The Norwood Report, in Maclure (1965) p.203 
40Apple (1990), p. 133
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Tn ascending order o f literacy the next group ( the TV stream 
was divided into those who could and those who could not 
read) is a large one composed o f the remainder o f the 'D' boys 
and most o f  the 'C' boys. This group have below average 
reading ages but at least they can make some sense o f simple 
prose... A few  boys in the 'C  stream, perhaps most o f the 'B' 
stream and the lower half o f  the 'A' stream, are boys who can 
read, in many cases well, and they are able to write 
comprehensible English... Our most erudite boys are the ten 
or fifteen who compose the top half o f  the 'A' stream. These 
are the boys who will do well in the Secondary Modern 
leaving certificate, who will pass certain subjects in the GCE 
O-Level examination, and for whose benefit much o f the 
school timetable is designed. ’ ^ ^
Partridge here shows how common place and entrenched was the vocabulary 
of selection and how children were categorised and 'streamed' ad absurdum. 
Even 'streams' were further sub-divided. Only the 'A' stream, and then 
seemingly only the top half of that stream, were considered to be worthwhile, 
the rest were judiciously consigned to educational oblivion. Selection and 
labelling had become the means of organisation and of control, both 
internally in the school and as a means of controlling the public perception of 
what schools were about and of controlling pupil expectation. It became the 
'common sense' of schooling and educational success became dependent on 
how far up the educational stream the child was allowed to paddle.
Peter Mauger ^2 attacked the principle of selection and of the criteria used 
by Butler and Norwood for selection in an article characteristic of the 
egalitarian discourse of comprehensive education, which for a time 
attempted to succeed Butler's discourse. While his argument is passionate, 
and. perhaps a little lop-sided in places, he nevertheless makes some telling 
points. He points out that the psychological evidence used in this discourse 
was oversimplified, at best crude, and that it was out of date even in 
Norwood's time. There was no evidence offered that the age of eleven marks
^  cited in Bell, Fowler and Little (eds) Education in Great Britain and Ireland. (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul/Open University Press, 1973) p. 120/1 
^  Peter Mauger, Selection fo r  Secondary Education, in David Rubenstein and Colin 
Stoneman (eds) Education for Democracy. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970)
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a definite or critical stage of growth, or that there were three types of mind 
discernible in children at eleven or at any other age. He condemns the 
vocabulary of Butler and Norwood with some fury:
‘It is hardly surprising that people with such an artificial, 
compartmentalised notion o f  human beings should advocate 
apartheid in education (though apparently they viewed with 
equanimity the thought o f  their own sons in public schools 
mixing with the other two types - or perhaps public school 
boys all belong to the first type?). ’ ^
The pseudo-botanical/organic metaphors provide such a vocabulary in which 
politicians and educators could redefine essential educational relationships 
and obscure the perception that educational policies were a result of 
particular political and ideological choices. Tellingly, not only did neither 
Norwood nor Butler offer criteria by which to differentiate clearly defined 
natural kinds of children, nor did they ever seriously try to, and they both 
cheerfully acknowledged that omission. While they both vaguely refer to 
psychological evidence they do not seriously offer a psychological 
justification for their categories: the 'common sense' of their categorisation 
rendered that kind of theory unnecessary.
The vocabulary of natural selection explicitly used by both Norwood and 
Butler allows, perhaps even demands, the de-personalisation of educational 
relations between the individual and the institution, categorising and 
labelling the child with apparently little more justification than the opinion of 
a teacher. There was no actual evidence offered for these categories. 
Norwood says that these were 'questions it was not necessary to pursue\ 
presumably because the answers were so blindingly obvious to him and his 
committee, so indelibly were they written in the common sense story of 
human nature of the time. They were intuitively and experientially justified 
by the perceptions of ‘common sense’ because they accorded with the types 
of child that educators had traditionally perceived in the classroom. That the 
categories were also highly ideological, their use and meaning dependent on 
a more deeply embedded story of society, was, however not so much 
disguised by the Committee as perhaps simply not visible to them. Their
43Mauger (1970) pp. 133/4
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assertions were made heroically, with little concern for evidence or theory, so 
confident were they that their perception was the true one.
Metaphors, like Butler's 'natural ability', for example, fixed the discourse of 
selection into the 'common-sense' of the then established educational 
narrative and with its continued use it amassed a weight of significance and 
signification which was to create a forbidding inertia.
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Chapter 3
Great Expectations and 
the Discourse of Containment
... the general liberal consensus that ‘true' knowledge is fundamentally 
non-political... obscures the highly i f  obscurely organised political 
circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced. '
Edward Said Orientalism *
1: Butler's Voices
‘He do the police in different voices’
Charles Dickens: Our Mutual Friend. Chapter 16
Historically in England it has been characteristic of the Conservative Party to 
grant social reforms, at the most minimum level possible, to avoid the threat 
of social unrest. The speed of the industrial revolution, for example, took the 
politicians by surprise. The then tradition of laissez-faire politics prevented 
direct state intervention: the mechanisms and institutions necessary to 
administer an effective and universal education system did not exist even if 
the political will had. Only when the mounting social problems reached crisis 
point, against the threatening background of continental popular uprisings, 
did the government intervene and then only as minimally as would alleviate - 
or at least show their concern and apparent willingness to attempt to alleviate 
- the worst of conditions. Even then, state intervention in education, for 
example, was little more than a matter of encouraging the Victorian 
philanthropic conscience of a few liberals and providing some basic state 
funding than in taking any direct control. The state relied heavily on the 
Church of England and people like Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster to 
provide a basic education for the ordinary people of England. The education
^Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1978) p. 10
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of the children, the boys in particular, of the economic and ruling elite was, of 
course, another matter and was otherwise provided for.
In Conservatism. Ted Honderich describes how the Respectable Tendency 
of the Conservative Party habitually represent themselves as not a political 
party in the sense that they prefer if possible not to advocate or attempt to live 
some grand narrative of society in the way that the Labour Party or even the 
Liberal party do. Rather Respectable Toryism presents itself as the 
representative and custodian of a way of life, of a particular social system and 
the cultural values which legitimise it. The Party came into being, as 
Honderich points out, as a result of the French Revolution in order to defend 
the traditional privileges of the then ruling class. Honderich points out that it 
began 'in disapproval, shock, fear and resistance ’ and is perhaps 
characterised quite simply as being against change. This reverence for 
traditional values and institutions and the established moral and social order 
permeates Butler's Act. Nothing communicates itself more clearly more than 
his reverence for the class system.
Yet at the same time his was not necessarily a crass greed for wealth or 
position. Essentially the Act sought to preserve the hegemonic status quo - 
something like Hogg’s myth - and those wider, more general and more diffuse 
social and cultural narratives which underpinned it, using the concept of 
service to do so: those most advantaged were at the same time under an 
obligation by virtue of their superiority, burdened with what almost amounted 
to an unalienable duty to serve and defend the people through their leadership 
of the institutions of the state and the culture. The essentially Respectable 
Tory narrative of Butler is invisible. It lies behind the rhetoric and the 
discourse of common sense. It is slippery: it does not even, perhaps, exist as a 
coherent story in itself, but rather it is a reactionary, politically expedient, 
response to change which seeks to protect and preserve its hegemony and the 
traditional cultural narratives in which that hegemony resides.
This elite is not a meritocracy. In spite of Butler's attempt to redefine the 
educational narrative, admission to it is rather more like Hogg’s cultural 
initiation, described earlier. Hogg’s myth serves as the focus imaginarius of 
these more diffuse social narratives in which the then Tory Party was located.
9
Ted Honderich, Conservatism (London: Penguin, 1990) . 
■^Honderich (1990) p.l
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Authority is located in tradition, or at least in the traditions and culture of the 
dominant class and the value of this initiation ensures that the system is 
essentially self-policing, according little discursive space to dissent or change.
The challenge that had faced Butler was to reform, or at least to reinterpret, 
the existing dominant discourse of education in a way which would gain the 
consent of both wings of the House and the educational authorities and 
educationalists, and which at the same would fulfil the popular demands for 
greater access and have popular support. His Act had to reflect the heady 
optimism of the hope of the time, even if he and the then educational 
establishment did not, themselves, entirely unambiguously share it. Indeed 
Butler did much to exploit the popular will for reform in obtaining wide 
consensus for his Act. The traditional more hands off, laissez-faire 
educational discourse was not an option; the rhetoric of post-war 
reconstruction which had been so effectively used to bolster morale in 
wartime had created a popular acceptance, if not demand, for cradle to grave 
state provision, for social planning, reform and change which was later clearly 
expressed in the victorious social narrative of the Labour Party in 1945.
Williams^ describes how in forming what was to become the emergent 
dominant story of education there were present contesting elements of quite 
different educational stories. These stories Williams called the Democratic, 
with its emphasis on widening opportunity and education for all; the 
Industrial with its emphasis on training, technology and vocational skills 
allied to the needs of the economy; the Liberal with its focus on respect for 
traditional cultural values and to these might be added the Progressive, with 
its stress on the individual needs of the child. Butler's Act attempted a kind of 
multiple appeal: he has a different voice for everyone. Each story came with a 
long pedigree. Each had its own focus imaginarious - its own idealised 
representation of the character of education and educational identities - and 
each provided its own characteristic metaphorical construction of reality.
The challenge facing Butler was to forge a consensus among these rival 
stories - a consensus in which not only was any radical reform of the 
education system ruled out, but also a consensus in which some discourses 
which had championed a particular story would lose out and where their
 ^Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution fHarmonds worth: Pelican/Penguin, 1961) p. 161 
and passim.
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rivals would gain. Butler's stated intention, and in the political circumstances 
he could not have said otherwise, was to reform the educational system in 
order to lessen the class differential in educational success and to provide 
greater educational opportunity. Using this democratic voice, Butler 
effectively undercut the more socialist voice of the Labour Party. Full blooded 
egalitarianism was not on his menu however, he spoke, though even then 
vaguely, of equality of opportunity. He even went so far as to voice his 
concern about the education of girls: 7 hope all opportunities open to boys 
will be equally open to girls though again he does not voice this concern 
with a full-blooded objective that the bias towards boys in current educational 
provision should come to an end, but rather he opted to voice only a weaker, 
more vague aspiration.
Perhaps Butler's tentativeness towards creating greater educational 
opportunities for girls was an indication of his rather less than fully 
democratic principles. Earlier in 1942 he was asked in an amendment debate 
to consider making equal pay for women teachers a feature of his Bill. The 
amendment was passed by a very narrow majority though it had been opposed 
on the government benches. This was the only parliamentary defeat the 
wartime coalition government suffered. Butler would not consider any such 
change to the pay scales; in his view it would have created a precedent and 
would be followed by similar demands from the civil service and that, he 
said, would be financially disastrous. Butler was furious and gave the 
impression that he would stall the Bill, if not resign his position. His response 
was to have an artfully managed tantrum. 7 am not going to tumble round my 
cage like a wounded canary. You knocked me o ff my perch. You have to put 
me back on my perch otherwise I won't sing. ’ His threat, though it was not 
specific, intimidated the reformers and threw them into a panic. They had so 
long anticipated a new educational system that even the National Union of 
Teachers, who had for years campaigned for equal pay, asked their supporters 
in the house not to demand that the amendment be implemented. The success 
of such intimidation was not lost on Butler: ‘it paid a handsome dividend ’, he 
said, and it allowed him thereafter to dominate the committee stages of the 
Bill. Equal pay for women had to wait until 1955 and even then it had to be 
phased in over six years.
^R. A. Butler to the House o f Commons, January 19/20 1944 in TESS 6/5/94 op. cit. p.viii. 
^cited by Michael Barber, "Crisis o f Conscience," TESS 6th May 1994, sec. The 1944 Act: p. 
xvii.
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By abolishing fee paying in grammar schools and by expanding the assisted 
places scheme, Butler intended the impression of an educational meritocracy: 
selected solely on the basis of ability but, as has been discussed, the concept 
of ability was a mechanism which would, inevitably, protect and preserve the 
traditional class boundaries of educational achievement. Butler's educational
n
meritocracy did, however, in a limited fashion, have some effect. Addison 
describes a significant trend in increasing numbers of working class children 
at grammar schools from beyond the previously statutory 25% upwards to at 
least 40%, even more in areas which had traditionally been more generous to 
the aspirations of the working classes. However, though there was an increase 
in the number of children selected to grammar schools, and while this 
educational expansion was generally welcomed, the whole schooling system 
envisaged by Butler was never fully implemented.
The identification of'technically minded' children was problematic and when 
attempted proved to be such a small number that in effect those children who 
did not qualify for grammar school entry were condemned to an secondary 
modem schooling. This effectively left them without any negotiable 
qualifications. And it would have been very costly to create the technical 
schools. However, Butler surely was ingenuous in hoping that his system 
could achieve ‘parity of esteem’ or that it could actually lead to greater 
educational opportunity. It was, indeed, the perceived lack of esteem for any 
other school than the grammar school, that was one of the main reasons that 
the technical school was strangled at birth.
While Butler's democratic voice at times rings with conviction and sincerity, 
at the same time it is the voice of someone who was always on the outside of 
the social world which he was attempting to regulate. Neither he, nor his 
officials then at the Board, had much intimate knowledge of the lives of the 
people they discussed so lightly and, on occasion, so caustically. Butler and 
his officials at the Board of Education were all successful products of quite a 
different educational system and as products of that system their perceptions 
of what education was, its purposes, what to change and how to change it was 
limited. Even James Chuter Ede, Butler's Labour deputy at the Board of 
Education and an invaluable ally, was a product of a minor public school and
^Addison (1985/95). p 165 and passim.
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Cambridge, though he had been a teacher at an elementary school. Addison
o
records that nearly twenty-five percent of Labour MPs had a public school 
education and that the Atlee government had retained the traditional 
deference for ‘the old school tie’. Stuart Maclure^, the former editor of The 
Times Educational Supplement, remarked that a separate selective and 
non-selective school system was the received wisdom, the common sense of 
the time, even on the Labour benches.
Under the succeeding Labour administration the received educational story 
was unequivocally that of selection by ability. Though 'parity of esteem' was 
part of the rhetoric it was not convincingly part of the story. Ellen Wilkinson, 
the Minister for Education after the 1945 election stated: ‘Not everyone wants 
an academic education. After all coal has to be mined and fields ploughed, 
and it is a fantastic idea that we have allowed, so to speak, to be cemented 
into our body politic, that you are o f  a higher social class i f  you add up 
figures in a book than i f  you plough the fields and scatter the good seed on 
the land. ’ ^
The narrative expectation of the story of education was one in which a 
grammar school education - except when a public school education was not 
possible - was clearly acknowledged to be not just superior but really the only 
type of education that mattered, the one which opened the door to the 
privileged strata of society. This narrative expectation created in effect the 
elitist ethos of the grammar school: that ability was a privilege and created 
consequent obligations to duty and service as well as offering the possibility 
for subsequent initiation into the cultural elite and potentially opening the 
doors to opportunity, wealth and social position. Though Wilkinson does 
attempt to undermine that story, deriding the middle class white-collar 
aspirations of the grammar school educated, even using unctuous biblical 
allusion to try to assert the equal value and dignity of the labour of the 
working classes, her argument is glib and unconvincing.
Her argument is not, though, quite the same as Butler's. His argument pivots 
on the notion of desert: those most able deserved an education appropriate to
8Addison (1985/95) p 167
^Stuart Maclure, Act o f  Faith Amid the Heat o f  Battle in TES(S) 6th May 1994, sec. The 
1944 Act: 50th Anniversary: p.iii.
* ® cited in David Rubenstein and Brian Simon The Evolution o f the Comprehensive School 
1926-1972. (London: Routledge, 1972) p. 38
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their ability and one which will give them the opportunity to serve the larger 
community to the best of those abilities. Wilkinson's argument is organised 
around the concept of need and of a sanctimoniously disingenuous, 
egalitarian view of the value of labour. The appropriate education is the 
education the child needs and wants mediated by the economic organisation 
and needs of the larger community, and the needs of the child are largely 
established by the perceived ability of the child. This perceived ability meant 
that sixty to seventy percent of children would be denied what was seen as a 
worthwhile education, an academic education. While this might have caused 
some Labour politicians, like Wilkinson herself, some private qualms, it did 
not influence their public policy. Addison cites David Hardman, a junior 
minister in the then Labour controlled Education Department, who wrote: 
‘The minister wanted to eliminate the direct grant list, the response being 
protests in my ear from Labour backbenchers who had important DG (direct 
grant) schools in their constituencies. She also ventured the opinion that 
public schools should be taken into the State system and even the universities. 
Nothing came o f this though I heard Herbert Morrison describing the idea as 
female tantrums'. ^
The succeeding Labour Party which was dominated by a very similar 
Respectable Tendency, differing in degree rather than kind from their Tory 
counterparts, adopted much the same story. Their manifesto had promulgated 
a vision of a more equal society but this was interpreted when they were in 
power as the maintenance of much the same traditional institutions and values 
as the patrician Respectable Tories, though with some erosion of some 
property rights and some amelioration of the lot of the common people with 
the creation of a welfare state. Apart from the privatisation of some large 
industries, though they would agree with the Keynsian motivation, and the 
cost, though not the principle, of the welfare state, there was little that the 
Tory Respectable Tendency could complain about.
The Labour Respectable Tendency exploited Butler's democratic voice in the 
'44 Act to postpone their new Jerusalem, put off until the blueprint for an 
educational meritocracy could eventually bear fruit. Though there were voices 
of dissent in the Labour Party, as Butler had artfully used or cynically ignored 
his backwoodsmen so did the Respectable executive of the Labour Party - and
11 Addison( 1985/95) p. 151
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if those dissenting voices made their complaints privately rather than publicly, 
and if their complaints could be brushed aside with the machismo and the 
patrician condescension of Morrison's dismissal of Wilkinson, so much the 
better.
The disingenuous democratic voices of the Respectable Tendencies, of both 
the Right and Left, were designed to give the appearance of greater equality 
rather than actually to deliver it and ultimately to maintain the hierarchical 
class story of society. This gap between their rhetoric and what they did is 
perhaps best summed up by Oliver Van Oss, a housemaster at Eton: 7  think a 
shudder did run through and people would say, 'We can't see how anyone 
who believes in the public schools can support the Labour Party' etc., etc... 
It didn't worry me because I thought it was all my eye and I didn't think they 
would abolish the public schools because they were educationally so
i o
good.
There was to be some tension in maintaining the superiority of the academic 
education in later years when it was perceived that the lack of scientists and a 
weakness in science teaching was having a detrimental effect on the 
economy. Though Britain, in the 40's and early 50's had not yet become quite 
as enthralled by science as it soon would, there were discernible stirrings of 
this particular concern: the connexion between education and the economy 
had long been part of the traditional discourse of education but as yet it had 
only been addressed through half-hearted and piece-meal initiatives. Butler's 
Act appeared to set out to correct this deficit once and for all. His industrial 
voice repeats the metaphors of waste and economic renewal yet, while he 
wills the end - an educational system which would aid the economic recovery 
of Britain - he fell far short of willing the means.
His voice was very much in accord with the times, and certainly the years 
following the 1945 Act saw substantial renewal of school buildings and 
facilities. These new schools were built but their educational character was 
largely unchanged. The new building programmes tended to focus on the 
Primary schools and the building of new secondary modems - interestingly 
the grammar schools tended to prefer to inhabit their old buildings: redstone, 
no matter how eroded, was more symbolic of the old, traditional educational
^ibid., p. 167
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order maintaining, through a kind of architectural semiosis, their links with 
their past and echoing in their architecture something redolent of the spires 
and dreaming groves of Academe. For them their crumbling old buildings 
were more appropriate than the airy, bright modem glass and steel structures 
in their presentation of themselves as the apex of the established educational 
order. Neither the rhetoric nor the architecture of modernity did anything for 
them except to provide them with contrast, emphasising their symbolic 
identity. More importantly, their curriculum too remained largely unchanged, 
their pedagogies and academic aspirations unaltered.
The old elementary schools were revamped and renamed secondary modems
but, even though Butler might have had the best of intentions, these schools
could not throw off their second-class status. Nor had Butler very clearly
enunciated the aims of these schools. They were not to be academic, that was
about all, in effect, the aim they had. It was more of a suggestion that they
should aim at a more pragmatic, technical and scientific kind of education
than a stated aim. The Education Minister, Ellen Wilkinson, published a
pamphlet in 1947 on ‘The New Secondary Education ’. She wrote: ‘The
schools must have freedom to experiment, room to grow, variety for the sake
o f freshness, for the fun o f it even. Laughter in the classroom, self-confidence
growing every day, eager interest instead o f bored conformity, this is the way
to produce from our fine stock the Britons who will have no need to fear the
new scientific age, but will stride into it, heads high, determined to master
1 ^science and serve mankind' . Yet there was no sign of any curriculum 
development, no central view of what the processes of education should 
contain. Instead things were allowed to continue in much the same way as 
before. Addison ^  describes how some of the more innovative Secondary 
Modem schools began to tinker with the curriculum, devising thematic 
studies and relating their curriculum to the social environment and the 
practical needs of their children - studying local housing, looking at transport 
and such like and even going beyond that to have the child look at their 
citizenship in concrete terms. Addison, however, describes how this kind of 
curriculum innovation was short lived and how enthusiasm for such projects 
soon waned and manual and technical skills became the focus of the 
Secondary Modem curriculum.
^Quoted in H.C. Dent Growth in English Education 1946-1952. (London: Routledge, 1954) 
p. 89
Addison (1985/95) p. 161 and passim
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The possibility of a technical school, Butler's model of industrial education, 
was subject to a curriculum squeeze. The carpet was pulled out from under 
this idea even further when some Secondary Modems began to enter some 
pupils for public examinations: there was, in the end, little apparent 
justification for a yet another kind of school. In effect the industrial voice of 
the '44 Act was muted and all that happened was that the bi-partite school 
system which evolved only further emphasised the value and exclusivity of 
the grammar school, tightening the conceptual ring-fence that Butler had 
already thrown up around it. It is ironic that the rhetoric of One Nation, so 
strongly advocated by the Respectable Tendencies of both the Right and the 
Left should seek to maintain and to strengthen a two-tier state educational 
system and to exclude any meaningful discussion of the private sector from 
any state planning about education.
The unwillingness of Butler and his successors to contemplate curriculum 
change, which might perhaps have made his categorisation of children more 
educationally effective, sounded the death knell for their industrial education 
aspirations, and it was this unwillingness to consider the curriculum which 
also stifled his progressive voice. Wilkinson in 4The New Secondary
Education’ stated that education should come 'out o f  the interests o f the 
children' and both Butler and Norwood were careful to state that their system 
was 'child-centred'. However this kind of bald statement was about as far as 
they went. They excluded from their considerations any reference to 
progressive theory which typically argued that the school should be fitted to 
the needs of the child and not the child to the school.
According to Montessori, for example, children are the victims of adult 
suppression and they have been compelled to adopt defensive mechanisms 
alien to their real nature in the struggle to hold their own. The first move 
toward the reform of education in her view was to re-educate the educators: to 
enlighten them and to eliminate their perception of their own superiority - to 
make them more humble and passive in their attitudes toward the child. This 
kind of characterisation of children certainly did not accord with the received 
educational story of Butler's time: it was not that it was not known about, 
rather it was excluded from debate because it was not respectable. It did not 
just go against all common sense but by revolutionising the whole story of 
education it threatened the very fabric of their respectable society. In a sense
64
it was just not British so much did it conflict with the established perception 
of essential educational and social identities. The kind of revolutionary 
educational relations which it suggested were anathema, unthinkable to the 
public-school educated policy makers of the 1940's - policy makers, like 
Butler, whose own sense of purpose and duty was to protect and maintain the 
traditional educational story and so preserve the hegemony of the ideologies 
of the respectable social narratives which underpinned them.
Both the industrial and child centred voices of Butler in effect stifled the 
possibility of any radical revision of post-war education. Butler's Act is 
perhaps more interesting for what it does not say than for what it does. His 
discourse consistently and implicitly condoned elitism and the inadmissibility 
of progressive theories. The thorough democratisation of education was never 
on the menu, nor was the greater democratisation of society through 
education. Some stumbling steps were taken to broaden educational 
opportunity but the class base of society was too strong a story, too embedded 
in common-sense, to be respectably challenged. Butler exploited the 
vocabularies of other educational discourses to fix an ideological framework 
for thought so that it was impossible for the educationalist to think otherwise, 
or at least impossible to both think otherwise and to retain influence among 
policy makers or retain intellectual or political respectability. To be 
respectable, to be admitted into the discourses of power, required a pragmatic 
conformity with the 'real' world... the 'common-sense' narratives of a 'common 
culture1.
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2: A Culture o f  Consent
‘As on the one hand it should ever be remembered that we are boys, and boys 
at school, so on the other hand we must bear it in mind that we form a 
complete social body... a society, in which, by the nature o f the case, we must 
not only learn, but act and live: and act and live not only as boys, but as boys
who will become men. ’  ^^
The recurrent natural imagery and the metaphysic of human nature and 
'natural' social forms that this imagery concealed suggests that Butler's most 
passionate and most convincing voice is his liberal one. The key to liberal 
philosophy, John Gray ^  points out, is that the individual can only flourish 
within a culture of consent, a 'common' culture, where accepted and deeply 
embedded personal and social narratives provide clear moral and political 
authority for the shape and quality of the common life. The narratives show 
what kind of life and what quality of life may legitimately be expected or 
aspired to and of these narratives that of education is vitally important in both 
inducting the citizen into the culture and in conditioning and reconciling the 
citizen to his or her expectations.
The grand liberal narrative of High Culture, which Butler exploited though it 
will later be argued that he also weakened it as he did so, had its roots in the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment, but not the Enlightenment moral and 
political theories of Natural Rights which had thrown so many continental 
political and social discourses into crisis. The political home of this liberal 
narrative became the Tory Party which, at the time of revolution on the 
continent, originated to counter these revolutionary discourses through an 
essentially reactionary discourse which sought to maintain the hegemony of 
the privileged classes by containing the aspirations of the masses for 
constitutional and social change. The rhetoric of this counter discourse sought 
to preserve the cultural hegemony of these classes through the narrative of 
liberalism, presenting as common-sense a romantically idealised story of 
English culture in which to locate and justify their position of power. The 
rhetoric of common sense, the assertion of this one common cultural story as 
'natural', observably and instinctively true and beyond need for any further
^  from Rugby Magazine:the frontispiece o f Thomas Hughes (1857), Tom Brown's 
Schooldays (London: Puffin/Penguin, 1971)
John Gray, After Social Democracy fLondon: Demos, 1996) p. 16 and passim.
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justification, masked the social, economic, and religious ideology of the 
narrative.
A strong 'common' culture in which to locate the primacy of individual 
freedom and choice is a necessary condition of the social discourses of the 
liberal narrative, where a clear and common-sense interpretation of the public 
good arbitrates between individual freedom and public responsibility. This 
'common' culture should be shared by everyone, though in the discourses 
discussed, some people only may be spectators, knowing the rules and but not 
actually participating.
Consequently one of Butler's chief aims was to create a consensus around his
Act in order to maintain the authority of the liberal narrative which
underpinned it. He claimed that: ‘...this Bill owes its welcome to an
appreciation o f the synthesis which it tries to create between order and
liberty, between local initiative and national direction, between the voluntary
agency and the State, between the private life o f a school and the public life
o f its district, between manual and intellectual skill, and between those better
1 7and those less well endowed. . This rhetorical dialectic charts the 
pretensions of the traditional liberal approach: a careful, winding middle way 
of compromise, avoiding the broader road of ‘ideological’ extremes, and by 
avoiding open conflict to better preserve and protect the existing, traditional 
cultural stories. Gray writes that even after the social democratic years of the 
sixties and seventies and the Thatcherite reformation of the eighties, liberal 
individualism is still deeply embedded into the political and social psyche; it 
is, he comments, 'an historical fate, which we can hope to temper, but not to
1 o
overcome'10 If it remains so deeply embedded now, it was even more so in 
Butler's time. What Butler sought was, through an educational policy, to 
reinforce the traditional moral and social order and to contain the impact of 
dissenting narratives, especially those narratives which threatened to 
reinterpret, widen or replace the cultural institutions and canons which the 
liberal narrative held sacred.
For example, the great hope of the socialist narrative was to compete 
effectively with, or possibly to supplant, the dominant liberal vocabulary. The 
liberal vocabulary, with its constituting metaphors, provided, however, a deep
^R . A. Butler to the House o f Commons, January 19/20 1944 in TESS 6/5/94 op. cit. p.ix 
l8Gray(1996) p. 56
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cultural meaning: it reflected the patterns of domination of one particular way 
of life over others, excluding those who were not so inducted into the 
dominant vocabulary. The institutionalised elitism of public schools and the 
grammar schools could then be seen as primarily concerned with providing 
and maintaining this form of induction or initiation into the vocabularies of 
power. This is well illustrated in the metaphor of the glass ceiling for women 
attempting to break into social and economic institutions hitherto dominated 
by men. They may mimic the dominant vocabulary of men, the metaphors of 
war and battle for example, as a kind of protective coloration to disguise their 
differences and gain admission, but the essential differences in forms of life 
between men and women will in the end prevent complete synonymy and will 
ultimately exclude them. Only when women are wholly inducted into the 
form of life of men, not just attempt to mimic the surface meaning but to 
encompass the deep meaning which is the vocabulary that represents the 
whole of the culturally determined socialisation and maturation process of 
men, could they hope to succeed on those terms. This is not possible, 
consequently the only way for women to succeed is to change the 
vocabularies of power, change the underlying social narratives and forms of 
authority which maintain men in power.
The socialist narrative, of society and of education, centres round the central 
theme of the struggle for justice. Benn writes: ‘Change takes place when the 
people have decided they will no longer tolerate injustice or unfairness. ' ^  
and he characterises the post-war victory as the rejection of the social 
conditions of the Thirties and the demand for a fairer society. It is the quest 
for a fair society which provides the focus imaginarious of the socialist 
narrative: it is struggle and the built-in perception of the inevitability of 
victory through the justness of its cause which gives it its dynamism - and the 
always present spectre of past betrayals which haunt any prevailing hope of 
progress which gives it its tension and pathos.
The optimism of politicians such as Benn that they might then be building the 
foundations of a New Jerusalem helped to create the intellectual and 
emotional backdrop for these post-war years. Benn, later on, called them in 
his Diaries 'The Years o f Hope\ perhaps setting up the narrative tension for 
the inevitable betrayal to come. Benn may perhaps be accused of gilding the
^  Benn (Winstone ed.) p. xii
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lily of hope, or at least of not clearly representing the complex social forces 
which created it, to give his story greater narrative impact. A simple theme 
makes for a better story. His account is of an unambiguously socialist victory 
on an unambiguously socialist programme of reform. While there is no reason 
to doubt the popular will for social reform, it is not at all clear that there was 
overwhelming popular support for socialism.
Yet, notwithstanding Benn's account, the late 1940’s socialist narrative was a 
complex one: it prospered on the popular hope for change but at the same 
time many in the Labour Party - the Respectable Tendency - harboured a 
distrust of socialism becoming the all-embracing grand narrative of society. 
Consequently, this element of self-doubt present in the post-war narrative 
weakened it, the doubters perhaps having as their focus of unease the 
disastrous and inhumane effects of grand social narratives in Nazi Germany 
and in the USSR. It was, for example, the time when Orwell's Animal Farm 
was published with its warning about the corruptive seductiveness of Grand 
Narratives.
Animal Farm with its central, unromantic and deliberately unsophisticated 
metaphor of the farmyard, struck at the heart of the matter. It was more than a 
warning about the potentially corrupting effect of power; it was a warning not 
so much about the betrayal of politicians as about placing uncritical trust in 
the Active attractiveness of the big story which does the thinking for you, and 
thereby being blind to the smaller, individual stories of ordinary people. It is 
not without its ironies that Animal Farm is a product of these years of hope: 
behind the pessimism and the warning lies a sub-text of hope in the common 
people which Orwell later echoed in 1984 when he wrote the anti-climatic 
and not entirely unironic message: that if there is any hope, it lies with the 
proles. That the Labour Party did not on gaining power enact a more 
egalitarian educational policy is perhaps explicable in that the Butler Act did 
speak with the echo of an egalitarian voice and also by the unease with which 
the grand narrative of socialism sat with 'respectable' Labour Party politicians 
who saw as their cultural tradition not Marx but the conservative, and 
respectable, religious non-conformism of their predecessors.
It is, incidentally, this theme of intellectual and emotional conflict and 
subsequent betrayal which so pervades the history of romantic and idealistic 
narratives of society, and which may rescue them from accusations of
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simplicity or naivete, that has perhaps so attracted Twentieth Century 
novelists and artists to humanism or democratic socialism away from the 
benign paternalism of the Victorian novelists. The theme has considerable 
fictive attractiveness which has proved irresistible in the discourses of many 
politicians, from Benn on the left and to Thatcher on the right. The theme of 
betrayal is perhaps the single theme which characterises the modem novel, for 
example. It is, as we shall see in later chapters of this exercise, an important 
theme in modem social and educational narratives bringing to an end the 
rhetorical persuasiveness of grand narratives of society.
The 1944 Act began this process of cultural disestablishment of not just the 
grand socialist Narrative, which will be dealt with later, but also, ironically, 
of the grand liberal narrative too. The liberal voice of Butler has echoes of the 
discourse of Matthew Arnold and anticipates some of the discourse of G.H. 
Bantock. Bantock and Arnold both contributed to the grand liberal narrative 
of education and culture, offering discourses of education legitimated by the 
authority of their interpretation of classical sense and sensibility, though their 
less charitable critics may consider an allusion to another Austen novel more 
appropriate. However the grand narratives to which Arnold and Bantock 
subscribed were very much weakened in and, en passant by, the discourse of 
Butler's Act.
The social context of Butler's Act was mirrored in the unrest of Arnold's time
and for both of them education was a means of protecting the traditional
values of the state from revolutionary change. Yet for Arnold, and arguably
for Butler too, the expansion of education to the masses was not to better
acquaint the masses with the riches of the culture, rather it was primarily a
response to the threat of civil unrest, a preventative measure rather than a
positive social policy. Arnold proposed: ‘Education, in the common sense o f
the word, is required by a people before poverty has made havoc among
them; at that critical moment when civilisation makes its first burst, and is
70accompanied by an immense commercial activity. ’ Arnold's concept of 
Education is proposed as a pragmatic response to growing unrest but, like in 
Butler's Act, there is no serious suggestion in his discourse that education 
should be in the interests of the economy or that education should attempt to 
create greater egalitarianism or that the needs of the child should be the
20 Matthew Arnold, in a letter to the Hertford Reformer, cited in Raymond Williams, Culture 
and Society 1780-1950 fHarmondsworth: Pelican/Penguin, 1958) p. 123.
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fundamental priority. Arnold's vision of culture was a product of his 
distinctive middle class background, family and education and he never really 
seemed to envisage it being acquired by the 'lower' classes to any significant 
extent. Arnold's hope, and Butler's, lay not in the proles, the hope of the 
socialist, democratic narrative, but in the emergence of a cultural elite, 
educated to defend the sanctity of the canon and institutions of the liberal 
narrative and to continue to maintain its hegemony and exclusivity.
The history of all hitherto society is, for the liberal narrative, the history of the
cultural struggle. In the construction of this elite, neither Bantock nor Arnold
are narrowly class conscious and appear to share some of Butler's idea of
meritocracy: however not Butler's crude - and to them vulgar - meritocracy of
'ability' but rather an aristocracy of 'sensibility'. In each class, they would
argue, there are a few people - 'remnants' as Arnold calls them in Culture and 
11Anarchvz , survivors of the cultural wastelands of the classes - who are not 
led by their class interests but by 'a general humane spirit, by their love o f  
human perfection'. In an implicit analogy to the priesthood, the attainment of 
ones 'higher' nature is in principle open to members of all classes who have a 
'calling' to spiritual devotion rather than the vulgarity of the worship of 
material goods. Both call for a kind of freemasonry of the cultured few, with 
highly selective and exclusive admission procedures, arduous initiation rites, 
ritualised reverence of cultural symbols and icons and all wrapped in the 
trappings of the English established church. Like the Freemasons they would 
justify their hegemony by something like Hogg’s mythology of obligation and 
benign service to the excluded masses.
This metaphorical contrast between the mechanical and the organic is a
characteristic of the liberal discourses. Arnold criticises as 'mechanical' the
instrumental reasoning applied almost algorithmically to social institutions
such as education. He employs his 'mechanical' metaphor to criticise the
educational system: he describes an over reliance on 'mechanical processes'
and too little emphasis on 'intelligence'. He describes the examination, created
to allow for payment by result, a 'mechanical' examination which inevitably
gives 'a mechanical turn to the school teaching, a mechanical turn to the 
11inspection..' . As Butler also did, Arnold saw society in 'natural' organic
21 •in Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1906) 
^Matthew Arnold (1867) Inspector's General Report to the Council in J. Stuart Maclure 
Educational Documents: England and Wales: 1816 to the present day. London: Methuen
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terms, not reductively as the sum of its constituent parts but as a whole 
organism. His elite would not necessarily provide the 'mechanical' brain of the 
society, but would provide the moral and emotional centre: not the ego but the 
super-ego.
Bantock, too, despised the social 'mechanisms' of educational and social
theorists. He is particularly brutally scathing of Mannheim and the idea of
state planning. He is disturbed by Mannheim's metaphors: he quotes
Mannheim: ‘It (social planning) is not the treatment o f symptoms but an
'y'xattack on the strategic points, fully realising the truth' . He criticises 
Mannheim's use of mechanistic and military metaphor with considerable 
effect and contemptuously dismisses Mannheim as a 'social mechanic'. His 
description of Mannheim's educational 'plan' is both telling and incidentally 
amusing. He describes Mannheim's vision of society as 'a society o f termites' 
where education moulds the child into a mode of life that places value in the 
collective rather than the individual will. The core of his disagreement is that 
such metaphorical descriptions of society create a view that is too impersonal, 
too restrictive of the freedom of the individual: 'There must be system - but an 
organic not a mechanical one; there must even be tradition' The 
individual, stripped of their individual spiritual and cultural identity and 
aspirations, is submerged in the notion of community and becomes an 
anonymous cog in a state 'machine'.
These framing metaphors of health suggest that certain social forms or
conditions can be diagnosed by someone suitably qualified as a particular
problem which is inherently bad, and that it can be 'cured' by some remedy.
Egalitarianism is a kind of infection that might spread if not treated, 
presumably, with large doses of Culture. The metaphor conceals the 
ideological process involved: who makes this interpretation and in whose 
interests? What this ideological process does is to problematise those social 
narratives which dissent from the 'established' authorised view. They are, 
however, not just problems but potentially dangerously debilitating if not 
'treated'. The most sinister diseases might require the most radical surgery. 
Neither Arnold nor Bantock directly consider dissent. Bantock airily suggests
1965,1973) p82/3
^G .H . Bantock, Freedom and Authority in Education (London: Faber & Faber, 1952) p. 33 
and passim 
^ibid., p. 181
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that the notion of Culture is not a complete one, it is open to modifications. 
However, for Bantock the process of modification demands that the modifier 
be part of the cultural elite, there is no other access, and consequently there is 
no access to the core of the canon to any kind of radical dissent, nor will he 
allow alternative forms of culture any authority.
Although Bantock would assert that ’education should be primarily
deterministic' ^  this he would construe as a 'natural' determinism rather than
a ‘mechanical’ one. The 'natural' sensibility or ability of the child as assessed
by the teacher would determine the child's educational future, not some
'mechanical' state educational policy which aims to try to create some form of
educational equality, for example: 'like Guild Socialism... which is a
reduction to the lowest terms - nothing higher than which now is, only
lower... It is necessary to get the germ o f a new development towards the
7 (\highest, not a reduction to the lowest' .
Bantock discusses the 'natural', 'organic' philosophy of D.H. Lawrence in 
order to give weight to his attack on the 'mechanical' approach to educational 
and social policy, to rise above the philistinism of middle class morality, of 
petty organisational rules and regulations and get to the heart of the 
educational matter, personal freedom. This he defined as freedom from the 
tyrannies of ’mechanical' state planning and 'mechanical' pedagogies and 
'mechanical' theories; and, on the positive side, the creation of educational 
conditions that give children freedom acquire the values and sensibilities of 
the cultured elite. Bantock reiterates Arnold's criticism of crude means and 
ends reasoning and, like Arnold, contrasts the 'mechanical' with the 'vital' and 
Lawrence's - and his - use of organic metaphors, of development and of the 
state, which Arnold idealised as: ‘the organ o f our collective best self our 
national right reason ’. Bantock's critique of Mannheim is counterpointed by 
his own 'organic' metaphors of society and education: *It is chiefly because the 
English body politic, partly no doubt due to its insularity, has succeeded in 
retaining a certain organic (as opposed to mechanical and imposed) quality 
o f interrelated social obligations that planning is less popular here than 
elsewhere. ’
^ibid., p. 59 
ibid., p. 158 (Bantock’s emphasis) 
^7ibid., p. 34
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There is more than a trace of cultural and national imperialism present in 
Bantock's narrative: he is implacably against the 'importation' of'foreign' ideas 
and he on occasion does exhibit anti-Semitic tendencies. It is ironic, for 
example, that he dismisses Mannheim's ideas by equating them with the evils 
of Nazism when it was to eradicate the possibility of just that kind of evil 
recurring that Mannheim proposed his system of educational and curriculum 
planning. Bantock's organism, like Hogg’s, is above all else an English 
organism. Bantock, for example, is scathing about what he sees as an attempt 
by Mannheim to dilute canonical English culture with foreign artefacts: he 
finds Mannheim's remarks on the cultural significance of jazz, for example, 
distasteful. He resents any popularisation or 'watering down' of the Culture. 
He speaks of the danger of the 'semi-literates' and the popular 'quizzes and
T O
public forums'. He fears education has 'gone down to meet the people'. His 
fondness for D.H.Lawrence is perhaps the fondness for a soul reclaimed from 
the pit of barbarism that is his, and Lawrence's, view of working class life, 
except when he indulges in some metaphysical whimsy about the dignity of 
work and working class 'intimate togetherness'.
Bantock himself indulges in flamboyant metaphysical metaphor, creating the 
'natural' division between ‘higher ’ and 'lower' moral and aesthetic 'planes' of 
distinction and of existence in order to maintain his exclusive, authorised 
canon. On a fundamental level what he finds so objectionable in Mannheim is 
his lack of metaphysics, his materialist inability to see what must remain 
sacred or profane. He accuses Mannheim of propagating a 'simplified social 
mythology' which places political and cultural power in the hands of 'those 
not conspicuously capable o f undertaking the responsibility' - sharing 
Arnold's fear of the egalitarian story diluting 'real' culture, trivialising the 
sacred canons. The sense of an impending cultural Armageddon permeates 
the liberal discourses and gives them their vitality.
Bantock however is explicitly conscious of the metaphysical dimension of the 
metaphor and of the need to offer some kind of justification for them. His 
metaphors are used aggressively to attempt to counter the increasing 
persuasiveness of the emergent educational discourse of the egalitarians. He 
adopts a robust liberal discourse. Behind his, and indeed the relatively more 
conciliatory discourse of Butler, is the perception of 'lower' and 'higher'
28ibid., p. 169
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natures, perhaps redefmable in terms of 'natural' ability in Butler's Act, but 
essentially categories of sensibility. The metaphysical baggage of 'best' and 
'worst' selves, 'higher' and 'lower' consciousness or 'planes' of perception, 
'types' of mind or child, and 'natural' abilities categorise in order to justify the 
exclusion of certain items from a canon or certain children from access to 
certain kinds of education.
The 'natural' metaphor implies essential differences between people. It 
imposes a classification of natural kinds, as if these kinds and their essential 
differences were just the way the world is and in no way ideologically 
constructed, neutral categories like the classifications of botany or zoology. 
The metaphor implies that no factors other than unalterable biological or 
psychological or, more importantly, spiritual necessity limit educational 
progress - the metaphors suggest at different times different formulations of 
human nature. Both Bantock and Arnold ultimately appeal to the moral sense 
and sensibilities of their readers - as Butler does to his listeners - to justify 
their ideas. Indeed their vocabulary excludes those who do not share their 
'common' sense of moral and cultural superiority.
What is, however, most important for the liberal discourses is that they 
counter effectively the egalitarian argument that social factors are the 
determining ones. The metaphor has at its ideological and metaphysical roots 
the fundamental premise that since people are essentially different then they 
are categorisable into different types, some more valued in these discourses 
than others and then characterised by different needs and desires, different 
beliefs, different habits and even different habitats. Butler favours three types 
of classification, both Arnold and Bantock, more exclusively still, favour two: 
a small elite corps of cultured people and the barbarian or philistine masses. 
The distinction is not presented, though, as simple 'common sense' assertion. 
It is justified through a quite complex conception of human 'nature'.
Through the process of attaining 'higher' culture, people may attain their true, 
'higher' nature. The texts of Arnold and Bantock are testaments to their faith: 
they each use religious metaphor and each locates their respective elites in a 
missionary position within a hostile, barbarous society. Butler, too, uses 
religious imagery to describe his Act, the words 'devotion' and 'zeal' recur as 
he describes the qualities teachers must have and school inspectors are
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reserved a special place in his litany of saints: HM1 Inspectors, themselves
the special apostles o f  widening and humanising content. ’
Bantock also uses religious imagery - like Arnold, his ‘nature’ is essentially
religious - to describe the necessary and essential process of what he would
describe as real learning which may only occur with the acknowledgement of
the authority of knowledge - that is the authority of traditional canonical
forms of knowledge - and the learner's own sense of deficiency, 'of rightful 
70s u b m is s io n 'to that authority:
'Learning always involves a determination to grasp after what 
is yet uncomprehended. It requires, on the part o f  the learner, 
a respect for the unknown, a reverence before the unattained; 
inevitably therefore, a transcendence o f  self. All learning 
presupposes an act o f faith...'
Butler’s Act, for example, does not address pedagogic issues or attempt to 
describe or circumscribe the role of the teacher. Indeed on teachers’ 
professional status he remains silent. He seems content with the traditional 
Mr Kipps image of the teacher as a distant, vaguely benign, authority figure 
there simply and impersonally to transmit right reason and right feeling. 
Bantock's education, too, is a sober process. He constructs the identity of the 
teacher as a reserved, cold authority: a mentor who is concerned only with the 
inculcation of knowledge and sensibility as laid down in the sacred canons. 
Bantock objected to the 'fun and frivolity’ which he narrowly saw as 
characteristic of progressive education. The teacher is not, he jeers, a 'Big 
Friend'-, the teacher should determine what is taught and to whom it is taught, 
and should not pretend that learning is not hard work followed by more hard 
work.
Civilisation, for Bantock, is serious, not a subject for irony. It is made up of 
ritualised acts of submission to proper authority, and that authority in 
education is not the teacher but the canon, though a certain degree of 
authority, he acknowledges, inevitably is transferred to the teacher. Bantock is 
concerned about this sub-Freudian transference effect causing teachers to 
have a misplaced perception of their own importance. Consequently he
^T E SS 6/5/94 op. cit. p.vi. 
30Bantock (1952) p. 203 
3  ^ibid., p. 189
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characterises a metaphysic of teaching, where the teacher impersonally - the 
pupil should have no other Gods before him - leads the pupil to interface, a 
metaphor Bantock would loathe, with the sacred canon. The real educational 
relationship is that interaction: on such 'holy ground', 'real' learning 
'transcends the individual and social life, and that, informing its true spirit 
and its true essence there is the ultimate apprehension o f the divine in 
man . It is this humble deference to authority, to the sacredness of the 
knowledge of the canons, that marks the truly educated, the truly cultured, 
rather than the attainment of any kind or degree of knowledge.
A curriculum designed by Bantock or Arnold would not be in any clear sense 
a 'common' curriculum. Only a few of the children would have the necessary 
sensibility to be considered educated in Arnold's or Bantock's terms. Bantock 
is, for example, caustic about the possibility of a 'common curriculum'. 
Speaking of the more democratic intentions of the Harvard Report, he writes:
‘The writers tangle themselves up into the most delightful 
knots when the problem o f what to give the less gifted arises - 
how to turn the weeds into rose bushes. The curriculum for  
these people must not be simply watered-down versions o f  
more complex courses but authentic and fresh vehicles o f the 
spheres o f  general education - the world, man's social life, the 
realm o f the imagination, the ideal - designed to implant the 
power o f  thought and expression, the sense o f relevance and 
value.
Bantock is clearly not above using the odd mechanical metaphor himself and 
perhaps it is not just the writers of the Harvard Report that tie themselves up 
in knots. There are, indeed, some knotty problems with the botanical 
metaphors he uses here: how can 'the power of thought' be 'implanted'? What 
is a 'sense' of relevance? He clearly finds quite worthless those 'weeds' who 
cannot assimilate his cultural elite even though he patronisingly grants dignity 
to 'human beings, when they are being themselves; so that the most 
commonplace actions and the drabbest o f people acquire an immense 
richness'. ^
■^ibid., p. 203 
■^ibid., p. 168 
■^ibid., p. 155/6
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Like T.S.Eliot he does not see the educational world populated by 'mute 
inglorious Miltons' but by the few who may be educated to be the worthy 
bearers and transmitters of the Culture, and those who are the recipients of the 
crumbs that fall from the high tables of their wisdom. What is required is that 
the many less gifted children are educated to understand their limits and to 
acknowledge the wisdom of their betters. He abhorred what he called 'false 
democracy’, citing Lawrence, 'where every issue, even the highest is dragged
' i c
down to the lowest... .
Bantock asserted that such educational inequalities were not only ’natural' but 
were also liberating. He cites Lawrence for support: 'When, therefore he 
suggests that the masses are incapable o f mind-consciousness, he is 
concerned to free them, not to enslave them. They are 'To give active 
obedience to their leaders and to possess their own souls in natural pride \ ° 
Bantock's laudable intention was to remove what he saw as educational 
tyranny, but he interpreted that as to avoid thwarting the 'true nature' of the 
child. He recognised the subtleties of cruelty, the way social democratic 
theorists might deny the individuality of the child, subsuming the child's 
desires and aspirations to the needs of the whole; and he recognised the 
potential for cruelty in the way that progressive theorists tend to give too 
much reverence to the individual child to the exclusion of all else. He perhaps 
vaguely recognised the need, as Rorty does, for the necessary detachment of 
irony to question the values of educational narratives, though he uses derision 
rather than irony in his polemics. He does not, however, employ irony in his 
discussion of his own preferred narrative. He does not, for example, and nor 
does Butler, address the hegemonic dimension of their vocabularies, which 
they rather tend to pretend do not exist. Neither do they consider the way that 
their discourse grants a small number of people power and influence and 
denies those to the many.
The liberal discourse requires the essential indifference of all concerned in 
the educational process to everything but the Culture, defined with some 
circularity as being whatever 'cultured' people believe it is - unless Bantock's 
and Arnold's metaphysical view is taken that it is a kind of Platonic realm of 
eternal truths and even then it is only the initiated who can discern it and 
communicate these 'truths' to less gifted mortals. All educational relationships
3^ibid., p. 161 
36ibid., p. 177/8
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and methods are valid only if they are in the interest of the greater good, 
indeed the ultimate good, of the maintenance of established authority, the 
revealed Truth. Where Butler differs is that he seeks to maintain a particular 
way of life, one oriented very largely on middle class values, which Bantock 
and the others might well consider rather narrow and vulgar. In Bantock's 
narrative, education is a spiritual activity, the search for perfection, a Grail 
Quest. The freemasonry of the elite requires the initiation of the child into 
what are almost chivalric virtues, purity of purpose, spirit and mind.
Though Butler's discourse masks its essential elitism, Bantock's narrative is 
apparently unconcerned about creating social division and the potential for 
harm that this might cause. His concern is to inculcate, in only those pupils he 
defines as capable of it, the capacity for independent thought inside the 
framework of the pervasive authority of the canon: to establish, maintain, 
transmit and internalise in the pupils a culture in which values have been 
fixed by the elite. He, as Butler did, could rely on the 'mechanism' of the 
hidden curriculum with its inevitable emphasis on differential treatment and 
selection, ranking processes and labelling of success and failure, to create the 
necessary conditions for consent: the recognition by all the pupils that 
differential reward for different levels of achievement is fair and just - and 
'natural'. That this system might create other kinds of cruelty, he offers no 
comment.
What is clear is that both Bantock and Arnold differentiate people in terms of 
sensibility, 'ability' being a secondary factor. However Butler’s discourse 
apparently differentiated people in terms of ability, but then Butler did not 
consider that everyone would have to submit to his testing regime anyway: 
who he excludes is as important as who he has designed his system for. The 
^nly publicly perceived form of worthwhile education that Butler offered, the 
grammar schools, was the Respectable Tendency's interpretation of something 
like Arnold's ideals, though in many respects a travesty of them. Where the 
real hope of Butler's discourse resided was in the public schools.
The public schools, excluded from Butler's regime, educated their children 
without recourse to selective testing; for them the class background of the 
children ensured that since they would probably be economically secure in 
later life. They could then concentrate on their primary aim, to induct the 
child into the sensibilities, mores and culture of the ruling elite. 'Higher'
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natures were ever considered more a matter of breeding and heredity than of 
'ability'. The only practical determination of'higher' nature for those not of the 
advantaged classes, was to test 'ability' and for those who passed that test 
there was some limited opportunity to develop their 'higher' selves.
Social and educational advantage was a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition of a 'higher' sensibility or 'higher' nature. What grammar schools 
had to offer was not just the pragmatic considerations of a better education 
and better life chances but also the faint hope of admittance into the 'higher' 
culture, where the real power was. However, the degree of educational and 
social leisure time - time not directly related to the struggle to pass public 
examinations, for example - required to develop 'higher' planes of being 
ensured that those who had to struggle to make their educational ends meet 
were, of necessity, excluded. Also, since such 'higher' natures themselves are 
defined as the 'natures', the interests and aspirations of the privileged class, in 
effect 'higher' natures could only really be achieved through social, and 
therefore educational, advantage. Built into this concept of nature is the 
justification for privileged classes to reproduce their advantage. As a 
metaphysic the 'natural' distinctions have their educational feet in clay, though 
very privileged clay.
Bantock's narrative is about the need for educational freedom from what he 
saw as enervating fashionable educational theories which were adopted by 
politicians for expediency and popularity, and for the re-establishment of 
traditional forms of discipline and authority. In his narrative there is no 
freedom without authority, without some framework that makes the idea of 
freedom mean something - the authority of the Culture. His discourse 
attempted to influence educators and policy makers through the view he 
polemicised and the derision he heaped on other narratives. The danger he 
saw was the threat of the 'dilution' of culture, as if it were some kind of 
chemical solution, securely locked away in a cabinet, that would grow weaker 
if too many people were invited to share in it or contribute to it.
Carlos Fuentes, writing about Mikhail Bahtkin remarks, 'ours is an age o f  
competitive languages' ^  Bhatkin theorised about the novel, asserting that 
fiction was bom because in essential ways we do not understand each other
^  As cited in Christopher Norris, Spinoza & the Origins o f Modem Critical Theory (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1991) pp. 256.
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any longer - the different vocabularies of different life-worlds, to borrow a 
term from Habermas, are in competition, preventing synonymy. The 
vocabulary of Bantock is designed not to reduce but to increase and to 
sanction such competition and to sustain it through education. He is not 
concerned to try to create synonymy: meaning is only for the few. The rest, by 
virtue of their intellectual, moral or aesthetic inability, are cast into the outer 
darkness. He has no truck with Butler's, admittedly hesitant, assertion of 
'parity of esteem'. For Bantock, ‘A mass-culture will always be a substitute 
culture : to settle for less is apparently like buying cheap cola when the 
'real thing' can be purchased, though at greater expense.
Bantock has neither respect nor time for other life worlds, no time for
anything but his narrow English volume of hallowed texts. Other 'foreign'
cultures have nothing to offer him: he is secure in his insular, intellectual
imperialism. Bantock's curriculum would be a narrow thing indeed with only
those subjects legitimised and granted authority by tradition - social studies
thus became a 'bastard subject' - and rigid subject barriers. The traditional
subjects, he claims, demarcate fundamental, epistemological distinctions,
each marking out some 'natural' area of knowledge, and each with its ‘own
IQrules oj verification proper to their own fielcT . This epistemology is not 
really developed by Bantock, indeed it would not be an easy argument to 
justify; rather it seems to be the case that his claim for the necessity of such 
rigid boundaries of different 'natural kinds' of knowledge, just as in his 
assertion of different 'natural kinds' of children, is required in his story to 
assert the common-sense authority of traditional educational curriculum 
content.
Bantock's discourse is a monological one: he has his list of sacred texts, and 
unitary meaning which is dogmatic and demands complete conformity. There 
is no discursive space allowed for ambiguity or a plurality of viewpoints or 
narratives. He would have little sympathy with this exercise, engaged as it is 
in the analysis of political and social narratives in terms of a competition 
between vocabularies for domination. Where there can cnly be one narrative 
then there are no narratives at all: where there can be only one vocabulary 
there can be no debate, no dissent and no possibility of irony. Bantock 
claimed to have found the Truth. He emerged triumphant through the
38Bantock (1952): p. 47 
39ibid„ p. 198
81
assertion of spiritual values which neither of his opponents, as he constructed 
them, can match. His sense of triumph was like the victory of the 19th 
Century missionaries over the pagans: his sense of mystical purpose and 
spiritual power overcomes and converts the heathen, but like the missionaries, 
his mysticism renders invisible the gunboats of the colonial power of the 
British Empire which politically, economically and culturally exploited the 
mission of the priests.
Education policies lead to systems and stories that have profound cultural and 
ethical effects and surely deserve research, informed comment and objective 
and reasoned argument and logic. Yet Butler had little beyond a professional 
politician’s expediently narrow view of education and what Bantock has to 
offer, in the end, is only a spurious mysticism masquerading as philosophy 
and a series of dyspeptic polemics about intellectually respectable educational 
theories which he has caricatured to make appear ridiculous.
For Arnold the end of reason and philosophy was the systematic searching for 
certainties, where Truth always has a capital letter. Bantock, too, is possessed 
by this same search and what he and those of like mind found True provided 
him with his certainties. Yet the end of philosophy, of literary criticism and of 
educational theory is not to find truth: there are no certainties no matter what 
Arnold, Bantock or Butler might assert. Rather, perhaps, the end of 
philosophy might be better understood as the discovery of irony: to locate 
meaning and to attempt to generate some kind of synonymy between 
conflicting vocabularies.
It is for this reason these chapters set out deliberately to ironise the narratives 
they discuss. Rorty recognised the need for irony: without irony there is no 
passion, without passion there is no commitment, without a shared 
commitment - some sense of solidarity - there is no meaning, and without 
meaning there is nothing but, at worst, deliberate or inadvertent cruelty or, at 
best, Cartesian solipsistic isolation and the Humean nightmare of one 
undifferentiated thing after another without shape, form or value. Greater 
understanding might reconcile competing stories and competing forms of life.
The imperialism and exclusivity of the liberal narrative of education, and the 
value it places on one form of life, one type of mind, one vocabulary above 
another, inevitably produces conflict unless it is maintained by some form of
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social control. Hogg’s myth, Bantock's authoritative canon, Arnold's 
sensibility and Butler's Act are all forms of control. Butler both saw, perhaps 
more pragmatically than Bantock, that the preservation of this privileged form 
of life - and the narrative that sustained it - required something more than 
rhetoric. He, with reluctance, saw the only recourse was to the state. Arnold's 
enlightened state was an idealised and impossible fiction so Butler made the 
best of what was available. But this state control could not be overt or 
repressive: a Gestapo would not only be offensive to Butler, Bantock and 
Arnold, but also ultimately self-defeating if the end is to maintain some kind 
of libertarian liberalism as they each did. What was needed was a more subtle 
means of control, over the discourse of education without infringing too much 
on personal liberties. This was Butler's challenge and to an extent he 
succeeded, at least in the short term, to manufacture educational consent, to 
borrow a phrase from Chomsky. Bantock's book is witness, however, to the 
crisis which soon was to develop.
Postscript
At the time of writing this study, we seem to be experiencing a paradigm 
change from 'commitment' politics back to some kind of 'consensus' model. 
The 1944 Act seems to have become reinvented as an icon of consensus 
politics, perhaps not so much the content of the Act though much of what 
Butler had to say appears to be in the process of being re-interpreted in more 
fashionable language, with more fashionable metaphor, but the method by 
which he gained consent and managed dissent
Even now, more than fifty years since Butler's Act, Butler is fairly 
consistently characterised in the present day educational discourses as a 
popular hero, a man of deep and humane principle who had outfaced 
Churchill's rage when he disobeyed Churchill's demand, when he was 
appointed President of the Board of Education, not to introduce any 
educational legislation. It was he who had driven through his Act despite the 
resistance of the Churches and many of the other members of the House and 
of the Cabinet; he who had worked assiduously, with humility and humanity, 
to gain the consent of educationalists and educational administrators; and he 
who had finally, with magnanimity and modesty, accepted his success.
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As political skill has become in recent years much more professional he has 
become a kind of paradigm. His 'lack o f  obsessive insistencestates Michael 
B a r b e r ^ ,  was his chief virtue: his political realism and his consensual
approach, his art of compromise and his powers of persuasion through which 
he could turn potentially contentious ideas into a political reality with 
widespread support. This verdict on Butler and his Act was shared even by 
the educational press: ‘...a masterly piece o f work combining far-seeing 
statesmanship with acute political realism ’ ^
A. H. Halsey, in his doctoral thesis, too was filled with admiration for the Act: 
‘It was a marvellous step forward because it expressed a wonderful national 
unity, an emphasis on educational progress, an impulse that was sweeping 
through the nation which was very, very good. ’ ^2 This, perhaps more than 
anything else, establishes the potency of Butler's voices or perhaps it is a 
reflection of the wishful thinking of the egalitarians that Butler spoke with 
something like their voice. It was Butler's skill in creating consensus which 
has so attracted writers like Barber and Addison. Butler titled his 
autobiography, The Art o f the Possible. It is his pragmatism and skill in 
avoiding outright confrontation - at least confrontation that he could not 
exploit - that they find so attractive and which forms a central theme of their 
narratives.
For example, both make much of how Butler managed the thorny problem of 
Church control. In this part of his Act, Butler explicitly makes the 
acknowledgement that in considering the problem of the central control and 
funding of the educational expansion he envisaged and the unaccountability 
of church controlled schools he was fortified by the fact that we were a 
National Government and have made an all-party approach.. He outlined 
the problem of funding and management which had beset Church schools 
since the turn of the century and proposes a 'partnership' with them though he 
insists that increased state aid must entail increased state control. He gives the 
Church a stark choice. Their refusal to allow greater state control 'would...
^  Michael Barber, "Broadside from a backwater," TESS 6/5/94. sec. The 1944 Act: 50th 
Anniversary: p.iv.
^Harold Dent, Dec 18th, 1943: in Patricia Rowan "Journalist with a hand in history," TESS 
9/5/94, extracts from the Times Educational Supplement leaders of former editor, Harold 
Dent: p.xi.
A H. Halsey as cited by Peter Kingston, "1944 and all that," The Guardian 18/1/94, sec. 
Education Guardian: p.3.
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imperil its general acceptance and might bring about a reaction as 
detrimental to the Churches as to the cause o f education itself.' ^  As with 
industry, Butler uses the rhetoric of partnership rather than coercion though in 
doing so, given the prevailing climate, there was little chance that either the 
church or industry would make any serious or public objection, '...education 
should be regarded as the an ally and not the dreaded competitor o f  
employment ’
Addison's interpretation places Butler as one of several main protagonists of 
the action. However, his admiration for Butler is tempered by an analysis of 
the history of the time in which he describes how a happy coincidence of 
events were also necessary conditions for Butler to succeed. He does praise 
Butler's political skills - ‘a young Conservative politician o f great subtlety 
and perseverance ’ - but these skills were not sufficient on their own for him 
to succeed It is, however, clear that Butler did, with great skill and 
diplomacy, steer the Bill through to completion, exploiting a fear here and a 
sense of justice there, obtaining at the end a remarkable consensus. Even the 
communist leader of the National Union of Teachers, C.G.T. Giles, the author 
of The New School Tie, and certainly no friend of the establishment, greeted 
the Act as a great step forward for democratic education which would achieve 
for children, 'a happier childhood and a better start in life ’ ^
Yet Butler's discourse obscured real educational inequalities and continued to 
reproduce inequalities. Butler, for a time, succeeded in preserving the old 
traditional loyalties of class and country, and the authority of the educational 
elite. Butler's rhetoric of equality was not a call for greater justice but was, in 
the end, a mechanism to justify the exclusion of the many ultimately from the 
social and economic goods the society had to offer. The ideological function 
of his and Arnold's and Bantock's, 'natural' metaphors is to attempt to remove 
educational methods and policy from the material concerns of political 
debate: the apparent ideological innocence of the metaphor removing 
education from the ideologies of power, class and the distribution of wealth 
and substituting 'natural' phenomena as excusing conditions for lack of 
complete educational success, just as the vagaries of the weather removes 
responsibility from the gardener or the owner of the garden for plants that fail
^  TESS 6/5/94 op. cit. p.ix.
^ ibid., p.vii
4^as cited by Michael Barber in, "The prime o f R A Butler," TESS 14/1/94, sec. Review: p.2.
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to flourish. It allows decisions about children's futures to appear to be 
objective, not a question of opinion but of fact. The 'common-sense' of their 
dismissal of proposals like Mannheim's state planning and social mechanisms 
as unnecessary interference with the freedom of the individual conceals their 
own fiction of natural selection: a mean doctrine of natural kinds of children, 
subsequent complex testing and labelling procedures and the organisation 
(though apparently not the 'planning', since 'planning' would suggest expert 
advice and theoretical justification) of the necessary regimes of schooling.
Butler's Act traded heavily on the social capital different forms of education 
would bring. The Act, whatever its stated intentions were, firmly embedded in 
the public perception that a grammar school education was best, unless, of 
course, a private school was affordable. Yet the Act, as we shall see, also 
contained the seeds of its own demise. The Act so raised educational 
expectations that when these expectations could not be met, when demand 
outran supply, the perception of the injustice of the relative denial of access 
or opportunity to a 'proper' education, ironically, brought Butler's liberal 
narrative to crisis.
By implying the cultural superiority of certain types of education, the notion 
of 'parity of esteem' never found much public acceptance, Butler's discourse 
inevitably implied cultural inadequacy, and obliquely legitimised privilege. 
Bourdieu^ describes success in this kind of educational system as being 
dictated by the degree and extent to which the pupil or student has absorbed 
this dominant culture, in his terms, how much cultural capital they have 
acquired. Since those in power control the form the culture takes, they are 
then able to limit who may acquire it and so sustain their dominant position. It 
was, for example, from the distorted sense of reality created by such cultural 
hegemony that the concept of'cultural deprivation' had acquired meaning and 
currency in the discourses of the egalitarians. This term has been, and 
sometimes still is, employed to offer an explanation as to why some children, 
from the working class, because they are female, or because they come from 
an ethnic minority, fail to achieve educationally as much as middle class or 
upper class children, in particular those children educated privately.
^Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron Reproduction in Education. Society and Culture. 
(London: Sage, 1977) Chapter 5 and passim.
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It is a symptom of how deeply embedded Butler's liberal vocabulary was to 
become in educational discourses that this notion did gain such currency. 
Cultural inadequacy - a relative failure to acquire the sensibilities of the 
dominant cultural narratives - was discursively conflated with cultural 
difference, living a different story with different beliefs and different values: a 
distinction especially relevant to systems such as Butler's where schools were, 
by definition directed to, or allowed to, stress certain cultural values which 
were different from those of significant sections of the population.
The liberal discourses discussed in this chapter sought to banish other 
narratives, other cultural values: like Henry IV to ‘Banish plump Jack and 
banish all the world'. There was no space in Butler's discourse for Falstaffian 
extremes or even differences. Treading their mean Aristotelian middle path, 
their morality propped up by occasional self-indulgent stage-managed shows 
of moral indignation, they forged a fiction of education and society. Yet 
there was nothing woolly-headed about Butler's voice. It was clear, certain 
and authoritative. His narrative held out, somewhere in the myth of an 
increasingly meritocratic future, the promise of a final resolution. His Act 
made no explicit attempt to counter or deny any other discourse, on 
alternatives he maintained silence. It was presented as only a practical 
solution to practical problems. It adopted no explicit theory and had no 
philosophy except that masked ideology implied by the metaphors it 
employed.
Butler attempted to de-politicise educational debate and obtain consensus for 
his position by appealing to 'common-sense'. He disguised the fact that 
educational policies are moral acts which have significant consequences for 
the individual and for society by pretending that he was not really making 
moral or political choices at all, that he was just reflecting the way that the 
world was. The element of incompleteness in Butler’s narrative, though it was 
fugitive, was to provide only the appearance of dynamic tension; rather it 
would be used to control the direction of future debate. It became the agenda 
on which future change would be built, at least for the next twenty years or 
so. Its vocabulary was the one which was preferred, its metaphors literalised 
as 'common-sense'.
Butler had created in his Act the terrain of educational debate and by so 
circumscribing the discursive arena he in effect maintained for his narrative a
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considerable ideological degree of control over what direction educational 
debate could take. In particular, he had managed to attain and fortify the high 
ground in the immanent battle between those like himself and the 
egalitarians.
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Chapter 4
The Iconography of the Grammar School 
and the 
Politics of Desire
'The element o f  envy, conscious or repressed, can for the most part be 
ignored. It is the reformers who cherish the highest ideals, who are 
emotionally committed to the concept o f equality, that are the most 
dangerous. In the name o f fairness' and 'social justice', sentimentality has 
gone far to weaken the essential toughness on which quality depends' ^
It was the traditional intolerance of political discourses with radical 
disagreement that made the educational consensus of the post war years 
politically so apparently remarkable and which perhaps has made the 
objective of achieving consensus in present day educational narratives so 
apparently desirable to certain politicians. Interpreted with generosity, the 
post-war consensus could be seen as an attempt to pull the educational story 
out of the destructive ideological conflict of competing narratives, to make it 
somehow above and beyond the desires of power, or at least to appear to be 
so. Less generously it could be interpreted as an abdication of power by the 
respectable politicians of both wings who broadly agreed that the Butler 
narrative, particularly in its expansion of grammar school education, was 
probably the best of all possible educational worlds. However, rhetorically 
there were problems for both wings in being explicit in their desire for 
something like an evolved Butler narrative.
Even the educational consensus of the post war years had been riven by 
discursive conflict. A kind of consensus had been uneasily maintained by the 
‘Respectable’ tendencies of both political parties, but more and more it 
seemed to have become perceived as only producing a directionless, static
 ^Angus Maude The Egalitarian Threat in (eds) C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson Black Paper 1 
(London: Critical Quarterly, 1968): p.7
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narrative unable to offer the kind of educational expectations that were 
becoming seen to be necessary to Britain’s cultural and economic future. The 
hard egalitarian narrative of the Labour Party demanded greater equality than 
the increased opportunity of the Butler narrative could provide and on the 
right, the Butler narrative was perceived to have conceded too much to the 
egalitarians. A quiet ‘hands o ff consensus, with no strident advocacy of 
alternative narratives, leaving the development of education and schooling in 
the hands of local authorities and the educational professionals was 
politically the course of least resistance. Comprehensive education, 
counterpointed by the vocabulary of disadvantage, became the dominant 
narrative, for a while at least, almost by default.
1. Managing Expectations
'A grammar school education for all'
Labour Party Manifesto, 1964
What Butler maintained was a narrative containing two discrete educational 
stories, one for the elite and one for the rest, maintained by the fiction of 'the 
mystique o f a traditional authority' for the elite and 'equality of opportunity' 
for the aspiring classes; the tension of the possibility of class advancement 
for the 'most able' keeping the social system in uneasy equilibrium.
These two educational nations are described clearly by Nigel Wright:
'Britain has never attempted to offer one type o f education to 
all children. In the nineteenth century> the powers-that-be did 
not feel that the lower classes needed, or deserved, or could 
benefit from, the kind o f education given to the privileged few.
In the 1920s psychological theories o f innate intelligence did 
open the way for the extraction o f  'clever' children from the 
working classes on the basis that there was (some) ‘gold in 
them thar hills'. This was institutionalised by the 1944 
Education Act which proposed to offer a grammar school 
education to anyone whose ’innate intelligence' made them 
likely to profit from it. The rest o f  the population were to 
receive an 'equal but different'schooling.'
2 Nigel Wright, Progress in Education. A Review o f  Schooling in England and Wales 
(London: Croom Helm, 1977) p. 162
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However, on a more political level, the identification of the 'real nature' of 
the child became the problematic of even Butler's limited revision of the 
educational discourse: that some children had been excluded from 
opportunity in education for economic reasons was a feature of the pre-war 
hierarchical social order, and if that social order was 'natural' then the 
exclusion was also 'natural'. What Butler did, even if inadvertently, was to 
discursively weaken the 'naturalness' of that social order in his Act, in effect 
to further weaken the traditional, 'Respectable' Conservative's view of the 
'real' world. Instead of the philanthropy of the rich allowing a few children of 
the lower order educational opportunity as an act of charity, Butler's Act 
granted them such opportunity, almost as a right - though, ironically, more a 
'natural' right than a legal one - if they could meet the criteria of the selection 
process. The odds against success, however, still remained stacked against 
them. The 'nature' of the child, however, had shifted a little in Butler's 
pseudo-mentocratic discourse to become more a matter of the child's putative 
'ability' than the child's social class.
It had soon became a material question as to how significantly Butler had 
widened the opportunities of children to the 1^ 651' education possible: in his 
system the grammar school offered the most desired education but selection 
to it was clearly biased in favour of the middle classes. It was not just that by 
reason of their social background that children of the middle classes were 
advantaged in the selection process, but the traditional grammar schools, 
those most desired, were already geographically situated in middle class 
areas and further, educational expansion as envisaged by the Butler 
consensus was economically constrained and consequently the numbers of 
children who could be admitted to grammar schools was limited. The 
alternative technical schools, which were designed in concept to provide a 
different route of educational opportunity, were a victim of financial 
constraints. They never really featured on the educational landscape and the 
last of the few created closed in 1955.
Will Hutton, the economist and journalist, was educated in the nineteen 
sixties at Chislehurst and Sidcup Grammar school. His education perhaps 
exemplifies the discourses of desire of the Butler Act. He came from an 
enterprising middle class background and his parents were ambitious and 
wealthy enough that if the local grammar school had not been considered
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acceptable, he would have been educated privately. In this he was not really 
the characteristic child of the Butler narrative who would typically and 
condescendingly be more accurately described as one of the deserving poor - 
yet, ironically, in many ways he was the typical child of the Act. The ethos of 
his school was egalitarian, but in a way that only a privileged educational 
establishment seemed to be able to understand the concept. He writes that:
'...the Head's ambition for the school was to break the British 
class system and he was determined that his boys should be as 
clever, should get to Oxford or Cambridge in equal numbers, 
should be as well read and as soundly confident as public 
schoolboys... It was a very meritocratic environment. We 
were made to feel that there was nowhere that we shouldn't 
go, nothing that we shouldn't attempt and that what mattered
-5
was our brains and our articulacy...'
This is what seemed to have become of the egalitarianism of Butler's Act; it 
became narrowed to become simply an instrument with which to widen 
middle class expectations and opportunities and to break down, in some 
degree, the elitism of the English educational system. How successful this 
attempt was is perhaps exemplified by Hutton who was interviewed but not 
accepted for Cambridge and instead went to Bristol University.
Hutton's failure to enter into the privileged educational world of Cambridge 
is perhaps brought into ironic perspective by the experience of Julian 
Critchley, the present Conservative MP for Aldershot, in getting into Oxford 
some years earlier. Critchley, offering advice to his grandchild who, as a 
result of three 'A' Levels and a successful interview, had been accepted by 
Magdalen, writes:
'In 1951, Pembroke was the only college not to require an 
examination; it was enough that I had been at Shrewsbury 
and had got my Higher School certificate. Michael Heseltine 
and I were briefly interviewed by some dull dons, and, as a 
result, we 'talked' our way into Oxford. You are to be 
congratulated on having done it the hard way. ’ ^
Will Hutton, writing in TES(S) 12/7/96: My Best Teacher...
^Julian Critchley in a letter to his grandson, published in The Guardian 1/10/96
92
Critchley's wistful remarks include some advice about restaurants, girls, 
being nice to the dons, and avoiding spending too much, though he admits he 
was lucky in that his father gave him £400 a year, the average industrial wage 
at the time. He does, however, go on to offer a - possibly caricatured - 
picture of life at Oxford in the 1950’s, a social world from which Hutton, in a 
further irony, would have been relieved to have been excluded:
‘In my day Magdalen,... seemed fu ll o f  toffs, lanky young men 
in brown twill trousers and floppy fair hair. They spent their 
time beagling and buggering. I  expect all that has changed, 
for public schoolboys are now a small minority among 
undergraduates. '
Critchley's nostalgia downplays the inequalities of educational provision and 
opportunity by his deliberately ingenuous description of the cultural and 
social value of his education. That entry to such universities is now 
somewhat more meritocratic is mentioned only as a slightly regretful 
afterthought. Hutton's headmaster's Butlerian meritocratic vision, 'that what 
mattered was our brains and our articulacy', was unquestionably naive.
Hutton's experience typifies the dogged resistance of the story of English 
education to interrogation or re-interpretation. Bantock, as discussed in the 
last chapter, exemplifies this resistance of the narrative to being interrogated. 
He gives the impression that the world, the cultured world or the truth of the 
world, is being spoken through him, by his voice, by his desire. He obstructed 
interrogation by using derision to undercut critical analysis and to threaten 
the analyst. His discourse was grounded in fear of the loss of control of the 
narrative.
Bantock's was a desire for mastery of signification - of meaning - that was the 
root of his 'authority'. He sought to control who can speak and what they 
might say. He seemed to see relationships - social as well as intellectual - in 
terms of power, with the relationships of participants inevitably characterised 
as master and slave, dominant and subservient - always in hierarchical terms. 
Bantock was not however naive, he saw that this hierarchy was inevitably a 
source of conflict: it contained the threat that it might become subverted or 
inverted so that the slave can come to dominate the master - a betrayal which
5Ibid.
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was just what Bantock feared was coming in the educational narrative; that 
instead of the masses being led by the cultural elite, rather he foresaw the 
values of the cultural elite being subverted by those who should be doing the 
leading: the popularisation of culture, the watering down of traditional values 
and verities, the betrayal in which everything that has cultural 'meaning' was 
being challenged. It is this recurrent narrative motif of betrayal which 
sustained the rhetoric of the Conservative Party in their struggle against the 
egalitarian counter-narrative of the comprehensive movement.
Butler had re-established the clear symbolic order of education. His system of 
classification, categorisation and selection was unambiguously hierarchical: 
there was a place for everyone and everyone knew their place. It established 
a necessary fiction, the class educational story though within the relatively 
more mobile class system of the times it allowed for a certain degree of 
social and educational mobility. In this caste system, the grammar school - 
the public school reinvented for the lower middle classes - became the centre 
and the object of desire.
Though discursively the Butler Act appeared to assert the ideology of the 
post-war 'common people', in effect what it did was to maintain and even, 
perhaps, to harden social class differentials. Snobbishness and privilege were 
still prominent features of the educational landscape. Angus Maude, for 
example, complained that abolishing the grammar school as a means to 
attempting to create greater equality in education was: 'To try forcibly to 
prevent the emergence o f an elite.' The grammar school had become the 
middle class's route to economic and cultural power and it was in defence of 
this privilege that their power was exerted - as witnessed by the Black Papers 
which were militantly middle class - to combat what they saw as the threat of 
the comprehensive movement.
The grammar school symbolised history and tradition, assimilating post-war 
anxieties about the loss of social and cultural values and the certainties of the 
past, and granting in turn status and prestige. It preserved the 'mystique o f  
traditional authority' and, perhaps most importantly, it provided the middle 
classes with social power within a coherent symbolic order. It was sustained 
by the vocabulary of essential difference, establishing clear boundaries
^Angus Maude The Egalitarian Threat in Black Paper 1 : p. 8
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separating and making distinct the classes and their cultures and values. By 
so setting in concrete the essential 'natural* differences between children, 
Butler's Act attempted to free the educational system from any obligation to 
seek to become any more egalitarian. It was only when it was confronted by 
the aspirations to educational equality of the comprehensive movement that 
the grammar school was clearly revealed as the powerful icon of culture that 
it had become, the representation of the 'real' which granted signification and 
meaning to the educational story. Indeed the 1964 Labour Manifesto used 
the slogan ‘a grammar school education for all ’ to seek a popular mandate 
for the comprehensive school system.
For Bantock, the burgeoning comprehensive movement was essentially an act 
of blasphemy. Bantock's discourse was an attempt to hold back the post-war 
tides of egalitarian change and to attempt to reinstate the 'proper' educational 
order and protect it from the threat of this kind of hegemonic inversion. This 
emphasis on betrayal was to lead in lesser writers, as shall be seen in the 
Black Papers, to a much more crude rhetoric in which their totemic 
vocabularies of 'ability' and 'nature' and 'class' were to use the ideal of the 
grammar school as the central arena of their ideological struggle, in their 
discourses of privilege, envy and desire.
The ideology of selection and ability, though, had come under threat. The 
validity and reliability of the 11-Plus, the social cost of a divisive educational 
system and the perceived inegalitarian ethos of education and schooling had 
all undermined the simplistic 'common-sense' plot of Butler's Act. The 
egalitarians also exploited the class tensions which remained the foundation 
of Butler's narrative. With the Newsom Report as added justification - it 
found that only 21% of secondary modem schools were up to standard and
n
41% of schools 'seriously deficient in many respects' - the egalitarian 
counter narrative had gained substantial cultural momentum.
Newsom's rhetoric, like Butler's, was of waste: 'the potential o f these
children (of average or less than average ability) is very much greater than 
is generally assumed and that the standards they could achieve could
o
surprise us all' ° but the rhetoric went beyond crude economics, it also
*7
Chairman, John Newsom, Half our Future: A Report o f the Central Advisory Council for 
Education (England) (London: HMSO, 1963) p.258, Table 28. 
ibid: p. xiv
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invited cultural change. On social, moral and economic grounds, the report 
recommended: 'a change o f thinking and even more a change o f heart' ^ . 
Though couched in rather bland bureaucratic prose, the liberal demand of 
respect for persons is at the foundation of Newsom's revised story. It is a plea 
for a change in perception, to value those who it appears to him have been 
short-changed in their educational lives.
Newsom also challenged the construct of 'ability', the 'common-sense' of the 
current educational system: '...we deduce that it is not possible to generalise 
about the capacity o f the average and below average (pupil) until we have 
had the opportunity o f keeping them at school for a longer period and in 
smaller classes.' ^  Though Newsom did not speculate on any form of 
school re-organisation, he did distrust what he saw as premature judgements 
of 'capacity' in the current system. He makes a tentative attempt to shift the 
educational discourse from the concept of ability as a limited, inborn, 
'natural' quality of the child, to the somewhat more rhetorically neutral ideas 
of'capacity' and 'potential' which place more attention on the responsibility of 
educators and politicians to devise a form of schooling which might extract 
from children all that they may be capable of.
'Capacity' is, at least, a more optimistic metaphor, predicated on what any 
child might achieve given the opportunity, whereas 'ability' is in the discourse 
always a discriminatory criterion, a selective and limiting representation. 
Newsom's distinction however, does not seriously counter the ideology of 
'natural ability', it does not address the metaphorical foundations of the 
narrative; rather the distinction pleads for a change in emphasis, between 
seeing the child as a 'half full' bottle rather than a 'half empty' one.
Newsom's report offered a platform for those seeking a new educational 
consensus. By 1964 the then Labour Government had become more 
sensitised to educational inequality. Inequality - in education, housing, health 
and social security - had been the central plank of their manifesto and 
comprehensive reorganisation had been their policy since the early 1950's.
i^bid. p. xiii 10ibid: p. xiv
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In seeking to explain what he saw as the inept and politically disastrous 
introduction of comprehensive schooling, Dennis M arsden^ comments that 
there was little public will at the time for comprehensive reorganisation and 
that claims for a popular mandate were 'eyewash' He accuses the Labour 
Party of failing to address the perceptions, the desires and the anxieties of 
those involved in the educational world, both parents and teachers, of failing 
to recognise the lack of public support, and of a failure of commitment to 
reducing structural and institutional inequality in England. He describes how 
the Labour leaders had: 'developed an overpowering coyness about taking 
any action which would curb or interfere with the existing maldistribution o f  
power or resources.'
Yet in an alternative interpretation of events offered by George Walden , 
he describes what he calls 'The Comprehensive Folly' and claims to show that 
the passion of the Black Paper writers had its match in the enthusiastic 
egalitarians of the comprehensive movement, especially in the Labour Party. 
He cites a choleric Anthony Crosland insisting: ' I f  it's the last thing I do, I 
am going to destroy every fucking grammar school in England and Wales. 
And Northern Ireland.' ^  It was the perception - or, perhaps, the 
construction - of the zeal of such egalitarians which provided the Black Paper 
writers with their enemy. While Walden complains about the crudity here, it 
is not that of Crosland's language, but of what he calls the 'congealed 
vocabularies'  ^  ^ of not just the egalitarian narrative but also of the traditional 
'Respectable Conservative' narrative of the Black Papers.
What Marsden describes, however, is far from this kind of passionate 
intensity: he describes a policy vacuum and unconvincing rhetoric giving rise 
not to Walden's terrible beauty of egalitarianism but rather to a catalogue of 
indecision and deferral, leading eventually to a series of ineffectual 
initiatives. Certainly, the Labour Party, in office, displayed a reluctance to 
exert its control over the reorganisation: by issuing Circular 10/65, requesting 
authorities to prepare for secondary reorganisation rather than requiring it as
 ^  ^ Dennis Marsden, Politicians, equality and comprehensives ( Fabian Tract 411, 1971);
re-printed in (eds): Robert Bell, Gerald Fowler and Ken Little, Education in Great Britain and
Ireland (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) pp. 123-128.
12ibid. p. 125 1 1 George Walden, We Should Know Better: Solving the Education Crisis (London: Fourth 
Estate, 1996) Chapter 8. p. 145.
14 ibid p. 145 
^  ibid p. 163
97
part of a new education Act; by refusing to instruct the Department of 
Education to enforce and supervise comprehensivisation, but instead to rely 
on grass root support - sympathetic local authorities - to see it implemented; 
by explaining in Circular 10/66 that the government could not afford to offer 
new funding to implement change and at the same time increasing the 
educational temperature by denying funding to proposals for any more 
bipartite schools; by postponing, in January 1968 the raising of the school 
leaving age legislation, a central recommendation of Newsom; and, in 1970, 
failing to ensure that the bill to proscribe the Eleven Plus was passed in the 
House. By 1970 the Labour Party had lost the election and further 
opportunity to enact legislation requiring comprehensive schooling had 
effectively been lost.
Benn and Chitty point out Labour's historical reluctance to reorganise 
education: ’In all its years o f government, from 1924 to 1979 Labour has 
never implemented a major education act - nor introduced any major new 
academic qualifications. All such changes have been implemented under 
coalition or Conservative governments.' ^  However, they do not really 
attempt to explain this reluctance. It is clear that education is an important 
part of a socialist narrative of society but it clearly did not have the same 
significance in the thinking of the Labour Party. Education has long been 
recognised as means by which the society, its forms of social and economic 
relations, its culture and its institutions are reproduced from generation to 
generation. However, it does appear that the Labour Party never really has 
had a clear educational story to tell.
Historically, radical polemics such as Tawney's Equality^  were rhetorically 
important to the Labour narrative, but these were, however, limited in scope: 
they were mainly concerned with access to education and with protecting 
gains already made. Tawney's had been a significant text of the 1920's and 
30's, in that 'equality' had by then become an established, central and 
unassailable tenet of the Labour story of society. However, this became 
translated in the educational story of the Labour Party policy as a struggle for 
wider access to education and schooling. In Idealistic but not Visionary ^
Caroline Benn and Clyde Chitty, Thirty Years On: Is Comprehensive Education Alive and 
Well or Struggling to Survive? (London: David Fulton, 1996) p. 9
R.H. Tawney, Equality (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931 revised 1964) .
^  cited in Education Group: Centre for Contemporary Studies, University o f Birmingham, 
Unpopular Education: Schooling and Democracy in England since 1944 fLondon: Hutchison,
98
for example, Tawney uses metaphors of 'landings and staircases', 'cul de 
sacs', 'bridges', 'greasy poles’ and 'handrails' to depict the struggle for access 
to the first division of the educational world - the grammar school - rather 
than the reorganisation of schooling on egalitarian lines, creating one 
educational story for everyone. Though Tawney attacked the May Committee 
(1931) cuts in education expenditure as a 'declaration o f  class war’ ^  the 
socialist rhetoric disguised the essential conservatism of the Respectable 
Labour story. The Labour Party in office was much more conservative and 
made little attempt to counter the established dualist educational narrative 
with any radical educational reorganisation.
Butler had, anyway, rather cut the feet from Labour's narrowed interpretation 
of equality: access to schooling was no longer a problem as such. Rather the 
problem became reinvented as access to the grammar school when the 
defence of the fiction of parity of esteem had become untenable. For the Left 
as much as the Right, the selective grammar school was the only real 
educational option. Benn and Chitty describe how the Fabian Society were 
inclined generally to take an elitist view of education and that Sidney Webb 
had, for example, backed the 1902 provision of free places in public schools. 
Even Tawney had acknowledged the need for different schools and types of 
schooling for different children.
The child's 'nature' and 'natural ability' had become the 'common-sense' of the 
educational narratives of both the Respectable Left and Right - the two 
stories of education for the two 'natural' kinds of children.. It is not, however, 
clear exactly what qualities of the child the metaphor 'ability' represents. 
'Ability' was the product of a curriculum and an assessment regime which 
was designed to produce a spread of achievement. The validity of the testing 
was a question of whether or not the test results statistically reproduced the 
Bell Curve, a psychometric representation of the 'natural' distribution of 
human attributes, such as height, weight and, more importantly, intelligence. 
This Bell Curve would grant hard empirical justification to educational 
selection procedures of the Butler Act. By representing 'ability' as a 'natural' 
attribute of children, it required the interpretation of educational problems as 
the consequence of the individual child's nature. The pleasing symmetry of 
the curve reinforced the hierarchical, pyramidal world picture of the
1981) p. 29 
ibid p. 12
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Conservative Party. That 'ability' is not ‘naturally’ equally distributed, like 
height and weight, gave greater justification for differential educational 
experiences for children.
90However in a recent study by Fischer et al it appears that the Bell Curve is 
more a product of the self-fulfilling prophecy than anything else. The authors 
have shown that IQ, rather than representing a fixed 'natural' capacity, has 
more to do with the impact of the social and cultural environment on the 
individual. What determines life chances is not the child's IQ, but the social 
experiences that shape the child's life: child's home environment, the quality 
of the child's schooling, the child's race and gender... They claim that: ‘In 
practice psychometricians have defined intelligence after the fact: after 
constructing intelligence tests, obtaining the results, and interpreting what 
those results mean ’ Intelligence is defined, then, in terms of what they 
call the 'political arithmetic' of the tester's view of the world and will then, 
reflexively, justify that view. Fischer et al cite the statistical gerrymandering 
performed by the original authors of The Bell Curve, Richard Hemstein and 
Charles Murray, to make the raw scores in their study fit neatly into a 
'normally' distributed curve. They claim that IQ tests measure not 'natural' 
capacities but instruction - the quality of teaching and schooling has much 
more to do with it, as has the quality of the child's social environment. 
Cognitive functioning increases as the intellectual complexity of demands 
placed on it increases. It decreases as the tasks demanded are repetitive, 
undemanding and are perceived to be worthless.
It is the two educational stories, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, which create 
two kinds of children, not 'nature'. The common sense of the established 
narratives created the 'natural' differences between children. The children are 
read by the text, to borrow one of Roland Barthes's aphorisms. Inequality is a 
designed-in feature of the Butler Act rather than a 'natural' phenomena to 
which it responded. 'Ability' was not a politically or scientifically neutral 
concept but rather a means by which the selective process in education were 
justified and were sustained. It has long been the common-sense of the 
educational world picture of the Conservative Party justifying their dismissal
20 Claud S. Fischer, Michael Hout, Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Samuel R. Lucas, Ann 
Swindler and Kim Voss, Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996) p 45 and passim.
^^ibid., p.45
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of the impact of social factors on the development of the child. That the child 
does not perform well is a 'natural' consequence of the child's inherited 
capacities, not the child's environment. That the environment is miserable is 
a consequence of the child's parent's limited ‘abilities’ which the child has, 
unfortunately but inevitably, inherited. The social order was 'natural', the 
inherited ability and capacities of the population scientifically measured and 
neatly displayed in unambiguous statistical form.
Interpretations from the Right and Left both agree that comprehensive
reorganisation was disastrous, though for contradictory reasons.
Interpretations like Marsden's point to the reactionary forces of the
Respectable Tendency in the Labour Party and their reluctance to shift the
established educational story in a direction they feared would be unpopular
and in a direction for which they had, anyway, only a limited sympathy - they
did, after all, continue to refuse to pledge the disestablishment of the public
school system and they still, though reluctantly, for a time maintained the
assisted places scheme. Though the official Labour story was that the
tripartite system, and the bipartite system into which it evolved, did mirror
and perpetuate unacceptable social class divisions in society, there was little
will for radical change. Marsden discusses how Anthony Crosland, in a
rather less irascible mood, hoped that, '...slow changes at local level would
11provoke less hostility and permit time for the education o f the public'.
11In this Crosland was not so far from the view of Cobban , though for 
differing reasons. Cobban, however, began his article by asking a question 
which was for him not rhetorical. He asked '..is it always right to 
subordinate educational considerations to the ideals o f social justice7' ^4 
Many of the other Black Paper writers would have found this question too 
ludicrous to ask, believing that their view of society and the purposes of 
education was common sense rather than part of a political ideology and that 
the grammar school system was the best of all possible worlds. Since the 
socialist narrative subordinates everything to the principles of social justice, 
Crosland could only fudge the issue and could only reply something like that 
in theory social justice overrides all other principles, but that practical 
political considerations demanded moderation and circumspection. Bismark's
^  Marsden (1971): op.cit., p. 126
^J.M . Cobban The Direct Grant School in Black Paper 1 (1968) 
^ibid p.41
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dictum that politics was 'the Art o f  the Possible' infused the 'practical' politics 
of both Respectable wings of the parties.
However, the two parties were still quite distinct. For the Labour Party 
narrative it was a matter of a fundamental moral principle that had been 
deferred until the times were more propitious: the Conservative Party, 
however, at that time at least, had no similar foundation in clear social or 
moral principle. The sense of an ending, endlessly deferred, has now come to 
characterise post-modern narratives, but at that time the Labour Party did 
have a clear end sight, even if they could not achieve it and even if their 
hearts were not really one hundred percent committed to the comprehensive 
school as the means for achieving it. The Labour Party had a clear idea of the 
importance of their modernist narrative of social justice. In some ways the 
Conservatives, in contrast, have perhaps always had a post-modernist 
narrative, even before the term had become fashionable.
2. An Uneasy Consensus
"There is no doubt that in our headlong rush to educate everybody, 
we are lowering our standards"
T. S. Eliot: Christianity and Culture
The 1960s were a culturally and ideologically complex time, when the 
rhetorical base of the traditional social narratives of the Conservative Party - 
and the Respectable virtue of selfless public service which propped up their 
object of desire, the hierarchical social order and the maintenance of 
privilege - was becoming less persuasive. The rhetoric of egalitarianism of 
the Labour Party had become the dominant narrative, even if it was the softer 
‘equality of opportunity’ version which actually coloured their social 
policies. The Labour Party interpreted the popular will for greater social 
equality as popular agreement with their egalitarian discourses. This was, 
however, perhaps more wishful thinking than actually the case.
Though there was broad sympathy with pretensions to equality, at least as an 
eventual goal, popularly other cultural forces were at least as strong. Class 
divisions in society were perceived as less relevant to ‘modem’ life, perhaps 
partly a result of the Respectable educational policies following the Butler
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Act and perhaps also due to the growing emphasis on new types of industry 
and technology less associated with the class divisions of the past. Certainly 
the forms of life which were developing were much less influenced by 
‘traditional’ values.
There was much more cynicism about cultural traditions and forms of social 
and economic relations but at the same time there was also an idealism for 
the future. It was a romantic time, not just in the egalitarian politics of the 
Labour Party but also in the wider culture: The sixties witnessed a delirious 
upsurge o f romanticism in which the rebel and the deviant became heroes, 
the self was exalted and rules, restrictions, conventions and traditions were 
ditched wholesale. Personal style - cool, chic, cynical and consumerist - 
became the ideal... Richards is describing developments in the cinema, 
but they are as applicable in the wider culture of the times. Though the 
Zeitgeist of the times was egalitarianism, at the same time there was, 
paradoxically, much greater cultural emphasis placed on the individual, her 
search for self-identity and for a story to express that identity. The search for 
an individual style became in many ways the dominant feature of the culture 
and individualism - as expressed through consumption - was eventually to 
become the dominant ethic.
At the heart of a narrative is expectation, and at stake in the control of a 
narrative is the control of what forms of knowledge and culture it authorises, 
what may be legitimately expected of it, who may legitimately have great 
expectations and, inevitably, whose aspirations will be managed, granted or 
denied. In Great Expectations, for example, Pip is held upside down by the 
convict, Magwich and, in fact and metaphor, he sees the world upside down 
from then on. He misguidedly writes himself a story in which Miss Havisham 
is his benefactor and where he is entitled to believe he has expectations 
beyond those which he might legitimately hope for given his class origins. It 
is this misplaced belief which leads the arriviste Pip to deny his class, to 
deplore his family and eventually to come to grief. Pip’s expectations were 
not legitimate in the social narratives of his time and his presumption was 
cruelly punished.
^  Jeffrey Richards, The way we were, The Guardian 15/8/97
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What Butler had done through his narrative was to offer great expectations, 
but not to everyone: only the minority who were labelled in his story of 
human nature as the deservingly intelligent could legitimately expect the 
educational and thus the social and economic benefits of his narrative. And, 
largely, Butler’s educational story, as it was maintained by both the Labour 
and Conservative administrations up to the mid-sixties, had delivered and 
established a clear narrative expectation. At the same time, however, the 
story had also, when the notion of ‘parity of esteem’ became vacuous, 
created a less welcome narrative expectation for those not ‘selected’ for what 
had become the only ‘real’ education, the grammar school.
Labour, however, had traded on the rhetoric of a new, technocratic 
meritocracy to gain power and in the mid 1960s egalitarianism had become, 
even if more as rhetoric than fact, the sign of the times. However, this new 
egalitarian narrative appeared popularly to promise greater expectations than 
it could deliver. It did, to do it justice, take clear measures against poverty 
and deprivation, notably the Plowden Report and the establishment of 
Educational Priority Areas. These measures, however, continued to fuel the 
popular perception of the value of the grammar school, that comprehensives 
were somehow second class, more appropriate to the culturally and 
economically disadvantaged. The quasi-egalitarian narrative of the Labour 
Party, for example, was to increase the number of comprehensive schools 
from four and a half percent of the total secondary school provision in 1961
to close to thirty percent by 1971, but with only a corresponding shrinkage in
9 f\grammar schools of less than two percent . The new comprehensives were 
mostly old secondary modems upgraded, and they carried with them into 
their new incarnation the same problematic cultural, social and economic 
identity.
77Marsden^7 describes the ambiguity of the popular perception of 
comprehensive schooling. Egalitarianism was then the popular spirit of the 
times, Marsden cites a 1967 New Society opinion poll which recorded that 
although fifty-two percent of those polled were in favour of comprehensives, 
yet the same poll recorded that only sixteen percent would opt for a 
comprehensive school for their child and over three quarters of those polled
^1961 figures from Social Trends HMSO (1970) p.124; 1970 figures from Statistics DES. 
1970 vol. 1, p.2
"^Dennis Marsden (1971) p. 124
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favoured the retention of grammar schools. The egalitarian educational 
narrative had come to be iconically represented by the comprehensive school 
and was never as popular, it seems, as the left had hoped. The public clearly 
favoured the broad cultural narrative of egalitarianism and the greater 
expectations which that seemed to offer, but they were, frustratingly to the 
left, apparently not entirely convinced by comprehensive schools. This was, 
perhaps, because in the left rhetoric of the times they seemed to have become 
linked with the expectation of educational failure. The egalitarian 
educational narrative had created a rhetorical linkage between 
comprehensive schools and social deprivation and disadvantage.
Silver ^8 describes the new ‘Born to Fail' vocabulary of the educational 
narrative and its focus on deprivation, squalor and slum life and he argues 
that it was adopted with too little critical insight and too much enthusiasm by 
both politicians, particularly of the left, and educational theorists. Clearly 
what had attracted politicians of the left to this kind of vocabulary was its 
apparently scientific approach and the rhetorical force with which its 
impartial ‘scientific’ pronouncements lent to the narrative of egalitarianism. 
Statistically it purported to show causal links between economic status and 
educational success and thus between the grand narrative of capital and 
structural educational disadvantage.
Though Silver distrusts generalised images he does, however, himself 
construct an image of ‘the poor’ in his narrative, as a sub-class essential to 
capitalist modes of production. This kind of narrative distinction, common to 
the vocabularies of both the left and the right though for differing reasons, as 
Silver describes, creates a ‘them’ and ‘us’ characterisation at the heart of the 
narrative. It has clear implications of the cultural superiority of ‘us’ and 
creates a relationship of domination and subservience. And it is at the heart 
of Silver’s narrative too. As the egalitarian narrative of the Labour Party also 
did, this distinction tends to suggest essential, though not necessarily 
‘natural’, differences among people and inevitably to marginalise certain 
groups. It emphasises differences rather than similarities and tends to 
dehumanise ‘them’, the recipients of the label ‘the poor’ or, more 
euphemistically the ‘disadvantaged’, in that they are only perceived in the 
narrative as a problem which the narrative will then go on to ‘solve’ in some
28Harold Silver, Education as History (London. Methuen: 1983) p. 270 and passim.
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way. Inherent in the metaphorical classification of certain people as ‘the 
disadvantaged’ is that they become marginalised and excluded; at best, it 
seems, they are subject to unfocussed feelings of benevolent philanthropy or 
to the often ungentle ministrations of social policies designed by ‘us’ for their 
benefit.
Chris Goodey identifies the inter-relationship of knowledge and power in this 
kind of vocabulary: T am saying that we are confronted, beneath a language 
which is often common to both parties, with two competing moral 
philosophies, and that the language o f  partnership is a mirage, a deliberate 
and partisan disguise for the fact that one o f  those philosophies holds power 
while the other comes from beneath the underdog. There are not 
\professionals' and 'parents'. There is a strange tribe that believes in spells,
psychometric assessments and incantations, and there is a tribe...of real
7Qpeople.... 'equal partnership'... is spurious.. ’ This power and knowledge 
asymmetry is further emphasised by Tomlinson. Though she is speaking 
about parents of children with special needs her remarks apply to this broader 
vocabulary of disadvantage: ‘This clientele will be largely composed o f  the 
relatively powerless ... working class and black parents who often lack 
understanding about what is happening to their children, can be mystified
and persuaded by professional expertise and jargon, and have little... redress
•?0in the face o f professional judgements. ’ Those most affected by this 
vocabulary are those who are already the most disadvantaged. Armstrong and
■j i
Galloway describe how the parents of children with special needs are 
made to feel that they have no real say. In any conflict of interest between the 
parents and the professionals involved, the parents come out worst. Parents 
are viewed as part of the problem rather than as being part of the solution. 
The discussion of the child's need takes place in the terrain of the vocabulary 
of disadvantage, a vocabulary which is restricted by the special claims to 
knowledge of the politicians, teachers and professionals involved, and where 
power is exercised only by the professionals.
The knowledge of the parent or the child caught in the narrative expectation 
of this vocabulary is not regarded as valid. Further the educational problems
29 Chris Goodey: Fools and Heretics: Parents' Views o f  Professionals, in Booth et a l ) 
Learning for All 2: Policies for Diversity in Education. ( London, Routledge: 1992) p i76 
Sally Tomlinson (1981) Professionals and ESN (M) Education in Swann (ed) The Practice 
o f Special Education. ^London: Basil Blackwell, 1981) p276
Armstrong and Galloway: On Being a C lien t, in Booth et al (1992) op. cit. Chapter 16
106
the child experiences may be caused or greatly contributed to by conditions
at home, but these specific conditions are not addressed and the child tends
32to be viewed impersonally, defined as a member of a sub-class. Habermas 
argues that, through such impersonal and excluding vocabularies, the 'life 
worlds' of people, the stages on which they act out their lives, their social and 
communicative realities, have been 'colonised. Their lives have been 
categorised and de-personalised by the strictures of the narrative and the 
educational organisation of the state. The knowledge of the professionals in 
education is codified into a discourse which does not simply stereotype the 
life world of the individual but actually constructs it. The bureaucratic rules 
and regulations, the labelling and categorisation, all are divorced from the 
real life experience of the individuals concerned. Habermas characterises this 
process as 'juridification':
‘... (the) objective redefining o f  the client's lifeworld which... 
requires an incessant process o f  'compulsory abstraction ' o f  
everyday life situations. This is... a practical necessity in 
order that administrative control be exercised. Juridification 
thus exerts a reifying influence on the lifeworld, which, when 
combined with the enhanced claims to expertise o f  social 
workers and other administrators in the newly redefined 
categories o f life, produces an insidiously expanding domain 
o f dependency. This domain comes to include the way we 
define... family relations, education, old age, as well as 
physical health and mental health and well being. ’
Nothing persists more than a story, particularly if that story is not just 
persuasive but also, and seemingly inadvertently, ensures a built-in cultural 
imperialism. The vocabulary of disadvantage is not really essentially 
different from the vocabulary of the Victorian philanthropy it so despises for 
its crude assumption of cultural superiority, insensitive labelling and 
paternalist arrogance. It too creates Habermas’s ‘insidiously expanding 
domain o f dependency \
32R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations o f Critical Theory (London, Macmillan: 
1986) pp 134-5
33 S. White The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
1988): , p. 113
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This is, however, not to deny the existence of social inequality or that some 
people were, and indeed still are, socially, economically and educationally 
disadvantaged. Will Hutton in The State We’re In ^  divides Britain into a 
40-30-30 society. Seventy percent of people have secure or fairly secure 
economic stability and prospects while thirty percent are living in relative 
poverty, crammed into housing estates with little prospect of escape. 
Dependency, in Habermas’s terms, has become to characterise their life 
world, and with it ever reducing expectations.
The problem of the vocabulary of disadvantage is the problem of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy: the characterisation of the narrative defines 
legitimate expectation and the limits to aspiration. Bob Holman , for 
example, complains of the narrow expectations children from impoverished 
backgrounds have of their future, not as a ‘natural’ consequence of a lack of 
‘ability’ but a narrative consequence of the educational story and the 
dependency culture they have had imposed on them. He records that in 
Glasgow, in spite of decades of attempts to combat social and cultural 
deprivation, seventy percent of children from economically stable, 
‘advantaged’ backgrounds will achieve the educational qualifications which 
will allow them to fulfil their ambitions, but that only three percent of 
children from the ‘deprived’ housing estate he lives in will manage to match 
these achievements. The vocabulary of disadvantage circumscribes 
expectation.
Butler’s metaphorical construction of the educational world into ‘natural’ 
kinds of children, ‘natural’ social and cultural hierarchies and ‘natural’ 
taxonomies of knowledge limited initiation into the vocabularies of power. 
The vocabulary of disadvantage similarly perpetuated, if inadvertently, much 
the same kind of story. It similarly constructed the educational world, not 
into ‘natural’ divisions, but into class differences. Like Butler’s story, it had 
difference at its core though its rhetoric claimed to seek to eliminate rather 
than maintain difference. Education was conceived as a mechanism to 
increase equality and opportunity. The comprehensive narrative, built on the 
vocabulary of disadvantage, constructed the ‘disadvantaged’ as an essentially 
dependent sub-class and consequently comprehensive education came to be 
seen as resolving a particular problem and concerned only with raising the
^W ill Hutton, The State We’re In (London, Jonathan Cape. 1995) Chapter 7 and passim, 
in Feel the quality, not the materialism , The Guardian 13 August, 1997
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expectations of a marginal group. It created a particular and in many ways 
peculiar kind of educational reality, a reality in which the wider purposes of 
education were somehow lost. It created an almost impenetrable narrative 
silence about ‘academic aspirations’, and indeed about vocational education, 
seeing these as divisive concepts which those oriented on ‘elitist’ grammar 
school selective education would seize and so distort the social engineering 
purpose of the narrative. It became so concerned about countering rival 
narratives that it lost sight of any positive plot of its own.
Ironically the maintenance of the vocabulary of disadvantage as the principal 
rhetoric of the comprehensive narrative reinforced the popular sense of 
inherent cultural difference by creating a dependent sub-class rather than 
establishing a wider sense of common cultural identity which might have 
been more productive in increasing opportunity. The comprehensive 
narrative was not, however, popularly perceived as providing greater 
expectations for everyone and its rhetoric was the dismissive intolerance of 
the political discourse to alternatives.
Both Butler’s and the comprehensive narratives labelled certain groups of 
people - the virtually uneducable ‘bronze’ child or the ‘disadvantaged’ child - 
and placed them on the margins. Butler’s central organising metaphor was 
one of ‘natural’ social order, while the comprehensive metaphor was one of 
economic class ordering. Presented this way it seems unsurprising that it was 
so unpopular with parents, even with those who were ‘poor’. The vocabulary 
of disadvantage did remain, however, popular with the liberal establishment, 
the theorists and the professionals as in many respects it still perhaps does.
What the comprehensive narrative desired was to provide expectations for 
the lower classes, to do what the Butler narrative had done for the middle and 
rising middle classes. The romantic idealism of the social solidarity of the 
comprehensive narrative gave it narrative force and the vocabulary of 
disadvantage which it employed made it very difficult to counter effectively, 
especially given the egalitarian spirit of the times, but in many respects 
though it redescribed the educational world in quite different terms, it 
maintained a story ironically similar in effect to that of Butler’s.
While Butler’s narrative was of keyhole surgery, the egalitarian narrative was 
of transplants. The myth of social progress, scientifically planned and carried
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out with surgical ruthlessness, was at the heart of its narrative. It was a 
romanticised union of science and liberal democracy. Comprehensive 
schooling was an intervention to attempt to alleviate disadvantage but, as has 
just been described, it was never empowering. It was the ‘treatment’ of a 
problem, an attempt to ‘rectify’ a social breakdown. It created a culture of 
dependency. The ‘social scientist’ vocabulary of ‘disadvantage’ was 
dehumanising, in spite of the at times romantic rhetoric about the value of 
people as ends in themselves. It characterised ‘the poor’ in terms of their 
social class conditions, not as individuals but as a kind of blockage in a 
pipeline, a spanner in the works.
The comprehensive narrative’s vocabulary represented society as essentially 
a machine rather than Butler’s and Hogg’s organism, and education as 
essentially a problem. For Butler education was never problematic, it was a 
clear and tried and tested means to provide appropriate expectations for the 
different ‘natural kinds’ of people. On the other hand, the social scientists of 
the comprehensive movement saw schooling as a means to engineer a 
different kind of society: Some people, and I am one, want to use education 
as an instrument in pursuit o f an egalitarian society.
-in
Their vocabulary , in keeping with their ‘scientific’ model of society, was 
one of ‘statistical relationships' and’ comparisons' , ‘longitudinal survey's, 
of 'co-efficients' and 'correlations', of 'untapped resources,’ and behind the 
rhetoric was their perception of a failed social and economic superstructure, 
an economic machine falling into terminal decline. The emphasis of the 
rhetoric was on waste, on the inefficiency of an education system which 
produced too many failures: the economic dead weight of the ‘culturally 
deprived’ who, by definition, to all intents and purposes were all those who 
were ‘disadvantaged’ because they had not had the ‘advantage’ of a grammar 
school education. The lack of an alternative educational curriculum vitiated 
the comprehensive story.
The argument for comprehensives was as much, if not more, about the 
economic future as it was about social justice. However, the rhetoric of social
^ /r
A.H. Halsey, Education and Equality in New Society: 17th June, 1965 
■^as in, for example, Peter Townsend (1965) The argument fo r  comprehensive schools 
originally in The Journal o f the Campaign for Comprehensive Education, reprinted in Robert 
Bell, Gerald Fowler and Ken Little (eds) Education in Great Britain and Ireland (London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1973) pp. 121 to 123
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justice was not convincing nor was it uttered with much conviction. The 
Labour Party had always had an ambiguous view of equality. For them social 
justice was to extend the provision of schooling to all, regardless of their 
social class or income and this, to a degree, was what Butler had achieved. 
They were far less convinced by the harder egalitarianism of the 
comprehensive movement. In The Future of Socialism. Crosland, the 
Education Secretary from 1965 to 1967, shows his broadly favourable 
attitude to the selective system. In his chapter The Influence o f  Education, he 
writes that although the eleven plus test was ‘bitterly disliked and resented' 
yet: ‘It was thought that a child's whole future was decided on a single day's 
test. No doubt much o f  the dislike was based on ignorance or exaggeration. 
The results in fact were never decided on a single day's test. Immense care 
was commonly taken over borderline cases. There was always provision 
(though imperfect) for re-testing and transferring ‘late developers'. And the 
better secondary modern schools began increasingly to provide advanced 
courses and thus a route to the higher occupation. '
Though Crosland heartily loathed inherited privilege and the independent 
schools, he was clearly unconvinced by the hard egalitarianism of the 
comprehensive narrative. Like Silver, he distrusted the grand narrative of 
egalitarianism, preferring the softer, and more pragmatic, Respectable 
alternative of providing greater access to opportunity and different routes to 
greater expectations. It was, however, the perception of the provision of an 
educationally, economically and socially fulfilling narrative expectation for 
the majority of people which fuelled the egalitarian narrative, the public 
rhetoric, of the Labour Party.
The educational narrative of Butler had come to be undermined by 
expectations manque. For those not selected to the grammar school the 
expectations were bleak and even for those selected, like Hutton, not always 
fulfilled. The egalitarian narrative of comprehensive schooling languished in 
its vocabularies of disadvantage and offered at best only limited expectations 
for some and a narrative silence for everyone else.
Ill
3. New Socialism, New  Story
We are redefining and restating our Socialism in terms o f the scientific 
revolution. But that revolution cannot become a reality unless we are 
prepared to make far-reaching changes in the economic and social attitudes 
which permeate our whole system o f society.
The germ of a new narrative began to emerge in the late sixties, however. It 
was one which avoided what the politicians of the Respectable Left had 
come to see as the outmoded vocabulary of class struggle and which 
consequently sought to place education in a new focus - as an agent of 
progress in the economic struggle for Britain to survive and thrive in the 
modem world. Certainly Butler had also made this one purpose of education 
but with far less emphasis. Butler’s narrative had authorised quite a different 
culture, which Harold Wilson satirised as ‘Edwardian establishment 
mentality ’ ^
Wilson’s 1964 manifesto promised an escape from the class narratives of a 
moribund, tradition-bound, feudally-minded Conservative Party and in 
contrast he presented a modernist programme of planned innovation and 
improvement. Labour presented themselves as the party of the future: a 
technologically oriented meritocracy in which class distinctions would 
become the stagnant vocabulary of a past age and where structural inequality 
and privilege would be addressed through educational and social 
programmes which would be designed to bring about a greater evenness of 
opportunity.
This promise was summed up by Dennis Healy: 7 think the big failure o f all 
post-war governments has been to produce an educational system which 
enables us today, for example, to move into the new technologies as fast as 
our competitors are moving... the whole school system's been dominated by 
the values o f the early nineteenth century public schools... and I think that 
it's clearly inadequate for economic success in the modern world. At that 
time, technological advances had made the world a smaller place, more
38 Wilson (1963) in Brian MacArthur (ed), Twentieth Century Speeches (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin: 1992)p.336 
•^ibid., p.336
40Addison (1985/95) p. 169/170
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pluralist and eclectic in culture and more optimistic for the future. The 
authority of tradition had become weakened as had the class order. The 
post-war baby boom had created a powerful new consumer of culture in the 
young - the teenager had come into her own - and this youth driven 
consumption of popular culture became a dominating economic force.
The adjective ‘trendy’ so often and so disparagingly used in the Black Papers 
is witness to the strength of this new culture. In contrast to their assertions of 
traditional authority, the rhetoric of the Labour Party was of modernity, youth 
and challenge, in contrast to the later, more reactionary vocabulary of the 
Black Papers. Wilson’s "The white heat o f technology’ speech to the Labour 
Party conference in Scarborough in October 1963 constantly refers to a new 
beginning. Wilson’s ‘new socialism’ rhetoric is of challenge to 
old-fashioned industrial practices and renewal through changed attitudes, and 
in particular through education and training. His hope, however, was not 
with the educationalists or indeed the proletariat, but with the scientists. He 
called for those ‘in the Cabinet room and the board room alike' to be ‘ready 
to think and to speak in the language o f our scientific age.' His 
vocabulary was that of a pragmatic, clear-sighted, classless and essentially 
apolitical professional who is despised in a country run by dilettantes and 
amateurs: ‘a nation o f Gentlemen in a world o f players \ It is this metaphor 
which characterised the new egalitarian narrative of the Labour Party. It 
represented not the individual hopes and aspirations of the people nor did it 
offer any breadth of culture - this, though limited, at least was offered by 
Butler’s narrative - rather it narrowed the focus of wider social narratives 
down to economic success and the agents of success - the new technocracy. 
While it condemned inherited privilege it did so not from moral outrage but 
for commercial reasons.
To be fair, however, Wilson’s administration did expand higher education 
with the Robbins Report42 and, notably, the founding of the Open University 
in 1969, so breaking down some of the perceived elitism of the educational 
narrative. The Open University had its roots in the Labour educational story 
of the Workers Educational Association and Ruskin College. It widened 
educational opportunity and offered not just a narrow vocational education
4 ^Wilson (1963) in MacArthur (1992) p. 337
42Report of the Committee on Higher Education appointed by the Prime Minister (The 
Robbins Report) (London: HMSO, 1963)
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but also the wider notion of education, for self-realisation and growth. At this 
same time the old epistemological and curricular barriers in higher education 
were also being broken down. ‘New’ subjects, like cultural studies, gender 
studies and peace studies became popular and were often maliciously 
caricatured by the Black Paper writers who so suffered in the disappearance 
of the old certainties. These subjects all traded on a new, more critical - or 
heretical, depending on the viewpoint - approach to academia.
In schooling, however, the stress was on providing compensatory educational
schemes - extending opportunity to the disadvantaged - rather than on
addressing the ideological and hegemonic dimensions of a fully realised
egalitarian narrative and addressing the structural educational inequalities
represented by the remaining and still warmly perceived grammar schools
and the independent sector. David Hill, the recently retired media
spokesperson for the Labour Party reflects on his early career as adviser to
Roy Hattersley in 1973:
'My first abiding memory was sitting next to the headmaster
at the Independent Schools Conference where Roy Hattersley,
as shadow education secretary, read out a speech which I  had
helped to prepare, calling for the abolition o f private
education. As a result o f  that speech Roy failed to get into the
cabinet. Harold Wilson was a great champion o f grammar
4  ?schools and thought Roy's views far too egalitarian. ’
The Labour Party was content to allow comprehensive schools to exist, but 
alongside rather than as a replacement for the bipartite system. In effect they 
altered the meaning of 'comprehensive education' so that it was essentially 
purged of its controversial social engineering connotations, its signification 
of the elimination of class privilege in education and its role in the 
production of a more just society. Circular 10/65 asserted that the object of 
comprehensive education was to preserve, 'all that is valuable in grammar 
school education' and to make such an education 'available to more 
children'. Caroline Benn and Clyde Chitty describe the effect of this 
sanitisation of the term: 'For all anyone could tell, it looked as i f  it was going 
to be acceptable for the old education in two or more schools... to continue
David Hill, in an interview by Steven Richards on the occasion o f his retirement in: ‘After 
25years Labour's original spin doctor is moving on. . . ' New Statesman 15/5/98
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as before under one roof a course few  o f those working in the field were 
prepared to accept'
In what sense were the children 'equal'? How could individual differences, 
needs, talents, aspirations and backgrounds be taken into account? Was it 
simply another way of saying that all children should be permitted to achieve 
their full potential? Was it a demand that all classes were given the same 
opportunities or life chances? Was it the result of an economic imperative to 
increase the educational standard of the work force? Was it about all 
children being admitted into the cultural stories of the middle class? Though 
Benn and Chitty reflect on these different interpretations of 'equality' they 
cannot find any sense of consensus.
What is clear is that the term is dependent on a narrative context, a story. It is 
part of a wider plot. What the various Black Papers had done was to deride 
the different significations of the term within the ideological framework of 
what they at times wilfully and intemperately interpreted as the socialist 
story. In classically socialist terms 'equality' was what Raymond Williams 
calls the keyword of their story, encapsulating and representing their struggle 
for economic and cultural advancement and their eventual attainment of 
political power. It gave their story the narrative tension of struggle and, in 
Kermode's terms, a sense of an ending. While it is not difficult to deconstruct 
the ideological trappings of differing interpretations ‘equality’, to do so 
without understanding its symbolic and ritualistic importance to the socialist 
narrative is to miss the point. Like 'class' it has signification - of the story of 
socialism - rather than any specific sense. As a term it makes immanent the 
whole history of the socialist struggle.
What 'equality' seeks to do is to redress historical oppressions and to 
re-describe metaphorically the social and the educational story. Butler's 
bi-partite story was too closely identifiable as just another version of the 
'great ladder of being' metaphor of society.
Mary Wamock objected to the educational ladder metaphor: '... it became a 
concept which was not to be tolerated in public policy any more than the 
social ladder, an equally real, but equally deplorable idea; to be mentioned
44 Caroline Bell and Clyde Chitty (1996) op. cit. p. 28.
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i f  at all only to be reviled' However, rhetorically, this deferral of
meaning, which in turn allowed for the narrative ambiguity of the term 
'equality', became a target of the Black Paper writers and the effect was 
debilitating to the comprehensive discourse. The Black Paper writers 
understood well that 'equality' in the socialist discourse represented a story 
which was the antithesis of theirs - one story of education for one type of 
person. They therefore exaggerated the effectiveness of the comprehensive 
movement. Though it did have some significant success - in 1965 there were 
262 comprehensive schools, by 1970 the number had risen to 1,150 - 
however, measured in national terms, this did not signal the death of the 
grammar school or of the two stories of education it represented, which 
remained well established not only in many areas but, more crucially, in the 
minds and hearts of the politicians of both parties.
While the Black Paper writers were more than willing to lay all social ills at 
the feet of the egalitarians, similarly the egalitarians were concerned to lay 
all the social ills - though differently interpreted - at the feet of the 'elitist' 
grammar school 'reactionaries'. Walden, however, presents a more measured 
story and, though no egalitarian himself, acknowledges that the 
comprehensive movement had some modest success, particularly in areas 
where they were 'true' comprehensives, with a relatively broad social class 
intake. It was this 'modest' achievement Walden applauds though at the same 
time he finds reprehensible the political willingness to settle for so little.
Even Rhodes Boyson ^6 allowed that the comprehensive school could be 
successful though only if its egalitarian purposes were viewed with suspicion 
by the managers of the school and so long as the school eschewed 
progressive educational policies, viewed examination results as a measure of 
success, maintained a didactic style in teaching, in management adopted a 
style of avuncular sympathetic despotism, and retained a firm grip on 
discipline, featuring, when necessary, corporal punishment sensitively 
administered. He was not as far from the view of the Labour Party as he 
would be willing to admit.
45 Mary Wamock. Schools of Thought f Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) p. 41 
4  ^Rhodes Boyson "The essential conditions for the success o f a 
comprehensive school in Black Paper 2 p.57-62.
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Boyson derided the comprehensive principle, however, though not 
necessarily the comprehensive school: 1just as truth may be the first casualty 
o f war, it can be an early casualty in any social or religious outburst from  
men looking for simple solutions for the problems o f  their time. A search for  
complete equality, combined with a vague Rousseautic belief that all men left 
unhampered are good, has brought the pressure for fu ll secondary 
comprehensification for social ends, for non-streaming and the adoption o f  
so called 'progressive' and non-academic teaching or non-teaching. This 
egalitarian movement driven forward by adult men and women with the sad 
simplicity o f the militant students has made reasonable men o f varied 
opinions jump for cover...' Boyson described how he organised his
comprehensive school on what he claimed were pragmatic rather than 
ideological lines: any teaching method was acceptable - provided it was not 
progressive - if it led to improved examination results; the pupils were 
streamed into three broad bands following a broadly common curriculum but 
at different 'depths' and some mobility between bands was possible; and by 
adopting fairly humanitarian pastoral policies and structures. The key, he 
claimed, was strong management and a demand for excellence in teaching 
and learning. In effect Boyson had come as close as he could to creating 
Butler's tri-partite system in one school in many ways closer to the Scottish, 
particularly in Glasgow, amalgamation of junior and senior secondaries 
under one roof which took place in the early sixties. Like these Glasgow 
schools, Boyson's school had, however, only a geographical relation to the 
ideal of the comprehensive school, though at the same time it was, 
apparently, far from the disaster which the Black Paper writers had generally 
so gleefully labelled the comprehensive schools.
In effect, the egalitarian narrative was to have a reverse effect, to further 
entrench the value of the grammar school in the public imagination. Even 
when grammar schools were made comprehensive they still retained their 
cultural cachet and the educational inequalities they represented remained 
stubbornly in place in their new incarnation. David Blunkett remarks: ‘When 
comprehensives were introduced (into Sheffield) we weren't aware o f the 
serious consequences arising from the fact that nearly all the ex-grammar 
schools were grouped in one area o f  the city. We just weren't appreciative o f
47 ibid. p. 57
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the problems that arose from the development o f comprehensive 
education. ^
In Sheffield there developed a hierarchy of comprehensives, with the pecking 
order following the economic geography of the city. P.R. Sharp described the 
educational reorganisation of schools in the West Riding of Yorkshire ^  in 
the late 1950s and 1960s. Sharp describes how the problem of 
comprehensivization of the schools in this area was tackled. Economic 
restraints forbade the building of new schools, but the existing schools were 
too small for the planned large scale comprehensives which were envisaged. 
The Chief Education Officer, Alec Clegg, was committed to comprehensive 
education and considered several different types of arrangement: the creation 
of junior (ages 11-14) and senior (14 plus) high schools with no selective 
entrance but retaining some forms of selection for parts of the curriculum, 
such as Latin, and some streaming in other subjects.
Clegg’s scheme was introduced in 1958 in a piecemeal way over most of the 
West Riding. However the scheme came under pressure when the children 
who planned to leave at 15 were allowed to complete their education in the 
junior schools. Clegg complained that ‘bright children o f feckless parents' 
would be disadvantaged and that the junior schools would be seen to 'become 
finishing schools for working class children - or, put it more crudely, dumps 
for the Newsom types ’ - a reference to the ‘less able’ children with whom
the Newsom Report (1963) was concerned. It is clear that the vocabulary of 
‘disadvantage’ had permeated and come to dominate the educational 
discourses of the time and, while its intentions were no doubt of the best, it 
was not a vocabulary which created public confidence.
In order to prevent this ‘dumping’ Clegg, in 1963, proposed the 
reorganisation of the area into Primary (ages 5-9), Middle (ages 9-13) and 
High (ages 13-18) schools. This arrangement, it was claimed, would maintain 
the spirit of the comprehensive idea and the middle schools in particular 
would prevent what Clegg saw as the premature selection of some children
48-in an interview with Steve Richards The man who used to run the city council... in New 
Statesman . 11th July 1997 
PR. Sharp (1980), The origins o f  middle schools in the West Riding o f Yorkshire in Ben 
Cosin and Margaret Hales (eds) Education. Policy and Society (London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul: 1983) pp.263 - 270 
50ibid., p.265
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for the academic curriculum. Clegg struggled to be allowed this 
re-organisation and, after much canvassing, permission was granted on an 
experimental basis. However Clegg had many local difficulties having his 
scheme put into practice. He had problems implementing this scheme with 
his educational authorities and there were enervating political antipathies to 
various of the personalities involved. Clegg was forced to wait for a 
Ministerial decision from the DES giving the official position on the age of 
transfer from primary to secondary education and what powers LEAs had for 
school reorganisation. By 1966 Clegg was given official sanction for his 
middle schools but is was not until 1968 that the first school opened.
Clegg’s struggle clearly shows the Labour Party’s reluctance to give a clear 
or imaginative lead to the move towards comprehensive schools. They were 
reluctant to either give LEAs clear guidelines or indeed to allow LEAs to 
make up their own. Clegg was a hard-headed, practical educationalist, 
committed to seeing his comprehensives succeed yet he was frustrated for 
almost ten years by an indecisive Labour Party which clearly did not share 
either his commitment, his vision or his energy.
As a postscript to Clegg, the lack of enthusiasm for a radical restructuring of 
schooling and the curriculum of the Labour Party in the seventies was to lead, 
though admittedly indirectly, to the ‘scandal’ in October 1996 of the West 
Ridings School. This school was an amalgamation, an ‘economy of scale’, 
which combined two older schools in Clegg’s former area of responsibility, 
the schools he had such high hopes of in his restructuring package. It had 
become, as Clegg’s vision was gradually eroded by the uncommitted Labour 
Government and the succeeding Tory narrative, a sink school, the most 
talented children in the area moving to the re-invented grammar schools in 
the area. In 1995 only one percent of the pupils achieved five GCSE passes at 
Grade C or better and it had become the ‘dump’ school for problem pupils in 
the area The local educational story in Yorkshire had come almost full 
circle since 1958. However, this is to anticipate the argument of succeeding 
chapters in this exercise.
Even had Wilson’s Labour Party grander aspirations, the relative economic 
stability of the post-war years had ended and Britain was plunged into a
^ a s  reported in The Guardian. School faces ‘hit squad ' : 25th October, 1996
119
series of boom and bust economic crises. Sterling crises, devaluation, 
alarming trade deficits, uncontrollable inflation - the effects of the 
post-industrial revolution, the clouds of which had been slowly gathering for 
some years - had made the economy a more central and pressing focus of 
government policy. The attempt to reform trade unions, Wilson and Barbara 
Castle’s In Place o f  Strife, foundered in acrimony and cries of betrayal. 
Thompson notes: ‘Repeated doses o f  deflation and high interest rates 
intended to defend the sacred sterling parity (which was sacrificed in the end 
anyway) made a shambles o f planning on any basis, whether public or 
private.... Meanwhile social expenditure was rigorously cut back and 
intended programmes abandoned.
The Labour Party was still not as committed to the radical reorganisation of 
schooling as its rhetoric might have suggested. Little educational innovation
o
took place. Indeed, as Willie Thompson points out the Labour Party’s 
restrictions on public spending ensured that little could be done to forge their 
‘new Britain’. Thompson describes how the economic disasters and the 
perceived betrayals of the Wilson government caused it to fall not only into 
public disrepute but eventually into disastrous internecine power struggles. 
The educational narrative, meanwhile, existed in a kind of limbo. The Labour 
controlled Local Education Authorities continued to create new 
comprehensives as they wished but there was none of the modernist planning 
and scientifically structured programmes that had been promised. Wilson’s 
new narrative foundered and his metaphorical redescription of education had 
to wait in the wings for its time.
Nor, however, was the Conservative Party under Heath any more successful 
in establishing a clear narrative expectation from education. There had been 
created, though, a general consensus around the vocabulary of disadvantage. 
Heath remarked that there had been a ‘social revolution that ‘has caused us 
to switch the emphasis to education for the underprivileged' Heath went 
on to extol the virtues of educational opportunity and to assert his acceptance 
of the evils of selection: 7 want to make it clear that we accept the trend o f
educational opinion against selection at eleven-plus. By selection I mean the
52 WillieThompson The Long Death o f British Labourism (London: Pluto Press, 1993) pp. 
74/5
^  ibid. Chapter 3: Breach o f  Promise 1964-73.
■^Edward Heath in a speech at Overseas House, St James’s on 17th June 1967 reprinted in 
Bell Fowler and Little (1973) p. 129
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process o f classifying children according to their IQ and separating them 
into different types o f school at too early an age ’.
His concurrence with the soft egalitarian narrative of the Labour Party, 
however, was not complete. He still maintained a difference - selection was 
not to be abandoned but merely postponed, and he continued by asserting the 
virtues of the grammar schools in the familiar rhetoric of the Respectable 
Tories: The grammar schools, both the ancient foundations and those 
established in the last fifty or sixty years, have made a magnificent 
contribution to our educational progress and our national well-being. It is 
right that we should be so concerned about their future. ' Heath makes a 
typical, Respectable Tory, metaphorical reference to the ‘health’ of the 
nation. However, his is not a closed position: in the interests of consensus, 
though he closes the door to revolutionary change, he offers the possibility of 
‘evolutionary’ change: ‘Yet the grammar schools themselves have changed 
many times in their history, long or short, whilst at the same time 
maintaining their characteristics o f a broad liberal education and high 
standards. It has been this readiness to change and adapt themselves which 
has enabled them to keep pace with the sociological as well as the technical 
developments o f the twentieth century.' ^
Heath makes clear his desire for consensus and his offer here to the Labour 
Party is not so very far off the views of the Respectable Labour politicians, as 
has been described. He does not rule out comprehensive reorganisation: The 
Conservative Party remains firmly opposed to the rapid and universal
C * J
imposition o f comprehensive reorganisation' . What he does rule out is 
hard egalitarianism, which was never much more than a rather half-hearted 
and rhetorical threat anyway. Though he maintains the value of direct grant 
schools and the independent sector - to which he obliquely refers to when he 
insists that ‘education should not be a state monopoly', he quickly returns to 
a reassertion of the value of the vocabulary of disadvantage and makes a 
vague apology for the tendency of the Conservative Party’s educational 
policies towards elitism:
‘Perhaps in the past there has been a tendency on the part o f 
government and teachers to concentrate too much on the
55ibid. p. 129 
56ibid. p. 130 
57ibid. p. 130
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ablest children and not enough on the average. This tendency 
is now being corrected and justly so. But we must be sure that 
in concentrating on those who have not had the chance in the 
past we do not neglect those who could and should be
C O
excelling. '
Indeed as Dale points out, by Heath’s time: ‘...commitment to selection to 
secondary education and automatic opposition to comprehensive education 
ceased to be central parts o f  official Tory education policy.. ’ There was,
however, in Heath’s speech the hint of a new narrative paradigm - built 
around freedom and choice. He stated: We also believe that in a free society 
every parent should have the right to choose what kind o f recognised 
education a child should have in accordance with its needs and abilities ' 
Though Heath so qualifies the parent’s ability to choose that his position 
begins to lose coherency, there remains enough sense to suggest a clear 
contradiction in his thought. The vocabulary of disadvantage and the 
egalitarian comprehensive narrative cannot co-exist with free parental 
choice. For the time being, however, this new narrative, like Wilson’s 
technocratic narrative, had to be silent.
Though the move towards greater comprehensivization had not really been 
enthusiastically viewed by either political party, that ceased to make any 
difference: it had gained through its appearance of granting greater 
educational opportunity and in the broad acceptance of its vocabulary of 
disadvantage a cultural inertia. So irresistible did it become, indeed, that it 
was the Heath Conservative administration, with Mrs Thatcher as its 
Secretary of Education, which was to create more comprehensives than any 
previous Labour administration. Certainly she did so reluctantly and she did 
so while creating legislation to prevent the compulsory creation of 
comprehensives and she did, as Dale notes, attempt to slow the momentum 
for comprehensives in Tory controlled LEAs. However she found herself 
relatively powerless, in the grip of an educational vocabulary with which she 
radically disagreed. Kogan remarks 'she wasn't disposed to listen to the
58ibid. p .130
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unalloyed liberalism o f  the educational service ’ ^ ^  but she was unable, then, 
to make any radical changes.
Thatcher had little enthusiasm for the process but found that she had little 
power to do otherwise than follow the wishes of the local education 
authorities and the advice of her department. It was her experience of 
impotence here that was apparently to colour her subsequent attitudes to 
educational policy making, to local authorities and to educational 
professionals. In the meantime, however, the educational picture remained 
ambiguous. Although the comprehensive narrative was dominant, the 
grammar school had proved iconically too powerful to be completely 
subjugated by the new egalitarian narrative. It survived, though in straitened 
circumstances, and a kind of 'mixed educational economy1 had been created, 
not in any planned way but more, apparently, as a result of a kind of narrative 
inertia.
Heath too, like Wilson before him, was driven to compromise. His 1970 
Selsdon philosophy, prototype free market manifesto promise, to renew the 
industrial base and to stop state subsidies to Tame-duck’ industries, was 
wrecked by the power of the trade unions. In the 1970 Conservative 
Manifesto Heath wrote in the introduction:
‘Nothing has done Britain more harm in the world than the 
endless backing and filling which we have seen in recent 
years. Once a policy has been established, the prime minister 
and his colleagues should have the courage to stick with
u. « 2
The Selsdon philosophy was the first real stirrings of what was later to 
become re-invented as Thatcherism. Heath attempted a programme of 
minimising government intervention in the running of the state and in placing 
greater emphasis on competition and efficiency in industry. This vocabulary, 
for the time being, was generally applied to economic matters and not to 
social policy. There was little that was, however, decisive about Heath’s 
government. In education they indeed ‘backed and filled’, leaving the system 
to the ministrations of the civil servants in the DES, their educational 
advisers, the local education authorities and to the schools themselves. His
^  cited in Dale (1989) p. 79 
^cited  in Thatcher (1993) p. 154
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administration quickly collapsed, and with it the final vestiges of the power 
of the Respectable narrative of the Conservative Party. Davies ^  remarks 
that the Conservative Party had its foundations in a stable economy which 
‘allowed the party to retain the privileges o f  its supporters whilst professing 
concern, and sometimes indeed doing something, about the worst-off 
members o f society ’.^4 Heath was confident in using Disraeli’s ‘Two 
Nation’ narrative in his speech on education but the economy was in almost 
permanent crisis and without that stability the traditional Respectable 
narrative came under enormous pressure.
The Respectable narrative was founded in the tradition of the ‘true 
Englishman’ and had maintained power on their fiction of the English way of 
life. The maintenance of that way of life, with its clear social hierarchies and 
differentials, was ultimately rooted in the economy. They had kept alternative 
narratives, such as Socialism and the more stringent Hayek’s neo-liberalism, 
at arm’s length because they maintained economic stability. It was this which 
allowed them to represent the rival narratives as the encroachment of 
‘foreign’ ideology into the established culture - as somehow just not 
English, as not ‘common-sense’, as not how ‘we’ do things. However, 
Heath could not manage the intermittent boom and bust economic crises and 
maintain that way of life in the ways to which it had become so accustomed. 
Not only that, but the traditional Englishness of the story was apparently 
threatened by the Heath administration’s attitude to Europe and Britain’s 
entry into the Common Market, and culturally, the egalitarian spirit of the 
times had made traditional class differences hard to maintain. They had come 
to be seen as old fashioned and culturally enervating.
Further, Heath’s promise to reinvigorate the economic base was soon in 
tatters. His plan to deny ‘lame duck’ industries further subsidies and to 
de-nationalise loss making heavy industries no matter what the social cost in 
unemployment was defeated by popular dissent, such as Jimmy Reid’s 
workers’ occupation of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. Heath lost control of the 
country, and with that the power of the Respectable narrative that could no 
longer deliver the economic and social expectations of growth and stability.
A.J. Davies, We the Nation: The Conservative Party in the Pursuit o f Power ILondon. 
Abacus: 1995) p. 29 and passim 
64ibid p.29.
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His tenure ended in the oil crisis and seemingly continuous industrial 
conflict. He had been forced to call five states of emergency.
His administration had reneged on their Selsdon promises to re-invent 
industrial relations and to refuse to intervene in the economy. Instead he had 
reverted to Respectable policies in a desperate attempt to regain some 
authority and control. He had increased public spending - in education, even 
Thatcher was not to cut back but rather to spend more on primary education 
and on the raising of the school leaving age though she did make a token cut 
by taking away school milk - rather than decrease it or even to make any 
radical review of it.
Yet these Respectable Keynsian policies almost succeeded. In 1972 he 
almost instituted a wages and incomes policy, though his manifesto had 
clearly ruled this out. His by then less abrasive rhetoric about partnership 
with the unions rather than war led to a period of relatively peaceful 
industrial stability for a while, until his was shattered by what Gamble 
records as the incompetent handling of wage negotiations with the miners 
The final straw was the conflict with the miners which led to national power 
cuts and the three day week.
Andrew Gamble reflects that what led to the downfall of Heath was the 
miasma of failure and incompetence which had come to envelop his 
administration. The Respectable paternalist narrative had become 
discredited: the expectations it seemed to offer were of more unrest and 
economic and social failure. His ability to govern - the persuasiveness of his 
narratives to provide great expectations - was perceived as finished. His 
narratives lacked all authority.
Heath’s 1974 election manifesto was entitled ‘Who governs Britain?', 
emphasising the siege mentality of the then unpopular and enfeebled 
Respectable Tory narratives. Heath lost the subsequent election and the 
Conservative Party were left with only the tatters of a disintegrating 
narrative. It is perhaps this tension on the Tory narrative which goes some 
way to explaining the increasingly hysterical tone of the Tory 
counter-narratives of society, in particular the polemics of the Black Papers.
Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics o f Thatcherism 
(London, MacMillan: 1989, rev. 1994) p. 85 and passim.
The story of the totemic ordering of society based on Respectable Tory 
formulation of human nature was no longer tenable. It had become too much 
generally accepted that all people were essentially the same, in their desires 
and aspirations, though ‘sameness’ did not necessarily clearly entail 
‘equality’. However, the ‘natural’ virtues of the elite class - service and duty - 
essential to the justification of the Respectable narrative were becoming less 
persuasive and less meaningful.
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Chapter 5
The Educational Spectacular 
and the End of Consensus
'The grammar and public school standards cannot be dead as 
a national ideal unless we betray them. Why should it be 
assumed that total change is inevitable? To destroy a fine and 
tried educational system in the interest o f vague class hatreds 
is a conscious choice... Why should fine schools be deliberately 
destroyed for an envious belief. ^
1. Sound and Fury
Though educational policy and the policy makers existed in a cosy consensus, 
the wider rhetoric of education in the seventies was far from placid. Albert 
Hirschman comments in his essay 'Politics’ “ that the comfortable post war 
consensus on economic and social policy broke down, or at least was fatally 
debilitated, because it was inherently dull. There was little perceptible 
difference between the ideologies of the two main parties - sarcastically 
termed 'Butskellism' after the relatively consensual Respectable Conservative 
and Respectable Labour narratives of Butler and Gaitskell - and the 
consequence was, in Hirschman's terms 'a loss o f spectacle'. This eventually, 
Hirschman argues, paved the way for the spectacle of 'highly partisan creeds' 
and politics driven by an openly proclaimed ideology. And along with this 
new creed came a re-vitalised rhetoric to evangelise for it, or at least to 
demonise the opposition. Whether Hirschman is correct to suggest that it was
* (ed) C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson, editorial comment in Black Paper 1 p.(i).
 ^ Albert Hirschman 'Politics' in David Marquand and Anthony Seldon (eds), The Ideas that 
Shaped Post War Britain (London: Fontana, 1996), pp. 29-40.
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just the dullness of politics that was a factor in the rise of the Neo-Liberal 
Tendency of the Conservative Party is open to question but it is certainly the 
case that the new political rhetoric of education was spectacular.
Both the Labour Party and the Respectable Conservatives were by this time 
presiding over a relatively consensual, or complacent, educational world, 
depending on who was doing the interpretation. Their social narratives had 
remained, with uneasy silences, much as they had been under Butler. 
Ransom argues that this period was still dominated by the post-war narratives 
of Keynesian centralised control of the economy in the social interest, social 
democracy and in education, equality of opportunity. The old certainties of 
class and culture which had supported the narrative of Butler had, however, 
begun to lose authority and by the mid-70s the Respectable tendencies of both 
the Labour and the Conservative parties struggled to maintain narrative 
control.
The Butler consensus, with its closer focus on educational opportunity, had 
also inadvertently legitimised the educational narrative of the comprehensive 
movement, something in the way that Bantock had feared would occur, and 
this had created quite a different set of expectations which were not 
reconcilable with the established expectation of education. These created 
unsettled narrative tensions: there was a continuing demand for total 
comprehensivisation and an end to 'elitist' forms of schooling and, as 
exemplified by the Black Papers, there were increasingly ferocious demands 
to end the comprehensive process and, indeed, reverse it and return to 
'traditional' forms of schooling.
Hirschman describes three 'archetypal' forms of rhetoric used 
characteristically, though not exclusively, by the Neo-Liberal Conservatives 
in their polemics against the Conservative’s traditional enemy, 'the 
progressives': the arguments of perversity, futility and jeopardy. Though these 
were originally used by Hirschman to describe American Conservatives, they 
seem equally applicable to their English counterparts, and exemplified by the 
Black Paper writers. Hirschman describes these 'archetypal' arguments:
Stuart Ranson cited in Peter Ribbins and Brian Sherrat, Radical Educational Policies and 
Conservative Secretaries o f State (London: Cassell, 1997) p. 11.
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• ' the perversity thesis, whereby any action to improve the 
political, social or economic order is alleged to result in 
the exact opposite o f  what is intended;
• the futility thesis, which holds that attempts at social 
transformation will produce no effect whatsoever and will 
be incapable o f making a dent in the status quo; and
• the jeopardy thesis, which holds that the cost o f a new 
reform is unacceptable because it will endanger previous, 
hard won accomplishments.' ^
To balance this, Hirschman also describes the essentially similar progressive 
equivalents of these arguments:
• We should adopt a certain reform or policy because as 
things are we are caught, or will shortly land in, a 
desperate predicament that makes immediate action 
imperative regardless o f  the consequences. This argument 
attempts to deflect the perversity thesis.
• We should adopt a certain reform or policy because such 
is the 'law' or 'tide' o f  history - this argument is a 
counterpart o f the futility thesis, according to which 
attempts at change will come to nought because o f various 
'iron laws'.
• We should adopt a certain reform or policy because it will 
solidify earlier accomplishments - this is the progressive's 
retort to the jeopardy claim that the reform is bound to 
wreck some earlier progress.'
Richard Johnson^ argued that The Black Papers became a central focus for a 
new political and educational narrative. He argues that although the paper 
writers, Cox and Dyson, argued that they were apolitical, having only the
^ibid. p. 37 
i^bib. p. 37/38f\Richard Johnson, A new road to serfdom? A critical history o f  the 1988 Act in Education 
Group II, Dept o f Cultural Studies, University o f Birmingham, Education Limited: Schooling 
and Training and the New Right since 1979 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991)
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health of the education system in mind, the papers 'drew in (neo-liberal 
Conservative) activists and forged a political identity. ’ Indeed many of the 
writers had clear associations with the Conservative Party and many with its 
Neo-Liberal Tendency: Rhodes Boyson, Lord Harris of the National Council 
for Educational Standards, Baroness Cox, Stuart Sexton and many others.
A study of the Black Papers will clearly illustrate the accuracy of Hirschman's 
description of the Conservative polemics. However, the Black Papers also 
began to establish the Neo-Liberal rhetoric of education, and of society. Their 
ideology was, however, never quite decisive or clear cut. Typically the 
opening sentence of the introduction to Black Paper 3 H970t appealed to the 
usual ‘traditional’ arguments: 'During Mr Short's period as Secretary o f  State 
for Education and Science, an extremist group o f 'progressive' educationists, 
with his support, flooded the newspapers and television with propaganda. 
Experienced teachers were astonished to read articles and speeches 
proposing that examinations should be abolished, that traditional subjects 
should be abandoned for 'progressive projects', that all selection should be 
banished from secondary education, that there should be no more streaming 
at any age, and that universities instead o f being centres o f excellence should 
turn 'comprehensive'. The whole enterprise was conducted with missionary 
zeal’. 7
Here the authors invoke the jeopardy thesis with the additional implication of 
perversity. Their enemies - and again the tone suggests a kind of violent 
conflict - remain the rather shadowy educational 'progressives'. The rhetoric 
continues with this rather hysterical tone: 'In this speech, Mr Short is typical 
o f the progressives in his ignorance o f human nature. Examinations always 
need reform but to do away with them is to return to selection by 
favouritism... Also very few teenagers would work hard without the incentive
o
of an examination. ’ °
The authors make an appeal to an 'iron law' of human nature: examinations 
and competition are necessary to motivate an otherwise 'naturally' shiftless 
student population and to maintain standards and ensure that the perversity of
1 C.B.Cox and A.E. Dyson, prefatory remarks: Letter to Members o f Parliament: Goodbye 
Mr Short: A Valediction Forbidding Mourning, in (eds) C.B.Cox and A.E. Dyson Black 
Paper Three (1970V p.2.
8ibid. p. 7
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teachers does not compromise the reliability of the selection processes. This 
type of argument is common in these papers; that 'progressive' formulations of 
human nature are 'unnatural' and educational policies based on them are 
consequently doomed to failure: 'The fact that inequalities existed within the 
old selective system does not mean that they will disappear when selective 
examinations are abolished; and the fact that it is the pupils from poor homes 
who have been handicapped in the past# does not necessarily mean that they 
will lose these handicaps when comprehensive education becomes 
universal'?  Ignoring the 'fact' that there are discrete, natural kinds of 
students and attempting to provide a uniform educational provision for all is 
perverse; and the perversity of continuing to try to implement 'progressive' 
policies in the face of the 'evidence' of their futility provided in the Black 
Papers, jeopardises all the educational traditions which have been so hard 
won in the past. The logic is inexorable, though their 'facts', as usual, are 
generally a mish-mash of unsubstantiated assertion and circular appeals to 
authority and to English tradition as they had re-invented it.
However, along with these three types of rhetoric, there is also a more 
spectacular rhetoric of betrayal that Hirschman might have included. This 
thesis might perhaps be something like:
• (he betrayal thesis, which holds that the educational and
social advantages o f the traditional Conservative social
and economic orders are so plainly obvious to common
sense that to suggest radical reform can only be an 
envious and malicious attempt to subvert and destroy the 
traditions o f  Britain (England) for alien and extremist, 
ideological ends.
At its crudest it is a 'reds under the beds' McCarthyite conspiracy theory of the 
most naive kind, which typically creates a powerful enemy for itself from 
among the various left-wing groups, riven, in reality, by antagonistic factions 
and weakened by regular internecine ideological warfare: 'The current 
Marxist strategy> for bringing down liberal societies concentrates on winning 
preponderant influence in key institutions (schools and academies are
^Douglas, Ross and Simpson, All Our Future (1968) cited by Cox and Dyson (1970), op.cit. 
P -3
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particularly important)...' 'Progressives' in education are in the Black 
Papers consistently blamed, inter alia, for anarchy in society, the 'permissive 
society', the deliberate lowering of educational standards, the destruction of 
high culture and the substitution of popular 'withitcity' . There was an odd 
contradiction in the Black Papers: though their writers generally favoured 
Bantock’s elitism and loathing of the ‘popular’ yet they were not unhappy to 
see their distempered rhetoric becoming popularised in the national press. 
They were happy to use public opinion provided it reflected the ‘correct’ 
story.
The Black Papers marked a clear moment of change in the Conservative story 
of education. It became rhetorically necessary to attack teachers and their 
professional status. Teachers, and their unions, had become to be seen as the 
enemy. It was the teaching professionals, along with teacher trainers, who had 
become perceived to have so clearly accepted the narrative of egalitarianism. 
It was they, rather than the Labour government, who were, to these writers, so 
enthusiastic about engineering a new society. Teachers were, in their view, 
becoming the gatekeepers of a strange new world, a world which excluded 
them and their ‘common sense’ elitist narrative of ‘natural’ differences and 
hierarchies. At best, they wrote, such betrayal might be partly excused on the 
grounds of stupidity or to blind adherence to the often attractive but 
dangerous theorising of seditious demagogues. Teachers were sometimes 
demonised as individuals - 'With teachers like Mr Medway it is not surprising 
that young people use words such as 'cronical', and cannot tell the difference 
between ’momentary' and momentous' ^  - or as a group. Kingsley Amis and 
Robert Conquest lead a much stronger attack on teacher professionalism. 
They satirised the teachers as being so misguided as to believe that to teach is 
to, 'Impose irrelevant facts and bourgeois indoctrination upon'\ that spelling 
is 'a bourgeois pseudo-accomplishment designed to inhibit creativity, self 
expression etc"; that examinations are 'irrelevant... test(s) purporting to 
check a student's know ledge... often repugnant to his personality, and failing 
to take into account the distractions inevitable in a concerned life'; that
^Caroline Cox, Keith Jacka and John Marks, Marxism, knowledge and the academies, in 
C.B. Cox and Rhodes Boyson (eds), Black Paper 1977 (London: Temple Smith, 1977) p. 125
*  ^ C.B. Cox and Rhodes Boyson, Letter to Members o f  Parliament Black Paper 1977, op.cit.
?27'all the subsequent definintions and references, except where otherwise noted, from: 
Kingsley Amis and Robert Conquest, A Short Educational Dictionary in Cox and Dyson 
(1970), op. cit. pp 67-70
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'better' is a 'divisive term... reproducing bourgeois ideology'', that discipline is 
arbitrary and fascist and unreasonably demands students do what they 'do not 
feel like doing'.
The anonymous rank and file of teachers were treated more generously, at
least insofar as to be labelled stupid is preferable to being traitorous. Jacques
Barzan is not alone in lamenting the 'refractory' material of many teachers but
he was concerned not so much in blaming them as in vilifying their
'progressive* educators. It was, in his view, the educators of the present
generation of teachers who were to blame for having created teachers: 'more
easily prepared in the virtues o f  the heart and the techniques o f  play than in
any intellectual discipline. Themselves uneducated and often illiterate..., they
infallibly transmitted their inadequacies, turning schoolwork into make
i 1 3believe and boring their pupils into violence and scurrility.' Teachers 
were represented as the dupes of the educationalists. Amis and Conquest go 
on to deride the theoreticians of the egalitarian narrative and the forms of 
knowledge that it authorises: 'Theoretician; his main duty is to improve the 
theses mentioned in this dictionary. Actual teaching experience, with its 
narrowing, ossifying consequences, is a disqualification for such 
employment'. If teachers do stupid things or appear to be ideologically 
inspired - and this they imply is entirely evident - it is because they have been 
brainwashed. It was important that the Black Papers should appeal to teachers 
but this presentation of them also de-professionalised them. Their knowledge 
was described as worthless and they themselves are characterised as lacking 
the substantial intellectual and moral character to resist their indoctrination. 
They are portrayed as generally well-meaning and, with backhanded 
generosity, as often quite skilful, but by reason of their youth, psychology or 
temperament, easy prey to the unscrupulous theory-mongers of the 
'progressive' Left: '...those in the educational world are well aware o f how 
such unqualified pronouncements (the 'bad' ideas of the Plowden Report on 
discovery methods) have been hammered into young students in colleges o f 
education..' ^
1 1Jacques Barzan, The Centrality o f Reading, in Cox and Dyson (1970) p. 74 
^C .B . Cox and Rhodes Boyson, Letter to Members o f  Parliament Black Paper 1977, op.cit. 
p. 7.
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The attack became intent on undermining the professionalism and the 
professional knowledge of teachers. Teachers had been seen to have gained 
too much power in the educational processes even though that was partly due 
to the Labour Party’s abdication of responsibility. It had become the ‘common 
sense’ of these Papers and was a lesson that Thatcher was to learn. The claim 
to authority, central to the claim for the professionalism of teaching, was 
undermined as the knowledge which underpinned such authority was 
‘debunked’ and the trust in the altruism of the teacher was shown to be a 
sham. That no serious argument was offered to justify these assertions was 
beside the point.
Tt might be argued that, even if it was unconscious, the purpose of the Black 
Papers was to create chaos, in effect to fill the gap left by the collapse of the 
Respectable narrative and to maintain the advantage in the destabilisation of 
the egalitarian narrative until it could be replaced. It was to find something to 
cling to in the cultural and social vertigo the writers were suffering. It was to 
fill the gap between the breakdown of the old certainties and the formation of 
some new story that they could live in. Though they had no real power or 
hope to change anything, the Black Paper writers felt compelled to maintain 
some sort of narrative presence even if that was reactionary and incoherent at 
times. The apparent respectable Tory and Labour consensus over the softer 
version of the egalitarian narrative had exasperated them. They felt that their 
world had been redescribed and that all that they valued was gone.
However, much of the Black Papers was simply a reiteration of the old elitist 
narrative in reaction to the egalitarian vocabulary of disadvantage, and though 
many of the writers were concerned to try to re-invent the vocabulary of 
elitism, it was never really a possibility. Their elitist vocabulary had become 
too entangled with, and diffused, in the narrative of the Respectable 
Conservatives and that, with the demise of Heath, had become hopelessly 
compromised. While a new narrative was formulated, however, the Black 
Papers had the effect of maintaining the destabilising of the egalitarian 
narrative. Eventually the rhetoric of the Black papers was to be used to 
authorise a quite different narrative.
Meanwhile, it was rhetoric such as this which also de-stabilised the 
comfortable consensus about education. However, the Black Paper writers 
were generally not aware that the narrative which they were espousing was
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dead and nearly buried. Though their polemics were spectacular, when a 
sober attempt was made to assert their own educational policy to counter the 
'progressives', the rhetorical fireworks were spectacularly absent. Their 
positive proposals bore a perhaps unsurprising similarity to those of Heath 
which were described earlier. Having established to their satisfaction the 
futility and perversity of the comprehensive movement, which failed even to 
achieve the ideals of its supporters, and having made clear that their 
opponents', the 'progressive experts’, research was hopelessly ideologically 
compromised, Cox and Dyson ^  began their positive argument with the 
assertion that it is direct grant and grammar schools which, quite obviously,
'maintain the highest standards, and offer opportunities on the basis o f  
genuine equality o f  opportunity for all' . ^
They went on almost, but not quite, to flirt with the vocabulary of
disadvantage, and to admit that the present bi-partite system was perhaps
17flawed and that a '.socially unacceptable situation exists' , which required a
' different and fairer concept' of education which, they decided was to be
based on the current direct grant/grammar/comprehensive school system but
with the difference that there would be ' no stigma attached' ^  to those who
did not either aspire to, or were not selected for, the direct grant or grammar
schools. To attempt to reduce this stigma, selection they argued, as indeed did
Alec Clegg in Yorkshire though for quite different reasons, for a
postponement of selection for two years: '...the 11 plus will cease to be a
great divider  by 13 a child's ability and motivation are usually apparent...
Selection will., be made on teachers' reports, continuous assessment and
other methods, as well as upon written exams' . ^  The 'sting' of selection
would be removed because those selected for direct grant and grammar
schools 'will be in such minority that no sense o f  failure will be possible for  
70the rest’. Because so very few would be selected for the upper echelons of 
the educational ladder, the comprehensives would, ‘naturally’ come under 
relentless pressure from parents for results so that their educational standards 
would rise and they would of necessity have by then built up their own
 ^■’ibid. p. 6 
^ibid. p 9 
1 / ibid. p 9 
^ibid. p 10 
9^ibid. p 10 
^^ibid. p 10
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academic tradition. Comprehensive schools, they assert, would not be 
destroyed by 'creaming o ff  the elite because this underestimated children's 
latent abilities. Selection was not completely reliable, they implied, and many 
children rejected for the elite schools might still go on to university. 
Furthermore comprehensives attracted teachers who were skilled at patiently 
and painstakingly 'bringing on' such unpromising children than the elite 
schools which, anyway, had a quite different ethos.
However, Cox and Dyson did acknowledge the danger of creating elites but
their solution, like rest of their argument, was breathtaking in its simplicity:
'Under the emerging system, Direct Grant and grammar schools will not
produce an exclusive elite or a self sustaining meritocracy, but will merely
provide an appropriate education for students able, and willing, to profit
71from what such schools give...' . There would be equality of opportunity, 
they assert, because attendance at direct grant and grammar schools will offer 
'no long-term advantages'. Thus they side-step the, to them pernicious, 
vocabulary of disadvantage. The purpose of these elite schools would be to 
stimulate the comprehensive system, raising standards and increasing 
opportunities for all. It is not made clear why, if they did not offer future 
advantage, parents would be induced to send their children there, given the 
additional costs of uniforms, equipment and travel as well as the social cost to 
their children. There is however one, happily accidental, purpose for the elite 
schools - they have profound cultural importance: 'Direct Grant and
grammar schools, alongside the best in Independent schools, will uphold the 
moral and cultural values o f European civilisation, and ensure that intellect 
does not, by becoming divorced from such qualities, form a meritocratic 
world apart' .
Cox and Dyson's deliberately guileless argument concealed their implication 
that comprehensives could not be similarly equipped, presumably because 
they had an student body unsuitable to the rigours of academic study, 
immersed as they were in 'popular' culture and, anyway, their students and 
their more sociologically oriented staff were ‘naturally’ and ideologically 
unsuited to be the purveyors of high culture.
21 ibid. p 10/11 
22ibid. p 11
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The real danger of the current 'progressive' drive towards comprehensive 
schooling, in their view, was, paradoxically, to comprehensive schools 
themselves. By demanding just one kind of schooling, progressives would 
deny comprehensive schooled children - in effect all children if they were to 
have their way - access to higher culture because of the comprehensive 
movement's misplaced notion of equality, stemming presumably either from 
their stupidity or envious malice. This, Cox and Dyson argue, would 
inevitably destroy the traditional cultural values of an English education 
which can only reside in the more traditional, selective and culturally 
sensitive elite sector. They seem to be contradicting their earlier assertion that 
comprehensives can offer - provided they are spurred on by competition from 
other types of schooling - their most able pupils an 'academic' education. They 
seem to suggest that the academic pretensions of the comprehensives, their 
effort to provide even a watered down grammar school curriculum, will have 
them frenziedly sowing their high cultural seeds before swine: their 
'progressive' pedagogy will not allow their more able children to acquire these 
cultural values and the less able will not be able to understand what is going 
on anyway and therefore will receive an entirely inappropriate education.
Their rather spiteful rhetoric notwithstanding, Cox and Dyson did have a 
point. The lack of curriculum concern and direction on the part of the 
government and LEAs and the inability of teachers to build an appropriate 
curriculum in the ensuing policy vacuum was because the emphasis of their 
narrative was to expand opportunity to the ‘disadvantaged’. There was a 
significant absence of imaginative planning for a kind of education which 
would have been more effective and worthwhile for everyone. This narrative 
silence gave the Black Papers their opportunity and their justification, though 
they made little positive contribution and themselves showed a paucity of 
imagination or sensitivity in their proposals.
Cox and Dyson's proposal is, broadly, to do nothing much but make a 
cosmetic change to Butler’s system by raising the age of selection. Their 
argument - like Heath’s and, indeed, not too far from the realpolitik of the 
Labour Party - was to maintain the existing fragile educational status quo and 
not to pursue any policy which sought to make radical change: extending 
comprehensivisation by proscribing direct grant or grammar schools, or 
interfering with the Independent sector. They implicitly acknowledged that 
they had lost much of the battle to the egalitarian narrative: they were offering
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a kind of truce. However, their narrative conceals their re-description of the 
comprehensive school. They appear to give limited consent to comprehensive 
schools but only after they have re-described them as something much more 
like Butler's technical schools. They voice their hope that a new educational 
consensus could be forged on these terms, with the raising of the age of 
selection as a sop to the social consciences of the Left.
At the same time their argument contained some of the germs of the emerging 
neo-liberal story of education, greater accountability of schools to parents 
and a limited form of competition to raise educational standards, though their 
arguments are in essence still those of the Respectable Conservative with 
their emphasis on traditional cultural values and selection by merit. While 
their vision of schooling in England, broadly still Butler's bi-partite system 
without 'undue' emphasis on the social effects or vicissitudes of the selection 
processes, was remarkably similar in many ways to the system of English 
schooling today, the narrative base of today's educational system is quite 
different.
Stephen Ball describes this process of destabilisation of the egalitarian 
narrative in the 1970s, and as it survived as a counter-narrative in the 1980s, 
as 'the discourse o f derision' ^3 However this, like Hirschmann’s similar 
description, was not actually a discourse; it was not the advocacy of a 
narrative. The discourse of derision, in itself, created no expectations nor did 
it provide any re-description or re-invention of reality, rather it was the 
rhetorical destabilisation an existing narrative. The vocabularies of derision 
create only chaos. And in creating this, at least, the Black Papers could clearly 
claim some success. The legitimation crisis which was to affect the 
Respectable narratives of both the Labour and the Conservative parties was, 
however, principally brought on by economic crisis but the Black Papers can 
fairly claim substantial influence on the emerging educational narrative of the 
Neo-Liberals under Thatcher.
Ball 24 identifies three clear strands to the rhetoric of the Black Papers which 
were to have an enduring influence on the subsequent educational narratives.
Stephen J. Ball Politics and Policy Making in Education. (London, Routledge: 1990) p.22 
and passim.
^ ibid pp.25-6
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Firstly, the decline in educational standards; secondly, the culpability of 
teachers and their educators at the training colleges. The third theme was that 
of indiscipline in schools and society. Ball describes how these three themes 
were to become the public image of schooling, ‘the generally accepted ‘what 
we all know about school ” - particularly the comprehensive school. 
Eventually these were to become the common sense. Teachers became to be 
seen as preventing an effective education either through stupidity or 
ideological malevolence, and their status as professionals began to decline 
from then on. Schools, particularly comprehensives, became more and more 
linked to low educational standards and bad discipline and in turn the 
reputation of grammar schools was again reinforced. Social indiscipline 
became linked to lack of educational direction, in particular the cure for 
social problems became to be seen as requiring a return to, or rather a 
re-invention of, Traditional standards’ and traditional forms of authority in 
schools.
‘Progressivism’ became a term of abuse; it became rhetorically linked to 
educational failure, the decline of standards and social indiscipline and the 
egalitarian narrative. Soon, a fourth theme was to emerge, the blaming of 
schools for not just this cultural disaster but also for Britain’s economic 
decline. These themes were strengthened in the public image by the general 
strategy of the Conservative Party to generate a climate of panic and fear to 
defeat Labour in 1970: what Ball describes as their attempt to exploit the 
rhetoric of ‘a nation under threat' ^ . That they did defeat Labour makes 
clear the success of their creation of a sense of anxiety. It was the rhetoric of 
jeopardy which was the bottom line of the arguments throughout the Black 
Papers, the other forms of argument - futility, perversity and betrayal had 
anarchy as the 'logical' consequence of disagreeing. It is this explicit or 
implicit rhetoric which so consistently lent a tone of hysteria to their 
arguments and often distracted the reader from their educational arguments 
which were not all ill considered. It was, however, ironic that the purveyors of 
chaos should insist that it was chaos that they sought to avoid.
Economic crises, trade union unrest, racial tensions and roller-coasting 
inflation continued to rack the country and, like Pip, the Respectable 
politicians began to find themselves unable to control their narratives. Or
^ ib id  p. 26
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rather they were perhaps more like Miss Havisham, surrounding themselves 
with the disintegrating fabric of a withering narrative, stagnating, while 
outside the world was moving on inexorably. In the end, it seems that the 
egalitarian story of the Labour Party had simply run out of plots and, in its 
attention to its quite frequently diverting economic sub-plots and internal 
power struggles, it had not so much deferred an ending to its educational 
narrative as lost sight of one.
2. Paving the Way: 
The Great Debate
‘England has been in a dreadful state for some weeks. Lord 
Coodle would go out and Sir Thomas Doodle wouldn 7 come 
in, and there being nobody in Great Britain (to speak of) 
except Coodle and Doodle, there has been no government.'
Charles Dickens, Bleak House: Chapter 40
It was in 1976 that Callaghan attempted to wrest the advantage in the struggle 
for control by attempting a radical re-description of the narrative. He had seen 
the initiative of the egalitarian narrative tarnished, if not lost, in the barrage of 
propagandist rhetoric of the Conservatives and the right wing press. He 
certainly had no confidence in the egalitarian narrative to repudiate their 
claims about falling standards and cultural and economic catastrophe. 
Thatcher’s lack of enthusiasm in creating so many comprehensives when she 
was Education Secretary was mirrored by the singularly unebullient approach 
of the subsequent Labour administration under Callaghan. The rhetoric of 
egalitarianism which had been the principal driving force behind the reformist 
educational narrative of the Labour Party - and which had, in reaction, 
provided power to the counter discourses of the Conservatives - had begun to 
lose discursive force as the various economic problems and crises placed 
insupportable pressure on the maintenance of the social narratives the Labour 
Party as it had, incidentally, to the Respectable Tendency of the Conservative 
party. Something like Butler's Respectable narrative still survived in not 
inextensive pockets of Local Educational Authority resistance to the removal 
of their grammar schools and in the independent and semi-independent school 
sectors yet the move towards the ethos of the greater egalitarianism of the
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comprehensive school had gained a cultural impetus, as Thatcher found, that 
had become almost irresistible, though perhaps sometimes less out of 
conviction than out of habit.
At the same time, the ‘common sense’ view was that comprehensive 
schooling, was a disaster, unable to prevent seemingly inexorable cultural and 
economic decline. The legitimation crises had debilitated both the 
vocabularies of elitism and of disadvantage. Neither could maintain any real 
narrative authority. Where there was still enthusiasm for comprehensives was 
from the teaching professionals and theorists who habitually used the 
vocabulary of disadvantage and were still convinced by the prospect of 
greater social justice it promised. Not even Margaret Thatcher could see, nor 
would she have desired, the possibility of the return to the narrow cultural 
hegemony of the elitist narrative of the Black Papers. Educational debate had 
become both embittering and, as will be described, in the entrenched struggle 
of two popularly odious stories, impotent.
Educational policy making had become in the 1970s more a matter for the
educational professionals, especially through their trade unions and the Local
Education Authorities. There was no grand narrative vision, instead the
competing rhetorics were content with gaining small victories, minimising
defeats and living in a world of ideological detente. Andrew Gamble remarks
that the Callaghan government, like the Heath Government before it, dropped
any pretensions to radical policy making and ‘attempted to cope with the
9 f\recession by a mixture o f pragmatism and opportunism' Callaghan’s 
government had re-assumed the by then traditional, relatively powerless role 
of government in education: it provided money and attempted to set the 
agenda for educational reforms but avoided direct control and left it up to 
local government and the teachers and education professionals to discuss 
reforms, to amend them - perhaps even to ignore them - and to set the time 
scale to implement them. Patricia Rowan, the retiring editor of the Times 
Educational Supplement describes, with penetrating hindsight, the process of 
reform:
'The educational system o f 20 years ago was cumbersome, and
the pace o f change slow. Almost any attempt at reform was
^Andrew Gamble (1988, rev. 1994) p.99
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doomed, crushed between those two icons: partnership and
consultation. One committee on public sector higher
education balanced competing interests so well that it never
got beyond stalemate. By the time every interest group had
been consulted several times on any given subject - before and
after a report was drawn up; before and after legislation was
drafted - either the education secretary or the government
97itself had run out o f time.'
In his Ruskin College speech in 1976, the newly confirmed Prime Minister, 
James Callaghan, made a determined attempt to wrest the advantage in the 
educational debate from the Conservatives, and also, indeed, to undermine 
the egalitarian narrative of his own party. Class was no longer quite so 
important, style and fashion had become more powerful social discriminators. 
Comprehensive education seemed to fit in with this new ’trendy' youth 
consumerist society. Labour Party policy had with Halsey tended to become a 
matter of attempting to remedy deprivation rather than to make any sustained 
attempt to restructure education or schooling. The relatively failed attempt to 
reorganise schooling on comprehensive lines marked the end of attempts to 
reformulate the educational story the end of grand theories of education.
Callaghan attempted to provide a narrative, or at least the basic plot of a 
story, which could win popular authority. By this time the much publicised 
'scandal' of the William Tyndale primary school had left the egalitarian 
educational narrative in something of a shambles and the official report on the 
Tyndale school was shortly to be published. The more positive and vigorous 
narratives of the Wilson era, the 'white heat o f technology \ the child-centred 
pedagogies, the comprehensivisation of schools, had all but fizzled out under 
the sustained onslaught of the media about falling educational standards and 
loony left teachers.
The Tyndale scandal in the early seventies had underlined the popular 
conception of mad, bad teachers and the shortcomings of ’progressive’ 
comprehensive schooling: though perhaps the real problem appeared to be not 
so much what the Tyndale teachers were doing but their refusal to do it
9 7
Patricia Rowan, From one extreme to the other, Times Educational Supplement (Scotland’) 
25th April, 1997, sec. Features, p.5.
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quietly: 'They (the Tyndale teachers) were quite explicit in opposing the 
centrality o f schools' human resource service to the community. Their job was 
not to provide 'factory fodder'; they saw themselves as preparing human 
beings rather than human capital. They sought too, to undermine the class 
structure as far as possible in their policies and practices, rather than 
reinforce it, which they saw as the inevitable outcome o f  schools' traditional 
sorting and selection function. The practical outcome o f these policies were a 
decreased emphasis on 'occupationally useful' skills, a refusal to stratify 
pupils on the basis o f accepted criteria and the implementation o f that not 
uncommon rhetorical claim that the school should serve the most 'deprived' 
segment o f its population.'
Callaghan, in discussing the factors which lead up to his Ruskin speech, 
referred to the Tyndale affair, implying his agreement with the popular 
jeopardy and betrayal theses: 'It was an illustration o f  the kinds o f things that 
parents were saying to me... ' . The explicit hard egalitarian socialist
ideology of the Tyndale teachers reinforced the popular story of 
comprehensive education - jeopardy and betrayal - and the media response 
was not to question what were the purposes of education or what values were 
important in schools but instead to offer up teachers as scapegoats for the ills 
of society, 'brainwashed' ideologues deviously intent on destroying the 
opportunities of the children and presiding over anarchy in the schools, rather 
even than comprehensive schooling itself, or the educational system or 
educational policies or the curriculum. The economy was running out of 
control: the oil crisis was at its height, inflation was rising, unemployment 
was at crisis levels, industrial unrest was commonplace and there was a 
significant decline in wages and the standard of living:
'The picture painted showed schools taken over by extreme 
progressive ideas... peddled by... politically motivated and 
irresponsible teachers with the deliberate intention o f 
weakening the nation's moral fibre by the corruption o f its 
youth, and o f  weakening its international competitiveness by 
the destruction o f  its academic standards....
78 Roger Dale, The State and Education Policy (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989)
p. 126.
ibid. p. 4
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What the William Tyndale affair did was to prove that this was 
no mere fantasy. It demonstrated what we all felt in our hearts 
about progressive education... was right after all.'
Dale comments that the 'Plowden' consensus, at best a half-hearted thing 
anyway, was by then firmly on the wane and, though its fall from grace was 
not directly attributable to the Tyndale affair, there had been for some time 
little political will to continue the narrative of progressive educational 
principles. On its own, Tyndale’s progressivism was not really the issue: the 
debate was never really about pedagogy or curriculum or even the broader 
purposes of education. Rather, the debate was beginning to be about control, 
who was to control the educational processes, and more importantly, the 
social and cultural expectations of the educational narrative. It was the 
beginning of the end of an autonomous educational story.
Certainly Butler had always had a concern with the economy but his concern 
was not directly built into the story; rather the value of his educational story 
to the economy was in a way epiphenomenal: the wider expectation of 
educational opportunity he created would aid the economy, but the story was 
not built round the economy, rather it was parallel to it. Though they were 
quite discrete stories, the two would act in conjunction but without any 
established connexion. Butler saw no need in his story for a causal linkage 
between the economy and education. As opportunities were seized and more 
people gained the benefits of the educational process, then the economy with 
its need for a better educated workforce would mirror that benefit. Butler had 
no desire to displace the socialising and cultural aspects of education, so 
necessary to re-inventing the hierarchical social order which was his primary 
object of desire with a, to him, crude linkage of education and the economy. 
The egalitarian story too placed great emphasis on the socialising function of 
education, though in their case to engineer a new society rather than maintain 
something like the old social order. However, the decades of economic 
uncertainty and crises had thrown this epiphenomenalist ‘mirror’ approach 
into question. There was a perception that education had to be more closely 
controlled.
•^ibid. p. 132
144
Dale indicates that the Tyndale affair did point the emerging narrative in a 
significant direction: "... teachers could run the schools in ways that clearly 
contradicted many o f  the shared assumptions on which the education system 
rested. Teachers could be effective in day to day control o f the schools, and 
they could use that control in ways not welcome to the school managers or its
D /
funding authority." The emerging narrative rhetorically located the 
concept of parent power in direct conflict with teachers and schools, 
particularly schools and teachers espousing progressive ideas. It further 
entrenched in the imagination of the public an educational system not just out 
of control but actively subversive of the ‘British way of life’. Further it 
brought to greater prominence education's role in the national economy and 
perhaps began the process of the narrative absorption of education into the 
national economic story, denying it its own unique story. These two concepts 
- parent power and the integration of the educational story into the economic 
story - became central concerns of Callaghan's Ruskin speech.
In his attempt to regain the initiative and to provide a rhetoric of education as 
equally vigorous and spectacular as the counter-rhetoric which had so 
disestablished the egalitarian narrative, Callaghan adopted many of the 
premises of the Black Paper writers, by then the received popular wisdom of 
the ‘real’ world of education. He had much the same aspirations as Cox and 
Dyson, though his was a much more authoritative theatre, attempting to 
fashion a new educational consensus out of the shattering of the old order 
much as Butler had done in 1944. He, however, did not have the favourable 
political climate that Butler did: his opposition was much more formidable, 
much less willing to play second fiddle. There was little political will on the 
Conservative side for the establishment of a new consensus. Also his 
audience did not have the same relatively unsophisticated and deferential 
public perception of education and teachers - that had been terminally 
undermined by the popular press. He was addressing a cynical and embittered 
perception of the world of education and the declining status of teachers.
In effect Callaghan halted the ideological pretensions of the Labour Party to 
an extension of comprehensive education and the pursuit of greater social
J  ^RDale: "The Politicisation o f  School Deviance: Reactions to William Tyndale" in Barton 
and Meighan (edsf: Schools. Pupils and Deviance. (Driffield, Nafferton: 1979) cited in Ball 
(1990) p. 27
145
justice through the educational narrative. His plea was a pragmatic one, 
delivered apparently ideologically free, for practical solutions to the 
educational problems. While it seems uncharitable to make a criticism in 
hindsight, it does seem characteristic of Prime Ministers in trouble to come 
up with Big Educational Ideas: in Callaghan's case, however, it was not an 
idea on which to base policy but rather to attempt to try to grasp some 
authority by setting the agenda and, perhaps, to gain some popularity out of 
the chaos.
He began the ‘Great Debate’ in his Ruskin speech with a reference to 
Tawney, perhaps the only great educational thinker of the Labour Party and 
an icon of the socialist struggle for equality in education. In this way he 
attempted to relate his present speech to the traditional Labour Party narrative 
of the continuing struggle for greater social justice in education, but he 
side-stepped the typical rhetoric of the Left. 'Let me answer the question 
'what do we want from the education o f our children and young people with 
Tawney's words once more. He said: 'What a wise parent would wish for their 
children so the state must wish for all its children'. ^  Thus he immediately 
asserted, if indirectly, what was to be a major theme in his speech, parent 
power. His imagery was of the paternal state. His principal rhetorical device 
was metaphorically to conflated the family with the state - in effect 
threatening that if the educationalists could not come up with a better story 
then, albeit reluctantly, the state would have to take some measure of greater 
control, justifying this by the material implication that the state was acting in 
loco parentis. He was reflecting the popular image of schools being run not 
for the benefit of parents, pupils or the country but for the advancement of a 
failing ideology.
His speech maintained this paternal, or perhaps avuncular, tone and through it 
he subtly distanced himself from any idea that he was, himself, some kind of 
ideologue. His object of desire was to create a new story that was more 
responsive to the wishes of parents and the needs of the economy, though 
these were, in his conflated metaphor, actually much the same thing. He 
wanted his motives made clear: what he wanted was simply to create an 
agenda for debate. He, it seems, wished to avoid any great expectation of he
12 This and subsequent quotes are from the re-print o f Callaghan’speech in Times Educational 
Supplement (Scotland J 25th April, 1997
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himself, or his government, taking direct political control over educational 
policy. His chosen role was to voice his concern over controversial issues 
rather than taking any committed political or ideological stance. It would not, 
perhaps, be uncharitable to suggest that indeed the Labour Party had entirely 
run out of ideas.
He later commented that in this speech: 7 did not want to pick quarrels... my 
hope was that we would be able to work together... that there should be 
agreement on the way forward for education' . His role was to reflect 
what he saw as the popular mood, the common sense of schooling which had 
been constructed by the rhetoric of Tory propagandists aided by the ineptitude 
of his and previous governments’ administration of education. His private 
tone, in addressing his own Secretary of State for Education had been blunt: 
'Was the teaching o f the three Rs satisfactory? Was the curriculum in Maths 
and Science sufficiently rigorous? Was the examination system a proper test 
o f achievement7 ' His Ruskin speech was not much less blunt. He 
conceded the central themes of the Black Paper writers. He agreed that 
standards were generally too low: 'With the increasing complexity o f modern 
life, we cannot be satisfied with maintaining existing standards, let alone 
observe any decline. We must aim for something better'
He made his and previous administrations’ abdication of direct responsibility 
into a kind of virtue. Maintaining his paternal persona, he implied that he had 
hoped that the educationalists would get it right by themselves, but now he 
had become forced to recognise that they required a father’s guiding hand. He 
complained of the anchor-dragging effect of trade unions and their claims to 
the autonomy of the professional and to insensitive local authorities. He 
readily conceded that much of the problem lay with the teachers: ’one o f  
their troubles is that for an educated group, they behave far too defensively' 
and, suggested, clearly indicating that his sympathies did not lie with the 
teachers, a more prominent role for the schools inspectorate. He showed the 
typical popular mistrust of'progressive' education, calling for an examination 
of 'the methods and aims o f informal education'.
as cited by Michael Barber, New Ijibour, 20 Years On, Times Educational Supplement 11 th 
October, 1996 sec. TESS(2): p.4 
ibid. p. 4
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His principal concern, having established his credentials as untainted by 
socialists or educationalists, was that schools were not adequately serving the 
needs of industry: 7 am concerned on my journeys to find  complaints from  
industry that new recruits from the schools sometimes do not have the basic 
tools to do the job that is required.' He was concerned that vocational 
education has been neglected and voiced what was to become a typical 
Thatcher refrain in the eighties: ‘Why is it that 30,000 vacancies for students 
in science and engineering in our universities were not taken up last year 
while the humanities courses were full?' The deliberate philistine implication 
of this remark was clearly intended as a rebuke not just to the elitist narrative 
of the Tory Party but also to the intellectuals of his own party with their 
egalitarian theory and ideals. It was a demand for a ‘common-sense’ 
approach, as apparently atheoretical and ideology free as Butler’s. Callaghan 
projected himself as a pragmatist and he grasped the opportunity created for 
him, ironically by the Tory Press and the Black Paper writers, to voice 
popular opinion. His speech was as much about power, his new position was 
not entirely secure, as it was about education.
o c
Chitty argues that it was in this speech that Callaghan's renunciation of 
ideology in favour of pragmatism, his linking of education with the economy 
and, most importantly, his admission of powerlessness to control or change 
the educational narrative was to have profound effect on the subsequent 
educational narrative of the Neo-Liberals in their determination to centralise 
control over the educational narrative, in particular by instituting a national 
curriculum and controlling how it was to be delivered by creating a new 
institutional culture in education. Kenneth Baker, indeed, hailed the Ruskin 
speech as an educational landmark:
'...there was a growing disquiet that things were not all right 
in the State o f Denmark, or in this case the State o f Britain.
This concern was powerfully expressed, initially, by a Labour 
prime minister, Jim Callaghan, in that famous speech he 
made at Ruskin in 1976. What he said was bitterly resented by 
the educational establishment and by Shirley Williams, his 
own Education Secretary. It was felt that education was a 
specialist matter - as such it should be left to the specialists.
Clyde Chitty, Towards a New Education System: The Victory o f the New Right (Lewes: 
Falmer, 1989) .
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You shouldn't have clumsy politicians tramping around in the 
secret garden o f the curriculum. But there was a growing 
disquiet about what was happening in education. First 
because many people who had gone to grammar schools were 
very saddened to see their old schools under attack. Second, 
many people were saddened that the great hope which had 
been invested in the idea o f the secondary modern school had 
not been fulfilled. Third, many business people were saying, ' 
...'we're getting applicants who are barely literate and not 
numerate. What is happening to our education system?' And 
so this was a matter which was being forced upon our 
attention and which had to be addressed by all politicians - 
not just Conservative politicians. There was disquiet within 
the Labour Party as well.'
It was the Conservatives who seemed to be most appreciative of Callaghan’s 
speech: it undercut the egalitarian narrative and the socialist ideology which 
underpinned it. What Callaghan seemed to demand was a radical shift in the 
focus of the educational narrative, from the struggle for justice for all to the 
individual’s educational success. In a sense the effectiveness of an 
educational system was to be judged simply and arithmetically by the sum of 
these individual successes. It left the Labour party, almost literally, speechless 
and, for the Conservatives, it signalled some kind of victory in their struggle 
against the egalitarian narrative. While not conceding the old, Respectable 
narrative of the Black Papers it offered them a new discursive opportunity, 
and they did not have long to wait to seize that opportunity.
Kenneth Baker, in conversation with Peter Ribbins, in Peter Ribbins and Brian Sherrat 
(1997): p. 91
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Part 2
The Bourgeois Story
’In many people's eyes it is now the Conservative Party which stands 
for social fragmentation, while the opposition represents the healing 
force o f  community and compromise... Ho one now doubts the value o f  
economic freedom or the spirit o f enterprise, but the exclusive 
emphasis on such things look like so much self-serving rhetoric... In 
itself and severed from the institutions which limit it, the market may 
pose a threat to traditional forms o f social life, to custom, religion
and morality.'
Roger Scruton, cited by Charles Leadbeater in 
Seven Blue Moods'. New Statesman, 4th October, 1996
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Chapter 6
Consuming Passions 
for Education
“The Old Testament prophets did not say “Brothers I want a consensus ". 
They said: ‘This is my faith, this is what I passionately believe. I f  you believe
it too, then come with me. ”
Margaret Thatcher ^
When Butler was made president of the Board of Education in 1941 he told 
his officials, who had asked for his plans, that he supposed he would ‘...tour 
the country making some speeches about education'. The reply was: 'But 
minister, there is only one speech about education ' ?■ Indeed there had been 
since the war just one dominant educational story, in a broad sense. However, 
with the accession of Thatcher it was about to undergo an revolutionary 
paradigm shift. Though Thatcher’s emergent bourgeois educational narrative 
was in some ways similar to the Black Papers construction of educational 
common sense and, indeed, to the Respectable Butler tradition, her adopted 
narrative framework, the Market, was antithetical to this Respectable 
tradition. Her attempt to wrench control of the narrative of education from the 
professionals and to locate it in a Market framework was to bring about a 
radical re-description of educational identities and realities. The dynamics of 
this narrative shift and the nature of the new narrative is the topic of the rest 
of this study.
' Margaret Thatcher (1979), cited in Andrew Gamble The Free Economy and the Strong State: 
The Politics o f Thatcherism (London. MacMillan: 1989, rev. 1994) frontispiece, 
cited by Michael Barber in A Strategy for Success: The Guardian , 7/3/97
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1. The Keywords o f  the 
Bourgeois Educational Narrative
'Our country's decline is not inevitable. We in the Conservative Party think 
we can reverse it. We want to work with the grain o f  human nature, helping
people to help themselves...'
Conservative Party Manifesto, 1979
Roger Scruton  ^ speaks of the late seventies and early eighties as the time 
when the 'collapse o f the educational system' led to the government 'at last' 
beginning to provide 'the language with which to formulate new (educational) 
policies' and he stresses the importance of having to 'create a language with 
which these policies can be debated'. Thatcher’s narrative provided such a 
language though, as it turned out, it was not necessarily a language that 
reinventors of the high-culture tradition like Scruton, as will be discussed 
later, might have chosen.
Raymond William’s Keywords, for example, provides a dictionary of the 
traditional, Respectable vocabularies of post-war years, providing the cultural 
meanings of words which had become: 'significant binding words in certain 
activities and their interpretations; ...significant indicative words in certain 
forms o f thought. Certain uses bound together certain ways o f  seeing culture 
and society... The key words of Thatcher’s narrative, the key metaphorical 
representations of the world which are the subject of this chapter are, 
however, not to be found there, even in the 1983 edition. Williams’s book is 
dominated by key terms from the arenas of struggle between the classical 
narratives of socialism and liberalism - between Mill and Marx - which have 
so engrossed Respectable philosophers like Scruton. Keywords, for example, 
has much to say about ‘Equality’, but nothing about ‘Quality’. 
‘Nationalisation’ is discussed, but not ‘Privatisation’. Terms such as 
‘Accountability’, ‘Excellence’, ‘Competition’ or ‘Choice’ are conspicuously 
absent. Present are words like ‘Dialectic’, ‘Liberation’, ‘Collective’, 
‘Consensus’, ‘Society’... words which seem to feature only pejoratively, if at
JRoger Scruton (1990): Open University TV Broadcast (1990), Policy Making in Education: 
The Education Reform Act.
Raymond Williams, Keywords (London: Fontana 1976, revised and extended 1983); 
Introduction, p. 15
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all, in the social and educational vocabularies since Thatcher. It is perhaps 
evidence of the extraordinary success of the Thatcher bourgeois narrative that 
Williams’s book is, this chapter will argue, perhaps more of historical than 
current cultural value.
The ‘grain of human nature’ had been represented in the Respectable 
educational narrative by various hegemonically related metaphors and 
corresponding metonymies - organic metaphors of the state as gardener and 
social ‘growth’ through education, evolutionary metaphors of the 
development of society, biological metaphors of ‘innate’ qualities like ability 
and intelligence directing ‘natural’ growth, and ‘scientifically’ circumscribing 
the limits of individual growth, along predetermined paths and the social 
ordering, metonymic dimension of such metaphors - the Platonic myth of 
metals, the much older but still totemic ‘ladder of being’ where social 
organisation is a reflection of what God and/or Nature has ordained, the 
sociobiological description of ‘natural’ kinds of people determining location 
and value in society through their ‘natural’ ability and ‘natural’ class 
privilege.
The Respectable narrative had determined the cultural ‘common sense’ of 
what was ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ development, educationally and socially; 
what was appropriate to different ‘kinds’ of people as educational provision 
and what was inappropriate; what kind o f ‘growth’ or ‘development’ - social, 
educational or sexual - was ‘normal’ and what was ‘abnormal’ or unnatural’; 
what expectations people could legitimately contemplate; what was culturally 
sacred and what profane. The ‘natural’ elitism of the regimes of selection 
were moderated and justified by the assumption in the narrative of a putative 
meritocracy and an altruistic ethic of service and duty for the selected elite. 
The narrative consensus between the Respectable politicians of both the Left 
and the Right had effectively ‘depoliticised’ education: the kernel of the 
largely successful rhetorical attack on the counter-narrative of the hard 
egalitarians was that they were attempting to relocate education as a political 
objective, as a means of redescribing society in a radical way. Thatcher was, 
however, to break this narrative consensus and once again throw education 
into the political arena.
The Respectable story had been weakened from the inside by the more open, 
meritocratic story of the 1944 Education Act which, though it had perhaps not
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seen its rhetoric of meritocracy as much more than a device to gain consensus 
and maintain the traditional cultural hegemonies, had in its new narrative led 
to a demand for greater expectations from the educational system by an 
expanding, increasingly prosperous middle class. The egalitarian counter 
narrative had weakened the Respectable story of human nature, of inherited 
‘natural’ ability and privilege. However, the increasingly persuasive middle 
class story of individual betterment through self-reliance, enterprise and hard 
work, both socially and economically, was under Thatcher to be revealed as 
the actual bastard child of the 1944 Act, not the counter-narrative of the softer 
egalitarians which had gained some narrative credibility in the Respectable 
interregnum even if it had failed to flourish.
In Thatcher’s victory in 1979 a new story, the bourgeois story, had finally 
gained a receptive audience. Alan Clark, in his television series about the 
history of the Conservative Party **, tellingly calls the period from MacMillan 
to Thatcher, ‘From Estate Owners to Estate Agents'. In it he charts the 
irresistible rise of the petty bourgeoisie into the arenas of power of the 
Conservative Party which had traditionally been the all but exclusive domain 
of the Respectable Tendency, a consensus driven Conservatism, essentially 
protective of traditional privilege, dominated by the shire aristocracy. After 
MacMillan and Douglas-Home - both from the patrician wing of the party 
even if MacMillan had more shallow aristocratic roots - the more egalitarian, 
at least in the shallower meritocratic sense, but essentially bourgeois 
membership of the seventies demanded change. The aspiring classes saw their 
hard won social and economic positions threatened by an equivocating and 
vacillating Tory Party, convinced by the right’s rhetoric of jeopardy, attacking 
what had been constructed as the radical egalitarian ‘hidden agenda’ of the 
left. Electoral defeats and failed international and national economic policies 
had by the late 1970s clearly brought into focus the pressing need for the 
Conservative Party to re-invent itself.
The force of Thatcher’s personality and the power of her advocacy of the 
bourgeois story was such as to make renaming it ‘Thatcherism’ irresistible. It 
will be discussed in greater depth shortly, but though it was primarily an 
economic story which owed much to the radical neo-liberal economists von 
Hayek and Friedmann and to their apostle Keith Joseph, there were also
^as broadcast on BBC2 28/9/97
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present aspects of a more simplified, attenuated, notion of society and a social 
radicalism and nationalism similar to Enoch Powell’s and much had been 
borrowed from Ted Heath’s neo-liberal Selsdon manifesto. It will be argued, 
however, that it was Thatcher’s driving commitment and her personal, acerbic 
confrontational manner, her heroic style, that drove her reforms rather than 
her mastery of the philosophical tensions and ambiguities of her narrative.
2. The Unforgiving Strategy
7/7 the Falklands we had to fight the enemy without.
Here the enemy is within, and it is more difficult to fight, 
and more dangerous to fig h t' ^
‘Consensus’ was the keyword of the Respectable narrative. The Respectable 
Tendency had invested their hegemony in the maintenance of the narratives of 
the Conservative Party as what EP Thomson called the ‘host culture’, creating 
a cultural ‘common sense’ and effectively depoliticising the stories. However 
the Respectable Tendency felt there was no alternative to Thatcher’s 
ideological story. They could see no hope of achieving power without it. The 
Respectable was no longer sustainable. Its demise had thrown the Respectable 
politicians into either a profound depression or panic.
Thatcher was vitally concerned to maintain control of the new narrative - it 
was tolerated by the Respectable Tendency because it had placed the Tories 
once again in power but its future was far from being assured. She saw 
enemies everywhere, not just in the narrative of socialism which she was 
confident she could handle, but more importantly in the Respectable story of 
her own party which she loathed perhaps just as much. The resolve of the 
Respectable Tendency had become debilitated - the Respectable Norman St 
John Stevas was never one of Thatcher’s ‘converts’ yet he found himself 
welcoming her premiership: 7  didn't know whether it (Thatcherism) will 
work or not. Why is there no critique o f  it? Because no-one has any 
alternative. There is nothing left to try'. However, what Thatcher stood for 
went against many of his most sacred patrician sentiments.
6Thatcher cited in John Osmond, The Divided Kingdom (London: Constable, 1988) p.39
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Thatcher had come to power riding on rhetorical storm clouds of economic 
and social chaos. Her rhetorical appeal was to save Britain from present 
disaster and the prospect of future catastrophe. However, she had been placed 
in power predominantly by the expanding and aspiring middle classes, many 
of whom owed their new economic and social power to Butler’s educational 
narrative. Her project was, bluntly, to smash the narratives which she 
perceived as threatening the discourses of her new power-base - The 
Respectable narrative of her own party and the egalitarian narrative of her 
political rivals - and to substitute her own narrative - a highly ideological, 
politically radical narrative that was not just unashamed of its ideology but 
positively flaunted it.
The Respectable Narrative had never really been a Grand Narrative: it was too 
fluid and too consensual, too pragmatic in its desire to maintain power to 
have a clear and unambiguous narrative base. It had largely become the ‘host 
culture’ because it had refused to cast its stories in explicit, unambiguous 
political and ideological terms: it never claimed that it would change society, 
just that it would provide a continuity of traditional, ‘common sense’ cultural 
values and stability for the country to ‘evolve’, ‘naturally’. It had maintained 
its hegemony over competing cultural narratives by accusing them of being 
political and they overpowered their rivals using the rhetoric of perversity, 
jeopardy and betrayal - they were ‘unnatural’, they went against the grain of 
‘common sense’, they were inciting revolution and playing ducks and drakes 
with the nation’s future.
The closest the Respectable Tendency had come to a grand narrative was its 
not always convincing advocacy of Disraeli’s ‘One Nation Toryism’. It was 
never the case that the Tories had neglected the importance of self-interest in 
their formulations of human nature, but unfettered liberalism was seen as a 
potentially dangerous - and political - rhetoric, particularly as the Reform 
Acts were widening the social base of the electorate. Unrestricted liberalism, 
would, inevitably and with Hobbesian savagery, justify a nation of ‘haves’ 
and ‘have nots’ - inviting revolution at worst and at best creating and 
maintaining an alienated electoral base which would be exploited by an active 
political opposition. Disraeli proposed a softer style: not unfettered egoism, 
but more what Thomas Nagel was to call ‘self-referential altruism’. Thus the 
benevolence of the Victorian philanthropists, individually concerned to lay up 
alms against oblivion, could be re-interpreted in populist political rhetoric not
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just as the human face of capitalism but as characterising the dominant ethic 
of the Conservative Party. Consequently the Victorians came to see education 
as essentially a philanthropic project and to perceive greater state control of 
education as a threat not just to their hegemony but also to the cultural 
hegemony of their economic and cultural stories.
By giving up some liberty, the Respectable tendency argued, they would 
necessarily gain less than they would with unfettered liberalism: but 
unfettered liberalism carried the risk of them losing everything. Butler 
succinctly called politics ‘The Art of the Possible’. The Respectable project 
was presented in the vocabulary of games: consensus politics was a game, 
however, which demanded apparently irrational behaviour, the voluntary 
giving up of potential winning strategies to ensure longer term gain. Thatcher 
could never bear such ‘irrationality’: that was her strength and, perhaps, her 
weakness too. To her it was simply incomprehensible not to strive with all 
vigour to win.
The Respectable Tory narrative traditionally tended to represent politics in a 
consensual way - conceptually similar to Kipling’s ‘The Great Game’ - with 
potential winners and losers regulated by gentleman’s rules which might be 
bent or skewed but which would not entirely be broken. As a game, strategy 
becomes the important thing in politics and rhetoric becomes its most 
important means to maintaining the necessary discipline and control of the 
narrative to allow the game to continue, especially when some members of 
the team become dissatisfied when it hits a losing streak. Losses - such as the 
tactical sacrifice Butler made of Bantock’s highly restrictive cultural elitism 
for a somewhat more socially inclusive elitism - were acceptable, up to a 
point, if there remained the possibility of long term survival and success.
The politics of the Respectable Narrative has its rhetorical roots in this kind 
of game-theory . Though, as Davies makes clear, the competitive nature of 
their concept of politics was never in doubt: ‘The relentless pursuit o f  power
H
The following discussion of game theory, in particular the ‘zero-sum’ game of 
noncooperative players, is indebted to J.L. Makie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) in particular to his discussion o f ‘The Prisoner’s Dilemma’; 
to Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985) for the 
discussion o f effective strategies in this game, in particular the ‘forgiving’ strategy; and to John 
Maynard Smith, "7 he Evolution o f  Behavior" in Scientific American. 239(3): 176-192 
(September 1978) for the development o f the ‘nice’ strategy.
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explains so much o f  the history and development o f  the Tory Party... It 
explains why, for example, the Conservative Party never had a consistent 
body o f ideas or a clear-cut ideology, in case they got in the way o f  power: 
hence the famed flexibility o f  the Party...’ yet at the same time they had 
developed what Hofstadter has termed a ‘forgiving’ or ‘nice’ strategy. He 
defined this as a strategic malleability, in which a player always co-operated 
with a co-operative adversary. If a player’s opponent did not cooperate during 
one play, over one policy, this strategy prescribed noncooperation on the next 
one, but a player with a ‘forgiving’ strategy reverted rapidly back to 
cooperation once her opponent started cooperating again. In this way, for 
example, the National Health Service remained recognisably as Bevan had 
created it, steel and coal remained nationalised, nuclear deterrence remained 
central to defence policy, and education remained broadly selective and its 
curriculum broadly traditionally classicist and elitist. Even with 
comprehensivization, the ‘common sense’ of essentially different ‘types’ of 
children was embedded in the story.
In effect, the ‘nice’ strategy required its players to submit their conflict to 
external arbitration to avoid mutually assured destruction: not so much 
consensus as detente. The educational story had thus become the property of 
the educational bureaucrats and professionals. Any attempt to radically revise 
the educational story - along egalitarian lines for example - was in the minds 
of the Respectable Right a betrayal of the rules of the game. This might go 
some way to explaining the particular venom with which comprehensive 
education was greeted: it was not just a threat to the hegemony of the 
Respectable story and its representation of education and educational 
identities and realities but also to the Respectable strategy which had so long, 
and often so precariously, maintained their ‘host culture’ hegemony.
Indeed, Hofstadter’s research discovered what the Respectable Tory Party had 
been practising for years; that their ‘forgiving’ strategy - at least the 
appearance of consensus - outperformed every other strategy that was 
‘unforgiving’. Respectable Toryism, thus, had become a broad church, 
allowing some degree of latitude in opinion, such that even if they disagreed 
on many issues the core ideology - selective schooling following the ‘natural’ 
kinds of children maintaining the ‘natural’ order of society and its ‘common
^A J. Davies (1995) p. 448
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sense’ cultural values - was maintained. Butler, for example, could still agree 
with the basic ‘common sense’ of Macmillan. That was the kernel of the 
pragmatists of the Respectable Tendency’s fears: that Thatcher’s story was 
too ideologically committed to be as flexible or so enduring. Their ‘forgiving’ 
strategy had kept not just them in power for most of the century but it also 
had left them in control of the ‘host’ social narrative - and its hegemony - 
with only marginal revisions having to be made.
There is no clear sense of an ending in this kind of Respectable politics, not 
even in theory: in this sense it can never sustain a Grand Narrative, like 
Socialism for example, where the End - total social equality - may be 
considered a woolly romantic fantasy but it still, in triumphalist, 
eschatological metaphors of the New Jerusalem, governs the narrative. The 
inflexibility of the socialist Grand Narrative - iconically represented in the 
radicals of the Left in Clause 4 Part 4 of the Labour Party Constitution - 
would, in the years to come, be more overtly recognised by the Respectable 
Labour Party, in an ironic reflection of Thatcher’s strategic victories over 
alternative stories, as preventing them from gaining and sustaining power for 
any length of time.
For Respectable Conservatives - and for their counterparts on the Left, the 
less ideologically certain politicians of Labour’s Respectable wing - the game 
cannot ever be won, it can only be lost: the strategy is to ensure the game 
continues and that those who are winning remain at least moderately satisfied 
and willing to continue in the same team. The risk of trying for an outright 
win - even just stating what an outright win would be - is fraught with danger 
and carries with it the real risk of losing: so the end is constantly deferred, 
re-interpreted, re-invented or revised.
Indeed the Respectable Tendency of the Left had, for example in their 
conception of educational realities and identities as has been discussed, much 
in common with the Respectable tendency of the Right - both broadly shared 
the same fundamental ‘common sense’ of education. Their consensus was, 
however, much deeper than the temporary allegiances of a political game: it 
was a matter of how they shared - and invested their very identities in - a 
common ‘reality’. Though they often and bitterly disagreed they did not 
materially threaten the ‘host’ narrative. They both hankered after an elitist - or 
at least a selective - educational system; they both agreed about the
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superiority of the classical curriculum; they both held the grammar school in 
iconic regard. Their less respectable wings might advocate different stories, 
the free market or hard egalitarianism, but the Respectable tendencies kept 
their hegemonic grip on their respective Respectable narratives. They might 
at times stray from it, as both Heath and Callaghan did, but they would return 
to its comfortable security in adversity.
Thatcher, however, had a radically different vision. She presented her vision 
as a Grand narrative, an all-inclusive social theory with the promised end of a 
‘natural’ bourgeois hegemony. Her narrative demanded the wholehearted 
commitment of its acolytes. She was much more ideologically sympathetic to 
an ‘unforgiving’ strategy: the ethos of Thatcherism was noncooperation and 
the savage competition of the classic zero-sum game. She refused to ‘play’ 
politics: for her it was war. Richard Crockett chronicles the ‘battles in 
cabinet' against the ‘Wets’ and Thatcher in her autobiography herself 
employs all the imagery of war, ‘campaign tactics in the battle bus', ‘Mr 
Scargill's insurrection', 'militant shock troops', ‘the enemy within’ 
‘privatisation...reclaiming territory', ‘a British victory on points (over 
Europe)’...^
Politics for her was in a sense more real than reality. It was, to borrow a 
phrase from Saul Bellow, a ‘reality policeman’ - it was not the arbiter of 
stories nor the gatekeeper of comfortable ‘illusions’ or compromised 
narratives - it was the destroyer of ‘false’ narratives: ‘The final illusion - that 
state intervention would promote social harmony and solidarity or, in Tory> 
language, ‘One Nation ’ - collapsed in the ‘winter o f discontent when the 
dead went unburied, critically ill patients were turned away from hospitals by 
pickets, and the prevailing social mood was one o f snarling envy and 
motiveless hostility. To cure the British disease with socialism was like tiying 
to cure leukaemia with leeches. ’  ^^
No ideology is pure, none is without the seeds of betrayal, none uncluttered 
by contradictory accumulations of cultural baggage except perhaps in the 
philosophical naivete of politicians like Thatcher. However, her demand for
^phrases selected from many examples in Margaret Thatcher The Downing Street Years 
(London: Harper Collins, 1993)
Margaret Thatcher (1993) p. 8
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an ideology was far more than her recognition that the Conservative party 
needed a new conceptual framework, a metaphorical re-description of their 
stories of society. Her desire was also for the power and control that a demand 
for a commitment to a particular ideology would bring. It was more than the 
demand for change; it was the demand for a change that would bring about 
and continue to maintain the ascendancy of the new bourgeois story of 
Conservatism for the future. The philosophy of communism was abhorrent to 
her, but the means by which the communist politicians had for so long 
maintained an enduring power-base, their nearly absolute control over the 
social and cultural stories of society, appears to have been far more attractive. 
Thatcher was much taken with her ‘iron maiden’ caricature, perhaps attracted 
by the cultural resonances of the ‘iron’ metaphor - ‘iron’ chancellors and even 
‘iron’ curtains - illustrating the popular historical regard for political 
inflexibility, for absolute, simple certainties and for pragmatic, determined 
action uncluttered by emotional or intellectual baggage.
She had no truck with consensus, no willingness to take an ‘acceptable’ loss: 
for her it was always all or nothing. Her position was strong because of the 
perceived failure of the consensual politics of the Respectable story and also 
because of the much reduced power of the counter narrative of the Labour 
party which had become weakened by internal power struggles. It was also 
strengthened by the residual popular perception of equality of status, in the 
sense of the decline of deference to ‘traditional’ class divisions particularly by 
the aspiring classes, and by the existence of the Welfare State. The popular 
perception o f ‘two’ nations was less strong, the ‘have nots’ apparently fewer 
and less perilously threatened. Thatcher never really threatened, for example, 
the essential principles of free education and health.
Her main advantage was the weakness of her opponents - ‘all the problems o f  
Britain were the direct consequence o f two things. One was socialism. The 
other was the Tory grandees'.  ^  ^ Both these ‘enemies’ were she quite soon 
rendered ineffectual. Thatcher was, in effect, able to attempt to take the board 
away and then begin a game of patience, ignoring the existence of any other 
player - even on her own side - and denying the possibility that there could be 
any other way of playing. Robert Skidelsky remarked that she was: ‘the most 
ideological prime minister to luive led a party that prided itself on
^Thatcher according to her media adviser, Tim Bell, cited in Davies (1995) p.336
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pragmatism. She got her chance because the old pragmatism had degenerated 
into a sticky corporatism which had become the vehicle for stagnation and 
decline \ ^
She presented her political strategy as a classic ‘zero-sum’ game - but there 
would be no co-operative strategy, no shared or compromised narrative, no 
communication: only savage rivalry with no quarter offered or given. This 
metaphorical construction of politics as a zero-sum game sees people - even 
those in the same team - essentially either as wholly committed devotees or as 
competitors and rivals, and, either way, not as ends in themselves but always 
as means. It offered only a very limited political morality with ethics, 
relations and alliances being exploitative and strategic. The only values with 
authority are those which maintained the story.
Her ‘philosophy’ was never clearly distinct from the cultural background of 
Thatcher herself. All her political instincts, her perceptions of ‘reality’, were 
bourgeois to their bootstraps:
‘Deep in their instincts people fin d  what I am saying and 
doing right. And I know it is, because it is the way I was 
brought up... in a small town. We knew everyone, we knew 
what everyone thought. I sort o f  regard myself as a very
normal, ordinary person, with all the right instinctive
. 12 antennae .
Stuart Hall characterised her style as ‘authoritarian populism’. Only she was 
ever the legitimate speaker, only her narrative had legitimacy: ‘A leader must 
lead, must lead firmly, have firm convictions and see that those convictions 
are reflected in every piece o f po licy '}^  Davies comments on the 
exasperation of her Cabinet Ministers with her heroic tendency to begin her 
meetings by summing up the policy conclusions or by making policy 
statements in advance of meetings: lAs I often did in government, I was using 
public statements to advance the arguments and to push reluctant colleagues 
further than they would otherwise have gone. '  ^^
lz cited in Peter Pugh and Carl Flint Thatcher for Beginners (Cambridge: Icon, 1997) p. 157 
^  Margaret Thatcher (.1993) op.cit., p. 207 
^cited in Davies (1995) op.cit., p. 31 
^ibid p. 125
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Her determination to destroy the traditional ‘nice’ strategy was a central 
complaint of the Respectable remnants of the new government. Francis Pym 
offered a typically condescending patrician comment on Thatcher’s strategy: 
'..we've got a corporal at the top not a cavalry officer. ’ ^  He saw, as did 
Thatcher herself, that she was not content with anything but a final victory, 
but he regarded this strategy as at best naive and potentially disastrous.
Davies records Thatcher saying, ‘There is no consensus. I  call them
1 7 . 1 0
(Respectable opponents) quislings and traitors'. ' Richard Crockett
characterises hers as ‘The Heroic Age’. For her, politics was always the crude
zero-sum game and her lack of co-operation with other points of view became
legendary: ‘To those waiting with bated breath for that favourite media
catchphrase, the ' U-turn’, I have only one thing to say. You turn i f  you want
to. The lady's not for turning'. ^  Such was the power of her rhetoric, allied
to her manipulation of populist culture, that the bourgeois story of the
Conservative narratives of education and society was to become, for a time,
the cultural iconography of Thatcher.
There are those, particularly on the Left, who would disagree that Thatcher 
herself was so important. John Pilger, for example, prefers a more traditional, 
Marxist interpretation of events, seeing Thatcher as merely an extension of 
the historical march of capitalism. However, he writes:
'...Thatcher was not 'a unique political force', as her 
mythmakers contend. What she did was to popularise 
petit-bourgeois reaction and to silence any opposing voice.
Indeed her greatest single achievement was the co-opting o f  
British liberalism: from the liberal media to the Labour Party.
The liberal intelligensia, in the press and the academia never 
seriously exposed Thatcherism by denouncing its tactics and 
decoding its language. Fraudulent notions o f 'freedom ',
'choice', 'enterprise', 'modernising'...., family values' and
^H ugo Young (1990) p. 331 
^Davies (1995) p.92
1 ^Richard Crockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the Economic Counter 
Revolution 1931-1983 (London: Fontana, 1995) p.287 and passim 
Margaret Thatcher, address to the Tory Party Conference, Brighton: The Guardian
10/10/80.
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‘reform ’ were not only allowed to become common usage, but
were adopted by those once proud o f  their liberal 
90credentials.
Pilger’s analysis of Thatcher’s ‘authoritarian populism’ and how it was used 
to maintain control over the discourses of politics is acute, but Pilger’s 
Marxist Grand Narrative does not explain why Thatcher’s story became so 
popular and so resistant to dissenting voices which were perhaps not as silent 
as Pilger describes though they did prove ineffective.
Partly the answer lies in the growing lack of confidence in the traditional 
Grand Narratives themselves, particularly socialism, to make a difference. 
The radical, modernist revolutionary projects of the 1960s and 1970s - 
typified by the egalitarian story of education - had foundered and, as 
described in the last chapter, there was a critical loss of confidence in the 
Respectable narrative of the Conservative Party which Thatcher filled. 
Certainly her story was perhaps not exactly what anyone much, even in her 
own party, seemed to want, but it was the only one uttered with enough 
confidence and certainty to persuade. It certainly struck a popular chord at the 
time when so much confidence in any kind of grand narrative had been lost.
Further, Pilger’s Marxist analysis appears to be unable to account for the 
success of Thatcher’s story: it seems to offer nothing but a reiteration of its 
compromised vocabularies, formalist historiography and class antagonism. 
He, in fact, states no more than we already know, without offering any 
explanation for Thatcher’s undeniable success. Populism is clearly about 
personality as much as ideas: it is about effective and manipulative rhetoric, 
persuasive stories and metaphors which strike the people as representing how 
they see reality. It is, above all, about managing perceptions of reality and 
maintaining power, not through force but by policing consent. Stuart Hall 
writes:
‘Popular culture is one o f  the sites where this struggle for and 
against a culture o f the powerful is engaged: it is also the 
stake to be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena o f
^John Pilger, Distant Voices fLondon: Vintage, 1992) p. 119
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consent and resistance. It is partly where hegemony arises, 
and where it is secured. ’ 1
Pilger‘s analysis is coloured by his own commitment, not even so much to 
one grand narrative, but more generally to grand narrative eschatology. For 
him there always must be a clear ‘sense of an ending’, as Frank Kermode 
describes it. It frames his view of the world. He sees politics as a perpetual 
conflict between the traditional grand narratives, socialism and liberalism, 
dating from the Enlightenment. What he seems not to wish to consider is that 
with Thatcher, though not necessarily because of her, we have perhaps come 
to the end of grand social narratives and their rigid uncompromising 
vocabularies and categories: in this sense what Thatcher was offering was to 
become not so much a grand narrative but a post-modernist simulation of a 
grand narrative. This, however, will be further developed in a later chapter.
Thatcher was instinctively sensitive to the popular mood. She, more critically 
however, had an awareness of the means by which she could construct, 
manipulate and reflect it, thus maintaining her bourgeois story and herself in 
power. She described the reasons for her victory over Labour in the 
confidence debate that led to the General Election in 1979:
The Government's defeat... symbolized a larger defeat for the 
Left. It had lost the public’s confidence as well as 
Parliament's. The 'winter o f discontent', the ideological 
divisions in the Government, its inability to control its allies in 
the trade union movement, an impalpable sense that socialists 
everywhere had run out o f steam...
The Tory Party, by contrast, had used its period in opposition 
to elaborate a new approach to reviving the British economy 
and nation. Not only had we worked out a fu ll programme for 
government; we had taken apprenticeships in advertising and 
learnt how to put a complex and sophisticated case in direct 
and simple language. We had, finally, been arguing that case 
fo r  the best part o f four years, so our agenda would, with
21 Stuart Hall 'Notes on deconstructing "the popular ” ' in R. Samuel (ed) People’s History 
and Socialist Theory tLondon: Routledge, 1981) p. 239
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luck, strike people as familiar common sense rather than as a 
wild, radical project. ’
Thatcher gave far more importance to the need to ‘manufacture consent’, to 
borrow a phrase from Chomsky. But the consent was as much for her personal 
power as for the story she came to embody. In many senses her story and she, 
herself, were the same thing - she was the story, the story was her. She 
wanted, almost evangelically, to rebuild the social narratives in her own 
image. She was convinced of the need for her narrative to bind not just the 
Party to Office, but the Party and the country to her. She presented the story 
and herself simultaneously as indispensable to the future of the nation. She 
always constructed herself as a strong person, a leader who had convictions 
from which she would not stray. Her intransigence to any criticism, never 
mind to counter-narratives, and her certainty in the correctness of her 
narrative became legend.
‘She knew what was best for Britain and therefore those who disagreed with 
her were not simply wrong - they were potential traitors to the cause ’, Davies 
comments . It is interesting to note that so many commentators, like 
Davies, Gamble and Crockett so often cited here, constantly fall into the use 
of both military and religious imagery when talking about Thatcher, reflecting 
the characteristic unforgiving nature of her rhetoric and its positive 
evangelising aspect
Indeed Thatcher radically redefined the Conservative Party as a Party with 
beliefs, with a dogma and with a mission. In dramatic contrast to the 
Respectable game strategy exemplified by Ian Gilmour’s insistence that:
‘British Conservatism is ...not an ‘-ism. It is not an idea. Still less is it a 
system o f ideas. It cannot be formulated in a series o f propositions, which can 
be aggregated into a creed. It is not an ideology or a doctrine. ’ Thatcher 
employed militant religious imagery to evangelise for her ‘creed’: ‘The Old 
Testament prophets did not say ‘Brothers I want a consensus'. They said: 
‘This is my faith, this is what I passionately believe. I f  you believe it too, then 
come with me. ’ J
^Margaret Thatcher 0  993), p. 4/5 
23Davies (1995) p.271
quoted in Peter Jenkins Mrs Thatcher’s Revolution (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987) p. 97 
23cited in Andrew Gamble (1988) p. v
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Thatcher’s story was not, however, so much a political story - it owed little to 
political theory. Rather it was a selective narrative based on her own idealised 
history, her home-spun values and beliefs re-invented as a creed and related 
with quasi-religious and portentous zeal. In many senses it was not unlike 
cult ‘philosophies’, like Scientology - at least in their characteristic style of 
charismatic, authoritarian leadership, the founder’s close and exclusive 
control of the largely home spun narrative, and a tendency towards paranoia if 
subject to criticism.
Her style was messianic, offering redemption only by a radical revision of the 
‘common sense’. She mythologised her own life in what was almost a 
fictional displacement of the life of Christ. She speaks in her autobiography - 
in the portentous tones of the New Testament - of her own nativity in a poor 
but honest comer shop; of her ethical and intellectual maturation under the 
influence of her father living above the shop; of her carrying out her father’s 
wishes when she went out into the world; of her time in the desert outside 
politics as one of meditation and the temptation of ‘giving it all up’; of her 
realisation that her unavoidable, sacred duty was to save Britain, to redeem it 
from the sin of socialism; of her regard for Keith Joseph as a John the Baptist 
figure preparing the way for her; of her recruitment of apostles into her 
cabinets; of her militant evangelism; of her initial triumphs against her 
enemies; of her casting the unions out of the temple of politics; of the 
development of her creed; of her final betrayal and her self-sacrificing 
abdication; and, finally, of the hope of resurrection in the future. It ends with 
her triumphal description of the new world she had created: that even if she, 
in her favourite Churchillian terms, had not been allowed ‘to finish the job’, 
at least she had set the agenda for the future and she had changed irrevocably 
the vocabularies of politics.
Davies ironically comments on this fictionalisation : ‘Mrs Thatcher's 'poor 
but honest' background was something she was not above exploiting. In fact, 
however, this grounding must have been drastically modified by her 
privileged experience o f education at Oxford, a professional life as a 
barrister and a marriage to a wealthy businessman. ’ ^  He seems to suggest 
that she used her bourgeois background in a explicit act of exploitation but
^ D a v ies  (1995) p. 94
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this is to miss the point. She was not separate from the story she had created 
about herself; she did not ‘use’ it, indeed it could be argued cogently that such 
was the power of the narrative that the story used her to fulfil itself. In any 
case, Thatcher never was able to distance herself critically from her own 
beliefs, she had no sense of uncertainty, no power of self-reflection, and 
above all no sense of historical irony.
There is a sense, however, in which Pilger is quite correct: Thatcher was, 
perhaps, written by her story as much as she was the author of it. If she had 
not existed then she would have had to have been invented. It is, in the end, 
not quite possible to separate the ‘real’ Thatcher from the one she, the story 
espoused, the popular media, her political devotees and even her enemies had 
invented. However there were two discrete elements to her story: its populist, 
sometimes contradictory, often simplistic and ill-defined, bourgeois ideology 
of a new, ‘natural’ moral and social order; and, perhaps more important in 
establishing her story, the unforgiving, heroic strategy of the market, the 
virulent rhetoric with which it was maintained and the way that foundering 
attempts to create counter-narratives were broken. What was to be different 
about Thatcher was how she re-politicised the Conservative story and how 
she grasped and maintained control of the social narratives, in particular the 
educational story.
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3. Redefining Society: 
Inequality by Design
‘Mrs Thatcher's success derives only in part from her ability
to plunder the chapel culture in which she was born... She is
also a consummate story teller to the nation, offering us easy
and instant illustrations like those o f  the brightly coloured
pop-up picture books o f our childhood. Leaving nothing to
chance, she tells us a constant succession o f fairy tales and
77parables to lighten our darkness. ’
Thatcher strove to change the language of the Tory Party. Her new language 
would, she believed, in the Conservative naive epistemological tradition, not 
make ‘reality’ or be complicit in its re-invention: it would simply reflect the 
‘real’ reality - in her case this was represented by the metaphorical 
construction, the story of the ‘Free Market’:
7 knew from my father's accounts that the free market was
like a vast sensitive nervous system, responding to events and
signals all over the world to meet the ever changing needs o f
peoples in different countries, from different classes, o f
different religions with a kind o f benign indifference to their
status. Governments acted on a much smaller store o f
conscious information and, by contrast, were themselves
‘blind forces ’ blundering about in the dark, and obstructing
7Rthe operations o f markets rather than improving them. ’
It was this cosy domestication of market forces that was to become the 
governing metaphor for her social policies. She could not resist, as few 
politicians it seems ever can, using organic metaphors. For her, however, it 
was not the country that was the important organism, as in the Respectable 
narrative, but the economic super-structure. She presented market economics 
as a kind of biological homeostatic mechanism, coming to the ‘correct’ 
balance by itself. In her view, providing the market was left to achieve this
71 Trevor Blackwell and Jeremy Seabrook: A World Still to Win: The Reconstruction of the 
Post-War Working Class (London: Faber and Faber, 1985) p. 156 
Thatcher(1993) p. 11
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balance by itself, without interference from politicians, then all, not just 
economically but also socially, would be well.
Her phrase 4benign indifference ’ could have been her maxim though the 
market as a mechanism cannot have a conscience and cannot be described as 
‘benign’ except in the very abstract economic sense that what is good is the 
freedom to trade without regulation and what is evil is that which interferes 
with such freedom and so prevents ‘natural’ economic balance, an ethical 
dichotomy that Thatcher certainly favoured. Hers was a Manichean approach: 
share-holders, entrepreneurs, businessmen, wealth creators were all symbols 
of ‘freedom’ and were consequently good; trade unionists, socialists, 
professionals were symbols of restrictive practices and therefore bad.
The ‘naturalness’ of Thatcher’s economic master narrative was not so much a 
metaphorical construction of human nature - as the Respectable Tendency 
had provided - but rather was presented more like a ‘natural’ law, a 
representation of how the world works, an economic version of Newton’s 
laws of physics. She was constitutionally unable to comprehend that any other 
story could have any legitimacy. For her there was only one story - a story of 
unnerving lucidity - which she saw with perfect clarity and she had little 
patience with anyone who could not see as clearly and ‘rationally’ as she did.
The startling simplicity of Thatcher’s argument stems perhaps mainly from 
her own experience, in particular from her faith in the ‘rational’ derived from 
the early influence of her father’s small businessman mentality and clearly 
influenced also by her training in reductivist, epistemologically and 
metaphysically simplistic, science. For her, the work of economists and 
philosophers was to affirm her ideas, not to inform them. Hers was a 
simplistic view of the Market, it is not at all clear, for example, that the 
Market is a homeostatic mechanism at all, rather that it is inherently always in 
flux. The Market did, however, appeal to her as a metaphorical vehicle for 
promoting the radical individualism that drove her narrative and a new moral 
order.
Thatcher’s narrative of reform presented a radically different ‘common sense’ 
educational reality though it was framed by a traditional political rhetoric of 
redemption. Politics, for her, was a reflection of essential human nature - she 
was first and foremost a political creature - and her conception of human
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nature was a narrow one. Her conception, stemming from this and from her 
petty bourgeois background and her schooling in free market economics, was 
of people as rational egoists competitively seeking advantage and 
co-operating with others - though never compromising on important matters 
of principle. It was this that fuelled her contempt for what she saw as the 
perversity of the educational professionals.
Thatcher’s narrative utilised the organising metaphor of the Market as the 
means by which society was to be regulated rather than any positive principle 
of social justice. At its heart was the minimalist economic theory of Adam 
Smith, refined and re-invented by economists such as Hayek and Friedmann 
Its view of human nature - central to the Market framework of her narrative 
and her re-description of educational realities and identities was something 
like Darwin’s and Spencer’s story o f ‘human as animal’ evolutionary success 
through ‘natural’ ruthless competitiveness and the correspondent ‘natural’ 
qualities of enterprise, hard work and self-reliance.
Darwinism, the ‘Blind Watchmaker’ as Richard Dawkins has described it, 
was particularly attractive because it suggested that the operation of physical 
laws alone were enough to describe the ‘natural’ place of humankind at the 
apex of creation. The ‘natural’ processes of selection were alone enough to 
describe this, as analogously, the ‘natural’ Market forces of choice and 
competition were sufficient in any description of society or, indeed, of 
education.
Thatcher’s accession was coincidentally accompanied by the increasing 
popularity of neo-evolutionary narrative formulations of human nature, 
‘selfish genes’ and ‘socio-biology’. Human nature, it was argued, is the 
product of evolution down to the genetic level: the qualities of radical 
individualism - selfishness, ambition and competitiveness - are ‘programmed’ 
into the human psyche. The socio-biological re-description of human nature 
in such para-Darwinian evolutionary vocabulary permitted a comfortable 
abstraction of, for example, the discussion of poverty. Poverty was a 
necessary and ‘natural’ evolutionary condition. The world was fairly neatly - 
and ‘naturally’ - divided between the successful ‘haves’ and the doomed 
‘have-nots’: the blind forces of evolution selected for the ‘natural’ human 
qualities of the bourgeois ‘haves’ - thrift, enterprise, competitiveness and 
ambition - and weeded out the feckless ‘have-nots’ for ‘natural’ extinction.
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This vocabulary could argue that it was neither an unsympathetic government 
with its series of hostile social policies, nor was it class antipathy that allowed 
some to prosper while others declined: it was simply the operation of the 
‘natural’, dispassionate, neutral forces, just like the weather or earthquakes 
which no-one could control.
Consequently, it could be argued, those who succeed do so because they have 
been selected: they have adapted successfully to the changing environment; 
they have the required qualities. Certainly, in classic evolutionary vocabulary, 
a species or a subset of a species which cannot adapt to a changing 
environment is ultimately doomed to extinction, but Thatcher’s 
pseudo-Darwinist vocabulary concealed that she had set about creating a new 
economic environment. There was nothing ‘natural’ about that: it was a 
political act, an act of conscious ideological choice even if she argued that all 
she was doing was removing interfering economic and social policies, 
allowing the ‘natural’ Market to exert its inexorable will. That some people 
failed to adapt is a perversely circular justification of a story which had 
created the environment in which they could not do otherwise. The new 
environment was fairly explicitly designed in order that the bourgeois class 
should flourish and that the bourgeois stories would ultimately be instituted as 
the new cultural ‘common sense’.
This concealment of the ideological sub-text of the story is certainly typical of 
the educational narratives of the Conservative Party discussed in this exercise 
and it is also typical of Thatcher’s - but only as Thatcher’s narrative has 
slowly and inexorably become adopted as the cultural common sense. The 
‘common sense’ of Thatcher was not immediately apparent, either to many of 
her putative Tory allies or to her opposition. The earlier narratives of the 
Respectable tendencies had operated as an established ‘host culture’, 
disguising their ideology behind their claim to represent common sense. At 
first the narrative of Thatcher, no matter how she attempted to represent it, 
was clearly not the common sense - her narrative was characterised at first by 
its struggle with what it represented as a debilitating, though established, 
culture.
The neo-Darwinian metaphor of the bourgeois narrative represents the 
essence of the paradigm shift between the Respectable and Bourgeois 
narratives. It provided a rhetorical frame which was in direct contrast to the
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static class organisation of the Respectable liberal narrative and with the 
fairly rigid class distinctions was the ‘reality’ factor of the egalitarian 
narrative. It was a metaphor, indeed, which encouraged a break with fixed 
social orders and traditions in favour of social ambition and material 
acquisitiveness as a marker of status. The metaphor was a dynamic one of 
becoming and of social change, not of the maintenance of the class status quo 
which was the defining principle of the Respectable narrative. Hogg’s, and to 
an extent Butler’s, use of evolutionary metaphor has been to represent society 
as a whole as the subject of the evolutionary processes, Thatcher’s narrative 
was to see the individual as the subject: the narrative was concerned only 
peripherally with ‘society’ changing but rather more with the way these 
processes operated on each person, to permit them individually to swim more 
efficiently in the gene pool and thus, incidentally, to create a better pool.
Thatcher’s was essentially a reformist narrative: its warlike imagery 
rhetorically bent on establishing an as yet unformed ‘common sense’. It relied 
on the exposition of the corrupt and inadequate values and institutions of the 
then established culture. The propaganda mills of the Bourgeois Narrative 
were to generate and exploit a popular sense of fear and, on a more positive 
side, the desire to realise personal ambition, to generate a new common sense 
of society and social institutions. It is the purpose, indeed, of this exercise, to 
show the dynamics of narrative change and the processes which operate to 
conceal ideology behind the mask of metaphor and rhetoric. Steven Ball, for 
example, notes the emphasis on nature in the new narrative: 'to stress the 
inevitability o f things'. He points out that this ‘obscures the role o f theory as 
a basis for policy making' ^9 Ball claims that Thatcher thus attempted to 
de-politicise the educational narrative. To an extent it does, in that it suggests 
that all she was doing was to allow the ‘natural’ world to take its ‘natural’ 
course. The ideological aspect of the narrative - its radical individualism - is 
thus concealed by its portrayal of itself as rationality: it merely reflects the 
‘natural’ world.
She may indeed have attempted to de-politicise the narrative and to disguise 
the narrative’s ideology behind a curious amalgam of market economics and 
this pseudo-Darwinist rationale in order to render it as ‘common sense’, but 
this is perhaps to simplify the dynamics of the cultural process. At first, such
29BaIl (1990) p 59
173
was the nature of its radical paradigm shift in educational identities and 
realities, and such was its impact on the educational world for example, that it 
was never really seen as anything but political and ideological. As her 
reforms have taken hold, however, and as the metaphorical transformations in 
the vocabularies of education have become so embedded in the common 
sense of the dominant narrative, perhaps the ideological foundations have 
now become less visible.
However, there was never much sign that visibility dismayed Thatcher: 
indeed she seemed to thrive on ideological conflict. Thatcher was never in 
any doubt that she was right and that hers was the ‘rational’ approach, even 
when she was almost the only one to think so, on Poll Tax for example, and 
she had little compunction about demanding compliance when she could not 
get consent. Thatcher’s style was not rational debate: it was the heroic, and 
often brutal, assertion of power. Her ‘common sense’ was fairly explicitly 
ideological and it was as such that she sought to impose it.
The aggressive, brutal story of evolution, the survival of the fittest, lent a 
rhetoric which had much dramatic impact, particularly in a time characterised 
by the pressing need for social and economic re-organisation and reform. It 
was its description of nature that lent the rationale behind her famous denial 
of society, but the individualist sub-text of her narrative was only very barely 
concealed, if at all:
7 think we 've been through a period where too many people 
have been given to understand that i f  they have a problem, it \s 
the government’s job to cope with it. 7 have a problem, I '11 
get a grant’. 7 'm homeless, the government must house me 
They’re casting their problem on society. And, you know, 
there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and 
women, and there are families. And no government can do 
anything except through people, and people must look to 
themselves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves and them, 
also, to look after our neighbour. People have got the 
entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations.
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There's no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first 
?0met an obligation.
Thatcher’s denial of society was, however, more a salvo in her rhetorical war 
against what she interpreted as the socialist counter narrative than as a 
material premise of her story. What Thatcher was denying was a way of life - 
and the vocabulary it used to represent the world - that was centred on the 
ideas of interdependence, social equality and cultural pluralism - the 
vocabularies of the egalitarian and, to an extent, Respectable narratives of 
education.
Thatcher denied narratives framed round a notion of social justice: the 
socialist narrative with its concern for natural rights and the duty of the state 
to fulfil the basic needs of its citizens was, for her, a perversion of the laws of 
nature, in particular the ‘natural’ iron laws of the market. She did believe in 
society: a bourgeois society. The economic success of Britain - and the 
success of the educational system - was in her story bound up in the blind 
operation of the Market, its ‘benign indifference’, which would ensure the 
survival of the fittest, the bourgeois; and correspondingly the ‘natural’ 
elimination of those who did not contribute to the economic gene pool. She 
writes: ‘...socialism had failed. And it was the poorer, weaker members o f
society who had suffered worst... More than that, however, socialism, in spite 
o f the high-minded rhetoric in which its arguments were framed, had played 
on the worst aspects o f human nature. It had literally demoralised 
communities and families, offering dependency in place o f independence as
i
well as subjecting traditional values to sustained derision. '
A key metaphor of Thatcher’s new narrative of society, used rhetorically to 
represent the old social narratives it found so debilitating, was the 
‘dependency culture’. Thatcher had reinterpreted the vocabulary of 
disadvantage current in the Respectable and egalitarian narratives as the 
maintenance of a ‘dependency’ culture. The egalitarian, and to a lesser extent 
the Respectable narrative, had, missing Shaw’s irony, blurred the Shavian 
distinction between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor. In their 
shared vocabulary of social justice Mr Doolittle had become re-described as a
10cited in David Willetts Why Vote Conservative (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997) p. 15 
^Thatcher (1995) p. 625
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hapless victim of the structural inequities of the capitalist state. The 
Respectable narratives had maintained redistributive policies, economically 
and educationally, to attempt to correct or at least moderate these inequalities. 
For Thatcher such inequalities were not structural but rather the ‘natural’ 
human condition. Doolittle, unambiguously, was a wastrel.
Thatcher, brought up as many of her Labour Party contemporaries had been in 
the work ethic of non-conformist Methodism, saw poverty as essentially 
sinful: the ‘poor’ had effectively rejected their ‘natural’ industrious and 
competitive natures and opted out of the struggle to ‘better’ themselves which 
for her was the essence of being human. For Thatcher, the history of all 
hitherto society was the history of the bourgeois struggle for individual social 
and economic betterment. That, for her, was the correct, indeed the only, 
moral order. She made no distinction between the ‘deserving’ or 
‘undeserving’ poor; rather she saw them as the effects of a dependency 
culture, as ingrate swallowers of state subsidies and hand outs paid for by the 
long-suffering, tax paying middle classes. Thatcher’s narrative emphasis was 
on the ‘deserving’ bourgeois: they alone were in a state of grace. It was they 
who made all the sacrifices yet they were the employers and the 
entrepreneurs, they were the wealth creators through their ‘natural’ qualities 
of industry, determination and cautious financial management. They had to 
have a story that recognised their importance.
Thatcherism had manufactured in her story a substantial appeal to the 
bourgeois - large and small business people, the socially and materially 
ambitious middle classes and the aspiring skilled working class. It was for 
them that the educational story was finally being written. These were the 
moral ‘heroes’ of her story; they were its central agents, the only characters 
who were fully rounded in her narrative. Her narrative was presented as 
fulfilling bourgeois dreams beyond avarice. Her mixture of vituperative 
derision and homely rhetoric won her the support of a disillusioned middle 
class. She carefully built the monolithic tenet of her creed, 'There is no 
a lte r n a tiv e and indeed there was no credible counter narrative to provide 
one.
Her story was an exclusive appeal to bourgeois self interest and aspirations. 
Their essential character traits - entrepreneurship, personal ambition, 
self-reliance, thrift... - were the cardinal virtues of her sociobiological story of
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human nature, and her narrative was governed by their motivations and 
desires. Her story valued them uniquely for the contributions they were 
making to the economic and cultural life of Britain and her story offered them 
stability, value for their money and the possibility of the fulfilment of their 
expectations that the Respectable narratives had so miserably failed to 
deliver.
Other characters - those who did not own their home, those who were 
unemployed, the unskilled and so on - were more one-dimensionally 
characterised as ‘dependent’, essentially a drag on the aspirations of the 
bourgeois. Hugo Young describes how one Cabinet colleague, wisely 
anonymously, described the narrowness of this characterisation and 
uncompromising certitude of her story: ‘She is still basically a Finchley lady. 
Her view o f the world is distressingly narrow. She regards the working class 
as idle, deceitful, inferior and bloody minded. And she simply doesn't
it
understand affairs o f state. She doesn V have the breadth'. Such patrician 
contempt marked the anger of the Respectable shire aristocracy and their 
‘One Nation’ rhetoric over their exclusion from the bourgeois hegemony. 
They were in turn described with matching malice, and as 
one-dimensionally’, as ‘wets’, though Thatcher was never quite able to 
silence their voices though she made a determined attempt to do so. With, 
perhaps unconscious, humour she described the ‘huffy' departure of the 
reshuffled Ian Gilmour and the 'grander' exit of Christopher Soames who 
gave her the impression ‘that he fell the natural order o f  things was being
IT
violated and that he was, in effect, being dismissed by his housemaid.
Indeed the ‘natural’ order of the respectable Tories was being turned upside 
down as the old elite gave way to the more vigorous bourgeois hegemony. 
Though they were characterised as the enemy, the Tory grandees had never 
united in open resistance to Thatcher but she was relentless in pursuing her 
narrative to the exclusion of all others. The ‘wet’ Jim Prior was replaced at 
Employment by the ‘dry’ Norman Tebbit and Mark Carlisle, whose 
consensus-seeking strategies had she believed fairly dismally failed, was 
replaced by Keith Joseph in that same 1981 reshuffle. The dissenting voice of 
the diminished Respectable Tendency of the Conservatives had largely had its
cited in Hugo Young, One of Us (London: Pan Books, 1990) p. 127 
Thatcher (1993) p. 151
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day as, gradually, the traditional Respectable power-base self-destructed 
during the Thatcher years.
Many of Thatcher’s closest allies had staunchly bourgeois backgrounds. 
Evans ^  charts the rise in the representation of professionals and business, 
almost exclusively men. There were fewer Tory MPs with inherited wealth 
and many were children of the ‘44 Act. The Tory party also saw an expansion 
of ‘professional’ politicians in its ranks, many from what was described now 
as a ‘classless’ background, the ‘new’ Conservatives, William Hague and his 
sergeant-at-arms Sebastian Coe for example, attended comprehensive schools 
but have achieved ‘classlessness’.
The concept of class became de-politicised under Thatcher. Indeed, 
‘classlessness’ became a metaphor for the bourgeois class which had grown 
strong in its narrative triumph: so that only the bourgeois were recognised as 
legitimately having interests and only the bourgeois had access to the 
discourses of power. To use the vocabulary of class or to acknowledge 
membership of a social ‘class’ - whether it be the working class or the upper 
classes - was, in effect, to invite exclusion from the discourses of power.
34Evans (1997) p. 48
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Chapter 7 
The Middle Way
7/ is my passionate belief that above all what has gone wrong with 
British education is that since the war we have... ‘strangled the middle way ’. 
Direct grant schools and grammar schools provided the means for people like 
me to get on equal terms with those who came from well-off backgrounds.' ^
1. Education in the Marketplace
The metaphor, ‘the middle way’ has come to code the bourgeois hegemony. It 
is not, as it might imply, an acceptance of the need for consensus or an 
Aristotelian avoidance of extremes. It locates the radical difference of the 
bourgeois narrative with the Respectable narrative of the Conservatives in 
which power had been ultimately located in the propertied elite and the 
redistributive egalitarian counter-narrative where power had been located in 
its construction of a class struggle. It emphasises the primacy of liberty and 
choice and, though it is a broadly meritocratic narrative, it seeks to empower 
only the middle classes. Its dynamic is one of social mobility, but always 
towards the middle class: all society is constrained to approach the condition 
of the bourgeoisie. Since access to power is discursively restricted to the 
middle classes, the lower classes are invited to aspire upwards and the 
cultural and political elite, the shire aristocracy and the academy, are forced 
to relocate downwards. Everything that wishes to rise, to paraphrase 
Malebranche, must converge on the bourgeois narrative.
The market was not the only thematic strand of the bourgeois narrative 
though it was the dominant one. It was the means by which education - and 
indeed all social institutions - were to be formally restructured, education was 
to become a mechanism for creating a winners and losers culture through the 
marketing of educational achievements as commodities. The second strand, 
the moral and cultural story rather than the economic mechanism, will be
^Thatcher (1993) p. 578
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discussed a little later though these strands are philosophically very closely 
linked.
In the Respectable narrative, education had been described primarily as a 
social good. Certainly it was portrayed as a means to the cultural, economic 
and social benefit of the state but the Respectable narrative was broadly, if 
not always convincingly, framed by a conception of social justice. The 
Market narrative entertained no such interpretation: it was driven by 
consumer demand for marketable commodities in open competition. The idea 
that education was a commodity - like a car or a beefburger - and that the 
school and the teacher were there simply to meet consumer demand and that 
their survival would depend on meeting that demand in competition with 
other schools was to turn the traditional reality of teaching and schooling 
upside down.
David Hart, the General Secretary of the National Association of Head 
Teachers bluntly made this point. Speaking about the Education Reform Act 
(1988) he remarked: 7 don't suggest she (Thatcher) sees schools as 
supermarkets, nevertheless what she is saying in effect is, that just as parents 
have every right to shop where they think fit, when it comes to buying goods, 
so they have every right to shop where they think fit when it comes to their 
child's education.'  ^ Yet this was exactly how education was to come to be 
viewed, not broadly where it was also concerned with the acquisition of 
culture, but much more narrowly as the acquisition of marketable skills. This 
paradigm shift in educational reality was premised on the strategic connection 
between education and the well-being of the economy. Whereas in the 
Respectable narrative this connection had been contingent - education had a 
duty to take some responsibility over its connection with economic 
development and the labour market - in the bourgeois narrative this 
connection became a necessary one, in effect identifying education with 
economic performance.
Callaghan had in the Ruskin Speech effectively repudiated the egalitarian 
narrative in favour of a much more economically effective, vocationally 
focused, educational system. He had tried to do so, admittedly, in the rhetoric 
of the expansionist tradition of the Labour Party educational narrative, though
^Stephen Ball (1990) p. 63
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he paid little more than lip-service to the redistributive and idealistic 
dimensions of that narrative. John Patten, however, to use a currently popular 
political idiom, put a different 'spin' on the Callaghan speech and he made 
explicit how it was used rhetorically to give justification for the radical 
metaphorical re-description of educational realities and relations of the 
bourgeois narrative. John Patten asserts the ‘common sense’ view that 
economic crises had created a sense of unease with the then established 
educational and social narratives and describes the 'deeper' cause of the 
failure of education:
’There are two important features. First the whole educational 
system was producer-driven; some saw it as indifferent to the 
needs and wishes, o f parents, o f  employers and the wider 
general public. It was never quite clear who was responsible 
for what, and it became clear that central government took no 
responsibility for the school curriculum, that government had 
few, i f  any, levers on standards o f  performance in schools.
Second, schools were failing pupils o f average and below 
average ability; there wasn't the right quality, breadth and 
balance for these pupils. And these issues, taken together, 
called for fundamental change. The Department, up until the 
1980s, concentrated on the supply and organisation o f schools 
- there was a certain complacency about the standards 
achieved by school leavers - but there was a growing 
frustration with uneven quality within the decentralised 
system, and it was this point that Jim Callaghan highlighted so 
strikingly.'
Thus education and the economy were to become inextricably linked. 
Educational Goods became economic Goods and only what was good for the 
economy was good educationally. Patten’s first words here show the new 
metaphorical representation of education. Thatcher’s narrative came to 
represent education in the vocabulary of business and the economy. Education 
was to be dedicated to the needs of consumers and employers - the end-users. 
The consumer of education was to be empowered by the creation of an 
educational market where the market forces of choice and competition would,
■^ John Patten in Ribbins and Sherrrat (1997) p. 171
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it was believed, inexorably drive up educational standards and, critically, at 
the same time make education much more responsive to the needs of business 
and the employers. Wider definitions of education, cultural initiation or 
enrichment, for example, were largely abandoned in favour of a vocationally 
oriented, consumer driven system: it is the customer, through her wallet, and 
the business end-user who would jointly determine the nature and standards 
of the service. In the end, excellence would be determined by crude utility 
and maintained by the introduction of competitive, dog-eat-dog market forces 
in schools.
Patten addressed what he, like Thatcher, had come to see as the central 
problem in education: that of control. Patten, rather oddly, used the economic 
metaphor 'laissez-faire' ^ to characterise the lack of political control of 
education in the 1970s. Presumably he was trying to describe a failure by 
previous governments to grasp control of the educational narrative, yet the 
central premise of the Market narrative was to abdicate central state control 
and leave education to the ‘natural’ balance of the competitive market. He 
speaks of Callaghan’s speech as 'very brave and farsighted' but criticised 
both Callaghan and Shirley Williams, the then Education Minister, for 
'back-pedalling\ not taking direct control of the educational system but 
instead relying on Local Education Authorities to initiate reform.
Mark Carlisle, Thatcher’s first Education Secretary, remarked: 7 did say at
one stage that the Secretary o f State was the reverse o f the harlot throughout 
the ages - you had all the responsibility and no power.' This perception of 
powerlessness, under the dead weight of the Respectable consensus, was to 
provide, under the succeeding Conservative Secretaries of State for 
Education, the focus of the Thatcher educational narrative on the necessity for 
both control and reform. Local Authorities and the educational professionals 
were to become characterised in the emergent narrative as being bent upon 
frustrating reform - either because they were pursuing their own self-interests, 
or because any proposed change was immediately obstructed because of their 
adherence to competing ideological agendas, or because of their instinctive 
resistance to change and their blind adherence to the system they knew, or 
simply because of their hopeless incompetence.
4ibid., 177
 ^ Mark Carlisle in Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 63.
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Mark Carlisle, Secretary of State for Education from 1979 to 1981, was 
reluctant ‘to grasp the nettle', a metaphor Thatcher was fond of. He, for 
example, remarks: '...when I came to office I  believed that schools had been 
through a lot o f  upset during the past few  years. There had been a great 
debate going on, for and against comprehensive education, for and against 
the 11-plus, for and against grammar schools - schools that had been thrown 
into turmoil. It seemed to me what was needed was a period o f stability. ' ^ 
Carlisle goes on to assert that much of the rhetoric about the state of 
education was not entirely valid and much had been exaggerated or taken out 
of context. This was not the preferred narrative, nor the heroic strategy that 
characterised the Thatcher reforms. She had perforce accepted ‘wets’ into her 
cabinet but by 1981 she had become much more established and confident in 
office and Carlisle was replaced by Keith Joseph who was not at all reluctant 
to ‘grasp the nettle', though he was later to admit that his confrontational 
style was not, in the end, as effective as it might have been.
Joseph regarded his time as Education Secretary as largely a failure, though a 
failure only because of his inability to tell the story in a way that would have 
converted the educational establishment, not a failure of the story itself. Like 
Thatcher, he believed that his story was the only truly rational one. In the 
new vocabulary, the welfare state and the ‘egalitarians’ had created a 
debilitating ‘dependency culture’ in education as elsewhere. In the bourgeois 
narrative, education was run by people who had been too long protected from 
public accountability - another key term - for the money they spent. The 
narrative was, therefore, framed by its ‘reality’ principle, the Market, and the 
vocabulary of reform: ‘And the faster the illusions o f practical men crumbled 
before the onrush o f  reality, the more necessary it was to set about 
developing... a framework... It was the job o f government to establish a 
framework o f stability... within which individual families and businesses were
n
free to pursue their own dreams and ambitions.
A central problem for the educational reforms was that the educational 
professionals, along with other salaried public sector professionals, were not 
part of the wealth-creating bourgeoisie. Characterising teachers as a problem 
was a central theme in the narrative, reflecting the popular image of teachers 
as trendy, left-wing activists. Yet many teachers, members of the bourgeois
6 ibid. p. 72 
^Thatcher (1993) p. 14
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‘salariat’, as Evans^ describes, were ‘natural’ Tory voters and found 
themselves cast as the enemy, along with Trade Unionists and socialists who 
still adhered to a different story. There were clearly not ‘dependent’ in the 
same way as the Tower’ classes but they were, in a sense, dependent on the 
wealth producing entrepreneurs: they used public money. Nor were they 
directly involved in economic transactions or exchanges. Kenneth Baker 
makes these points quite unambiguously:
O f all Whitehall departments the DES was among those with 
the strongest in-house ideology. There was a clear 1960s ethos 
and a very clear agenda which permeated virtually all the 
civil servants. It was rooted in progressive orthodoxies, in 
egalitarianism and in the comprehensive school system. It was 
profoundly anti-excellence, anti-selection and anti-market.
The DES represented perfectly the theory o f  producer capture, 
whereby the interests o f the producer prevail over the interests 
o f the consumer. Not only was the Department in league with 
the teaching unions. University Departments o f  Education, 
teacher training theories and local authorities, it also acted as 
their protector against any threats which ministers might 
impose. I f  the civil servants were the guardians o f  this culture, 
then Her Majesty's Inspectorate o f Education was its 
priesthood. ' ^
Much of the thrust of Thatcher’s reforms was an attempt to re-describe the 
public sector in market terms and to integrate the professionals into the 
bourgeois narrative, to recharacterise them by stripping away their protective 
claims to self-regulation and expertise and plunging them into the ‘real’ 
world. These attempts at reform created some alienation of the middle 
classes, especially those employed in the educational sector who saw, in the 
fissure opened up between the private and public sectors, that they were not 
being valued in the new narrative either materially or even with the respect 
they felt due to them. Though Joseph claimed he was simply ‘seeming’ to
o
°Eric J. Evans, Thatcher and Thatcherism (London: Routledge, 1997) Chapter 6 and passim 
^Kenneth Baker, The Turbulent Years: My Life in Politics (London: Faber and Faber, 1993)
p. 168
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attack teachers^, the market reorientation of education was seen by them, 
with some justice, as a threat to their professional status, indeed to their jobs.
To remove the ‘professional’ status of teachers was one of Thatcher’s key 
objectives in her fight to locate education in the wider narrative of the Market 
and to re-describe education as a commodity. ‘Professionalism’ had long 
been the code for the social status and autonomy of educationalists: to plunge 
them into the market was to reduce that status to that of a skilled tradesman - 
or even to that of a comer shop grocer - and to make the schools operate in a 
Market was to make their actions responsive not to the expertise and authority 
of their professional knowledge but to the parents re-identified as ‘clients’ 
and ‘consumers’. To create the new narrative reality of the market, the claim 
to professionalism had to be removed.
Thatcher had an enduring mistrust of teachers - ‘a deep dissatisfaction., with 
Britain’s standard o f education ’ ^  - though her comments were mostly bald 
reiterations of the Black paper venom of the seventies: 7 also believed that 
too many teachers were less competent and more ideological than their
i y
predecessors. 1 distrusted the new ‘child-centred’ teaching techniques... ’ .
Her ‘common sense’ was largely undisturbed by educational research or 
educational theory.
Teachers and their unions and the local authorities had indeed become 
powerful in the no-mans’-land between the conflicting egalitarian and 
Respectable narratives. Teachers, in particular the unions, had formed a 
buffer between mutually incompatible, potentially conflicting ideologies. 
They, Thatcher perceived, had the real power in education, but they seemed 
to take none of the responsibility. They were invisible, hiding behind their 
privilege of self-regulation. They were, she considered, too easily swayed by 
‘socialist’ rhetoric of egalitarianism, much too perversely committed to 
comprehensivization, and much too inefficient and lax to maintain 
educational standards. She believed that they were not just incompetent but 
they were also too ideologically compromised to adopt her Market vocabulary 
in education. They lived, in her view, in cosy complacency, cushioned by 
their professional privileges from the harsh realities of the economy. They, in
^Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 86 
 ^* Thatcher (1993) p590 
^ibid. p. 590
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her perception, resisted innovation, avoided accountability, limited consumer 
choice and prevented competition. Evans writes:
‘...they (professionals) winked at sloppy practice and casual
inefficiency. They were insufficiently self-critical. However
finely honed their skills and however much their expertise was
valued, Thatcher felt that they were insufficiently responsive
to market forces - and thus a collective impediment to the
achievement o f  the kind o f world she wished to bring about.
Professionals were particularly prominent defenders o f that
welfare tradition, especially in health and education, which
1 ?had been inherited from William Beveridge in the 1940s...
Thatcher complained about the lack of factual knowledge o f the subjects 
teachers needed to teach, too little practical classroom experience...and too 
much stress on the sociological and psychological aspects'. ^  Indeed, 
Thatcher tended to deny that it took any particular or specialised skills to 
teach at all - it was all just common sense. Educational theory had no place in 
her epistemology. In this, however, Thatcher was in the tradition of good 
canonical authority. Educational theory had never been, until the sixties, 
really acceptable in the academies. Mary Wamock, speaking of her early 
university career, remarked: ‘...Education Departments in Universities were 
pretty generally despised, devoted as they were to learning and leaching in 
general. Fellows o f colleges (in Oxford) used to speak o f  them with derision. 
“There's no such subject as education ”, they would say; and the implication 
was that those who could not get far in pure scholarship or real scientific 
discovery or genuine philosophy had invented a subject: Education - 
parasitic on the real thing.' ^
Nigel G rant^ remarked that such indifference or hostility to educational 
theory was indicative of a desire to maintain a conservative view of 
education, to maintain and reproduce the traditional values, canons and 
institutions which it narratively supports. Thatcher, though, was concerned
^Evans (1997) p. 65 
14Thatcher (1993) p. 598
* ^Mary Wamock: ‘Teacher teach th y se lf , The Dimbleby Lecture 1985: cited by Nigel Grant: 
'Some Uses fo r  Educational Theory, in Hamish Paterson (ed) Educational Studies at Glasgow 
University: Past. Present and Future (Glasgow: University o f  Glasgow, 1994) p. 130 
ibid., p. 131
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with reform. Ostensibly, the Market would decide which values were correct, 
what had authority and what institutions would survive. Thatcher was indeed 
confident that a ‘natural’ bourgeois narrative would ensure the survival of 
‘natural’, bourgeois values, authority and institutions. For her the ‘common 
sense’ was that education should reproduce bourgeois society and bourgeois 
values and that educationalists should recognise this as their primary duty.
Thatcher made a fairly determined attempt to destabilize the authority of 
unsympathetic teacher educators. Using characteristic Market-inspired
1 n
business metaphors, she tried in the late eighties to ‘break the monopoly’1 of 
teacher training institutions by instituting business inspired training schemes: 
one to create ‘articled’ teachers by what was basically an industrial 
apprenticeship model of training on the job; the other was the creation of the 
‘licensed’ teacher - someone who had experience of the ‘real’ world, the 
world of business, to bring to the class and to what she saw as the cosseted 
educational world. She envisaged that such schemes would supply half the 
required recruits to teaching. While this estimate was very optimistic, it was 
nevertheless a clear threat to teacher educators and to the traditional 
professional autonomy and expertise of teachers themselves. The vocabulary 
used to describe teachers was that of the trade apprenticeship, not of vocation 
or expertise but of the job and craft skill. Teachers had to learn their new 
place, their new description and their new identity - of the market, not the 
ivory tower. Their ‘skills’ would have to stand the test of open competition in 
the educational market.
However, there was, it seems, more than a degree of truth in Thatcher’s 
complaints even if her tone was, perhaps, not entirely justified. Since Butler 
the educational professionals had lived in their buffer zone, relatively free 
from criticism or control. That insulation had become progressively damaged 
since the mid-1960s - as described earlier - but the professionals had generally 
not heeded the writing on the wall. They had, in the public perception, been 
judged and been found wanting: they had done little to assuage fears of falling 
educational standards and incompetent teachers and they seemed to be 
insensitive to criticism and beyond public control. There was a clear popular 
dissatisfaction - however valid it might be or however it had been produced - 
with the uneasy equilibrium in the conflicting ideologies of comprehensive
l7 ibid., p. 598
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education, the selective grammar schools and the elitist private sector and 
there was a popular sense of the need for reform.
Humes no Thatcherite, nevertheless shares her suspicion about claims to 
professionalism. He claims that the meaning of professionalism in the 
vocabulary of teaching is not entirely clear and what claims to authority, 
expertise and special status it may legitimately have, have become debased as 
it has been rhetorically exploited, by employers to secure compliance with 
reforms and by teaching unions to demand a privileged protection from 
external oversight or accountability and as a crude bargaining counter in wage 
negotiations. Thatcher was concerned to break the institutional power of the 
teaching unions and to deny them not just influence over but access to the 
narrative. This she did by simply excluding them: her trade union reform 
legislation ensured that they could not make any effective resistance. She was 
also, however, concerned with the claim to autonomy of teachers: their claim 
to service, their loyalty to the client and their resistance to managerial 
pressures in changing their methods of teaching or in forming their 
judgements of pupils.
This autonomy had, anyway, already become weakened by the story of the 
teaching career. The really successful teacher was, as Humes describes, not 
the ordinary classroom teacher - rather it was the teacher who had progressed 
up the career structure. The claim to professionalism of teachers was plagued 
by such deep ambiguities: the career structure in teaching was one of 
advancement, which took the teacher out of the classroom where the 
‘professional’ skills were exercised and where claim to some unique expertise 
could be justified, onto a ladder of managerial and administrative promoted 
positions where such ‘professional skills’ were increasingly irrelevant. This 
careerist narrative, Humes argues, is more characteristic of a bureaucracy than 
a ‘profession’ such as medicine or law where simply being a doctor or a 
lawyer is generally sufficient in itself.
Thatcher had a hearty dislike of bureaucracies, seeing them as stultifying and 
unaccountable organisations resistant to change. The introduction of 
competitive market forces in education, particularly the greater emphasis it 
placed on the management and administration of schools, was to strengthen
18Walter Humes, The Leadership Class in Scottish Education (Edinburgh; John Donald, 1986) 
pp. 21-25 and passim
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the careerist story and to risk increasing the bureacratisation of the teaching 
force. However, in establishing an educational market, it was intended that 
teacher would be re-identified as the producer of a marketable commodity 
and would be judged by his or her effectiveness though that was to prove very 
difficult to quantify. Payment by results was the market logic - this would 
effectively prevent the bureaucratisation of teachers - but though it was often 
proposed and though it was a view that had many sympathisers, it proved to 
be politically impossible to impose.
The market ethos of schools was also intended to ensure that the new business 
minded management of the school would take much more account of 
corporate image and corporate loyalty and responsibility: their additional 
powers over the employment of teachers: the new emphasis on accountability 
and the carrot of promotion then ensuring that teachers, crudely, toed the 
desired line regardless of any ‘professional’ scruples. This control over 
teachers and its attempt to eliminate the potential for conflict between 
autonomous ‘professional’ and corporate values, was considerably more 
sophisticated, however, and will be discussed at greater length in the next 
chapter, particularly in the discussion of the regulatory culture of 
management that was to become a key feature of the new business vocabulary 
of schooling.
George Walden, a Tory politician with a greater sense of both justice and 
style, sums up the public perception of teacher professionals, who he argues 
had become identified with left-wing teacher activists, particularly those in 
the union conferences, who had in their speeches been at best insensitive to 
the public image - another keyword of the Market vocabulary - they were 
creating: ‘What is disturbing is the calibre and cultural level o f  the 
individuals involved. On that measure our militant teachers would not be 
allowed a platform by their fellow leftists on the continent. They are just not 
educated enough. The harm they do to their profession is out o f all 
proportion to their numbers. It is not simply that they are political infants and 
educational cranks whose speeches and appearance are not designed to 
bolster public confidence in state schools. The damage goes deeper. By 
defecting the debate on education to the unrepresentative periphery they 
draw attention away from more central issues...' ^ . There is some justice in
* 9George Walden, We Should Know Better: Solving the Education Crisis (London: Fourth 
Estate, 1996) p.28
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Walden’s judgement; the left-wing activists were politically not well 
educated. For example, Gramsci’s concept of educating the working class to 
the highest standards, creating an appropriately educated socialist elite with 
which to force cultural change was a current continental educational ideology, 
and something like this indeed had been the principle of the British Workers’ 
Educational Association: yet this would have been condemned out of hand as 
reactionary at these conferences. Even by April 1995, the ‘loony left’ image 
had not materially changed. At the 1995 Easter NUT conference the union 
executive’s motions had been consistently defeated on the card votes of 
associations dominated by left-wing militant organisations. Many still 
employed the language of the factory shop steward in defence of their vote for 
strike action in response to class sizes and national tests: ‘Some teachers' 
union members have demanded that they exercise their democratic right to 
withold their labour.. ‘Your leader vilified the “militant extremist delegates 
who rant and shout and refuse to listen”. But you offered very little 
alternative. We had a broad based\ united front... against the closure o f  the 
coalmines in 1992 but that did not stop the closures.' Teachers using the 
language of the shop floor merely affirmed the authority of the 
de-professionalizing rhetoric of Thatcher and her successors.
After David Blunkett had been mobbed by Walden’s ‘militant’ teachers at 
that same conference, Doug McAvoy, the NUT General Secretary, remarked 
in a vain attempt to rescue the image of the profession: ‘Sadly it is possible 
for an unrepresentative minority to gain an influence far greater than is 
attributable to their numbers' ^  and announced his intention to reform the 
Union. The concern with public image was a product of the increasing impact 
of the bourgeois story. Roy Hattersley summed up the discursive effect of the 
image of mobbing teachers on his attempt to reinstate the Respectable Labour 
narrative of soft egalitarianism: 'No doubt, some o f the idiots who besieged 
David Blunkett last Saturday night were... qualified to instruct the young. But 
they are obviously unfit to perform that task. So they have made it more 
difficult argue for an education policy which does not curry middle class 
favour by excoriating what I hope is still a profession.' ^  In Hattersley’s 
article there is a clear concern that the ‘image’ of teachers, even though it was 
an image partly stage managed by the rhetoric of perversity, has been
^Letters by John Stagg and Matt Foot, The Guardian 20/4/95 
^  Teaching Union declares war on leftwingers, The Guardian 29/4/95 
^ R o y  Hattersley: Louts, lessons and half baked notions, The Guardian 17/4/95
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damaged to the extent that they may no longer be considered ‘professional’ - 
and consequently their contributions to the educational narrative may be 
ignored, their concerns marginalised, and their privileges of self-regulation 
and non-interference may be summarily removed.
George Walden, speaking a more sophisticated and less emotional version of 
the bourgeois narrative, recognises this and finds it regrettable. He is partly 
concerned to raise the public status of teachers, even despite themselves, 
believing that they still might have something to contribute to the narrative - 
after all they are the people charged with delivering the service and it would 
be naive to exclude them entirely. However, Walden does not have much 
regard for educational theory - or at least any educational theory that does not 
follow the ‘common sense’ of the bourgeois narrative. Characteristically he 
dismisses theoretical concerns and diversity of educational provision using a 
medical analogy to emphasise the perversity of the educational professionals: 
'If a surgeon look o ff a leg without anaesthetic we would see it as no defence 
to say that he was simply using one o f the many options at his disposal: we 
would be astonished that such an option should be considered appropriate in 
any circumstances, and begin asking questions about the state o f the entire 
profession. And i f  we suspected that his action - and the General medical 
Council ’s stalwart defence o f it on the grounds that some surgeons took o jf 
legs one way, other's another - was in fact dictated by adherence to a theory 
o f medicine widely seen as quackery, the shift to private medicine would be 
sudden and vast.' ^
Part of his remedy is for the institution in England of a General Teaching 
Council that would ‘heal’ the profession - presumably by insisting that there 
is only one valid methodology, the bourgeois methodology, a rehash of the 
establishment of a work ethic, rote learning, strict discipline, emphasis on the 
three Rs, and selection by ability. In justification he points to what he sees as 
the enduring success of the private sector which exists only if it delivers 
educational excellence. The iconography of the Grammar school, as 
simulating the only real education which can only be found in the Private 
sector, dominates Walden’s narrative as it had dominated the educational 
narratives of the post war years. Thatcher’s solution was mediated by the 
same iconography: that when parents are given the choice, and where the
23 Walden (1996) p. 141
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schools are located in the marketplace responsive only to the wishes of the 
parents, then ‘naturally’ an educational system will evolve which will exploit 
the same consumer desire for grammar schooling and which will show the 
clear commercial superiority of ‘traditional’ methods and which will through 
market forces eventually recreate an educational system in this bourgeois 
image. While Walden is far more sanguine about the introduction of market 
forces in education and the commodification of education, otherwise he 
would agree that ‘traditional methods’ provide the only ‘real’ education. He 
reiterates, thirty years later, the same broad arguments of the Black Papers. 
He characteristically describes how pupil centred progressive education - the 
4quackery’ he refers to - has debilitated state schooling and how the 
professional image of state teachers has been damaged by their 
incomprehensible attachment to it.
Walden’s argument is simplistic, naive, and it offers nothing new - but then 
he believes, and he is very far from being alone, that there is nothing new 
which can compete with the bourgeois ‘common sense’ verities. Walden’s 
focus imaginarius is the private sector, the cultural repository of good 
educational practice, as evidence for this he points out that it has survived, 
indeed thrived, because clearly the state sector was too unresponsive to the 
wishes of parents and indeed to the traditional ‘common sense’ of educational 
methodology. It is now time, he argues, for the private sector to be used as a 
model to show the state sector the way. His view does not materially differ 
from that of Thatcher: he disagrees only on the means by which to achieve it.
Private schools, however, Walden insists, must not be narratively divorced 
from the state sector: they must be ‘opened up’ by a vastly increased 
supported places scheme to become part of a united, grand 4national 
educational enterprise' ^  to make Britain and its educational system great 
again. He proposes that the state sector, with much increased provision and a 
reversion to traditional teaching styles, be altered to what is recognisably 
something like Butler’s system of academic and technical schools with 
additionally some ‘specialised’ schools. Since, as Malebranche remarked,
4everything that rises must converge’, so improvements in the state sector 
would make the distinction between them and the private sector less 
pronounced and, since both were operating on much the same principles, in
^ibid., p3; the subsequent argument may be found in Chapter 4.
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effect there would be just one educational narrative for everyone. 
Malebranche also said that ‘we see all things in God’: Walden sees all things, 
it appears, in the private sector.
Thatcher saw all things, though, in a privatised sector - or at least as close as 
she could get to that. She reorganised the public education system - 
deregulating admission rules, allowing schools to opt out of local authority 
control, creating league tables - so that the bourgeois classes could continue 
to insulate themselves from the ‘lower’ classes and so that they would be able 
to continue to choose and to patronise schools in which their children would 
associate only with their own social class. Though grant maintained status 
was seen as being of limited, selective application by Kenneth Baker, 
Thatcher saw it as the means by which to re-invent the traditional grammar
J C
school as ‘the natural model ’ and she dismayed her secretaries of state by 
referring to grant maintained schools as ‘public independent schools’. Her 
first objective, though, had been to wrest control of the narrative from the 
professionals. Rhetorically she won that war, her unforgiving rhetoric had 
defeated and marginalised the influence of the despised professionals, but the 
real campaign, to maintain narrative control over education and yet to locate 
it in the marketplace, was her most difficult challenge.
^R ibbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 190
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2. Establishing Scholesia
‘Many constituents would come in to see me and would say, " I 
want my child to go to such and such school, but I  have been 
told he can't be allocated to that school. That he will have to 
go to another school instead. But it's further away; it ’s not as 
good; what can I do? ” These sort o f  questions came up 
frequently. What could such parents do i f  they were not rich 
enough to send their children to private education, or if, as 
was true o f  many o f them, they did not want to do so ’.
Kenneth Baker ^
The establishment of a ‘real’ market in schooling and providing ‘real’ choice 
to parents was in the mid-1980s proving an intractable problem. The 
educational voucher system had been the preferred option by the more radical 
promoters of the bourgeois narrative. That was the option which would most 
clearly locate education in the market place. In effect it would allow the 
government to relinquish all control over education - quality and standards 
would be generated through open market competition and consumer choice. 
The market, through the homeostasis brought about by open competition and 
freedom of consumer choice, would eventually ensure an efficient and 
effective service. In essence education would be privatised, just as the public 
utilities, British Steel and the railways were to be. Control would be 
effectively taken from the educationalists, the teachers, the educational 
bureaucracies, the local authorities and even central government, and placed 
firmly in the ‘hidden hand’ of the Market. Granted that through the voucher 
system, the continued use of public funds obtained through taxation, this 
privatisation would create a virtual rather than a ‘real’ market, yet it was 
considered that such a market was politically the most effective means to 
bring education into the ‘real’ world.
In Black Paper 1977. for example, Stuart Sexton broke with the traditional 
Respectability of the Black Papers to make this kind of radical proposal. His 
article was entitled ‘Evolution by choice'. He uses not the traditional 
Respectable organic metaphor of evolution linked to the ‘natural’ cultural 
health of the nation typical of much of the Black Paper contributions but
^ ib id ., p. 92
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rather his metaphor represents the ‘natural’ economic framework of the
Market. He makes the neo-liberal demand for the primacy of choice. He
argues that consumer choice - not tradition, not high culture, not the academy,
not government and certainly not the educational profession - is the final
arbiter of standards and schooling and that the state and its bureaucracies
should not interfere with the ‘natural’ right of parents to choose broadly
whatever kind of schooling they wish: 'We remove all other political
constraints and directions which seek to distort the pattern o f educational
supply and demand. We have to assume that the politicians keep their fingers
out o f it, apart from laying down the framework within which variety and
diversity can abound in accordance with the aspirations and abilities o f the 
77children. ’
An educational Market was his preferred framework and the voucher system 
his preferred mechanism for the homeostatic balance of supply and demand 
and the production of excellence. Butler’s ‘natural’ kinds of children and his 
meritocratic emphasis on the ‘deservingly’ intelligent were to Sexton 
irrelevant. The market allows no prior statements of value: the parents choose 
the school and the school generally delivers or it eventually goes out of 
business. The school does not choose the child' he insisted. Sexton extolled 
the virtues of the Market. Fundamentally education should be the 
responsibility of the parents. The state schools only be involved to provide the 
means by which parents fulfil that duty: the state provides the means and is 
concerned only to ensure that the taxpayer receives value for money.
Indeed vouchers would have been Thatcher’s choice. She set up the ‘Family 
Policy Group’ to reach some workable proposals for educational vouchers, ‘to 
give power and choice to parents ', though these would, for financial rather 
than ideological reasons, be limited to the State sector: 'Keith Joseph and I 
had always been attracted by the education voucher, which would give 
parents a fixed - perhaps means-tested - sum, so they could shop around in 
the public and private sectors o f education for the school that was best for
9o
their children.’ ° The metaphor ‘shop around’ encapsulates the whole
ideology of the scheme. It would allow a clear transfer of power from the 
provider, to use market vocabulary, to the consumer. However, though
27David Sexton, Evolution by choice in C.B. Cox and Rhodes Boyson (eds): Black Paper 
1977 (London: Temple Smith, 1977) p.86 
^Thatcher (1993) p. 591
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attractive in its simplicity, even this limited voucher scheme was judged 
impractical, not financially but politically: ’...you would have to have very 
controversial legislation, which would take two or three years to carry 
through, with my party split and the other parties unanimously hostile, on the 
wrong grounds. And all the producer forces hostile.... and the pilot scheme 
would probably have been wrecked by producer hostility... And I didn't think 
I  had the moral courage to impose it. O f course it wouldn 't be like imposing 
comprehensivization: i t ’s imposing freedom - that’s the main difference 
between the two...I was forced to tell the 1983 conference that ‘the voucher, 
at least in the foreseeable future is dead’... opting out will help to free up the 
system - with open enrolment forcing schools to be more responsive to the 
wishes o f  parents. ’
Even the heroic Thatcher advocacy of the bourgeois narrative found that 
discretion was the better part of its valour and the most radical educational 
reforms, like voucher system and payment by results, never found a 
favourable climate of opportunity even when the narrative was at its most 
persuasive. This did not dampen enthusiasm, however, rather it was seen as 
evidence for the need to promote the narrative even more virulently. There is 
a recurrent theme of being misunderstood - sometimes it is presented as 
wilful misrepresentation by critics or by supporters of a counter narrative to 
create mischief, sometimes it is down to the public’s ignorance of what is 
really good for them - in the discourses of the Thatcher reforms. She had the 
Platonic confidence that if only the listener would listen then they would 
understand the Good, and they would have to agree - such understanding for 
her carried a rational imperative. However when she spoke it was only to the 
aspiring bourgeois classes: her narrative was for them alone.
Her ‘knowledge’ of the Good and her ‘rationality’ were never themselves 
objects of any self-reflective critique. Indeed the thrust of her educational 
reform was the heroic assertion of the Good. Ribbins and Sherrat point out the 
lack of theory in the scripting of the 1988 Educational Reform Act (ERA):
‘there were depressingly few references to the views o f philosophers or 
educational theorists. Nor was there narrative space for doubt, even 
when empirical studies suggested that parents did not entirely endorse the
9Q
the ‘words’ of Keith Joseph in a constructed interview with Clyde Chitty in Ribbins and 
Sherrat (1997) p. 83 
■^Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 13
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reforms: ‘I'm very distressed by this country's complacency about state
education. I ’m even more distressed that a large number o f  parents are said
to be satisfied. I'm  even further distressed by the apparent complacency o f the
* 31inspectors who are meant to be the guardians o f  standards.'
The 1980 Parents’ Charter had been a first step in the process of widening
choice and empowering parents, in providing not what they wanted but what
was good for them, what they really wanted though they did not know that
themselves. In limiting the power of local authorities and asserting the
‘natural’, right of parents to choose and allowing schools some freedom to
meet the demands of parents, she was vocalising the desire of the bourgeois
by creating the educational environment where ‘children from families like
3')my own had the chance o f self improvement. Her subtext of self 
improvement by expanding educational opportunity, however, was a more or 
less straight lift of the Tawney Labour educational narrative. Blackwell and 
Seabrook describe how Thatcher appropriated the missionary idealism of the 
socialist narrative, reinterpreting it in her own narrative quest for a new 
bourgeois Jerusalem:
'It is worth recalling that this original purpose - this journey
to the new Jerusalem - was once the socialists' quest. But now
the terms have been reversed... Appropriating the rhetoric o f
Labour, Mrs Thatcher has created a world in which nothing is
any longer what it seems. Socialism is the true oppressor o f
the people; capital is what sets us free, comes as our
deliverer... She has absorbed the heroic journey o f  labour, and
all the potent images which sustained an outcast working class
? ?in its wretchedness...
She had recolonized the idealist vocabulary of the left leaving them, almost 
literally, speechless. Indeed it was the wretchedness of the bourgeois class - 
the suppression of their desire for self-improvement and their exploitation by 
an unsympathetic socialism hell-bent on using the fruits of their 
entrepreneurial labour to create a stultifying culture of dependency - that fired 
her rhetoric and her creation of ‘The Parents’ Charter’.
 ^ibid. p. 83 
^^Thatcher (1993) p.39 
•^Blackwell and Seabrook (1985) p. 160/161
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David C o o p e r * ^  illustrates the aggressive, unapologetic, bourgeois 
underpinnings of Thatcher’s narrative and its appropriation and 
reinterpretation of this idealism. The establishment of ‘opted out’ schools, 
open enrolment and the gradual reintroduction of selective education was 
creating what was in effect not so much a Parent’s Charter as a Bourgeois
Charter. Many existing grammar schools and fairly recently
comprehensivized grammar schools had found new identity, and increased
resources, as ‘opted’ out, re-invented grammar schools after the 1988
Education Reform Act. The remaining comprehensives and local authority 
run schools found themselves competing for ‘able’ children, their struggle 
made more difficult by the rhetoric of excellence which was attached to these 
new Grant Maintained schools and, practically, by the geography of the Grant 
Maintained and grammar schools which were generally located in middle 
class areas. The introduction of Teague tables’ in schools as an aid for parent 
choice created the immanent - and narratively necessary - prospect of ‘failing’ 
and sink schools. The market demanded losers if there were to be winners.
Cooper’s chapter can be read as an apology for the Thatcher reforms. He sets 
out to dismiss egalitarian principles in education; to define quality in 
education in terms of the notion of 'educational transformation'; and to argue 
in support of educational excellence and what that implies for the distribution 
of educational resources. He creates an imaginary community, Scholesia, in 
which there are just two schools, North and South. North, the grammar school 
in all but name, offers greater educational opportunity than South, in better 
conditions, with better resources, in a better environment. Children attending 
North are offered a better education and get better results in examinations and 
go on to become 'versatile, cultured, knowledgeable, imaginative, creative 
appreciative, moral agents' - in effect they will be ground on the educational 
mill of the bourgeois narrative. Children are allocated, simply on the basis of 
their ability, to either North or South though Cooper leaves unclear how these 
measures of ability are constructed and how they are used. South - the 
comprehensive, stripped of its predominantly middle class ‘able’ cohort - is 
less well resourced and the pupils there do less well and are prepared for jobs 
‘suitable to their lesser qualifications and abilities \
4David E. Cooper: Illusions of Equality. Chapter 2 : Equality in Education, (London: 
Routledge and Regan Paul, 1980) All subsequent quotes are taken from this chapter except 
where otherwise indicated.
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Cooper argues that while Scholesian education is inegalitarian, in that the 
distribution of resources is unequal and that certain developmental and life 
opportunities are denied to the pupils of South and granted to those at North, 
the system is nevertheless fair. Each pupil is allowed to develop educationally 
as far as they can, given that they have different levels of ability. The 
education each child receives is fair because it 'educationally transforms' that 
child maximally whether they go to North or South: that some children are 
more transformed, or transformed to a higher level, is dependent on the 
abilities and capacities and motivation - the ‘natural’ qualities - of the 
respective child, not on the system which merely reflects the inherent 
inequalities of human nature. Egalitarianism is ‘unnatural’ and adherence to 
it is the chief obstacle to the ultimately beneficent bourgeois progress of 
society.
Cooper disingenuously asserts that the quality of an educational institution is 
proportional to the degree of educational ’transformation’ it brings about - it 
has nothing directly to do with the opportunities it provides. Consequently the 
superior school brings about a greater degree of ’transformation’ in its pupils 
than any other school. Cooper even suggests that it would be possible for 
South to be the superior school because the degree of transformation there 
could be greater than North, even though the pupils from North might all be 
better ‘educated’. This reorganisation of schooling would be unjust, he claims, 
only if the pupil was not educationally transformed proportionately to the 
pupil’s ‘natural’ abilities, capacities and willingness to work hard:
‘Scholesians would regard it as a betrayal o f  such children, were their 
intelligence and other educational virtues not nurtured and developed to the 
maximum. ’ However, the clear thrust of the North/South organisation of 
schools is to underline the desirability of entry into the North school.
The talk of educational transformation is a disguise for the cultural superiority 
of the North school. Though Cooper, as Thatcher did to create a degree of 
competition in the educational market, would have to resort to crude 
measures of educational success to ascertain how much ‘transformation’ has 
taken place - to such measures as levels of achievement on assessment 
schema common to both North and South, to examination success or truancy 
rates, for example - the question of ‘transformation’ is always secondary to 
that of the pursuit of higher standards. Educational transformation’ is, in the
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end, a vacuous concept: it is a rhetorical device in the argument rather than a
substantive, measurable, qualitative or quantitative measure though it does
lend his story the empirical quality, though not an actual empirical base, that
Thatcher, for instance, claimed for her crude league tables: romantics and
» 35cranks... did not like.... basing policy on science rather than prejudice.'
Cooper claims that the empirical measure of ‘educational transformation’ 
refutes any egalitarian assertion that some pupils benefit at the expense of 
others. He, reversing the egalitarian educational ‘common sense’ that some 
are ‘bom to fail’ and others to succeed because of structural social and 
educational inequality, states that the 'superior1 child's abilities do not stem 
simply from good fortune, but develop through the child's hard work and 
application and this is what makes the child ‘naturally’ deserving of the 
positive discrimination he advocates. It is the ‘natural’ qualities of the child 
that determine success. The implication is that in the prior educational 
narratives with their emphasis on social justice, the bourgeois had been 
discriminated against; his Scholesia, in part, is justified in that it redresses 
past iniquitous sacrifices. He has modelled his system, he claims, to maximise 
the educational transformation of every child as an entitlement - a sop to the 
egalitarians - though it is always clear where the real educational 
opportunities lie.
Cooper argues that the purpose of education is, above all, to promote 
excellence and for that reason educational resources should be distributed in 
favour of the talented. This would be, in the longer term, beneficial for all. 
The talented make scientific and technological advance, they are the future 
wealth creators, and the corresponding increase in knowledge and wealth, he 
asserts, benefits all. Cooper asserts, with a less than secure logic, that it is 
rational to favour the talented because it is rational to desire the promotion of 
excellence and consequently irrational not to favour the education of those 
who are capable of achieving excellence. He points out that the able child 
deserves the best education, indeed is entitled to it, simply by virtue of the 
child's abilities: ‘The basic case for the North'South system is (almost 
embarrassingly) simple. It permits a closer approximation to educational 
excellence than its alternatives. The quality o f  education to be found there is 
higher. '
■^Thatcher (1993) p. 758
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‘Simplicity’ is another keyword of the bourgeois narrative and is used to 
silence more complex and theoretical educational social philosophy which 
might contradict its narrow ‘common sense’ certainties. Cooper’s Scholesia 
is performance driven: it is judged strictly - even crudely - on results, not on 
process. It accords with Keith Joseph’s educational view, ‘to switch the whole 
ethos o f government educational policy from inputs to outputs ’ which was,
' i n
according to Kenneth Baker, was the ‘startling simplicity ’ that was to drive 
the bourgeois narrative.
Cooper argues that the concern with excellence is fundamental: ‘It is one 
piece o f  evidence, i f  evidence is needed, o f  a fundamental human concern in 
myriad areas o f  human practice - the concern with the attainment, in 
whatever field, o f excellence; the concern that some should scale the 
heights... I  stress that it outweighs the lesser concern that there should be an 
evenly spread, general improvement in the quality o f  a practice. ’ He admits 
that the concept of excellence can mean different things to different people, 
and cites the different types of educational provision offered in England. In 
particular he highlights that offered by the independent public schools - and 
fortuitously finds a justification for excluding them, rooted as they are in a 
kind of market and as the ultimate objects of desire of the socially ambitious 
bourgeois educational narrative, from the state control of his Scholesian 
model. The private sector evaded Cooper as they have escaped other forms of 
control in the educational stories of Butler, the Labour Party and Thatcher. 
Their existence was indeed encouraged, under the pretext that they provided a 
model to the state sector of what constitutes educational excellence. 
Cooper’s view is broadly that a free market will breed excellence through 
competition between differing views of excellence: 'In education as 
elsewhere, competition among different methods and projects may be the best 
breeding ground for success'.
The bourgeois narrative is characteristically almost impertinently naive in its 
construction of society and in its assumptions about education. Cooper’s 
Scholesia, like Thatcher’s view of Britain, is aggressively simplistic. Their 
view of what society is, is attenuated and is without history. It is some sort of 
'given' state of affairs, static and, in effect, sacred. They rely on rather crude
■^John Patten on Keith Joseph, Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 170 
■*7ibid. p.37
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instrumental reason in their arguments, where the end, the bourgeois 
hegemony, justifies the means, and artlessly conceal the ideology which 
underpins their stories. Cooper makes no enquiry into the complex and 
abstract concepts he uses with such cavalier abandon. For example, he uses 
the word ’ability’ often: indeed his argument rests on a supposition that the 
term is easily definable and its meaning is clear. He also accepts traditional 
forms of knowledge and the power these bring with them wholly uncritically.
Cooper’s story unapologetically presents a closed system of ideas and a 
virtual denial of the social and material links between schooling and society. 
His educational story is almost exclusively the bourgeois story: society is 
‘naturally’ bourgeois, to model an educational system any other way would be 
perverse. He rules out of discussion the links between social class and 
educational achievement, between schooling and class reproduction and 
between schooling and its socio-economic setting because, in the exclusively 
bourgeois setting of his story, they are irrelevant. His unsentimental ‘realist’ 
thinking and his substitution of heroic certainty for argument is typical of the 
Thatcher strategy. His educational system, like Thatcher’s, is crudely Butler’s 
but with the concern for social justice stripped away and instead the pious 
assertion that his ‘fair inequality’ is the only way to ensure progress. The only 
education that matters is to be found in the re-invented grammar school, the 
grant maintained school. As John Patten remarked: ‘The Prime Minister 
(Thatcher) and myself regard grant-maintained as the natural model.. '
The real focus in the Thatcher educational narrative was the recreation of the 
grammar school, there was little concern with other ‘unnatural’ forms of 
schooling or indeed for those who did not possess the necessary ‘natural’ 
bourgeois qualities.
Cooper's discussion of equality is premised on his bourgeois individualism. 
He ignores the egalitarian insistence of the essential social interdependence of 
people and considers that a person is in a sense definable only by his/her 
achievements, status and acquisitions. This distorts the social framework 
essential to any discussion of justice: without a social framework and 
interdependence the concept of justice is meaningless. Cooper places a classic 
neo-liberal emphasis on the primacy of individual autonomy which he fears is 
threatened by the compulsion of stories which assert positive rights. Cooper
cited in Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 33
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asserts the negative rights of people, their rights not to be compelled. It is this 
premise which lies behind Cooper’s statement that ‘every new equality 
produces a new inequality’. It is only when people are viewed, in essence, as 
isolated individuals, ’windowless monads' in Liebnitz’s terms, that Cooper's 
statement makes sense.
Thatcher did strive to deliver a degree of prosperity to her constituency, the 
bourgeois, and her rhetoric, like Cooper’s, was aimed almost exclusively at 
them and especially to the aspiring bourgeois. Evans describes the importance 
of the policy of selling council houses to the tenants, for example, in the 
expansion of the bourgeoisie. She also did much, especially in the round of 
privatisations, to widen share ownership and there arose on the back of these 
privatisations and the deregulation of the financial markets, an expansion of 
the wealth ownership classes. She offered nothing to competing narratives 
except ruthless confrontation.
In many ways this expansion of the middle classes by Thatcher had been the 
object of desire of the Respectable narratives of the Conservative Party and 
the Labour Party. Selective education and the grammar schools were a 
mechanism for this and even the comprehensive narrative had been suborned 
by that desire. However, the social, cultural and, in particular, the political 
cost of the hegemony of the bourgeois narrative was more that they were 
willing to pay. Certainly the cultural ‘natural’ virtues and qualities were 
broadly shared by the competing Respectable narrative, but the real energy of 
the new narrative came from its legitimisation of raw material 
acquisitiveness, dog-eat-dog competition and crude individualism. Thatcher’s 
narrative was one of rampant individualism: not for her the slippery 
Respectable consensual quietism, sacrifice and subordination of desire, nor 
Bantock’s hegemony of an exclusive cultural elite and certainly not to the 
egalitarian aspiration to a pluralist society and pluralist values. For her the 
‘natural’ society was the bourgeois society: her ‘common culture’, a 
bourgeois culture.
The discourse of excellence in education in effect disguised the creation of 
the ‘common sense’ of the bourgeois educational narrative. Thatcher, Tebbit, 
Major, Parkinson and Scruton all went to grammar schools: what Cooper 
wanted was an educational system which was designed exclusively in the 
interests of the bourgeois hegemony. ‘Fair’ inequality would be, as in the
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Respectable narrative, moderated by pious assertion that the ‘haves’ would 
look after the interests of those excluded from their hegemony: 7 don't think 
individualism is anything to do with selfishness... But individuals have to 
recognise - and this has been an absolute characteristic o f the British - they 
have to recognise that as they do well, their obligation to their fellow citizens, 
to the community increases. ’ ^  Scholesia provided bourgeois education as 
the only route to opportunity and social advancement.
The key metaphor is the bourgeois re-invention of Tawney’s ‘ladder of 
opportunity’ and the limits the narrative places on who may legitimately 
climb it and for what purpose they may strive towards. This is at the heart of 
the bourgeois narrative’s ‘common sense’. Gillian Shepherd, for example, 
remarked: '...the Prime Minister (John Major) and I  come from similar social 
backgrounds. Very different in terms o f  environment, but similar social 
backgrounds which have given us very similar attitudes towards the 
importance o f education as an enabler and a ladder for children. Which 
means that we start from the same position without having to describe it to 
one another. ’ ^  This metaphor places emphasis on a distorted sense of 
equality: the parents of the ‘classless’ class, those from ‘broadly similar 
backgrounds’, are the ones empowered by this narrative; only those who so 
aspire are entitled to opportunity. The ‘startling simplicity’ is the tautology: 
only the deserving deserve. And the narrative makes clear who are ‘naturally’ 
deserving. There is a kind of sense in this, but education had traditionally 
been viewed as a vehicle for opportunity even for those who by virtue of their 
economic and social background had become aspirationally limited. In the 
bourgeois narrative it was up to people to seize the opportunity, those who 
could not get on the ladder - for whatever reason - were labelled feckless and 
dependent and the bourgeois narrative effectively excluded them. Chris 
Woodhead, the head of Ofsted, puts it neatly: 'when equality o f opportunity 
translates through to any kind offlirtation with equality o f  outcome that has a 
depressing effect on the educational experience.' ^  ^
Whose educational experience does Woodhead have in mind? There was 
nothing socially inclusive about the narrative though it provided the 
appearance of inclusion through the ‘natural’ qualities of ‘going it alone’
■^Margaret Thatcher, Daily Mail 29/4/88
^Gillian Shephard in conversation with Brian Sherrat, Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 221 
^  speaking in ‘The man they love to hate\ The Guardian 18/4/98
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independence, hard work and social ambition: '..the Victorians also had a
way o f talking which summed up what we were now rediscovering - they 
distinguished between the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving poor'... The 
purpose o f  help must not to be to allow people merely to live a half-life, but to 
restore their self-discipline and through that their self-esteem'. ^
3. Commodifying Education
7 regard the raising o f standards for education and the 
reorienting o f education towards the needs o f  a modern 
society as the most important supply-side economic change we
can make'
Kenneth Clarke ^
The process of establishing the new narrative was, however, far from 
immediate: ’■■for at least the first seven years o f its existence, the new
Conservative government was prepared to operate largely within the terms o f  
the educational consensus constructed by the leadership in 1976' It was 
only in the 1988 Educational Reform Act (ERA) that Thatcher finally 
institutionalised the new vocabularies of education and it is this in which 
Chitty locates the discursive establishment of the bourgeois narrative.
The ERA was unapologetically cast in the economic, business vocabulary of 
the market. Like Wilson and Callaghan before her, her rhetoric was of 
modernisation: a new system to meet the new needs of the new era. This is 
historically clearly a persuasively powerful rhetoric though it rarely actually 
meant anything much - there was, for example, nothing ‘modem’ about 
market economics. Such rhetoric had, however, worked in the past, at least to 
propel politicians into power, even if radical reform of the educational system 
had not actually taken place. Though Wilson, for example, had created a 
significant expansion in higher education, the reform of schooling to meet the 
needs of the technological era had proven to be much more difficult and 
Callaghan had provoked the ‘Great Debate’ in the interests of modernity 
without much immediate effect.
42Thatcher (1993) p.627
4^in conversation with Brian Sherratt in Ribbins and Sherratt (1997) p. 149 
44Chitty (1989)p. 172
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Andrew Gamble puts Thatcher’s attempt at ‘modernising’ reform into 
historical context: ‘There was a clear trend towards authoritarian statism in 
Britain from the mid 1960s onwards, caused by the breakdown o f the attempt 
to organise corporate consent fo r  modernisation programmes... ‘ ^  
Thatcher’s ERA was a modernist reform, in the sense that she believed, fairly 
uncritically, in the instrumentality of structures and systems to produce her 
vision of a ‘modem’ society. Hers was solely an instrumental vision: she had 
no time for metaphysical abstractions, for value judgements, or for 
uncertainty. Form would be constrained to follow a clearly identified 
function. Institutionalised market forces, which she would ruthlessly 
introduce, would bring about the desired end - the ‘natural’ bourgeois 
hegemony which would produce a new, prosperous economic and moral 
order.
What was to follow with the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) was a more 
brutal realisation of Callaghan’s rather vague vocationalism. The ERA was 
designed to further re-invent the educational vocabulary in the language of the 
market and to deny influence over the creation of the common sense of the 
narrative to the educational professionals and the local authorities who found 
themselves effectively sidelined by the Act. Ball charts ^  how the influence 
of educationalists, theorists and teachers over the emergent narrative had been 
negated. Indeed the policy community had, as Ball shows, changed 
dramatically since the ERA. Local education authorities found themselves 
denied control over much of their provision of education and what control 
they had was gradually eroded as the base of the policy community altered 
from its traditional orientation on the ‘producers’ to the ‘consumers’ - parents 
and employers. Sir Peter Newsam, for example, comments about the 
disempowerment of the local authorities: "No regard (was) paid in any 
measurable sense to the comments made: the local authorities were rather 
like people on the touchline o f a football match, shouting but really having
i 7
not much influence on the field.
^Gamble (1994) p. 181 
46Ball (1990)
4^Sir Peter Newsam, The Association o f County Councils: in O.U. Broadcast (1990) Policy 
Making in Education: The Education Reform Act
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The publishing of league tables, the emphasis on parental choice, the 
establishment of Grant Maintained schools (GM schools), the delegation of 
school management to parent governors, the funding of schools, the curricular 
programmes and their testing regimes... all these changed the vocabulary of 
education and these encroachments of market forces into education were 
eventually to give the authorities, and indeed the schools, far less control over 
what they could do and they were to become much more accountable for what 
they did.
The ERA was moved by Kenneth Baker using the by now fairly well 
established new vocabulary of education: ‘Our education system has
operated over the past 40 years on the basis o f the framework laid down by 
Rab Butler's 1944 Act.... We need to inject a new vitality into that system. It 
has become producer-dominated. It has not proved sensitive to the demands
40
o f change that have become ever more urgent over the past 10 years...' .
Baker continued with a sound-bite summation of the central purpose of the 
educational reform: 7 would sum up the Bill's 169 pages in three words - 
standards, freedom and choice. The purpose o f all these measures is to 
improve the quality o f education for all our children...' Standards
themselves, instrumental logic would suggest, would be determined by the 
market: what was valuable was what would have a cash value for the 
consumers and the employers. However, a wholly hands-off, laissez faire 
attitude to education and the educational narrative proved, it seems, rather too 
much power for a government to relinquish, particularly a government which 
had so much of its justification for reform caught up in the rhetoric of 
incompetent teachers and falling standards. Though the logic demanded that 
the government should ‘roll back the boundaries of the state’ and provide 
merely the framework of the market, ending all limiting regulations on 
schools and schooling, the Thatcher governments never quite had the will 
unequivocally to do so; and so the national curriculum was bom.
There are, however, apparently inherent contradictions in the bourgeois 
narrative which are pointed up by the establishment of the national 
curriculum. John Redwood stated, classically, that capitalism is blind to prior 
statements or judgements of value. The Market is no respecter of persons or 
position: ‘(Capitalism is)... anarchic and democratic in its style. It does not
^ Hansard: 1st December 1987: 771 
^ Hansard: 1st December 1987: 780
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matter who you are, who your parents were, where you came from: it is who 
you are and what you can contribute that matters. ’ Putative 
measurements of ability, in effect, become secondary to the freedom to 
choose, which in the consumerism of the market is reduced to the ability to 
buy. ‘Who you are ' and ‘what you can contribute ’ are, despite Redwood’s 
pretensions, largely irrelevant: the market is blind to good intentions. The 
Market is not meritocratic: it owes nothing to anyone. All it provides is a 
framework for consumer choice and the mechanism of competition which 
ensures, on threat of bankrupt extinction, that the consumer is satisfied. 
What is important is the exchange value an education provides, ultimately 
what it is worth to employers. Thus there was in the market stand of the 
bourgeois narrative a significant leaning towards the market value of 
education, the commodification of educational achievement and a marked 
distrust of ‘academic’ studies. The national curriculum, however, with its 
regimes of testing, while it created a base for comparison, allowing the 
placing schools in league tables, seemed to contradict the central ideology 
that it was the market which generated value; no value may validly be 
established prior to the free operations of choice and competition.
Many interpreters of the ERA, across the ideological spectrum - Steven Ball, 
Ribbins and Sherratt, the Birmingham Cultural Studies, Education Group, 
Clyde Chitty who are mentioned in this chapter, for example - locate a crisis 
in the Conservative educational narrative at this point: between what they 
describe as the neo-liberal discourse with its emphasis on freedom and the 
neo-traditional discourse with its emphasis on maintaining standards.
Indeed the neo-liberalist David Sexton was highly critical of the 
establishment of the National Curriculum: ‘The best national curriculum is 
that resulting from the exercise o f true parental choice by parents and 
children acting collectively, and being provided collectively by governors and 
teachers in response to that choice. The substitution for that freely adopted 
curriculum ... o f  a government-imposed curriculum is a poor second best.' ^  ^
Sexton was to derisively refer to it as the ‘nationalised curriculum' ^  and he 
was to state: ‘The Market itself will set what the curriculum should be and 
you don't need government - o f  any political colour - setting a national
^  John Redwood. Popular Capitalism (London: Routledge, 1988) p.44 
^  David Sexton in a letter to The Independent. 19/11/87 
■^David Sexton No nationalised curriculum, The Times 4/6/88
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curriculum.' 5-* though in his 1977 Black Paper Article he had acknowledged 
that the free market in education was not quite sufficient in itself: ‘As part o f  
that framework we must have minimum standards and a minimum 
curriculum... ’ ^ .
In neo-liberalism the ultimate virtue lies in freedom and choice, brought 
about by market economics. This ideology prescribes a very weak role for the 
state and regards state intervention in the lives of the citizens as coercive. It 
regards collectivist arguments for socially ameliorating or egalitarian policies 
as state oppression. The market economy, providing freedom and choice for 
the citizens is idealised and is held to guarantee a better life for all - though 
this is not to be understood as in any way egalitarian: neither equality of 
opportunity, equality of provision nor equality of outcome are allowable 
options. Neo-liberalism does allow some role for the government to set the 
narrative framework of the state and of the citizens’ legitimate expectations 
for self improvement: "The (neo-) liberal argument is in favour o f making the 
best possible use o f  the forces o f competition... It does not deny, but even 
emphasises, that in order that competition should work beneficially, a 
carefully worked out legal framework is required, and that neither the 
existing nor the past legal rules are free from grave defects. Nor does it deny 
that where it is possible to create the conditions necessary to make 
competition effective, we must resort to other methods o f  guiding economic 
activity." The neo-liberal argument against the National Curriculum was 
consequently not so much about having one but about setting its limits.
Indeed Thatcher shared much of Sexton’s concern. She states all she desired 
was: ‘a basic syllabus for English, Mathematics and Science with simple tests 
to show what pupils knew.' ^  She blamed Kenneth Baker for allowing the 
National Curriculum to mushroom into a complex, bureaucratic maze, 
accusing him of falling under the influence of educationalists in his, 
admittedly pragmatic rather than democratic, concern to include them in the 
process: 'For them the new national curriculum would be expected to give
S I David Sexton in Open University TV Broadcast (1990): Policy Making in Education: The 
Education Reform Act 
David Sexton, Evolution by choice in C.B. Cox and Rhodes Boyson (eds): Black Paper 
1977 (London: Temple Smith, 1977) p.86 
Friedrich von Hayek : The Road to Serfdom. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1944, 
rev. 1976), p.27 
56Thatcher (1993) p. 593
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legitimacy and universal application to the changes which had been made 
over the last twenty years or so in the content and methods o f teaching. 
Similarly testing should in their eyes be ‘diagnostic ' rather than ‘summalive’ 
- and this was only the tip o f  the jargon iceberg - and should be heavily 
weighted towards assessment by teachers themselves, rather than by objective 
outsiders. So by mid-July the papers I was receiving from the DES were
c y
proposing a national curriculum o f ten subjects... . Her contempt for the 
technical vocabulary of education is obvious, as indeed it was for the 
technical vocabularies of any social subjects with the possible exception of 
the ‘practical’ study of economics. Thatcher’s dissatisfaction grew as she - or 
rather her secretaries of state - began to lose direct control over the 
burgeoning educational bureaucracy: 4Ken Baker paid too much attention to 
the DES, the HMJ and progressive educational theorists in his appointments 
and early decisions: and once the bureaucratic momentum had begun it was
C O
difficult to stop.' . The 4simplicity' of her vision was lost, she claims, 
through the malign, empire building influence of HMI, the teachers’ unions 
and their demand for teacher-dominated assessment.
Nigel Lawson describes Ken Baker’s 4metaphorical handbaggings' by the 
heroic Thatcher during the creation of the national curriculum: 'The process 
would start by Margaret putting forward various ideas... there would be a 
general discussion... Margaret would sum up and give Kenneth his marching 
orders. He would then return to the next meeting with a worked out proposal 
which bore little resemblance to what everyone else recalled as having been 
agreed at the previous meeting... Even when Baker was replaced by 
MacGregor in 1990 - who she believed could more firmly 4keep a grip' on the 
national curriculum - it spiralled well beyond her original expectations. She 
states that: ‘By the time 1 left office I was convinced that there would have to 
be a new drive to simplify the national curriculum and testing.' ^  It was, 
indeed, later simplified somewhat by Dearing but the 4bureaucratic 
momentum' that Thatcher complained so bitterly about, had become so 
institutionalised - and for other reasons that will be discussed shortly - that the 
changes Dearing made were far from radical.
•^Thatcher (1993) p. 594 
58ibid. p. 597
eg r
J Nigel Lawson The View from No. 11: Memoirs o f a Tory Radical flLondon: Corgi, 1992) 
p.619
Thatcher (1993) p. 597
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A.V. Kelly ^  argues that the educational case given for the justification of 
the national curriculum - the maintenance of standards - is in important 
respects a blind and that the national curriculum is in essence a political 
device for centralising control of the educational system and that the 
curriculum proposed is best understood as a mechanism for maintaining that 
control. This does appear broadly to be the case, at least insofar as the 
national curriculum was a means of fixing the new educational narrative 
reality in the minds, and the vocabularies, of the educational professionals 
who, with reservations, accepted the curriculum as at least as an educational 
reform in the public examination tradition that they could understand and, 
moreover, it was one which appeared to grant them, once again, some 
measure of professional expertise. As such the national curriculum, as
Thatcher has described, was colonised by the technical vocabularies - the
fT)‘impenetrable educationalist jargon - of the educationalists.
However, there is some justification for Kelly’s view that in this strand of the 
bourgeois narrative education is all about initiation into 'British Culture' and 
'traditional' social organisation of society to promote a fixed social order and 
stability, to situate the child and the later adult into his or her social role. The 
introduction of market competition is limited to removing education from 
state ownership, but not state control. Johnson comments: "New Right
theory values prejudice over reason, instinct over knowing, in an 
anti-educational logic. Learning is not the changing o f self or society, nor the 
'raising o f consciousness' in the radical sense. Change through education is a 
rationalist illusion. Thatcher’s was indeed a rationalist, instrumental 
vision. The new educational narrative became a priority terrain of reform, of 
'culture restoration' in Ball's terms ^  in which the ideological sub-texts of 
bourgeois culture and social structure are presented as common-sense, 
self-evident truths.
The new narrative, bending under the strain of these different vocabularies 
and different interests, began to slip from Thatcher’s control a little and it is 
perhaps that which created the narrative tension in the story, or at least 
created the conditions for some internal dissent. The expansion of the
^  A.V. Kelly : The National Curriculum: A Critical Review ( London: Paul Chapman, 1990) 
pi 12 and passim.
Thatcher (1993) p. 595 
^Johnson (1991) p.90 
64Ball (1990) p. 48
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curriculum gave Sexton some justification for his protests but there was also a 
corresponding attack by the neo-traditionalists, like Roger Scruton and the 
Hillgate Group, on the market ideology of the narrative. Scruton stated:
‘Markets aren't the whole answer to every problem. An educational system 
can't be created by a market. In certain cases elements o f  market competition 
must be reintroduced. O f course there is also the fact that education requires 
a stable tradition o f  learning, the maintenance o f  subjects which have been 
acquired over hundreds o f years... the maintenance o f  a common culture. ’ ^  
The neo-traditionalist discourse demanded much closer control over the 
social narratives and was suspicious of putting trust in the blind operations of 
the market: " The value o f  individual liberty is not absolute, but stands 
subject to another and higher value, the authority o f established 
government." ^  It argued that the values of allegiance to legitimate authority, 
tradition and national identity are not negotiable. The purpose of government 
is above all else to maintain these: " ...the urgent need today is for the State 
to regain control over 'thepeople', to re-exert its authority, and it is useless to
s'?
think that this will be helped by some libertarian mish-mash...
The maintenance of British culture should be, therefore, the primary 
imperative of government and no apology is offered for the exertion of state 
power not to achieve justice, equality or even freedom but ‘to maintain 
existing inequalities or restore lost ones' Power may even be used 'to 
command and coerce those who would otherwise reform or destroy 
Scruton generally would agree that some element of market forces should be 
introduced but only to remove education from state ownership. Scruton's 
objections to the imposition of full market forces is concerned with the 
danger that this mechanism would generate cultural value on a cost 
accountant basis, on the cash value of the educational experience as the 
market conflates economic with moral values. However, like Sexton, his 
complaint is not so much about the policy as about its limits. Scruton’s 
attempt to re-invent something like Bantock’s traditional, elitist educational 
narrative will be discussed later but, meanwhile, it is clear he had no absolute
^R oger Scruton (1990): O.U. Broadcast (1990) Policy Making in Education: The Education 
Reform Act
R. Scruton. The Meaning o f Conservatism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980) p. 19 
^ P . Worsthome Too Much Freedom in Maurice Cowling (ed) Conservative Essays (London: 
Cassell, 1978) p. 150 
^ibid., p.9 
^ibid., p.25
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objection to the introduction of market forces as Sexton had no absolute 
objection to the national curriculum. The narrative ending - the creation of the 
bourgeois hegemony - both Scruton and Sexton broadly held in common. 
Their arguments were partly about the means to achieve this end and partly 
about what a bourgeois hegemony would mean.
Their debate was a throwback to the earlier narrative problematisations of 
education to the Black Papers and Bantock and beyond. It was, however, to 
become essentially meaningless. Neither Scruton nor Sexton fully understood 
the narrative change that was beginning to take place and how that was to 
render both their positions vacuous. The bourgeois narrative was not about 
the institution of a free market and the rolling back of the state, nor was it 
about ‘cultural restoration’: its vision of culture would be very different from 
Hogg’s Respectable vision and Scruton’s and Bantock’s elitism. Indeed even 
the principal speakers of the bourgeois narrative at this stage - Thatcher and 
her Secretaries of State included - often had great difficulty with the new 
vocabulary and found themselves in great difficulties trying to explain what 
was happening, attuned as they were to the traditional Respectable 
vocabularies of education in which they grew up.
Kenneth Baker comments on this confusion. He complains that curriculum 
debate in cabinet was often lacking in focus and expertise, the speakers 
relying on their individual educational experiences: ‘Much o f that discussion 
seemed to be woolly and vague.... the contribution o f colleagues... was not 
one o f the most glorious moments o f collective discussion I've ever attended.
It was largely derived from personal reminiscences o f their own education (I
70started rather like that myself). His is a scarcely veiled criticism of
Thatcher who saw everything as blindingly simple, obvious to ‘ordinary
people’ like her and to whom she made constant appeal: 'When she felt under
siege, particularly from what she saw as the establishment, she could rely on
71conference to boost her self belief and renew her thirst for conflict. ’ It 
was not just that Baker was frustrated by what he considered were unhelpful 
demands by Thatcher and his colleagues for simplicity and by their lack of 
understanding of what a curriculum entailed. Though he was concerned that 
his curriculum policy was not 'sunk in a mire o f  other people's individual
^Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 99
 ^* Richard Kelly ‘So much more than showbiz', The Independent 10/10/94
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memory and prejudice ’ he was also concerned that education should not 
be caught in what George Walden describes as the ‘congealed vocabularies' 
of the past.
Baker’s desire was to create a distinctively new vocabulary based around the
vocabularies of business: ‘There was this huge continent which was state
education, catering for over 93 per cent o f  all children. There was private
education, a relatively small island with 7 per cent. And there were no links
between them at all. No other types o f islands or semi-continents. What we
have done is to create a lot o f semi-continents in the CTCs and in the
grant-maintained schools. I  was also very interested in the administration o f
the whole system. I  had been a business manager and was therefore interested
7?in the mechanics o f  management. ’ Baker demands that the geography of 
reform, the ‘big picture’, be seen - not the smaller isolated squabbles about 
individual reforms. He was concerned in creating a long-needed and workable 
national curriculum - Thatcher’s version was by implication far too simplistic 
- which would ensure the raising of educational standards in tandem with the 
foundation of different types of schools in a coherent market mechanism in 
which parents could really choose the type of schooling they wished for their 
child. He was consequently not as enthusiastic about the uniform creation of 
grant maintained schools as Thatcher was. This is not to suppose that he was 
not committed to the market narrative, he was, but that he believed that the 
market on its own was not enough to ensure what he considered to be 
educational excellence.
Baker comments that the curriculum which he created was 'in many respects 
strikingly similar' to the 1864 Clarendon Commissioners. Indeed the national 
curriculum was to provide a vehicle for traditional narratives of education 
that Scruton, Bantock and Eliot would have difficulty complaining about. 
Baker was indeed greatly concerned with the propagation of the cultural 
values of the bourgeois narrative; '...the heart o f the Conservative mission is 
something more than economics - however important economics might be: 
there is a commitment to strengthen, or at least not undermine, the traditional 
virtues which enable people to live fulfilling lives without being a threat or a 
burden to others. ’ ^  However, in spite of the rhetoric, this was not so much
7^ibid. p. 100
7^Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) op.cit., p. 105 
74Thatcher (1993) p.279
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the restoration of ‘lost’ values but their re-invention as the values of the 
bourgeois narrative.
Stronach and MacLure deconstruct in the bourgeois narrative the concept of
‘cyclical^^  time: the rhetoric demanded a return to traditional values that had
somehow become lost in the misguided adherence to the failed Respectable
and egalitarian narratives. Thus Thatcher’s much publicised ‘return to
Victorian values’ rhetoric reflected her central concern with the narrative
institution - in her terms ‘re-institution’ - of a bourgeois moral order. She
constructed a time which was presently out of joint, pointing to the necessity
of return to the ‘natural’, individualist moral order of the bourgeois narrative.
The narrative, however, also used the concept of ‘progressive’ time which
7Stronach and MacLure represent as 'progress thinking,/0 characteristic of the
capitalist economic narrative and the modernist faith in systems and
structures. The economic future of Britain is portrayed as at a crucial stage, in
a crisis which may only be averted by a reconstruction of education The
narrative instils a sense of urgency for reform, silencing dissenting voices,
labelling them as out-moded and reactionary. What is needed is a modem
education for modem needs. Alan Amos, for example, supporting the ERA
speaks of it as a 'radical and reforming measure which boldly and
imaginatively creates a dynamic framework to our education system fully into 
77the 2 1st century. ’ ‘ ' These two senses of time, double coding the narrative, 
maintained, if not without tensions, order between the dissenting voices of the 
marketeers and the traditionalists.
Though Thatcher willed the means, the Market framework, she could be 
interpreted as appearing equivocal about the Market’s generation of cultural 
value - or at least the cultural value she desired. She was concerned, for 
example, that ‘Thatcherism in education ’ had become to be seen as 'a 
philistine subordination o f scholarship to the immediate requirements o f
no
vocational training.' ° Though apparently committed to instrumental market 
logic in educational reform neither Thatcher nor the Conservative Party were, 
it seems, willing to rely entirely on the Market to realise the bourgeois 
hegemony it desired. Indeed what is apparent from Ribbins and Sherratts’s
75Ian Stronach and Maggie MacLure, Educational Research Undone: The Postmodern 
Embrace (Buckingham; Open University Press, 1997) p. 89 
76ibid.,p . 89
77Hansard: 1st December 1987: 815 
7^Thatcher (1993) p. 599
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conversations with Conservative Secretaries of State for Education is just how 
often they, and Thatcher, drift in and out of these different vocabularies. The 
neo-liberalist and the neo-traditionalist vocabularies are often inextricably 
mixed. However, what the bourgeois narrative actually was to become was 
not either of these - though it was to owe much to both of them. It was a 
different kind of beast altogether even if it was to take well beyond Thatcher 
for it to be fully realised.
Thatcher had felt it necessary that not only should the educational world be 
institutionally located in the ‘real5 world of Market economics, but that it was 
also the values of ‘ordinary people’ that the educational institutions should 
reflect. In effect she tried to buck the Market. She was able to do this because 
she was not creating a ‘real’ market in education, but a virtual one. Only 
virtual capital would be exchanged in simulated competition. Ball calls this a 
‘proto-market' because there is no direct connexion between consumer 
choice and the earnings and benefits of the producers. To an extent, therefore, 
she was able to try to fix the values of the emergent narrative. She had the 
enormous assurance that her ‘common sense’ was the ‘common sense’ of the 
‘ordinary people’, the consumers, who would ensure the continuing 
hegemony of the values of bourgeois culture. She was supremely confident 
that her cultural values were the only rational ones and the possibility of 
conflict, between bourgeois values and the values her virtual Market might 
generate, was not just invisible to her but, in her narrow rationale, literally 
unthinkable. Since the Market was, in her view, the only rational and ‘natural’ 
means of social organisation, and since people were ‘naturally’ bourgeois - 
except when forced into ‘unnatural’ cultural values, brainwashed by 
misguided and dangerous ideologues - the virtual educational Market could 
not but create the ‘naturally’ correct, bourgeois cultural values. She, in effect, 
perhaps even unconsciously, attempted to fix the cultural values of education 
narrative as the ‘natural’ values of the bourgeois hegemony.
Blackwell and Seabrook comment on the Pilgrim's Progress subplot of the 
Thatcher story. Her story is of the bourgeois, suffering the iniquities of a 
reviled people, avoiding the traps and illusions laid by the devils of 
socialism, and finally attaining the celestial city of prosperity: ‘This is the 
long road I am resolved to follow. This is the path that I  must go. I ask all 
who have spirit - the bold, the steadfast, and the young in heart - to stand and 
join me as we go forward for there is no other company in which I would
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travel This metaphorical construction is of a directed and controlled 
movement through turbulence towards a time of stability - the homeostasis of 
the Market - offering a justification for what at present might seem chaotic 
social change and perhaps even cruelly harsh social policy, by the promise of 
eventual - and eternal - affluence. However, only the elect are to be her 
companions. The message was clear: adopt the bourgeois way - re-invent 
yourself in its stories, purposes and values - or fall by the wayside. At its 
roots there is no real contradiction between market values and cultural values 
in the bourgeois narrative.
There was indeed a crisis of sorts and the neo-liberal/neo-traditionalist 
problematisation of the Thatcher reform has become the received wisdom. 
The account of Thatcher’s reforms has become a drama of the struggle for 
domination of conflicting discourses, as in Ball’s analysis80. However, though 
this makes for a gripping text, it is perhaps to overstate the case. The real 
problem, it seems, was that of the exponents of the story getting to grips with 
the reality the new discourse was creating and the conflicts arise from 
misdescriptions rather than any deeper narrative crises. There is no sign that 
such conflict was to make any significant change in the narrative or offer any 
real resistance.
The market story was to remain the dominant ideological subtext of the 
bourgeois narrative and it was from that there arose what Stronach and 
McLure were to describe as the discourse of vocationalism. That was to 
become the arena of struggle, not so much for narrative domination but for 
the realisation of its re-description of educational realities and identities. It 
was to lend quite a new emphasis on opportunity and eventually to create a 
new kind of educational common sense and, eventually, a new kind of 
consensus in the educational world. There would be no cultural restoration 
and no further radical institutionalisation of market forces. This, however, is 
the topic of the next chapter.
^Blackwell and Seabrook (1985) p. 157 
80as in Ball (1990), for example.
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4. Six Stories
7  don V think I  had any distinctive ideas (except)... a feeling 
that we needed to do something about vocational education 
and to try to right the old binary line between the academic 
and the vocational I  feel very strongly that we need to do 
something about those people who have not been, perhaps,
challenged enough... they haven ’t had high enough
81expectations; ’
The next chapters will deal with the nature of the bourgeois narrative and the 
discourse of vocationalism and its impact on education. To sum up, however, 
it is, possible to discern at least six different educational stories ^  of the 
Thatcher years. Though not all of them were part of the emerging narrative, 
each of them had an impact on how the new narrative was to develop.
There was the Culture Restorationist story in which education was seen 
primarily as the transmission of (authorised) culture in authoritarian regimes 
at school. Schools would be required to operate on a subject focus, justified 
by tradition and defined in a national curriculum. The acquisition of 
knowledge was considered more important than understanding or creative 
pursuits. That knowledge was arranged progressively and tested at defined 
developmental (chronological) stages. The pedagogy of this story leant 
towards whole class teaching, 'traditional' methods and formal relationships 
between pupils and teachers as in Bantock’s narrative. The preferred 
assessment was by examination rather than coursework and such assessment 
was used as the basis of selection by academic ability. It’s preferred school 
was the grammar school. Parents’ involvement in this story lay in their ability 
to choose to seek admission to the grammar school but not much more than 
that.
The Labour Party counter narrative remained committed to the Equal 
Opportunity story even though that had been damaged, perhaps fatally, by 
Thatcher’s appropriation of its idealism. Roy Hattersley, for example, sees -
^Ribbins and Sherratt (1997) p. 185
^~As described, though here substantially amended, in Six Educational Theories by Michael 
Bassey, Executive Secretary o f the British Educational Research Association, in The Guardian
16/4/96
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even to this day - education as a means to redress social injustices and 
inequalities. This story was concerned to provide equal opportunities to 
succeed irrespective of parental wealth, race, gender or class. It was 
implacably opposed to private education and the assisted places scheme and 
its preference was for the comprehensive school. It was distrustful of 
selection and streaming within or for schools. It favoured democratic types of 
management and the involvement of pupils in schools and retained a soft spot 
for mixed-ability teaching. It maintained the professional story of teachers 
and valued them, preferring continuous assessment to formal examinations. 
Education was seen as an important socialising influence and education of the 
emotions was an important feature. It saw education as a means of 
restructuring society on a more equal basis.
The Elite story remained among some of the more unreconstructed 
politicians of the Right. This story saw education as a means to re-structure 
society into a small elite and the masses, with education primarily a means to 
train the elite. The underclass were to be given some training in relevant 
skills and some indoctrination into a moral code which protected the interests 
of the elite. It was a story designed to create compliance, obedience and 
uncritical thought.
The progressive Learner Centred story saw education as the social nurturing 
of the individual to fully develop their personal potential. Mark Carlisle, at 
the beginning of the Thatcher accession, was somewhat sympathetic to this 
view. The emphasis was on learner centred pedagogies and research findings 
This story tended to be democratic and collaborative in its relations and 
innovative in curriculum. Graded performances, formative assessment and 
self-assessment were important features and there was strong interest in 
cognitive skills, problem solving, creativity and critical thinking. This story 
was always a soft target and was to suffer most disapprobation in, and 
beyond, the Thatcher years. It had been the bete noire of the Right since the 
time of the Black Papers but despite much media ridicule and political 
oppression it remained very influential in the teaching profession.
Bassey’s next story was that of the Vote Seeking Pragmatists. This is not an 
educational theory at all, rather it is rhetoric which takes some educational 
issue as a text for political gain as opposed to rational discussion about 
education. It rejects contributions from educationalists except those who say
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what its proponent wants to hear. Its arguments are simple, emotionally 
driven and populist. The sound bite quality of its rhetoric is important: it is 
designed to gain press coverage and a mass audience. Parents are important 
only as potential voters.
Then there was the Industrial Training or Vocational story where education is 
seen in terms of its relationship to future economic growth and the 'needs' of 
industry. Education would not consist of just technical knowledge appropriate 
to the creation of industrial wealth but would also be concerned to instil the 
Values' of hard work, self-discipline, obedience, punctuality... The institution 
of league tables and the introduction of competition was intended to create an 
educational 'market' to improve 'standards' and create the appropriate 
'industrial' ethos. This story values only technical innovation, especially 
involving computers, and demands industrial or business management styles 
in schools, particularly sympathising with accountability regimes and 
maintaining an affection for performance based pay.
The ‘congealing vocabularies’ of these stories were to create some 
ambiguities and conflicts in the emergent story for some time to come but 
eventually a new common sense would emerge. These last two stories, in 
particular, were to be influential in the development of the bourgeois 
narrative which is the topic of the next chapter. However, though there are 
elements of all of these stories in the new narrative, even if they only feature 
pejoratively, the new story would not be any of them.
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Chapter 8
The Educational Panopticon
‘In practice, victory was with those who could speak with the 
greatest appearance o f clear, undoubt ing conviction and 
could best use the accents o f infallibility. ’
John Maynard Keynes ^
1. From Chaos to Order
‘Where there is discord let me bring harmony... '
Margaret Thatcher^
The main narrative characteristic of the period between the Butler’s Act and 
the ERA (1988 Education Reform Act) was that of chaos. Though the 
selective story remained the desirable educational story, evident in that its 
rhetorical power and influence had remained largely unchanged despite the 
brief egalitarian comprehensive interregnum, the plot - the clear, ordered 
development of the educational story - had been lost until it was to be 
re-invented and culturally restored by Thatcher as the Bourgeois Story .
Butler’s ‘consensus’ had masked the absence of any radical change in the 
educational narrative since the 19th century. Butler had attempted to bring 
some order to the increasing educational expectations of post war Britain by 
providing a narrative which was something rather more than a meritocratic 
veneer to a stolidly elitist system but which fell well short of providing 
substantial equality of opportunity. There followed a period of more acute 
narrative disorder with the egalitarian and ‘traditionalist’ narratives in
^cited in Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory ( London: Duckworth 
1981, revised 1985) p. 17
^Thatcher, quoting St Francis of Assisi on her accession: Thatcher (1993) p. 19
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contention, neither able to claim outright victory, creating an educational 
system riven by ambiguity and presided over by a quietist political 
‘consensus’ which opted out of seeking clear narrative direction.
There had been in conflict two interpretations of human nature each regarding 
the other as ‘unnatural’: the Respectable narrative and its selective 
educational story reflecting and maintaining the ‘natural’ class ordering of 
society justified by a weakened re-invention of the Great Chain of Being, 
anchored in the ‘mystique o f traditional authority and the egalitarian story 
with its attempt to engineer a more equal society by overt political 
intervention in the educational system, fuelled by a sense of the unfulfilled 
destiny of people who had the natural capacities to succeed but who were 
oppressed by an ‘artificially’ maintained class ordered social system which 
institutionally denied them fulfilment. There was from this conflict to emerge 
a different interpretation of human nature, a story which formed the 
ideological sub-text of the emerging educational story.
Thatcher’s reactionary bourgeois story, shared indeed by not a few ‘new’ 
Labour politicians as this chapter will discuss, regarded the egalitarian story, 
in turn, as essentially artificial: it upset the ‘natural’ balance of society by 
going against the grain of human nature, denying people’s essential ‘natural’ 
self interest, and their ‘natural’ qualities and ‘natural’ expectations. 
Egalitarianism, was accused of cheating by making promises that, given the 
essential ‘natural’ inequality of people, could not possibly be kept. The 
traditional Respectable story fared little better: it was accused of attempting 
to maintain a stagnant social system based on an outmoded elitism which 
obstructed the new bourgeois meritocracy. However, until the bourgeois story 
was to become the foundation of the new common sense of education, the 
educational discourses remained fixed in the struggle between selection and 
egalitarianism. This cultural lag created narrative chaos: as described at the 
end of the last chapter there were many different stories and interpretations of 
these stories all vying for domination.
However, the narrative chaos of the two older discourses of education had 
created ‘strange attractors’ - static narrative points about which speakers of 
the various educational discourses had tended to collect. Grammar schools 
and comprehensive schools had become the strangely attractive polar 
co-ordinates of the educational discourses since Butler. Such was the
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attractive power of these points that speakers almost invariably seemed to 
become caught in one or other of these narrative vortices. These types of 
schooling became constructed as idealised icons of the contending narratives. 
The actual schools themselves - the nature of the education they provided and 
their respective strengths and weaknesses - were lost in them, becoming the 
iconic receptacles of the narrative hopes and desires of the competing 
narratives. Their diametric opposition had become not just a feature of 
educational discourse but in essence what educational theory was about, 
setting its ‘battle’ lines - the ideological conflict was almost invariably 
represented in warlike imagery - defining its boundaries and so narrowly 
constricting what were its legitmate concerns, eventually to confound the 
possibility of any potentially constructive educational debate.
‘Real’ schools and ‘real’ education became lost in the rhetoric of what 
Michael Barber calls the 'passionate credulities' of an educational debate 
'..hung up in failed ideologies'^ . The ‘reality’ of the emergent bourgeois 
educational story will be discussed and whether it provides an educational 
debate that is not also hung up in different, but no less passionate, credulities 
will be questioned. Michael Barber is a key speaker of the ‘new’ Labour 
educational narrative and his exposition of the Labour educational narrative 
and its relation to the bourgeois narrative of the Conservatives will be 
discussed.
This chapter will also discuss how populist rhetoric, the presentation of policy 
and opportunistic exploitation of the media was to become an important 
feature of politics and the creation and maintenance of the bourgeois 
narrative. What was to become important was not so much what was 
happening in the educational world but the ‘spin’ with which these events 
were to be represented. Politicians were becoming much more versed in the 
manipulation of the media, having learnt from earlier crude attempts how 
putting the right ‘spin’ on events could generate political advantage. They had 
learned from the seventies and eighties, how minor, inconsequential events, 
like the apocryphal South American butterfly, initiated catastrophic storms: 
like the teacher who stupidly appeared in a sex education film, or the 
misguided ‘progressive’ fringe at William Tyndale school which stirred up
Michael Barber: The Learning Game: Arguments for an Education Revolution (London: 
Indigo/Gollancz 1996, 1997)
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increasingly vituperative rhetoric and counter rhetoric for the opposing 
camps. Such was the power of the largely right wing media creation of public 
disapprobation for the educational system, that the rhetoric of crisis in 
education was appropriated by political opportunists to foment crises that they 
might use to propagandise for the bourgeois narrative and, indeed, electorally 
exploit.
However, the chapter will go on to argue, the pragmatism and 
instrumentalism of the Panopticon has served not just to conceal the 
ideological base of the educational discourses but is an example of the end of 
attempts to construct grand social narratives. It is an example of the end of 
what might be considered as uniquely Conservative social narratives - and 
indeed uniquely socialist narratives too - as the plot has converged into an, 
arguably, lesser educational and social story without the distinctive qualities 
that the traditional narratives provided: indeed into a post-ideological 
narrative, a story without qualities.
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2. Building the Panopticon
"I don't think we consulted any o f  the professionals.
They were looked on as the enemy. " ^
Thatcher’s heroic strategy had been to promulgate the perception of 
educational crisis as an important rhetorical feature of the cultural 
establishment of the bourgeois story. The taming of the teaching profession, 
the marginalisation of the influence of the teaching unions and the much 
asserted impotence of the egalitarian narrative to meet the needs of children, 
the state or the economy, had left education in chaos and made it a popular 
and vulnerable target. Nor had the Labour Party - then caught in the chaos of 
the violent narrative competition between its left and the right wings - any 
credible alternative to offer other than a half-hearted reiteration of the 
egalitarian narrative which had by then been successfully represented not just 
as a failure but as a betrayal of the children, their parents and the state.
It had, however, become increasingly evident to Thatcher and her Education 
Secretaries that making sure that they alone were the ones in the room with 
the buttons - to borrow an Italian metaphor - was not sufficient. Their control 
over the educational narrative was far from secure even though they had, by 
the mid-eighties, succeeded in discrediting teachers and educationalists and 
removing them form direct influence over the policy making processes. Their 
‘discourse o f derision ’ had achieved that, but still, though they pushed the 
buttons, the educational narrative remained chaotic. Simply reiterating the 
language of consumerism was not, on its own, enough to construct the desired 
new reality. This is clear in Norman Tebbit’s contribution to the ERA debate: 
‘.. enough consumer choice will encourage the professionalism among school 
teachers ... needed to produce the curricula that will please parents and do 
well for children. ’  ^ What was required was that teachers and educationalists 
adopt that language and internalise its values and ethos. What was required 
was a change in the culture of schools.
4Nicholas Pyke quoting Stuart Sexton and his distrust o f educational research and researchers 
in the formulation o f  Conservative Party education policy in: Perish the thoughts.. Times 
Educational Supplement (Scotland) 4/10/91 
Hansard: 1st December 1987: 810
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Though at first the Thatcher narrative had created yet more disorder, by the 
early nineties, the ‘common sense’ of the bourgeois narrative began to 
become embedded in the educational vocabularies and, as it was internalised, 
slowly it began to create a new educational order, a new consensus. It is the 
creation of this new ‘common sense’ and the nature of this new ‘reality’ 
which is the subject of this chapter.
Thatcher’s bourgeois discourse of education demanded complicity: that its 
ideological values of cost efficiency, market economics and cultural 
restoration be shared by the teachers. At least in the short term - until 
teachers, colleges of education and other teacher educators had become 
'culturally restored' and the bourgeois story became the new ‘common sense’ - 
teachers had to be encouraged not to voice disagreement and, bluntly, be 
constrained to do as they were told. This required teachers to be made directly 
answerable for what they did and to be more closely supervised and 
controlled. Consequently, the keyword of this new culture was to be 
‘accountability’. The world of the teacher and the educationalist was to 
become metaphorically re-described by the language of consumerism and 
‘accountability’ was the means by which they were to be redefined, 
themselves re-educated and repositioned in it. It was to be the foundation 
stone of what might be termed the educational Panopticon.
In describing Thatcher’s, and her successors’, policing of narrative consensus, 
Foucault's discussion of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon ^ was persuasive as a 
framing metaphor for this chapter. The Panopticon was Bentham's model 
prison which in 1794 he managed to get the government to fund though it was 
never built. It was the apparent lack of interest of the government of the time 
in his reform which apparently converted him to the idea of bourgeois
n
democracy . Bentham was an early exponent o f ‘soundbite’ political rhetoric: 
his ‘felicific calculus’ an antecedent version of Thatcher’s bourgeois 
instrumental pragmatism and his dramatic rhetoric exploiting the current 
popular mood for reform.
^Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1977) p.200 and passim
7as described in Mary Wamock (ed): Utilitarianism. On Liberty. Essay on Bentham: 
(Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1962)
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The Panopticon was a modernist system of supervision and control; its 
effectiveness was not so much a matter of its punishment regime, though that 
was part of it, but rather its regime of surveillance which had the insidious 
effect of making prisoners their own best goalers. Though Bentham explicitly 
designed this system for a prison, it is implicit in his political philosophy as a 
metaphor for the supervision and control of society through the 
self-referential altruism of the principle of utility. The inmates of his model 
prison were arranged in cells round a central monitoring tower. They were 
subject to surveillance from the central tower though at no time were they 
aware when such surveillance was taking place: good behaviour, the carrying 
out of prescribed tasks, was rewarded, bad behaviour was punished. The idea 
was to make the prisoners their own best gaolers by making them internalise 
and become complicit with the values of the prison.
Access to the outside world was denied: the prison became all their world: all 
that was the case. Critically, each prisoner was alone, isolated so that their 
individual self interest, as defined and circumscribed by the regime, was the 
sole determining influence on their behaviour, and so their complicity was 
individualised. There was no possibility of collective action. Like in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, the zero-sum game described in the last chapter, each 
prisoner could only guess at the thoughts and feelings of his fellows: self 
interest was, inevitably, the only remaining - and therefore the only rational - 
motivation for action. Even the prison warders themselves were subject to 
surveillance by the prison governor, who was in turn subject to surveillance 
by visiting prison inspectors, who were in turn... and so on. Any critique of 
the regime was not just punishable but, in that it made reference to alternative 
worlds, it was eventually rendered meaningless in the narrow, claustrophobic 
vocabularies of the prison world. Foucault describes this process of 
internalising institutional values.
"He who is subjected to a field o f visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints o f power; he makes 
them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself 
the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both 
roles; he becomes the principle o f his own subjection. " ^
Q
Michel Foucault, cited in Peter Griffith: English at the Core: Dialogue and Power in English 
Teaching. (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992) p. 10/11
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The control function of the Panopticon rests not on what is said, but on what 
is left unsaid and ultimately rendered unsayable; not as much on who may 
speak within its confines, but who is rendered silent. The isolation of the 
individual and the individual institution into regimes of surveillance and 
accountability in effect leaves the structural bars of the prison invisible and, 
as it is internalised, undetectable.
The cultural change - the creation of a new ‘common sense5 of education - 
was brought about by the creation of a complex system of surveillance and 
control in the educational world. The teacher was to become the subject of a 
de-personalised disciplinary system in which the supervisors are themselves 
each such a subject and so on, and where ultimate control is invisible. Soon 
the teachers - isolated and individualised by regimes of accountability - were 
not simply redefined but came to redefine themselves as they internalised and 
became complicit with the values of the institution and so accountability, the 
measure of complicity, became the reality principle of the world of education.
The Panopticon was built by the bourgeois narrative in three ideologically 
congruent phases. Firstly, Thatcher seized control over what teachers taught 
and how they should teach by instituting a national curriculum and realigning 
the purposes of education along the needs of the economy. Secondly, the 
relocation of schools in the market was to place an increased importance on 
management and the vocabulary of commerce which insidiously began to 
take precedence over the educational vocabulary. Finally, the new culture 
was to be enforced by a reconstructed schools5 inspection service. The 
Panopticon, it will be argued, has become the embodiment of the bourgeois 
educational discourses: it has become the new ‘common sense5 educational 
reality.
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3. The Isolation o f  Schools:
Education in an Open Society
"It was the Black Paper writers o f the late sixties - advocating 
a return to the basics and to classroom teaching and 
discipline... which broke the consensus then controlled by the 
Left. These Black paper writers were... concernedfor the 
preservation o f real learning and the continuance o f an open
society. "
Rhodes Boyson ^
Boyson makes several oblique references to Popper's 'open society' ^  in this 
article, emphasising the central core of the Conservative bourgeois narrative’s 
distrust of social and educational theory and the narrow pragmatism of this 
new narrative. The enemies of the ‘open society’ are those who would deny 
choice and accountability: those who would constrain the people and remove 
their liberty in the interests of some ideologically grand social vision: those 
who would shape schooling to their ideological will, denying any democratic 
say in what was being done.
In opposition to such views Popper proposed that social changes, considered 
as purely empirical matters, could be 'scientifically' engineered by isolated 
and selective changes to social policy. It is in this sense, and against this 
background, that the institutional changes in education may be seen. The 
preferred message of the bourgeois narrative, which this chapter will attempt 
to deconstruct, is that the reforms are ‘ideology free’, simply the pragmatic 
means to create better educational standards.
It was the rhetoric of crisis in education which was used to create 
disillusionment with ideology and to form the popular desire for choice and 
accountability and consequently justify the building - and the maintenance - 
of the educational Panopticon. Barber, for example, remarks, ‘a sense o f  
crisis pervades the education service ’ . ^  Only a cursory glance at newspaper 
headlines over the past twenty years is sufficient to show how effective the
y Rhodes Boyson: Empty Heads on Education's Future, in The Observer: Schools Report, 
14/3/93
10Karl Popper: The Open Society and Its Enemies. (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1945)
11 Barber (1996/7) p. 22
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rhetoric of crisis has been in establishing this perception. This rhetoric 
maintained the popular perception of the need for something to be done. It 
provided the necessary tension in the narrative to justify its characterisation of 
teachers and its representation of the ‘real’ educational world and to keep its 
process of reform dynamic.
Only those who spoke within the rhetoric of crisis were granted a say in the 
discourse. As Barber points out, the more evidence was produced to show that 
schools were being at least relatively effective, the more that evidence was 
ignored by the then established common sense that schools were failing their 
pupils, the economy and the country. Barber1^  cites many examples of 
educational success: increasing numbers of pupils staying on beyond the 
statutory leaving age; a steady expansion in the number of pupils achieving 
GCSE passes and an increase in the quality of those passes; increasing 
numbers attaining A-Levels and many more entering further and higher 
education. Yet such successes were not allowed to count against the ‘common 
sense’ of crisis.
In a strict business sense, success would be welcomed and used to promote 
the image of the company and praise its methods. Yet the rhetoric of crisis 
was maintained even though clearly there had been many educational 
improvements and achievements. Its use, it appears, was not simply that it 
maintained the narrative tension and justified the reforms; it was a critical 
factor in bringing about change the culture of schools. Even when Gillian 
Shephard claimed credit for the improvement of exam results in the 
publication of the 1996 league tables, it was accompanied by the caveat that 
the improvement was 'not enough to salvage any realistic chance o f 
achieving the educational targets set for the year 2000 to ensure Britain can 
keep pace with its economic competitors.
Stronach and Maclure describe this use of ‘catastrophic future time ’ ^  in the 
bourgeois rhetoric, in which the construction of a dystopic future 
characterised the narrative - disaster stemming from the consequences of the 
denial of ‘democratic’ choice which consistently premised the reforms.
1 ^ ibid p. 23
 ^JThe Guardian 20/11/96
14Ian Stronach and Maggie MacLure: Educational Research Undone: The Postmodern 
Embrace (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997) p. 89/90
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Kenneth Clarke for example, rather than allowing the reforms to take the
credit for the improvement in basic literacy when the National Foundation for
Educational Research showed that spelling had improved instead asserted a
claim that one third of seven year olds cannot identify three letters of the
alphabet, implying future disaster. John Patten ^  claimed that GCSE results -
from an examination introduced and monitored by the government - must be
inaccurate if they show that educational standards are rising. Indeed there
were repeated claims that children cannot spell and that many cannot read, or
write, or count; there are fairly constant international comparisons which
purport to show how Britain is not competing well in the educational stakes.
Gillian Shephard, launching a ‘crusade ’ for 'plain, simple, effective English -
not just in the classroom, but in the media, in industry and commerce, even in
parliament. . .’ joined in: ‘For too long we have been to slack in the treatment
1 7o f English and we have impoverished our children in the process.'
Professor Gordon McGregor, sarcastically described this rhetoric:
"Our hearts go out to the Secretary o f State as he agonises 
over steadily improving GCSE results. But he is not alone. 1 
feel I must now publicly confess on behalf o f this college that, 
in spite o f  government's genuine commitment to inadequate 
funding, our students have just achieved... the best results in 
151 years.
... It is becoming embarrassing to feel obliged, year after year, 
to congratulate students and colleagues on what would appear 
at face value to be remarkable effort and achievement. There 
must, o f course, be a more acceptable explanation and we 
would be most grateful for any help the Department for 
Education can offer. " * ^
Nicholas Pyke ^  argued that the Conservative government was not interested 
in qualitative research but in statistics, which may be interpreted, or
^N FER  (1993): ‘Spelling it out, the spelling abilities o f  11 and 15-year-olds' as reported in 
TES (Times Educational Supplement) 12/2/93. The NFER study showed that 11 -year-olds in 
1988 performed better than the same age group in 1979.
16cited in John Marks Standards in Schools: Assessment. Accountability and the Purposes o f
Education (Social Market Foundation: London, 1991)
1 / The Guardian 14/10/94
1 8Professor Gordon McGregor, Principal, University College o f Ripon and York St John, in a 
letter to The Guardian, 8/9/92 
^Nicholas Pyke: Perish the thoughts..., TES 4/10/91
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manipulated, to suit their preconceived opinions. He concludes, more broadly 
and inclusively: ".politicians use research as a drunk uses a lamp post - for  
support rather than illumination". However the rhetoric was pursued 
relentlessly, impervious to criticism. It was not accidental but by design that 
as a consequence of the rhetoric of crisis there was no authoritative, or even 
informed, check on what politicians and the media could say about education 
or schools or teachers: the dogs of war had slipped their leashes and they 
allowed no quarter in the narrative conflict. Richard Hoggart, for example, 
was constrained to debate - on an apparently equal footing - with Barbara 
Cartland over her fatuous assertion that: ‘Our schools today are producing 
many pupils who are barely literate and therefore everything must be done to 
encourage them to read. I f  someone started reading any romance, not 
necessarily one o f mine, and ended up with Jane Austen, all the money spent 
on education in this country might be considered worthwhile. ’
Everyone, it seems, became an expert on what was wrong with education and 
the focus of discontent remained the teaching profession. Teachers and 
educationalists, the traditional arbiters of the ‘real’ world of education, were 
denied any authoritative place in forming the new educational discourse; they 
had effectively been marginalised and neither they nor educational 
researchers, had access to, or influence over, the policy making process. The 
rhetoric was not designed just to make teachers visible but also 
simultaneously to disempower them and to re-invent them as the problem.
Nor were the local authorities any more able to influence the reforms or the 
rhetoric which propelled them. The institution of grant maintained schools 
was to create yet another limit to their influence. Sir Peter Newsom remarks 
of the Association of County Councils comments on the ERA proposals: "No 
regard (was) paid in any measurable sense to the comments made: the local 
authorities were rather like people on the touchline o f a football match, 
shouting but really having not much influence on the fie ld ." ^ ^
Barber calls this denial of success by the Conservative narrative a ‘conspiracy 
o f silence' though he sees this rhetoric merely as the means to tame the
^®Shhh...page rage: The Guardian 22/9/97
^ S ir  Peter Newsom, The Association of County Councils: in O.U. Broadcast, Curriculum 
and Planning: A Curious Kind o f Ritual (1990, OU/BBC2)
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teachers and their unions and maintain the popular perception of the urgency 
of reform. It was not, however, simply the means by which educationalists 
were tamed; it has become more than just a rhetorical device, it had become a 
necessary condition of the new educational reality as that had become 
redefined in terms of the economy.
An important part of the explanation for the attractiveness of this rhetoric to 
the speakers of the new narrative was that it was in touch with ‘reality’: in 
the economic world of the eighties and nineties, crisis was the critical 
condition of existence as monetarist policies tried to combat recession with 
high interest rates and tight control over inflation. Businesses, in the market 
story, existed on the knife edge between supply and demand. Competing 
successfully, the central concern of the story, was a matter of sensitivity to 
consumer demand, providing a quality product and ensuring cost efficiency: 
it was the era of ‘down-sizing’ and ‘structural unemployment’, of ‘corporate 
ethos’ and ‘quality control’.
Britain had, in the culturally dominant market story, become Britain PLC: it 
too existed in a characteristic state of permanent crisis. The desires 
embodied by social policies became almost wholly eclipsed by the prospect 
of immanent economic catastrophe. The demonology of the bourgeois 
narrative was the economic threat to continuing bourgeois affluence: the 
danger to the individual of a rising rate of inflation, high interest rates and 
ultimate recession - where house prices would spiral out of control, where 
mortgages would be prohibitively expensive and the threat of repossession 
became real, where middle management might find themselves 
‘down-sized’, where pensions and investments were worth less, where taxes 
had to be increased - all coalescing in the rhetoric of ‘denial of choice’, the 
evil of attempting regulation of the market by intervention.
Education found itself just a part of this economic story: thus, 'Success in 
economic management is the most important single measure o f the 
effectiveness and coherence o f a party's political programme... ’ and, even 
more explicitly, 'Education is the single most important economic policy this 
government is following. ’ ^  John MacGregor, though espousing a devotion
9 9
David Willetts, Modem Conservatism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992) p. 124 
^John Redwood, 7/2/95, in a speech to the Conservative Party Central Office on the future of
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to traditional moral and cultural purposes of education, particularly the role 
of the ‘domine’ of the Scottish educational story, when he was charged with 
making the ERA reforms work went on to place education firmly in the 
economic world: ‘Education is o f fundamental importance, not only to the 
competitive performance o f the British economy, and o f  all firms and 
everyone in it in a very competitive world, but also to tackling the challenges 
o f technological change. I f  our young people are going to be able to cope 
with the world o f  the future, they need to have a very strong foundation in 
education.' ^  The management guru, Sir John Harvey Jones, remarked: 7t 
is in the field  o f  education that the greatest hopes for Britain's economic 
revival lie..' ^  Education had lost its own distinctive story, and its 
traditional cultural sub-texts, the transmission of ‘all that is good’, the values 
inherent in citizenship, moral and aesthetic appreciation, even its attempt to 
re-engineer society, were submerged in the economic vocabulary of means 
and ends.
Indeed the logic of the reforms was crudely instrumental. In the contemporary
world, it seems, social narratives have become, despite the occasional
nostalgic moralistic discourse of Thatcher and her Conservative and Labour
successors, no longer dominated by the traditional moral or religious stories.
The totems of the traditional Respectable stories - the class structure, the
intellectual elitism of high culture, the naive patriotism of King and country,
the established church, which made up Hogg’s ‘Myth’ of the ‘mystique o f  
9 f\traditional authority' z - no longer have the authority they once enjoyed as 
certainty in moral absolutes has been undermined.
The only certainties that remained believable in the new narrative were the 
certainties not so much of theoretical science, those were too obscure and 
unproductive, but the practical and prudential wisdom of the technological 
instrumentalism of applied science: that which gets the results, that which 
yields products that have value in the market. Indeed it had been the 
biological story - of evolution and of genetics - which was used to create the 
‘naturalness’ of the bourgeois narrative and this was crucially reinforced, 
indeed verified, by its market-oriented technological applications: genetic
the Conservative Party, as reported in ’House to House’, Channel 4 TV. 
^Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p. 127 
25TES 8/7/94
2^Ribbins and Sherrat (1997) p.27
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fingerprinting, gene sequencing, the creation of hybrids in agriculture and so 
on. Where faith in morality and in the ‘truth’ of the traditional grand social 
narratives had waned, faith in the ‘truth’ of biological determinism waxed and 
had been used, as described in the last chapter, to justify social policies based 
on ‘essential’ human inequalities: inequalities that are ‘natural’ and which 
cannot be changed no matter how benevolent the intentions of the 
counter-discourses. The pragmatic, instrumental vocabularies of technology - 
science applied in the interests of business - were to provide not just 
verifiable ‘truths’ about human nature and the nature of social organisations 
but they also had the rhetorical advantage of appearing to be free from 
ideology.
Sheila Lawlor, gives a classic statement of the individualistic educational 
philosophy of the market: no educational theory is needed, the role of teachers 
is simply to teach, the devices of the market will determine standards and 
ensure rising standards of teaching:
'The professionalism o f teachers will flourish in a transformed 
model, where all schools are independent trusts... In the 
collective plan for an education service teachers are 
deprofessionalised. They are seen merely as part o f  the 
planned economy o f education, seen too often as minions 
whose task is to promote the plans o f those whose expertise (if 
such it may be called) is not in the subjects they will be 
teaching but in education....Teachers should be subject 
specialists employed by their school to teach children their 
subjects. Like doctors and lawyers, teachers must master their 
subject academically and learn how to apply their knowledge 
on the job.
'True professionalism would bring high academic standards,
remuneration which recognises responsibility and excellence,
and a dynamic relationship with the parents o f  children who
are taught rather than the debilitating 'partnership', as it is
touted, with the local authority or central quango. It would
also bring the end o f teacher training as an activity conducted
in separate education departments o f universities and other 
11institutions. ’
27 Sheila Lawlor: 'Questioning Professionalism' The Guardian 14/1/97
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Lawlor disguises behind her privatising, non-interference rhetoric that the 
operations of the Market, as metaphor and as fact, are governed by the 
pragmatic logic of means, not the moral discourse of ends. She provides a 
seductive message, a re-invention of professionalism which, however, at the 
same times denies teachers any ‘professional’ skills. Teaching depends not on 
pedagogic expertise or knowledge but on individual, personal qualities.
A re-invention of something like the Butler’s consensus, as remarked earlier, 
was the ultimate object of desire of the bourgeois narrative. The foundations 
of the Panopticon were built heroically by Thatcher and as it was maintained 
eventually its ideological sub-texts were to become assimilated into the 
vocabularies of education and it would cease to be visible: it would become 
the new educational consensus. The ideologies that underpinned it would 
become ‘ideology free’ common-sense just as Butler had successfully, if 
temporarily, created a ‘ideology free’ educational consensus. For a time 
Butler’s common sense had become the educational reality: measures of 
‘natural’ ability had produced the three types of child which had in turn 
justified the ‘natural’ selection regimes and different but ‘appropriate’ types 
of schooling. That consensus had disintegrated in the demand for greater 
opportunity and in the loss in confidence of the cultural narratives which 
underpinned it. The chaos that followed Butler was a product, it seemed, of 
fruitless ideological conflict: consequently any new consensus had to be 
perceived to be unpartisan and ideology free: to create an educational system 
where, to invert Kenneth Baker’s comment about education in the 1970s,
'good education took precedence over dogma' .
And what was ‘good’ was, in the end, what was useful. There was a lapse in 
faith or confidence in anything but instrumental reasoning and Thatcher’s 
reasoning was quintessentially instrumental. The narrative authority of the 
bourgeois story ultimately legitimised itself not by its rather confused 
iteration o f ‘traditional’ cultural and moral principles, its ‘return to Victorian 
values’ but by its success in achieving stated goals - and as educational goals 
had been reinterpreted in the final instance as economic goals, economic 
success was Thatcher’s ultimate justification for her reforms.
^R ibbins and Sherrat (1997) p.93
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The effect of this bias towards instrumental logic on the role of the teacher, 
on the curriculum it predicated and the rather strange fate of the Conservative 
bourgeois narrative will be discussed a little later. The purposes of education 
had, however, become redefined. The new language of education was to 
become the hard pragmatic language of technology and the business world: 
devoid of ideals and woolly notions about the Good. What was good was 
survival and that depended on the cost-effective production of desired 
commodities. Thatcher took a very simple view about what was wanted: she 
considered everything in terms of its exchange value. Education was simply 
one commodity like any other. For her justice resided in the exchange 
mechanisms of the market - commutative justice rather than social justice. 
The ethics of the bourgeois narrative was the morality of the estate agent, 
where value was not intrinsic to the object but simply a matter of what it 
could be sold for.
Consequently, the world of education was to be firmly placed in the ‘real’ 
world: in the ‘open’ society’ it was to be made ‘visible’. Butler’s 1944 Act 
had maintained a narrative silence about teachers. He had not questioned the 
efforts of schools or teacher’s professionalism: he spoke of ‘the private life’ 
of the school and showed no inclination to change this state by granting 
parents the power of greater choice. Indeed he had tacitly accepted teachers’ 
‘professional’ status by not questioning their abilities, willingness or 
expertise and by leaving it up to them and the local authorities to run the 
educational system and to devise appropriate curricula for his different types 
of schools according to his framework. This perception of the private world 
of schools and schooling had remained stubbornly intact since Butler. The 
thrust of Thatcher’s earlier reforms had been external and structural: she had 
until the late eighties only peripherally affected the ‘private’ life of the 
school.
The 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) changed all that. Education was 
thereafter no longer a story in its own right. The narrative expectations of the 
bourgeois had to be fulfilled and had to be seen to be fulfilled. Those who 
were responsible to fulfil those expectations had to be seen to be doing so or 
suffer the consequences. Teachers could no longer have pretensions to the 
privacy of professional autonomy: they were to become visible. The ERA was 
designed to exploit the established perception of education in crisis to put 
teachers under the spotlight of accountability. The language of consumerism
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was to be taken to its logical conclusion by the creation of the national 
curriculum and the production of league tables as a measure of teacher and 
school effectiveness: its criteria for educational success became not the social 
good or even the individual good of the pupil but was to be reduced to crudely 
quantifiable measures of empirical success, the league tables of schools.
Education was presented as a consumer product, schools redefined as service 
providers. The interests of the consumer were defined, in the long run, as the 
interests of business and the consumerist/market vocabularies of education 
became inseparable from each other: individual self interest and the 
prospering of the economy were the same thing in the bourgeois plot, and 
supplied the only character motivation which was permissible in the story. 
Michael Portillo speaking to the Institute of Personnel Development stated 
'What we can do is increase the value that people add to their business 
through education and training. Our aim is a high wage economy, not a low 
wage economy... ’ The narrative mutation of ‘personal’ to ‘personnel’ in 
the authorised educational vocabulary sums up the new story of society.
The ERA was to provide the proto-market mechanisms by which parents, 
redefined as consumers, could compare school performances made visible by 
league tables of examination results and could thus make ‘informed’ choices 
as to which schools they, as customers, should patronise. The existence of 
schools would, it was intended, depend on their ability to compete with each 
other in the quality of product they offered. This was the first phase of the 
Panopticon but for the reform to succeed the teachers had to not just learn but 
to internalise the vocabulary of consumerism and its pragmatic logic, it had to 
become the culture of the school: it had to be lived.
The ERA was not established, however, without a ‘blip’ in the rhetoric of
crisis. John Patten mishandled the ERA curricular reforms so badly that he
*>0almost lost control of the discourse: his voluble disapprobation D led him to 
be sued by Tim Brighouse and his insensitive and clumsy attempt to impose 
national testing alienated not just ‘deeply lippy’ educational officers, 
'politically motivated' teachers and 'Neanderthal ’ parents but had even begun
^  The Telegraph, 28/10/94
■^references to Patton from: Stephen Bates, When the blue chips are down, The Guardian
5/4/93
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to create some popular sympathy for teachers. He even managed to offend his 
own right wing when Robert Skidelsky and John Marenbon, leading Tory 
thinktankers and quangoistes, resigned from SEAC when he considered 
taking legal powers to enforce the tests. Stephen Bates in his profile of Patten, 
remarks: ‘Patten does believe, like most Tories, that there is something deeply 
rotten in the education system... The fact that most parents don't appear to 
share that view is, to him, just proof that they have been brainwashed and 
deluded... ’
Duncan Graham, recalling his time as chief of the National Curriculum 
Council (NCC) reflects on his demise under Patten. He points out that, 
when he was appointed by Kenneth Baker, Baker was apparently concerned 
about the 'professional sensibilities o f  teachers' in imposing the national 
curriculum: it needed someone to 4take a grip '. Baker, he perhaps selectively 
recalls, wanted the NCC to offer ‘independent professional advice o f high 
integrity ’ . Indeed Baker reinforced this impression when he stated that he did 
not want the national curriculum to become a ‘narrow, utilitarian, Gradgrind 
curriculum' J and he preferred Graham’s ‘down to earth, very Scottish 
approach. He was not in thrall to the prejudices o f  academics.. ’ More 
importantly to Baker and his heroic establishment of the national curriculum, 
Graham does conceal the breakneck speed with which the reforms 
progressed, was that Graham was chosen to ensure that: ‘the curriculum did 
not fall into the hands o f the DES civil servants, inspectors, the academic 
establishment or ministers. Baker’s final inclusion of ‘ministers’ is 
perhaps just his attempt in more recent times to conceal the then intensely 
ideological thrust of the reforms: there was never any sense in which either he 
or his successors ever felt themselves unable to intervene.
Indeed it was heroic ministerial intervention, and their political appropriation 
of the reforms, that caused Graham’s fall from grace. Graham soon found 
himself ‘being kept away’ from ministers, only being summoned on ‘stage 
managed' occasions when policy decisions had already been taken. When, in 
1989, the NCC tried to exert some authority and proposed the publication of
11 subsequent references are taken from Duncan Graham’s article: Scapegoat fo r  all seasons,
The Guardian 13/2/92, unless where otherwise noted.
12Baker answers critics on curriculum: The Guardian 24/11/92 
Kenneth Baker: An insider’s notes on the curriculum, The Guardian 24/11/92 
34ibid.
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'five themes it thought were essential to all education: citizenship, 
environment, economic and industrial understanding, careers and health’, 
Duncan recalls: ‘then the roof fell in ’. The NCC were directed to ‘get on with 
the real work o f introducing the curriculum \ From then on nothing was to be 
placed on the NCC agenda without the explicit approval of the minister. The 
remit of the NCC was reduced until its influence reached what he called: ‘the 
illusory power o f a rubber stamp \ ‘Ministers ’, he states, ‘ saw every initiative 
as dangerous. In spite o f  evidence to the contrary, NCC was seen as being in 
the hands o f  the professionals, the educationists and the teachers \
Fallon and Eggar, junior education ministers under John MacGregor, accused 
the NCC of over-complicating the national curriculum and ‘not sorting out 
how the teachers taught'. Their publications were vilified by Michael Fallon 
as ‘rubbish', 'the biggest waste o f the taxpayers money' he had ever seen. 
Fallon with characteristic Thatcherite vitriol, commented: ‘Did ministers 
interfere? We certainly did... i f  Parliament had not... we would have seen 
history redefined as current affairs, geography covering politics and not 
places and English shorn o f grammar but including Monty Python'.
Graham describes how, when Kenneth Clarke became minister a whispering 
campaign began, blaming Baker for 'appointing people determined to wreck 
the government education reforms'. All the ills of the national curriculum 
were, he states, pinned on the NCC and SEAC (Secondary Examinations and 
Assessment Council) which now 'had no more influence than any other 
pressure group'. He complains that he was never called in for a ‘rational’ 
discussion of the role of the NCC. Graham was eventually replaced by David 
Pascall as head of the NCC. Pascall had no educational background but he 
was a prominent businessman and Tory think-tanker. It was clearly a political 
appointment. Pascall was seen for a time to be the person to make the NCC 
cease to frustrate their political masters. However he too was replaced in 
April 1993 by Sir Ron Dearing who was considered more ‘appropriate’ to the 
less ideological rhetorical tenor of the times: he was seen as ‘a safer pair of 
hands’: ‘a non-political appointee who had worked for both main political
parties and was therefore without ‘baggage " Ironically Pascal had come 
to adopt a conciliatory approach to teachers: he was accused in the traditional
^5The Times 23/11/92 
J^The Guardian 14/4/93
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vocabularies of the right, despite his market credentials, as having ‘gone 
native V an imperialist metaphor which has often been used by politicians of 
both parties to describe appointments which had become politically 
unsatisfactory . Pascal had even adopted the NCC line on the importance of 
values education and increasing the ‘understanding of our cultural heritage’. 
He was exasperated by his political masters’ ‘heroism’: ‘It is vitally important 
that... the chairman... talks to teachers, understands the issues and relates 
what is actually happening in the classroom to the real objectives. I f  that is 
your definition o f  ‘going native \ I make no apology. He had tried to win 
consensus for the reforms and perhaps he would have succeeded but Sir Ron 
Dearing, former head of the Post Office, was seen by the politicians as a 
figure more likely to build the ‘ideologically free’ consensus and Pascall was 
in turn sacked.
Dearing indeed was to become a key figure in the creation of the new 
consensus and proved an astute choice. He was never accused of ‘going 
native’ though he too adopted a conciliatory ‘listening’ approach. In August 
1993 his interim report on the slimming down of the national curriculum was 
well received by everyone even if it was more a result of a political rather 
than educational desire to create some semblance of consensus. The 
government needed to see the reforms working to maintain credibility and the 
unions needed to improve their image to try to recover some influence in the 
discourse. Dearing’s exercise in ‘the art o f the possible ’ perhaps came to 
mark the beginning of the new culture in education. Michael Barber 
acknowledged the importance of the emergence of what at last seemed like an 
‘ideologically free’ initiative. ‘The generous welcome Baroness Blach gave to 
the interim Dearing Report appeared to herald a the dawn o f a new era.. ' ,
he claimed.
The new consensus was characterised by an apparent absence of the heroic 
political statement. Patten had deliberately provoked the teaching unions 
partly because of this abiding distrust of them but also, it seems, for reasons 
of personal, political ambition - he wanted to be seen as a ‘heroic’ right wing 
hard liner. He had decided not meet with teaching associations: he snubbed 
the National Association of Headteacher’s conference by telling them he had
David Pascall, quoted in James Meikle Making no apology, The Guardian 14/4/93 
■^Michael Barber cited in: That was the year that was... TES 24/12/93
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nothing to say to them. He had decided not to speak to teachers’ associations: 
‘not to pander to them. They are an interest group and we do not want to get 
too close to them. ^  and when he met David Hart, the leader of the 
Headteacher’s Association who was sympathetic to the broader narrative 
bourgeoisification of schools, if not entirely content with the use of the 
mechanisms of the market, he remarked: ‘Come to make trouble again, I 
suppose’. This flamboyant, heroic strategy, however, did not meet with the 
same success as Thatcher’s did and threatened to undermine the curricular 
reform.
Patten was to be replaced a few months later by Gillian Shephard, a ‘safer 
pair of hands’ and who was to prove a minister somewhat more in touch with 
the less heroic, more ‘consensual’ approach the educational discourses were 
taking. Though the boycott of the testing arrangements by the teaching unions 
for a time seemed to threaten the whole thrust of the bourgeois narrative, the 
tide had irrevocably changed against the influence of teachers, educationalists 
and their professional associations in the affairs of the educational discourse 
and, though the union did eventually win some few concessions, these were 
not ultimately damaging either to the ideological thrust of the reforms or to 
the continuation of the rhetoric of crisis. Indeed their limited victory had the 
effect of etching the consumerist vocabulary of the market ideology even 
more deeply into the narrative. The Dearing Report, the result of the union 
action, was to reinstate the central principles of the ERA. There was no 
material change to the reforms: the prescriptive curriculum would still be set, 
albeit in a reduced number of subjects; mandatory testing would still be 
carried out at the key stages; and league tables of results would still be 
published in their crude form.
The national curriculum was reduced to a much simpler structure, much more 
in line - three years on - with Thatcher’s desire for simplicity. Ironically, it 
had been educationalists, particularly the HMI who had retained some 
influence over the Department for Education, who had made the curriculum 
so complex in the first place. Chris Woodhead, then the Chief Executive of 
the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority remarked: ‘the national 
curriculum was rescued from the complexity and bureaucracy which
IQthis and subsequent references in The Guardian 5/4/93
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threatened to sink it. Battles remain to be fought over the detail... The 
warlike imagery remained though, importantly, those who spoke it were to 
change.
In 1993 the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) was created by John 
Major. It was organised and staffed to be a market-oriented replacement for 
the discredited HMI: the effete educational aristos were to be replaced by 
‘ordinary people’, the sans culottes of the bourgeoisie. Having given up hope 
of reforming HMI, Ofsted was seen as the means by which schools would be 
encouraged to adopt the cultural values of the revolution. Having offered 
schools the carrot of increased funding by opting out of local authority 
control, Ofsted was to become the stick to ensure that the reluctant and 
recalcitrant would toe the narrative line. Its advent was announced by John 
Patten’s reiteration of the main recommendations of the 1992 ‘Three Wise 
Men’ report on primary education, the call for more whole class and subject 
based teaching and the need to place greater emphasis on differentiation by 
ability which John Patten called 'plain, old-fashioned common sense ’
HMI was suspected of more than a casual flirtation with ‘progressive’ 
education and though it would remain in an ‘advisory’ capacity, its influence 
over educational policy and its direct contact with the educational world was 
again eroded. Ofsted was created in line with Major’s ‘citizen’s charter’ 
approach to the public services: a kind of contract with the people - not as 
citizens as in the traditional discourses of Rousseau or Hobbes - but with 
people re-identified as essentially consumers. In effect Major offered a 
consumer protection service, giving product advice like Which magazine’s 
comparison of ‘service’ providers and their ‘products’, thus implicitly 
legitimising the principles of individual consumer choice and individual 
consumer self interest of the narrative. The neo-liberal emphasis on the 
freedom of choice of the individual was, in effect, reduced to providing only a 
choice of commodities and services they might consume.
Major’s period in office was marked by a growing popular cynicism with 
politics and the traditional ideologies of both Conservatism and Socialism. It 
had also become much more difficult to maintain the rhetoric of crisis by
^C hris Woodhead cited in: That was the year that was... TES 24/12/93 
41TES 12/2/93
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heroic statement. Thatcher had been propelled to power through her heroic 
Churchillian rhetoric, her ruthless single mindedness fuelled by her sense of 
certainty; but it was just those qualities which were to eject her from power. 
She, like Churchill, was a war politician: in times of peace, now that the 
bourgeois narrative was becoming the cultural common sense, she had 
become a liability to the Conservatives and their pursuit of power. The 
narratives of the Labour Party - as re-invented first by Kinnock and Smith and 
then, more radically still, by Blair - and the Conservatives began to converge 
and there was a correspondingly growing consciousness that politics was 
becoming less ideological. This growing ‘post-ideological’ bourgeois 
consensus was threatened by what appeared to be Thatcher’s heroic loose 
cannon, creating quite unnecessary dissension, not least among the 
Conservatives themselves.
This ‘post-ideological’ bourgeois narrative brought with it a new kind of 
social cohesion built around consumption. The bourgeois narrative’s 
justification of individual consumer fulfilment and individual consumer self 
interest had brought with it a popular scepticism for, perhaps even a fear of, 
potentially disruptive grand narrative claims: it rejected grand visions of the 
future which it replaced with the apparently ‘post-ideological’ demand for 
consumer protection. Indeed Major was exploiting the increasing popularity 
of consumerist ‘watchdog journalism’ in the media, perhaps the one area of 
journalism which had retained the confidence of an increasingly cynical 
audience. The consumerist stress of the educational narrative was thus to 
move beyond the commodification of education. An important aspect of the 
narrative is its metaphorical re-identification of education, not simply as 
‘product’ but as ‘brand’.
The commodification of education was to evolve in the narrative as 
competition between market ‘brands’ - the independent sector, the grant 
maintained schools and the comprehensives. Like washing machines or cars, 
the products of different producers are, essentially, identical: what the ‘brand’ 
gives is fashion, desirability, exclusivity, status and cachet: labels like 
‘Porsche’ or ‘Skoda’ on cars and ‘Calvin Klein’ or ‘Marks and Spencer’ on 
underwear become at least as important as the product themselves and 
probably much more so as ‘lifestyle’ replaced ‘class’ in the totemic 
reordering of society.
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The league tables must always favour the ‘selective’ schools: 
‘comprehensives’ cannot compete with them and such competition in 
examination results must always produce failures, ‘sink’ schools to provide 
the spur to greater efforts. Yet Barber describes the continuing improvement 
in educational standards in many comprehensive schools and Benn and 
C hitty^ show that they are not inherently ‘bad’ schools nor are their teachers 
inherently poor: they could provide as good an education as anywhere else if 
they were also patronised by the bourgeoisie. The ‘comprehensive’ school 
proved, however, too downmarket a brand to be the popular choice of the 
upwardly mobile. The Grant Maintained school, like the London Oratory 
which Tony Blair has patronised, was a more fashionably exclusive and thus a 
more desirable school: it provided greater social cachet than a comprehensive 
in Islington.
The bourgeois and the aspiring bourgeois ‘naturally’ chose the more chic 
independent sector or the grant maintained school. It is in this way that the 
educational narrative was ‘bourgeoisified’: not according to social class or 
putative ability as in the Respectable narratives but according to brand 
labelled ‘lifestyle’ choices - conspicuous consumption finally superseded 
‘class’ as the new social differential. Alan Clark quoting Julian Critchley, 
was to satirise this new class as ‘garagistes’, but it is a class which had 
become far too narratively secure in its expectations and smug in the comforts 
and cachet of its ‘lifestyle’ to be affected by such ‘meaningless’ criticism, 
interpreting it as either elitist snobbishness or envy, depending upon which 
wing of the traditional ‘Respectable’ narratives was complaining.
^Caroline Benn and Clyde Chitty (1996) op.cit. passim
^ in  his History o f  the Conservative Party, as broadcast on BBC2 28/9/97
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Chapter 9
Policing the 
Post-Ideological Consensus
"...part o f the significance o f the discourse is the impossibility o f reply. The 
culpable teacher, the implicated educational establishment, are excluded 
from valid participation in the debates which affect them directly...The 
discourse rests on their failings and their culpability, thus their 
responses...can be set aside... alternatives are thoroughly excluded and
discredited." ^
1. Surveillance
7/ put the country's most important issue firmly on the agenda
Ofsted was the means by which the bourgeois educational narrative was to be 
maintained. It would be the consumers’ watchdog, ensuring that all the brands 
offered value for money. Its apparent impartiality - borrowed from the 
consumerist watchdog discourse - was also a means to disguise the 
ideological trappings of the narrative, allowing the politicians to appear to 
distance themselves from the ‘post-ideological’ educational world. As a 
consequence, educationalists became themselves more visible and some 
began to see themselves as media figures of importance in themselves, as 
much as educationalists - a kind of Jeremy Paxman syndrome where the 
interviewer becomes more important than either the interviewee or the topic 
of discussion. Of particular relevance to this chapter is the media seduction of 
Chris Woodhead, the present head of Ofsted. Pierre Bourdieu  ^ describes the 
corruptive influence of the media and its concern over its market position -
* Stephen J. Ball Politics and Policy Making in Education. (London: Routledge: 1990) pp 58/9 
^Michael Barber on his ‘high point’ of 1993 which was the Ofsted Report Access and 
Achievement in Urban Education : in That was the year that was... TES 24/12/93 
Pierre Bourdieu, On Television and Journalism /London: Pluto Press, 1998)
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simplifying issues in populist terms, creating personalities and manufacturing 
controversies in its search for higher ratings. The market thus began to have 
an even deeper, even more invisible, influence on the educational discourse. 
It is for this reason that most of the references to Ofsted and Woodhead in this 
chapter are taken from the media.
The experience of Patten had showed that the heroic, hands on strategy of 
Thatcher was no longer as effective or as popularly received as it had been. 
Ofsted was to become the principle vehicle for maintaining the reforms and 
maintaining the rhetoric of crisis which now appeared to be coming from an 
dispassionate, independent consumer service. Indeed the vocabulary of 
consumerism became the common sense of the educational world and its 
ideology was masked from view as, proportionately, educationalists became 
much more visible.
Indeed the rhetoric of crisis was self fulfilling: it justified the ‘mission’ of 
Ofsted and in promoting crisis it also generated it. It was, more critically, also 
used because any other rhetoric had been effectively ruled out: the 
educational discourse had become so narrowed by the vocabulary of 
consumerism as to see success being determined by nothing other than the 
pressures of competition and the need to provide value for money.
Critical to ensuring that Ofsted was the vehicle for the continuation of the 
rhetoric of crisis was the appointment of Chris Woodhead as its head. He was 
to provide a leadership style and rhetoric startlingly similar to Thatcher’s. His 
preferred message was unexceptional: 7 see my job as trying to promote a 
professional debate about what constitutes good teaching. ' ^ And though 
inspection was bound to be stressful it was with a clear purpose: 'The stress is 
not just negative. It encourages schools to work with greater determination to 
deal with deep seated problems. ’  ^Ofsted’s role was simply that of supplying 
the ‘diagnosis' he further maintained, and leave it to the ‘professionals’ to 
provide the 'treatment'. The medical metaphor used reinforces the preferred 
perception of Ofsted’s impartial and ‘clinical’ role: that of a consultant 
visiting the ward, directing the junior doctors to what treatment is indicated 
but leaving it up to them to follow through on the prescribed course of 
treatment.
^The Guardian 18/4/95 
5ibid.
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However, he insisted, any treatment must not derive from one of the despised 
‘progressive’ egalitarian narratives: 'the old orthodoxies continue to exert 
their influence in too many classrooms ’ he said This abiding concern, real 
or imagined, with ‘old orthodoxies’ is characteristic of the conservative 
discourses: it was the demonology of the Black Papers, echoed by Thatcher 
and later again reiterated by Walden: 'Middle class parents especially have 
become more concerned (about)...the little Edens o f  amateur learning our 
primary schools have become.' ^ Walden accuses the old ‘timorous' HMI of a 
conspiracy of silence about such methods, praises Woodhead for breaking 
that silence and now with relief notes that the Labour Party ‘breaking with a 
long and culpable tradition o f silence, has joined the chorus o f critics o f  low 
aspirations' ^ and, indeed they now have come round to the new story so far 
as to ‘studiously refrain from attacks on the 'controversial ’ Chris Woodhead \ 
adding, 'the Labour spokesman, David Blunkett, is beginning to speak the 
same language, excoriating low achievement, especially in comprehensives.
Woodhead’s constantly reiterated purpose was to remedy falling educational 
standards: 7 have become more worried about the failure o f many children to 
master the basic skills, hence my emphasis on numeracy and literacy now... 
as I realised how low standards in some schools did sink. The culture of 
school had to be changed, in his view, not by force but by persuasion. Indeed 
applying the rigour of the law would, in his view, create too rigid a system 
and would be counter productive: 'Legislation cannot in itself change the 
educational culture, dent the orthodoxies, automatically cause teachers to 
teach in a different way... (government) should abandon the quest for  
dirigiste and mechanical solutions to transform the base metal o f low 
standards into sparkling educational gold.' Though echoing the rhetoric of 
both Matthew Arnold and Butler, he offered a solution neither would find 
palatable: the market: government should ‘devolve real freedom to schools, 
audit their performance and give parents a lot more information about what 
is going on ’ In particular he claimed real success for the league tables in
^The Guardian 5/2/97: 
7Walden (1996) p. 128 
^ibid p. 129 
^ibid p. 151
* ®The Guardian 18/4/98 
1 l The Guardian 26/2/97
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improving standards^. Though this simple regimen occasionally led to 
embarrassment, for example when he was forced to order an enquiry into a 
school an inspection had hailed as ‘a marvel' which was to come bottom of 
the league tables10, yet he persisted in the simplicity of his ‘mission ’.
The narrative redefined the problem of schooling as ‘low achievement’ and 
the solution stemmed from the application of market competition to raise 
standards. So when Ofsted admitted that ‘failing schools’ were almost 
invariably located in deprived areas - defined by the number of children 
receiving free meals - their answer was not to address the deeper social 
reasons why some children fail to thrive, and certainly not to advise that such 
schools were granted greater resources but simply to assert that these children 
‘were not less intelligent and had an equal right to a decent start’ but that 
‘right’ was denied them by bad teaching: ‘the teaching they experienced was 
more likely to be judged unsatisfactory or poor.' ^
It was the teaching that was the Teal’ problem: schooling had been redefined 
as a means for children to be inducted into the dominant bourgeois culture. 
David Blunkett, speaking of the importance of a formal curriculum in nursery 
schooling stated: ‘The longer you leave them (the children) without the skills 
that middle class families take for granted the more disadvantaged you are 
making them.’ ^  The solution was to put the schools under yet more
surveillance and to re-educate them through ‘tough inspections’, a 
‘crackdown on poor standards’, ‘swoop squads’ and the ‘name and shame’ 
policy for ‘failing’ schools. Local authorities too were to be subject to this 
field of visibility: Blunkett also insisted, using the same characteristic rhetoric 
as Woodhead, that ‘The inspection o f local education authorities is a key 
element o f our crusade to raise standards ’
HMI had carried out full inspections of about 50 primaries each year, Ofsted 
planned 100-150 inspections of primary schools each week. Adopting market 
methods, ‘bids’ for these inspections were invited and were at first mostly 
won by local authorities though later they were to be sub-contracted to 
quasi-privatised inspection bodies. Though Woodhead had expressed a
^T he Guardian 29/1/971 1
Strand Junior School in Grimsby: Observer 6/4/97 
^Guardian 18/4/95 
^T he Guardian 5/10/98 
^^The Guardian 12/9/97
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preference for his inspectors to have educational and managerial experience, 
many ‘lay’ inspectors had to be recruited to meet the target. The quality of the 
inspector was not always what it might be: one 70 year old ex-bank manager 
lay inspector, for example, triumphantly recounted her unique inspection 
technique: 7 thought - I've been a Brown Owl, I'll ask the teacher for a 
couple o f Brownies and we can talk Brownie-speak. And after half an hour I  
asked them who was the brightest boy in the class and who was the naughtiest 
and then I asked the teacher i f  I  could have them to show me around and I
/ j
must say she blanched...' 1 .
Woodhead’s was a deliberately naive ‘common sense’ approach. And it was
also very aggressive. Mike Tomlinson, the head of inspections at Ofsted said:
7 do not give a monkey's toss for the teachers. It's the children I care about.' 
1 8 Ted Wragg was to accuse Woodhead of ‘me Tarzan, you scum' attitude to 
teachers  ^ For Woodhead, however, such criticism was simply evidence that 
he was doing a good job: he thrived on his ‘bogey man’ image: 'In the 
demonology o f the education service... he is thg_ bogey man. He beats 
previous Conservative education secretaries.. Keith Joseph., and even John 
Patten... Resented by many teachers for his attack on their competence and 
trendy teaching methods, scorned by some education professors for his 
generalisations, judged by the majority in education to be compromising the 
independence o f his position, Woodhead.. arouses extraordinary passion'
Since Thatcher there had been an enduring suspicion among Conservatives 
that the people appointed to educational jobs as ministers or to their quangos - 
had ultimately failed them. Woodhead was clearly conscious of this: he had 
seen what had happened to Pascall and Graham and he was careful to create a 
tough, uncompromising persona: there was to be no danger of him or of his 
service ‘going native’, ‘...children in schools where there is much 
underachievement are not helped by the fact the morale o f their teachers
y /might be high' he stated unapologetically and uncompromisingly. He 
rejected criticism of Ofsted and allegations of it creating low morale: 7 don 7 
accept that we are demoralising everybody. I  think we are having a positive
17Catherine Hinds, lay inspector, quoted in Susan Thomas: Brownie points fo r common sense, 
TES 9/9/94
^The Guardian 5/2/97:
^T he Guardian 3/9/97
^^Lucy Hodges: On the Rocks with Machiavelli TES 9/2/96 
 ^^  Chris Woodhead cited by Peter Wilby, New Statesman 9/5/97
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79effect on morale. But this is a desperately difficult story to spin. ’ He was 
very conscious of the rhetorical dimension to his job in bringing about the 
desired cultural change. He was determined to ‘spin’ the preferred message: 
standards were falling, poor teaching was to blame and he was there to put 
things right. He really was the teacher’s friend, if only the teachers could be 
brought to see that.
Indeed his rhetoric was to share many common features with Thatcher’s. He 
became heir to Thatcher’s heroic strategy and ‘moaning minnies’ rhetoric:
‘ You are there to upset a number o f  people. It could have been much easier i f  
I hadn’t chosen to challenge as many people as 1 have. 1 ’m not sitting here 
whingeing about the way that the world has received me. ’ He shared her 
loathing of cultural theory: ’Do we really need research into how “schools as 
patriarchal institutions that are ideologically and culturally heterosexual... 
exercise a level o f control over the private lives o f lesbian teachers’ ^  
employing her favourite derisive - and quite improper logically - use of 
reductio ad absurdum. He too spoke of the enemy within: ‘There is still a job 
to do, the agenda out there is still not delivered and there are still forces who 
want to undermine our progress. I want to ensure that we travel down the 
right road. ’ J His target, like hers, was the ‘culture of dependency’: ‘Local 
authorities must not be allowed to reassert control over schools and revive a 
culture o f dependency under the guise o f helping teachers. The key 
responsibility facing the next government, whatever its political hue, is to
~)fsensure that the old orthodoxies and systems continue to be challenged ’ ’ .
He maintained the rhetoric of crisis with heroism: in his annual report for 
1997 he asserted that 3,000 headteachers were incompetent, showing ‘poor 
leadership’, as were 15,000 teachers and 16% of lessons are unsatisfactory 
Yet his annual report showed only 88 teachers performing at ‘poor’ or ‘very 
poor’ standard out of the inspections of 2,862 schools and 1,989 teachers 
were ‘excellent’ or ‘very good’. He defended this apparent discrepancy by
22The Guardian 18/4/98
23 ibid 
24ibid 
25ibid
26Guardian 22/1/97. 
22Guardian 5/2/97
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claiming the Inspectorate were reluctant to give low grades and thus damage a 
teacher’s career: his estimate was the ‘true’ one .
The Ofsted report on appraisal issued in 1996 cast doubts on the effectiveness 
of the policy and suggested, a constant theme of the bourgeois narrative that 
had often been promulgated but never implemented, that performance should 
be tied to pay. In that same year he was centre of a row over poor reading 
standards in Islington. The claims he made were, he admitted, based on very 
limited evidence and he took little account of the social context but he was 
giving the ‘true’ picture he asserts. There were several claims of ‘doctoring’ 
of reports - or at least shifting interpretation - to ensure maintenance of crisis: 
Gardiner and Hackett ^  cite Colin Richards, former HMI, who stated that the 
mid point on the scale of school performance had been changed from 
‘neutral’ to ‘negative’ to substantiate Woodhead’s assertion in his annual 
report that half of all primaries were unsatisfactory.
He consistently presents himself as the arbiter of the ‘real’ in education just as
Thatcher had been the reality policewoman of the broader bourgeois
narrative, the provider of the ‘true’ interpretations, the ‘actual’ facts of the
matter. Josephine Gardiner and Geraldine Hackett charted his heroic
statements for 1995/96. He grandly announced that 15,000 teachers should be
sacked on ‘Panorama’ November 1995. He dramatically timed his
contradiction of the figure estimated by Labour Party as required to reduce
class sizes, announcing the ‘true’ figure to coincide with the Conservative
Party Conference. Labour’s figure had been based on research by the
National Foundation for Educational Research and they claimed that £60M
was needed, Woodhead estimated nearer £250M but, as Gardiner and
Hackett comment, ‘doubt surrounds the process by which Ofsted arrived at
their figure ’ and David Hart commented: 'He has provided the
Government with a number o f face saving statements, not least on class size.. ’ 
31
He was often accused of being too close to the Conservative policy making 
process and, indeed, there is much evidence to support this. He had reputedly
28ibid
29Josephine Gardiner and Geraldine Hackett: The man who is already king TES 5/7/96 
3 °ibid
David Hart: National Association of Headteachers, quoted in Lucy Hodges: On the Rocks 
with Machiavelli TES 9/2/96
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reported to Tory ministers about how his boss was subverting their wishes 
when deputy chief executive of the National Curriculum Council (1990-91), a 
story he denied ^  though he did admit to ‘informal’ discussions. He had links 
to Politeia, Sheila Lawlor’s right wing think tank where he argued that ‘trendy 
teachers, not a lack o f money, were to blame for poor standards in 
s c h o o l s ' Of accusations that writing for a right wing publication 
compromised his independence, he made a characteristically aggressive 
defence: ‘I f  people cannot separate the substance o f the ideas from the
context in which I express those ideas, that's their problem' Like 
Thatcher he adopted a deliberate artlessness: in political discourses, the 
medium is at least as important as the message. In his defence he ingenuously 
stated: ‘Ofsted is a government department, and the head o f  all government 
departments is the Prime Minister' and cited Eric Bolton (exHMI) that it was 
a myth that inspectors had ever, anyway, been independent of government.
Woodhead had informal, long established links with education adviser 
Dominic Morris at Number 10 policy unit and his discussions there were 
apparently not reported to Gillian Shephard ^  which apparently led to 
‘strained' relations with the DfEE especially when Ofsted plans were 
announced in a speech by John Major but not cleared first by the DfEE. 
However, though there may have been some strain at times, some fraying of 
nerves about the infringement of traditional protocols, the shift in the rhetoric 
of crisis from the politicians to what had become in effect the new 
educational ‘establishment’ was eventually established. ‘It frequently looks as 
i f  he, rather than Gillian Shephard, sets the agenda on policy, and that it is 
he, rather than she, who has the confidence o f  the prime minister. ' ^
In his defence, however, it is clear that he is not party political: he would 
support anyone who maintained the bourgeois educational narrative: for him 
that alone seems to have authority and in his championing of it he has become 
an icon of it. His identity has become symbolic, transcending the actual world 
of education and he has come to represent the new ‘reality’. Though 
Woodhead’s obvious alliance with Tory education policy was to provoke a
3^New Statesman 9/5/97
33Lucy Hodges: On the Rocks with Machiavelli TES 9/2/96 
34ibid 
3 3 ibid
3 ^ 4/ the court o f  the ‘brave ’ chief inspector. TES 5/7/96
37Josephine Gardiner and Geraldine Hackett: The man who is already king TES 5/7/96
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TV presenter into making a bet with Ted Wragg and Michael Barber that 
within three months of a Labour victory Woodhead would be out, both knew 
better and took the b e t^ . Woodhead did not just keep his job but had his 
contract renewed, as announced on the 19th September 1998, with close to a 
fifty percent (including performance bonus) increase in salary. Indeed before 
the 1997 general election Blair had announced that Woodhead would retain 
his job, and such was the public image of Woodhead that this was a clear 
signal that Labour too had abandoned the ‘old orthodoxies’ and ‘passionate 
credulities’ of its traditional educational narrative and had embraced the 
bourgeois story which by that symbolic act was to be reconstructed as 
apolitical.
Indeed Woodhead was to find the New Labour administration just as 
sympathetic to the bourgeois narrative and he has also been accused of being 
too close to the New Labour government. John Dunford, the general secretary 
of the Secondary Heads Association was concerned about his ‘impartiality’. 
Woodhead, he claims was ‘too close to the policy-making process o f  ( the 
new Labour) government and (he) is not seen to be sufficiently independent in
riq
his judgements \
With Ofsted, Major was finally to provide, and Blair was to inherit, an 
apparently ideology free educational narrative with a sympathetic educational 
establishment to enforce it. Though there were still dissenting voices from the 
colleges, the universities and from the teaching unions, those voices were to 
become muted, less and less influential. The key to the Panopticon was the 
isolation of schools into individual service centres and from any influence 
over education policy, at the same time ruling the traditional, wider social 
narratives out of bounds. Woodhead’s Ofsted was to place the focus on 
individual schools themselves to solve their problems, to find their own 
solutions from their own resources. The school’s isolation was complete. The 
next step was to reinforce the isolation of teachers into their individual cells.
■^New Statesman 9/5/97 
•^The Guardian 19/9/98
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2. Clones and Butterflies:
Internalising o f  the Narrative
"the monstrous complacency o f  teachers who despise knowledge"
John Major‘d
In Generation X. Douglas Coupland describes a curious architectural feature 
of shopping malls. They are, he claims, lacking an external dimension: 
shopping malls exist on the insides only and have no exterior. The 
suspension o f visual disbelief engendered by this notion allows shoppers to 
pretend that the large cement blocks thrust into their environment do not, in 
fact, exist. ’ ^ ^  The world of education was to come to exhibit this structural 
curiosity: isolated and denied access to the discourses of power in the
external world, eventually the cement blocks of the new narrative, its 
ideological foundations and its at times ugly reinforcement of the market 
vocabularies, came to disappear from vision, absorbed into the background. 
Everything was viewed from the inside; all educational problems were 
explicable in terms of the individual school and resolvable by that school - 
any other speculation, explanation or potential solution was ruled illegitimate. 
Teachers, for example, were to blame for increasing number of expulsions: 
'Children taught badly are likely to become bored, and children who are 
bored are likely to misbehave’ Thus the unpleasant survival imperative of 
the market, leading schools to rid themselves of children who might 
compromise their results, became not even an irrelevant factor but an 
invisible one. Of the ideology of the market affecting the schools, the 
teachers, or the learning experience of the pupils adversely, the inspectors 
enforced and maintained silence. The expulsion problem was kept in the 
class: teachers were simply judged too confrontational^ by Ofsted inspectors 
and even the wider social reasons for misbehaviour were ruled irrelevant.
Teachers had become the problem and the solution was, in the pragmatism of 
the narrative, better management. The rhetoric of crisis created the perception 
of failing schools - perversely failing now that what constituted a ‘good’ 
school had been established - and the urgent need to make teachers visible
4®John Major: Address to the Welsh Tory Party Conference, The Guardian 11/6/93 
4 D ouglas Coupland: Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture. (Abacus: London,
1991) p. 71 
The Guardian 22/11/96 
4 i^bid.
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and accountable. The unvarying rhetoric of incompetence - even in spite of 
the facts was to appoint accountability as the reality policeman, to borrow a 
phrase from Saul Bellow, to enforce the new story. ‘Accountability’ is a 
concept borrowed from the dominant business vocabulary and provides a 
substitute for ‘responsibility’ and ‘duty’ in the traditional vocabulary of 
professionalism. The last chapter discussed how professionalism had become 
a tainted concept, a result of not just the bourgeois narrative’s discourse of 
derision but almost as much through teachers’ own ‘unprofessional’ conduct 
and smug complacency. ‘Accountability’, the searchlight of the Panopticon, 
was to end the privacy of teachers. It was radically to redefine teachers’ 
‘professionalism’ and their role in very different terms, and it was intended to 
induct them into the new story.
‘Choice’ and ‘accountability’ were the prerequisites of the bourgeois 
democracy and its ‘open society’. Michael B arber^ describes the new era in 
education as ‘the era o f accountability' though he dates it, not from the 
Thatcher accession in 1979 but from Callaghan’s Ruskin Speech. Barber is an 
apologist for the ‘New Labour’ educational narrative, which will be discussed 
later, and he seeks to re-invent the rhetoric of accountability, utilising the 
crude ‘we thought of it first’ rhetorical gambit, to maintain the discursive 
emphasis on the need to control the educational narrative and to remind any 
remaining unreconstructed educationalists, who may have thought that the 
new Labour government might have a more relaxed policy strategy about 
whose fingers were on the buttons.
It is not, however, clear that Callaghan’s speech marked this cultural change 
though it was clearly and important precursor to it in its themes and its 
demand for pragmatic solutions as described earlier. Certainly the 
Conservatives had claimed this to be the case but this was perhaps to 
re-invent Callaghan in their own image as a retrospective justification for 
their radical reforms. Callaghan had complained of inappropriate curriculum 
and the need to improve standards and argued for education to be more 
focused on the needs of the economy but he had not proposed the radical 
paradigm shift to consumerism that was the bourgeois narrative. Rather his 
speech was an expression of concern, calling for debate about the state of 
education. Though he asserted that economic concerns and the wishes of
44Michael Barber, The Learning Game (London: Indigo/Cassell, 1997) p.33 and passim.
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parents were legitimate, he did not assert that these were the only legitimate 
concerns. He did not so circumscribe the debate as to rule out the 
professionals, though he was to chide their demands for privacy. He said, 7/ 
is almost as though some people would wish that the subject matter and 
purpose o f  education should not have public attention focused on it; nor that 
profane hands should be allowed to touch it. ’ He avoided open confrontation 
but his pejorative use of ‘some people ’ and ‘profane ’ did clearly indicate a 
loss of patience with the overprotectiveness of the professionals.
It was Thatcher, however, who was to confront the professionals head on with 
a demand for visibility and accountability. Callaghan had been a little less 
heroic in his choice of phrase: he called for greater ‘monitoring ’ of standards 
but he was always careful to include the professionals: ‘There is a challenge 
to us all in these days and a challenge in education is to examine its priorities 
and to secure as high efficiency as possible by the use o f  existing resources. ’ 
It was this rhetoric of ‘challenge’ that Blair too was to echo in his speech to 
the Labour Party conference in 1998. It is a rhetoric of confrontation and one 
which implicitly accepts that education is failing. It problematises the issue, 
placing teachers and educationalists on the defensive, excluding them from, 
and making them the focus of, the managerialist discourses.
Thatcher as a matter of procedure had excluded the professionals and this 
Blair has continued though not quite so heroically. However, neither 
Callaghan’s, Thatcher’s or Blair’s concerns were entirely illegitimate: 
education and the economy are necessarily linked in complex societies. It was 
Thatcher, however, who was to carry Callaghan’s debate through to what she 
claimed was its logical conclusion, to deny that there was any other purpose 
in education than its contribution to the economic well-being of the country 
and it was Blair who was to maintain this narrative. It was premised on 
market efficiency and effectiveness: since education was being paid for by the 
taxpayer, it was a clear duty of the state to ensure that their money was being 
well spent to that end.
Such a concern is also not illegitimate, as Barber points out but it begs the 
question about what ‘well spent’ means, a question which Barber, a 
spokesman for New Labour, tends to allow to slip by uncontested. Indeed
^ ib id . p.47
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accountability works so as to conceal the values inherent in the narrative, its 
ideological base. It is a pragmatic, empirical concept which does not permit 
the discussion of ends, just means. The ideology behind the narrative 
disappears in through its concern with practical results: though its insistence 
that there is something which can somehow be empirically measured, charted 
or tabulated and that comparisons can be made by which to gauge the quality 
and effectiveness of teaching: more keywords of the new vocabulary.
In the last chapter, in the discussion of Cooper’s ‘Scholesia’, Cooper made 
the assertion that schools, and indeed teachers, could be compared fairly 
unproblematically though even he rejected the crude measure of examination 
success as a distortion of the purposes of education. It proved impossible, 
however, for the Conservative bourgeois narrative to come up with any viable 
alternative, so locked were they into the narrowness of their construction of 
the purposes of education. The league tables of schools were to become the 
crude indicator of the success or otherwise of a school, but in the microcosm 
of the school itself, accountability was to be the measure of the teacher. The 
governing concern, however, was to be the image o f success that could be 
created, and thus the survival, of the school - all other concerns, no matter 
how ‘educationally’ valuable they might be perceived to be by the 
‘professionals’ - were of lesser importance. How the school was seen by its 
‘client group’ was to become the over-riding concern of the school managers.
What was visible was only the school, as an organisation, its consumers and 
service providers: pragmatic managerial considerations - how to improve 
results, how to increase the school role, how to adapt teaching to dwindling 
resources, how to cut staffing costs and so on became the ‘real’ world of the 
school. And the new emphasis on management and administration was far 
from unwelcomed by teachers. They were to come to see this new emphasis 
on management as a means to re-establish their professional image, albeit in 
radically different terms, and to seize the opportunities for advancement that 
it offered. Teachers were not immune to the expectations offered by the 
bourgeois narrative as it became embedded into the vocabularies of the 
schools and, indeed, their professional associations.
As part of its strategy, the NUT carried out an advertising war between itself 
and the government over testing. A public relations consultant, Sir Tim Bell, 
was called in by NUT to investigate: How the union is perceived by opinion
2 5 8
formers and how that image can be made more palatable. ' ^  Bell, a former 
Thatcher spin doctor, was used to difficult projects: he had been hired to 
‘improve’ the image of Ian McGregor during the miners’ strike. The target 
audience for the Government advertising according to the DEE was ‘very 
much parents, the pupils and the wider public’: the NUT countered this with 
the with the ‘Our children are paying for cheap education ' an equally 
populist slogan^. This use of advertising was a sign of the new times for the 
teaching unions, a means for them to attempt to reassert some influence over 
the narrative. Such an approach was welcomed, unsurprisingly, by the 
advertising industry, and marked new sophistication in the way that unions 
attempted to deal with government. However, their use of advertising was not 
to promote educational debate but rather a marketing ploy to recover the 
public image of teaching and to improve salaries and conditions.
Leslie Butterfield, an advertising executive, remarked that ‘advertising can 
‘add value' to the profession, and at some time this can translate into 
financial benefit... (however) i f  current and potential teachers feel better 
about their job there will be some trade o ff against salary. So i f  the 
government can't pay teachers more, then a relatively modest sum invested in 
advertising could have significant benefits' Professionalism had thus 
become an ‘added value’, not an intrinsic aspect of teaching. It was simply a 
rhetorical feature of a media campaign to combat adverse propaganda: 
‘Government has no respect for the internal professional standards within the 
teaching profession... the undermining o f respect threatens the very existence 
o f the teaching profession. It could easily slip into being the teaching 
‘servicelow er in status, less motivated, less attractive to join. ^
The way to re-invent professionalism was not to take a critical look at 
teaching nor at the recent history of education, but to adopt the language of 
the market. It is an example of Clauswitz’s ‘reciprocal’. In On War he 
describes how a defeated army will adopt the strategy, even the uniforms, of 
the victors. The teaching unions defeat could not be better illustrated than in 
their attempt to use the market to reassert their status. ‘Market research 
could act in the education world to restore the mutual respect between the
4^The Guardian 3/5/95 
4^The Guardian 4/5/93 
48ibid
4 ^John Cronk, ibid
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teachers and government. ' ^  The market, acting not as savage competition 
but redefined as a kind of well meaning marriage guidance counsellor, would 
proffer ‘impartial' and ‘independent' and ‘practical’ advice.
The advertising industry suggested that teachers adopt a public relations 
strategy. They advocated the use of ‘focus groups’ and interviews with 
concerned parties - teachers, parents, civil servants and politicians - to build 
up ‘qualitative research ' to find common ground and build on that to give 
each party an understanding of the other’s points o f  view. Such an approach, 
however, locates the conflict in image, not in philosophical or ‘professional’ 
considerations, but rather in a squabble over status: a matter of pride.
Education was looked at from a ‘management and organisational viewpoint ’ 
by Celia P iper^, a management consultant: her prescription was for 
‘responsiveness to a rapidly changing world ’ as the new focus of the purpose 
of education. That, she argues, requires ‘leadership’ to ‘steer the profession \ 
At its heart, this presumes a pragmatic ideologically free system: the ‘leader’ 
is to act as an agent of change and she suggests a classic pragmatic algorithm: 
first identify problems; then hypothesise a strategy; implement that strategy 
and monitor progress; finally assess results and adapt the strategy to a 
‘concrete plan for change’. ‘Education’ she concludes, 'is a service, and its 
effectiveness depends on the commitment o f  its providers.' It is all a matter o f 
selling education properly: use of marketing techniques ‘takes party politics 
out o f  education and frees up entrenched positions *.
Different management consultancy Gurus propounded different 
organisational laws and different emphases - the Times Educational 
Supplement regularly now features a management section and even a casual 
glance at Routledge’s educational books list illustrates the multiplicity of 
management texts. The point is not that schools do not require administration 
and management, or that school management should not be informed, but the 
overriding influence of the market vocabularies had the result that the school 
became reality-locked into the vocabularies of management, of efficiency, 
quality control and performance indicators to the exclusion of everything else. 
Management was seen as the solution to all educational problems and, while 
good management may assist in the provision of a good education, it cannot
50ibid 
51 ibid
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solve all problems. It is not educational theory. What the emphasis on 
management was to do was to lock schools and teachers into themselves, into 
their isolated and individual problems. The wider social issues, poverty or 
parenting for example, which influence underachievement were rendered 
irrelevant and discursively invisible in the demand that schools should look 
only to their own resources to educate the children.
Indeed as evidence of the teachers’ internalisation of the bourgeois narrative, 
Gillian Shepherd considered the creation of a professional council for 
teachers in England similar to the Scottish GTC The threat to the narrative 
from teachers seemed finally over. Though she remained wary of creating 
another potentially hostile professional body - the BMA had opposed many of 
the health service reforms and there remained a residual fear that a teachers’ 
council might become controlled by the unions and work against the opening 
and deregulating of routes into teaching - she stated. 7 could support such a 
scheme that seemed likely to be effective \ Though such a professional body 
still has not been created, though New Labour has also expressed itself 
sympathetic to the idea: even just considering the idea that teachers might be 
given such status and authority did mark the growing confidence amongst 
politicians of the teachers’ internalisation of the story. Teacher training, 
however, was removed from the reach of a professional body: it would be the 
responsibility of the Teacher Training Agency, established in 1994.
The focus of this new vocabulary was the headteacher and the ‘management 
team’ in a school metaphorically redefined as an ‘organisation’. Tony Blair 
addressed a ‘leadership skills’ conference for headteachers, emphasising their 
importance: ‘Head teachers who turn their schools round, or lead already 
good schools to greater achievements, deserve better recognition and better 
salaries and we will not be afraid to say so. ’ The bourgeois narrative 
represents its values as cash. The emphasis is on the ‘leader’ to establish 
control over the production processes, ensuring that the product is delivered 
effectively and efficiently. It is a discourse of control, over teachers, 
depersonalised and reidentified as ‘individuals in organisations' or ‘parts o f  
the network’, and the devices by which school managers can maintain the 
correct ‘organisational behaviour' and impart the appropriate 'motivational
•^The Guardian 7/11/94 
53The Guardian 21/10/98
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impact ’ Appraisal interviews interrogate the teacher on their managerial 
role in maintaining whole school policies and local authority initiatives. The 
emphasis is on the teacher as an individual: appraisal becomes an exercise in 
establishing an individualised career path and is a means of creating a 
conformism in methods and behaviours.
All theory, except that of management, was to be sacrificed in the name of 
‘progress’ and ‘improvement’. The rhetoric of crisis, of failing schools, had 
so permeated the consciousness of the educationalists that they seized on 
management as the universal solution to all their problems. The inability to 
reply to this rhetoric, against a background in which the government, the new 
educational establishment and the media fuelled the sense of crisis rather 
more than it acted as a source of assistance or as a barometer of public 
opinion, had created in teachers what Umberto Eco in Travels in 
Hvper-Realitv calls the 'orphan syndrome o f the d is illu s io n ed with their 
reputation in tatters, they seized on pragmatic management algorithms as the 
way to re-invent their professionalism.
A.H Halsey charted the orphanhood of teachers, the demise of their 
traditional ‘professional’ status. In the 1991 conference of the Scottish 
Educational Research Association^ he described how the status of the 
university teacher has moved from guild member to bureaucrat and to a 
trader in the market place. He characterised the control and surveillance 
mechanisms as moving from the peer authority of the guild, then to the 
subjection of the teacher to managerialist culture - line management and 
appraisal - and finally to the competitive rigours of the laws of supply and 
demand of the market place. This development of these control and 
surveillance regimes was not however quite as linear and distinct as Halsey’s 
description might suggest. Elements of all three mechanisms, not always 
complementary, exist as the Panopticon in schools, though universities are, 
perhaps, by now more securely positioned in the market.
Walter Humes is even less sanguine about the extinction of professionalism. 
He took the view that professionalism had been cheapened anyway by 
teachers’ desire not so much for autonomy but for privacy. He describes their
Charles Handy and Robert Aitken, Understanding Schools as Organisations (Penguin, 
London 1986, 1990), terms taken from the Introduction and passim.
Arguments fo r Autonomy in TES 20/3/92
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use of it to conceal their essential conservatism and complacency about the 
effectiveness of schools; their manipulation of it as protection from political 
intervention in bringing about educational reform; and its exploitation as a 
bargaining counter in wage negotiations. In turn he describes ^  how it was 
rhetorically exploited, usually in the form of the epithet ‘unprofessional’, by 
school management and by politicians to impose reforms or wage and 
conditions packages. Humes indeed takes the development of the 
deprofessionalisation of teachers one step further than Halsey, describing it as 
the 'proletarianisation ’ ^ o f  teachers. He argues that the curricular reforms 
of the prescriptive national curriculum act to deny teachers access to the 
traditional vocabularies of the professional, to deny them ‘professional’ 
judgements about what they do and how they do it.
David Fielker, for example, describes how the national curriculum was 
received in schools - as a practical problem. Their *worries were
C O
administrative ones . Fielker concludes complaining of demands for 
conformity and the demise of the professional judgement: 'Choice is no 
longer available in education. Quite apart from the political implications o f  
who makes the decisions, and on what grounds, one finds increasingly that 
teachers are being told what to do... It (the national curriculum) removes from  
us (teachers) the ability to make decisions about what we teach, it negates our 
professionalism as teachers'. The unions had only half-heartedly complained 
of the oppressive philosophy of the national curriculum: their main focus was 
on the teachers’ conditions of service, their wages and their increased 
accountability. They had given up on any attempt to influence the narrative, 
instead they attempted to exploit the reform to better the lot of teachers. The 
problem was 'increased workload1 and ‘shortage of resources’: pragmatic 
difficulties carried much more weight than philosophical ones in their 
rhetoric.
In Scotland the main teaching union, the EIS, had a similar reaction to the 
5-14 Development Programme, the Scottish version of the national 
curriculum. They also complained of under-resourcing and increased 
workload. They accepted the reform as 'building on existing good practice....
^^Walter M. Humes The Leadership Class in Scottish Education (Edinburgh: John Donald, 
1986) passim.
^W alter Humes. The teacher as labourer TES 18/12/92 
^  David Fielker: How Teachers have lost the right to choose TES 22/11/91
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basically a sound structure.' The only aspect 'causing alarm' was ‘the 
question o f resources needed to put the guidelines into practice...the biggest 
resource implication is time..' They ignored its prescriptive undermining 
of teachers’ professionalism, what Walter Humes was to call its ‘teacher 
proofing ’ ^  of the curriculum, and instead they made some rhetorical capital 
for themselves, claiming that 5-14 was a product not of ministerial heroic 
imposition - as indeed it was, just as much as the national curriculum had 
been in England - but rather it was the result of the Scottish ‘consensual’ 
tradition - an enduring and endearing Scottish myth that should have been put 
to its final rest with 5-14 This nationalistic motif was prevalent in much of 
the EIS information to teachers. However, the EIS did avoid open 
confrontation with the government and, perhaps, as a result, the induction of 
schools in Scotland into the market narrative remains somewhat less 
pronounced than it is in England.
However, even in Scotland, the vocabularies of the bourgeois narrative were 
to become commonplace. Cameron Harrison, the chief executive of the 
SCCC, the Scottish equivalent of the NCC, declared 5-14: 'A good platform 
on which to build excellence' ^  and he too played the nationalistic card 
alongside the key words of the bourgeois narrative: 'Scottish education is 
recognised as good - the quality o f experience... is good.' He was, however, 
perhaps more conciliatory, more sensitive to teachers’ ‘professionalism’. He 
added that 5-14 was not really a version of England's national curriculum, but 
rather a framework that must be applied: 'There is a fundamental point 
underlying this. It is not acceptable for us as a profession not to be able to 
say we are confident the young people are getting all they should. That 
therefore requires us to draw up a framework'. At the same time he 
illustrates the pragmatism and simplification of the narrative: 'For Primary 
One teachers... there will be an early education file which contains all the 
bits they really need to know about'. The curriculum was all that the teachers 
needed to know; it contained all the ‘bits ’ that were important. And what they 
needed was not ideology but a practical ‘common sense’ curriculum, a result
^ Scottish Educational Journal Vol 75 No 1 (1992) Editorial 
^W alter Humes Teacher as Labourer TES 18/12/92
^ fo r  further examination o f the 5-14 Curriculum Programme see John McAllister The Control 
of Educational Thought, M.Ed Thesis, Glasgow University, 1993.
Cameron Harrison 'A good platform on which to build excellence' Scottish Educational 
Journal Vol 75 No 1 (1992)
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of post-ideological 'evolution' rather than dogmatic ‘revolution' as Harrison 
claimed.
Schools, like the other public institutions the health service and the police, 
had become privatised inasmuch as the vocabularies of business dominated 
their organisation and purposes though the next logical step, placing them into 
private ownership, was never politically possible. They became characterised 
by increasingly rigid line management structures, increased wage differentials 
for those in management positions and a correspondingly increased value 
placed on management. In education, as in the other ‘services’ this created a 
clear ‘career’ structure for the individual teacher: no longer was the classroom 
seen as sufficient in itself. Viewed in this limited way, as organisations, 
schools existed to provide the individual with a clear promotion structure. 
The mastering of the management vocabularies allowed the teacher to ascend 
the progressive, pyramidal, career structure, like a freemason progressing 
through the levels of initiation by mastering the increasingly esoteric 
vocabulary and magical symbolism. The status of ‘teacher’ had been so 
undermined by the rhetoric of incompetence that achieving a managerial 
position became the means to regain some status and at least the illusion of 
power. Real power, the ability to change or amend the narrative, resided well 
beyond the individual manager or the school.
The creation of a career structure for teachers was not unique to the bourgeois 
narrative: indeed teachers had been ascending the greasy poles of promotion 
for many years. What the bourgeois narrative was to add was the piquancy of 
‘real’ status: only those who competed in the stakes and who won, were of 
‘real’ value. The heroes of the bourgeois narrative were those who strove 
higher and higher. The narrative excluded the managerially unambitious: 
indeed it simply could not comprehend the lack of desire for individual 
‘betterment’ expressed in the race for the top. Other explanations were sought 
for such lack of ambition: incompetence, laziness, lack of drive... the 
characteristics of the unambitious were entirely negative and provided the 
focus of challenge for the new management discourses. A successful teacher - 
a superteacher - was one who was promoted: the most successful was the 
headteacher, the ‘leader’. Indeed the headteacher was sometimes presented 
as a kind of superhero, leading an SAS type rescue of the ‘failing’ school.
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Woodhead, for example, stated that local authorities should be able to 
'parachute' in heads with ‘streetfighting ’ skills to turn round such schools .
A key term of the managerial discourse was ‘leadership’. Woodhead, for 
example, shared Thatcher’s obsession with strong ‘leadership’. Schools are 
on their own, he insists, to stand or fall by their results. Consequently, the 
most important aspect of the school is the ‘leadership quality’ of the 
headteacher: ‘There is a culture o f  dependence where too many schools look 
beyond their own walls for salvation. Only the headteacher and the governors 
can take the school forward. ’ ^  and: ‘The weakest schools are invariably the 
victims o f  poor management' Gillian Shephard echoed these sentiments: 
7 think the ability o f  a head teacher is without doubt the most influential 
factor in improving standards in everything in schools' ^
Angela Rumbold, Under Secretary at the DES at the time of the Educational 
Reform Act, said that she thought that the educational management system 
proposed by the Act was probably the most important feature of the Act . 
This management system, it was claimed, was aimed at eventually devolving 
administrative and financial power to schools, though the state would retain 
overall curricular control. Public, independent schools were exempted from 
such curricular control, existing as they do in the open market, as distinct 
from the more limited proto-market proposed for state or local authority 
funded schools. Central to this reform was the emphasis it placed on the 
training of school administrators and managers to operate their schools. This 
continued a process which had been going on since the 1945 Education Act 
which required Directors of Education to be appointed, in whom was to be 
invested power in the development of an education system. However the 
emphasis was been subtly altered: the running and operational survival of 
schools was more and more devolved to school administrators: local 
authorities, it was intended, were to have less and less say in educational 
matters. The emphasis was placed more and more on the school as an 
organisation in itself:
‘The role o f headteacher s... has changed in a number o f  
respects over the last few  years. Headteachers are being asked
^ T h e Independent 3/7/98 
64The Guardian 18/4/95 
^ T h e  Guardian 5/2/97:
^Gillian Shephard in conversation with Brian Sherratt in Ribbins and Sherratt (1997) p. 214 
^ in  O.U. Broadcast Curriculum and Planning: A Curious Kind o f  Ritual (1990, BBC2)
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to demonstrate a range o f  new management skills; and 
training programmes, such as the SOED's management 
training programmes for headteachers, have been geared to 
fostering these skills. The development by the SOED o f  
performance indicators (such as Relative Ratings and 
National Comparison Factors) is giving headteachers new
C.Q
tools with which to judge the effectiveness o f  their schools.
Headteachers had to be transformed into entrepreneurs, concerned with the
practicalities of production, of market share and customer satisfaction rather
than educational theory. Commenting on a discussion with headteachers
while working on the Dealing Review, Woodhead commented on the
‘primitivism ’ of their dialogue: 'What struck me was that nobody laughed.’ ^
They had been talking of the wider purposes of education - of its formative
function in the creation of social and personal values: these were now
‘primitive’, atavistic concepts, no longer either relevant or legitimate. He
denied schools access to their traditional vocabularies, relentlessly driving
home their individual duties and responsibilities to their children: 'when
equality o f  opportunity translates through into any kind o f  flirtation with
equality o f outcome that has a depressing effect on the educational 
70experience ’. He reminded them of the cold market ‘reality:' The position
71o f a school in the tables concentrates minds, i t ’s a spur to improvement'
For ‘modernisers’, such as Thatcher and Woodhead, the market would breed 
diversity, experimentation and innovation - the choice of the consumer would 
drive the ‘values’ of schools. 'My job is not to protect the interests o f the 
producers... Woodhead insisted, and those consumers he speaks for are
not the parents of children in deprived areas but, as he reminded his Politea 
readers, the parents in the ‘leafy, middle class suburbs’ .
‘Quality assurance’ was the market mechanism the management team would 
use to protect the interests of these consumers. Though it was seen as vitally 
important, its emphasis on accountability had become seen to be threatening
^SO E D  (March 1992): School Management: The Way Ahead. (Scottish Office: Edinburgh,
1992): 3.1
^G eorge Walden (1996) p l4  
^ T h e Guardian 18/4/98 
^ N ew  Statesman 9/5/97
^Woodhead, quoted in Lucy Hodges: On the Rocks with Machiavelli TES 9/2/96 
^  Chris Woodhead, A Question o f Standards, Finding the Balance (Politea, 1995) cited in 
Walden (1996) p. 151
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by teachers. John MacBeath, for example, argued that there are three distinct 
aspects to it: 'The government has created a market, school effectiveness 
researchers have provided the criteria and Ofsted has provided the 
mechanism by which these two may be joined '. Each aspect he argued, 'only 
the most ideologically purblind* would deny has ‘significant benefits'. 
Perhaps so, but he is attempting to remove ideology entirely from the 
discourse: his acceptance of the pragmatic benefits effectively masks the 
highly ideological market narrative which underpins quality assurance. He 
then places a ‘New Labour’ spin on it: ‘true’ quality assurance only comes 
about when the school is allowed a ‘stake’ too. The process - he continues - 
must be seen as meaningful to the school: 'It should be honest, valid and 
reliable; it should be comprehensive, reflecting those things that matter to 
people. It should also be developmental and empowering, helping the school 
to set and monitor its own progress in a climate o f  mutual accountability.' ^  
The New Labour construction of a ‘stakeholder’ society will be discussed a 
little later but it is clear that MacBeath has become acclimatised to the new 
vocabularies of production and has, even if unconsciously, become part of the 
apparatus required to render their ideology invisible.
Michael Barber is another educationalist who has embraced the new 
managerial culture. As mentioned earlier, he tends to avoid ideological 
analysis, instead preferring the pragmatic discourse. He wrote, for example, 
‘The problem with the debate (about testing) ... has been that it has taken 
place within excessively narrow parameters... Firstly, there needs to be a 
thoughtful consideration given to the relationship between accountability... 
and effectiveness. Indicators chosen for accountability purposes should not 
result in increasing bureaucratic practices but in increased school 
effectiveness.... truancy figures should lead to improvements in attendance 
r a t e s . encompassing within the vocabularies of management the whole 
of the educational experience. He goes on to argue that although raw league 
tables are intrinsically misleading they are useful though they require to be 
published ‘alongside a Value Added Indicator' and ‘some measure o f school 
i m p r o v e m e n t The phrase ‘value added' became commonplace in 
educational discourse: it is a ‘spin’ expression, a piece of rhetorical
^John MacBeath: A stake in quality, TES 9/2/96 
^M ichael Barber: Quality Control TES 23/9/94 
^ibid
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expediency which disguises the unpalatable in an attempt to render it 
apparently positive.
Barber’s position had quite radically changed. When the Labour Party was in 
opposition he stated: ‘The market model is inappropriate. Once you 've bought 
your Hoover you don't need to be involved with the company again. But at 
school you've only just begun. The trouble is that the government sees 
parents as consumers. So they give them all sorts o f  performance data such as 
exam results and how to complain. But parents really want to be 
co-educators. Barber stated that parents are generally satisfied by state 
schools: he added, ‘What parents really want is an understanding o f  what 
their children are learning, how they are learning it, and how they can help. ’ 
He became converted to the emblematic ‘art o f the possible' pragmatism of 
the bourgeois narrative and came to embrace the market and the managerial 
culture much more intimately by the time Labour came to power.
In spite of the inflated claims for the saving grace of management, the actual 
prescriptions were generally unremarkable. Barber cited Kathryn Riley’s 
‘sensible' principles for the development of an ‘education indicators 
framework
1Indicators must be meaningful...;
They should compare one school to another..;
They should focus on issues about which we should gather 
information and on which we can act;
An individual school should be able to measure itself against 
what it thinks is important as well as more general indicators; 
Education is about social as well as academic development
7 0
and indicators must include both ’.
Indeed not so much unremarkable as obvious. What was important, however, 
was not so much what was prescribed but what was ruled out. This 
prescriptive, pragmatic ‘framework’ silenced the ‘professional’ voice, 
claustrophobically locked schools into themselves and generated even more
77 reported in Government out o f  touch with parents ’ wishes for children: The Herald 
11/10/94
^Michael Barber: Quality Control, TES 23/9/94: citing Kathryn A Riley and Desmond 
Nuttall: Measuring Quality: Education Indicators United Kingdom and International 
Perspectives (Talmer. 1994)
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school management. School policy making, development plans, appraisal, 
indicators of good practice, all occupied much of the time of teachers.
Teachers, and schools, were caught in a discourse of control: their authority 
was not that of expertise but as devolved to them from the hierarchical 
framework in which they were now firmly embedded. John Halliday describes 
the effect of the ‘orphan syndrome’:
'...many people do not feel comfortable with the idea that their 
collegial relationships are much more than a technique or 
device for the ‘morally neutral' attempts to implement 
educational policy. Nor might many teachers feel comfortable 
with a proliferation o f policy statements all purporting to 
prescribe the actions that they should take. This discomfort is 
likely to be particularly apparent i f  a proliferation o f  advisers 
and inspectors are appointed to guide and assess the way that 
teachers interpret policy directives.
In this climate three options might appear to be open to 
teachers. The first is to move up the hierarchy away from 
teaching. The second is to become 'morally neutral ’ 
technicians themselves by acting as a resource upon which 
students can draw as they work individually... The third is 
successfully to set up a business within school under the 
auspices o f one o f  the so-called 'enterprise initiatives'. ^
Halliday goes on to describe how each option narrows and impoverishes 
schooling, teaching and the educational experience of the students. The first 
two of these ‘impoverishments’ are the subject of this chapter: the third will 
be discussed in the final chapter. In the Panopticon, those teachers who 
refuse to conform to the managerial culture find, he argues, 'the odds stacked 
against them'. The conformist culture of quality assurance and its 
performance indicators, good practice and appraisal might well ‘weed out’ 
the bad teachers, though Blair in his conference speech at Blackpool (1998) 
suggested that this process, in spite of years of application of accountability 
and management theory had so far not proved very effective and bad teaching
79John Halliday: Markets. Managers and Theory in Education ( London: Falmer Press, 1990) 
p. 155
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was still a serious problem in schools: ‘There are too few  good state schools,
or\
too much tolerance o f  mediocrity, too little pursuit o f excellence. ’
Blair’s use of the keywords of the bourgeois narrative are telling, as is his 
implication that the grant maintained and independent schools are where good 
education is to be found. He continued: ‘there is no greater injustice to inflict 
upon a child than a poor education \ Ironically it is in the independent and 
grant maintained schools that the kind of iconoclastic teaching that Halliday 
values so much is often to be found, yet such teaching is less and less valued 
in the conformism enforced by the policy regulated state schools. Many 
‘good’ teachers too are likely to be ‘weeded out’ by quality assurance: indeed 
possibly more non-conformist teachers are likely to find the new climate in 
schools insupportable than ‘bad’ teachers who, like all bureaucrats, somehow 
cobble together the means to provide the minimum standards required.
It is the mediocrity of the conformist management culture that has come to 
concern Ian Westwood, the vice-chair of the Police Federation of England and 
Wales. He characterised high ranking police officers as ‘clones and
O 1
butterflies . He complained that candidates for promotion were becoming 
identical, 'cloned from the same mould., they give identical answers to 
questions and seem to have no ideas o f  their own'. He added that they have a 
‘butterfly mentality o f flitting from force to force in their search for  
advancement' and he accuses the preoccupation with management training in 
the police for creating this new species.
Ian Thorbum on the deskilling of teachers and the changing role of 
headteachers as school managers and line management tellingly remarked: 
'Wouldn't it be grand if  teachers would just fall in with Government's wishes 
and admit they are not professionals but technicians? I am given to make 
mock o f  the borrowed jargons in which educational management, as 
susceptible to the whims o f fashion as any teenager, loves to reclothe itself for 
every new season. But I believe in the power o f words such as clothes - they
0 1
not only express but shape the person whose deeds and words they cloak. ’ 
The vocabularies of management and crisis, cloaking the consumerism and
reported in The Guardian 30/9/98 
*^Ian Westwood in an address to the Liberal Party Conference in Brighton 22/9/98.
*^Ian Thorbum: Bring Back the Rectors. Link (GTC (General Teaching Council) newsletter: 
Issue 16, Winter 1993)
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the ideology of the narrative, have become more important that what is 
actually happening in schools. This has denied the school and the teacher 
anything other than the enforcement of a prescriptive curriculum and 
prescribed methods. In the end, that has become all there is to education - all 
the ‘bits’ required are in the standard circulars, all teachers need do is fill in 
the dots. All questions have been answered, the only problem is getting 
teachers to deliver it properly.
Any ‘professional’ concern about what is actually happening in schools, about 
the real learning experience of children and the problems they face, is 
distorted, ignored or neutralized by the narrative ‘reality’ of present crisis and 
the threat of future catastrophe. This has created a kind of reactionary 
permanent revolution which has ensured not just that power always resides in 
the political centre - in the room with the buttons - but it also positions 
education and educationalists firmly in the ‘real’ and ‘post-ideological’ world 
of the narrative - the market. This also, critically, created the conditions for 
and maintained the change in the ethos of schools: the continuing reiteration 
of the rhetoric of crisis maintained Thatcher’s process of deprofessionalising 
the teacher beyond simply denying them access to the discourse of power and 
the creation of policy. It has opened schools up to the Panopticon, to 
deskilling regimes of surveillance and control designed to ensure that teachers 
not only will not do other than they were told, but they are willing to do so. 
Not only are they denied access to the discourse and to the formation of 
policy but that they do not see that as their legitimate concern anyway. It has 
created the narrative conditions to make them, in Foucault’s terms, complicit 
in their own subjection. It is designed to create a regime which does not just 
forbid but, more radically, makes meaningless the traditional concepts of 
professionalism, ‘loyalty’, ‘duty’ and ‘autonomy’.
The market domination of the narrative has lent management a 
pseudo-scientific, even magical, quality: it was the means by which ‘reality’ 
could be altered and the proper state of things to be achieved. Gurus 
proliferated, offering advice and accompanying their philosophies with 
esoteric devices: plastic cards embellished with Venn diagrams representing 
overlapping areas of control; or mystic squares and triangles linking abstract 
nouns like ‘Knowledge, Power and Control’; or patterns of arrows, indicating 
communication lines... The vocabularies of education were colonised by 
management consultants, blithely assuming that schools were ‘organisations’
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and that all ‘organisations’ are regulated by the same set of rules: llt is 
reassuring to find  that many o f the truths about organisations hold good 
across the board... ^  stated Handy and Aitken: then they pointed out that 
schools only differed in the 'practical application ' of these rules. In a world 
in which educational theory had been ruled illegitimate, management theory 
was encouraged and it propagated as it became the route to ‘real’ 
professionalism in what was now the educational industry.
All human endeavour was seen in this way: cultural pursuits were all 
commercialised - the newspaper industry, the music industry, the film 
industry and the football industry. In The Learning Game, when discussing 
his vision of education and schooling, Michael Barber makes repeated 
analogous reference to football teams. He consciously makes use of these 
metaphors to lighten his text and give it a New Labour fashionable 
laddishness, but the underpinning ideology though is not, apparently, visible 
to him. It is almost as if, so immersed in the bourgeois narrative has he 
become, like Woodhead, that the metaphors are using him. His text shows 
just how far the vocabularies of management and the market have become 
embedded into the new ‘reality’ of schools.
In his representation of schools, the essential identities of the school and those 
involved are transformed - the football metaphor provides a highly 
competitive context, the overwhelming imperative of improving the ‘team’s’ 
position in the league table and of winning trophies; it describes the need to 
please supporters by attractive and winning play to ensure cash flow and thus 
the ability to compete successfully in the market. The importance of devising 
winning strategies is emphasised as is the need for team work, ‘professional’ 
attitudes and the acquisition of ‘star’ players and a ‘star’ manager in a highly 
competitive market. The need for constant training, practising and gaining 
new skills and creating team spirit are vital. The history and traditions of the 
team provide an important brand image which is exploited to maintain and 
increase market share. Barber’s book is an exercise in the reidentification of 
teachers and schooling along these lines. It permits, in fact makes imperative, 
the performance rating of teachers - as in New Labour’s proposed creation of 
‘superteachers’ and the payment of teachers by results, the abiding dream of 
the bourgeois narrative that may well finally be realised by David Blunkett
oo
Charles Handy and Robert Aitken, Understanding Schools as Organisations (London: 
Penguin, 1986/ 1990), Introduction.
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who described that as his intention in his speech to the Labour Party 
Conference in 1998.
There is, however, another dimension to the football industry that Barber does 
not describe: not all teams can be, no matter how good they are, in the 
Premier Division: the league structure determines that there must be losers, 
that some teams must be relegated. And it is a world entirely devoid of ethics: 
it is the world of bribes and bungs, of ‘professional’ fouls, of the sanctioning 
of selfish, personal aggrandisement, of wildly inflated cash values placed on 
players, of callous disregard for anything but success, of cut-throat 
competition, of the glorification of physical intimidation, of resistance to and 
derision of authority, of the legitimisation of tactical cheating, of bullying, of 
the vilest kinds of tribalism and nationalism, and mob rule. It is a world 
where the players and supporters are treated as means to the ends of 
commercial imperialism, not as ends in themselves.
Such a vocabulary of schooling can only have a corrosive effect on the 
character of schools, teachers and teaching. The idea that somehow it is all a 
game and that market strategies can make one school a winner over the others 
morally impoverishes schooling and teaching. Whilst in these post-modern 
times, the authority of the traditional institutions has been eroded, to the point 
that equal value can seemingly be placed on football and schooling, there still 
remains a residual belief that somehow schooling is really more important, 
that it is a profoundly moral activity in which, though it must exist in the 
context of the market narrative politics of expediency, it should somehow 
only sup at the table of consumerism with a very long spoon.
Moral values are certainly not to be found in the boardroom or the football 
field: there, ultimately, only success governs conduct. The market narrative 
offers only ‘promotion’ as value to the individual and the search for 
promotion inevitably means adopting the ‘clone and butterfly’ character. 
However, schooling requires not so much individual as community effort: 
seeking short term advantage corrodes the character traits required to build 
such a community, the formation of personal narratives which sustain the 
identity, character and purpose of the community. The solipsistic narrative of 
the market legitimises only the development of ambition, and this has the 
danger that it may isolate the teacher, detach them from the primary purposes 
of teaching and from colleagues re-invented as rivals, the school re-invented
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as a playing field, and create only superficial co-operation in the interests of 
the community. In the business vocabularies, all sense of ‘community’ may 
become fugitive. What is missing in the market narrative is any sense of 
purpose beyond personal advantage: all search for social meaning can become 
unrealisable in a world constantly in flux and where events seem merely to 
occur one after the other without any other pattern than the dubious and 
ambiguous causal connectivity of the market.
The fractured nature of time in the narrative of the market shows a world 
governed by short term advantage - an essentially uncertain future filled with 
flexible contracts, blurred roles, the competition for immediate survival 
linked only to this year’s results, the episodic, fragmented history of people 
moving from position to position - and this unpredictable chaos of the market 
risks the creation of an educational narrative devoid of ‘common-sense’, in 
the Scottish Enlightenment use of the phrase where it signifies the 
‘democratic’ intellect: the moral sense of the individual in a community of 
interests.
Even the pupil is seen in isolation: the curriculum and the school is 
concerned with meeting individual needs, on an individual basis in one type 
of school with one curriculum. It is a narrow and intolerant provision: what 
is good for the organisation is not identical always to what is good for 
individual pupils, for the community of the school, for teachers or for 
society. Not just teachers but pupils too are constrained in the Panopticon to 
conform: those who cannot are expelled for deviant behaviour or labelled as 
having ‘special educational needs’ and subjected to the same grinding 
curriculum with the assistance of ‘differentiated’ worksheets. The social 
needs or the needs of all the children in the community of the school may not 
be addressed as schooling has become divorced from the wider social 
narratives and locked into itself. The measure of a school becomes the sum 
of the ‘results’ of individual children and as a consequence the pupil may be 
come to be seen merely as a productive statistic in the results league table, as 
a means rather than an end. This is a characterisation of people that Richard 
Rorty has defined as ‘cruelty’: the erosion of ‘solidarity’ needed in a liberal 
democratic state.
"A liberal society is one which is content to call 1true' (or 
'right' or 'just') whatever the outcome o f undistorted
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communication happens to be, whatever view wins in a free
04
and open encounter. "
The Panopticon has been established and internalised: there are no 'free 
encounters’, only the illusion of freedom and power in the managerial 
discourse as the ‘common sense’ of the narrative has become embedded in 
the consciousness of educationalists. Social and professional ties - seen as 
potentially destructive, the ‘enemy within’, in the amoral narrative - have 
been weakened. Loyalty to the school as a purposeful community rather than 
organisation, to the students or to colleagues, is in the new narrative 
secondary to upward mobility and maintaining the success of the 
organisation. In the unpredictability, the headlong speed and the inherent 
instability of the narrative, there is no time for character to develop and 
unfold, no space for ideals to evolve, no vocabulary to allow a reconstruction 
of ‘professionalism’ which means more than the calculated thuggery of an 
experienced football player.
3. A Story Without Qualities
"The bourgeoisie...compels all nations, on pain o f extinction, 
to adopt the bourgeois mode o f  production; it compels them to 
introduce what it calls civilization into its midst, that is to 
become bourgeois themselves. In one word’ it creates a world 
after its own image."
Marx and Engels (1848) The Communist Manifesto
The abandonment by the left and the right of 'grand theories' of society or 
social justice in these post-modernist times has created a discursive vacuum 
which the bourgeois narrative has colonised with its ‘post-ideological’ story. 
While Marx and Engels’ economic historiography might be quite mistaken, 
their understanding of cultural domination by the middle classes was acute. 
Wbile each concern discussed in this chapter - accountability, management, 
standards - is legitimate in any educational narrative, the closed nature of the 
framing consumerist bourgeois narrative, with is narrow characterisations of
84Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) p. 66/7
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schools, pupils, parents and teachers and its single minded pragmatism has 
created an impoverished story.
"Tests... are a very good preparation for life and it is very foolish to say that 
they are not" ^  insists Sheila Lawlor but even Brian Cox a leading Black 
Paper polemicist, has criticised the national testing regimes as leading to bad 
teaching, and claims that they were designed to cow the teaching profession 
into submission, threatening fundamental rights such as the freedom to learn. 
He sees the tests as means of control, through the pupils’ submission to 
authority; reducing the learning process to sterile note taking and rote 
mechanical exercises; and reducing assessment to the ability of the pupils to 
repeat the teacher's notes or to pass bland multiple choice tests.
Cox speaks in the now illegitimate language of the classic liberal discourse of 
education. He asserts that education should be about self-fulfilment, 
tolerance, sensitivity, the discovering of one's humanity and should generate a 
positive attitude to culture: all qualities he sees being diminished by the new 
narrative. He objects to a curriculum so manipulated by politicians for 
ideological purposes and he despairs of the left response to the bourgeois 
discourse - the only serious objections the NUT and the NASUWT have, like 
the EIS, concern timing and workload.
There are few dissenting voices. John McFall, a Labour Scottish Education
on
spokesperson, pronounced himself in favour of teacher appraisal: ‘bad 
teachers could leave behind educational cripples ’ and he implied his party's 
acceptance of the 5-14 Programme though he assured teachers he would, 
using his ‘sensitised antennae ’, be attuned to their problems of implementing 
it. Tony Worthington in the run up to the 1992 General Election was to
oo
address the Socialist Educational Association on 'quality in education' ° to 
promise ‘excellence \ Tony Worthington spoke of education in terms of "top 
quality structures" and in the same debate, Ian Davidson, former Chair of 
Strathclyde Education Committee and now a Labour MP, stated: "Even with a 
Labour government, we will require to switch resources and that does imply 
more efficiency and a quality audit. ’ Jack Straw, the Labour Party spokesman
o c
Sheila Lawlor of the Centre for Policy Studies: in Open University broadcast: Curriculum 
and Planning: A Curious Kind o f  Ritual (1990, BBC2)
8^Brian Cox in Opinions (1993, Channel 4 TV)
8^John McFall, May 1993, in a speech to the EIS Conference, as reported in TES 7/5/93 
88TES 20/3/92
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on education at the time of the 1992 election, made several statements 
criticising teachers and commenting on the decline in standards, "I have made 
standards the centrepiece o f Labour's policies" Indeed apart from Straw's
rather muted attack on the market, his policies, where they are clearly 
discernible, broadly accept Tory reforms, wishing to see them implemented 
by local authorities 'without evasions o f  responsibilities'. Barber has taken up 
these themes in the ‘New’ Labour narrative with enthusiasm.
Chris Searle ^  recorded the demise of the progressive story. Its speakers 
appeared inevitably doomed to failure - usually fairly spectacular failure - 
with much critical comment from the press and the political establishment 
who seemed always eager to grasp any opportunity to gain from the debacle 
more narrative credence for their rhetoric of ‘standards’ and ‘traditions’ and 
‘loony teachers’. Duane’s ‘Risinghill’, McMullen’s ‘Countesthorpe College’, 
Toogood’s ‘Madely Court’ and Searle’s recent failure in the Earl Marshall 
school in Sheffield provided the politicians and the media with a long line of 
‘failures’ in attempts to influence the dominant story or to gain any 
legitimation for progressive ideas. R.F. MacKenzie, on the demise of his 
version of the story, stated:
‘We had believed the comprehensive system would help our 
pupils and would support us in our efforts to restore to them, 
the sons and daughters o f Fife miners, the feeling o f  their 
individual worth, the confidence to walk the earth upright, 
unabashed by anybody. We hadn't realised that the Labour 
Party accepted the old curricula, the old academic 
assessments on children.' ^ ^
Labour had never really adopted the egalitarian story and it was to come to 
speak the bourgeois narrative without much narrative dissonance. Maria
Eagle, an advocate New Labour’s adoption of the bourgeois narrative.
09referred to her mother’s failure to get a proper education' because 
although she had passed the 11 plus, she was unable to attend the grammar 
school because her parents could not afford the uniform. Mrs Eagle had gone 
to the grammar school for two weeks, ‘in pink frock and NHS spectacles' but
89The Guardian 17/3/92
90Chris Searle: Living Community. Living School (London: The Tufhell Press, 1997)
91 R.F. Mackenzie: State School (Harmondsworth Penguin, 1970) p. 140
92Maria Eagle, recently elected Labour MP, speaking on Westminster Women ITV 11/1/98
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had to leave and attend the local secondary modem. Labour’s answer is not 
egalitarianism nor any grand narrative vision, but to apply the consumerism of 
the market, to embed it even more deeply into the ‘common-sense’ of 
education. How this was achieved will, however, be discussed in the next 
chapter.
Kenneth Baker had asked: ‘...those who have comments to make about the Bill 
(The 1988 Education Reform Act) not to misrepresent its nature and 
purpose. It is about enhancing the life chances o f  young people. It is about 
the devolution o f authority and responsibility. It is about competition, choice 
and freedom... It is about quality and standards... It is not about enhancing 
central control.' The Labour Party has no philosophical objections. Blair 
wrote: ‘Education is the best economic policy there is. ’ ^  Mimicking the 
conservative pragmatic narrative they do not seem to see the reforms as being 
ideological; they discuss practical problems, to be tackled with common sense 
measures to eliminate ‘professional’ and ‘ideological’ objections.
Adrian Townsend, a headteacher who had ‘turned round’ a ‘failing school’ 
and was invited to the House of Commons for ‘recognition’ of his leadership 
skills and achievement, replied with his resignation. He announced that he 
was leaving because he had become so disillusioned. He wrote that the 
regime of ‘harsh unyielding' inspections had created a climate in which 
individuality was ‘stifled’ and teachers’ self confidence and morale were 
‘destroyed'. He added:
7 looked at the way education was going and decided that the 
system no longer needed or valued my own skills. There is now 
so much central control and training that we are almost at the 
point where we are being taught how to hold the chalk.
I feel I have no control or input into my own school... And I 
am not the exception. Within two miles o f here two 
headteachers are o ff sick and another quietly resigned last 
year. I know many heads feel the same way I do .' ^
Teachers, the ‘professionals’ caught in the Panopticon, were constrained 
either to develop the characteristic ‘qualities’ of the narrative - to become the
07
Kenneth Baker, 6th January 1988: Speech to the North o f England Education Conference 
^ T ony Blair: New Britain (London: Fourth Estate 1996) p.47 
^ T h e  Telegraph 20/10/98
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ambitious clones and butterflies, or to develop a hard skin of cynical realism, 
the ‘orphan syndrome of the disillusioned’ generated by their powerless view 
that they have no influence over the system and nothing much can really be 
changed. Hither way, a ‘professional’ quietism was created that has radically 
disconnected the 'ordinary1 teacher or educationalist from the policy process 
despite their real experience and expertise that might have informed that 
process. Exclusion is at the heart of the new narrative - ‘professionals’ are 
made to think that they are not part of the process, day after day: the 
establishment trades on the cynicism of the excluded to succeed.
Management discourse in schools, promoting the consumerist story via its 
various Guru-isms, has institutionalised an educational free-masonry which 
has created organisational policy and promotional ladders on fashion rather 
than theory. What stands for policy in schools now is the reiteration of the 
buzz words of the latest fashion by cloned educational ‘wannabes’. This will 
not re-connect the already disenfranchised with the political process: no talk 
of 'ownership' or ‘stake-holder’ inclusion will alter, though it does conceal, 
the exclusive nature of the politics of education and the policy making 
process.
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Chapter 10
The End of the Story
‘Nothing interests us any more.
There are no ideals worth living for, let alone dying for, and 
strong beliefs are the monopoly o f  the single-issue fanatics 
and self-appointed thought police. Celebrity is prized, 
especially when it is unhampered by achievement. The 
suburbanisation o f the soul leaves us without even the guilty 
pleasures o f decadence.' ^
Stuart Hall argues^ that to understand Thatcherite and post-Thatcherite 
political narratives, it is vital to acknowledge that the process of the cultural 
democratisation of Britain in the 1960s had a profound effect. He describes 
how the sixties marked a paradigm shift, not so much in social narratives but 
in the beginning of an understanding of the cultural mechanics of social 
narratives. Though the 1960s was a time when the established and traditional 
‘common sense’ narratives - of society, of religion, of sexuality, of family, of 
education and so on - were subject to critique and their certainties were 
subverted, these traditional narratives and institutions did survive the process, 
weakened but ‘recognisably intact\ re-invented in the bourgeoisie narrative: 
the ‘suburbanisation of the soul’. This failure of what he calls the 
‘revolutionary tradition' to effect profound political change - the 
comprehensive movement’s failure to combat the grammar school as the ideal 
and to establish a ‘common sense’ of egalitarianism in education for example 
- created a crisis in left wing political theory. This, he argues, in turn gave rise 
to cultural theory - a means by which the re-invention of traditional narratives 
could be explained and, more importantly, an understanding of the 
mechanisms of culture and how culture, and the narratives that underpin it, 
may be manipulated.
Mn Signs o f the Times The Observer 31/12/95
^Stuart Hall in conversation with Martin Jacques: Cultural Revolutions, New Statesman
5/12/97
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There was nothing apparently new about the educational system preferred by 
the new narrative - it seemed broadly much the same as the old grammar 
schools - though the educational narrative had profoundly changed. The 
purposes of education and the essential identities of teachers, schools and 
pupils had all, however, been metaphorically reidentified in the narrative. In 
effect, Hall was describing the Panopticon which had become firmly 
established in schools when he wrote: 'It (cultural manipulation) has become 
intrinsic to modem management. You can force people to go to work when 
they have to clock on and off, but you don’t own their souls. With the 
management o f  culture in the modern corporation, however, the idea is that 
people regulate themselves, they are invited to share the ownership o f the 
project, they become a new entrepreneurial subject. Foucault uses the 
wonderful term 1subjectification ’, which means at one and the same time to 
become a subject and to be subjected to. In other words it is double-edged.
It is, Hall argues, vital to understand how politicians manage and manipulate 
culture. He defines culture as ‘the structures o f  meaning that people use to 
understand what is going on in their lives' in effect what are called in this 
exercise ‘narratives’. Hall goes on to argue that current politicians, such as 
Blair and Clinton and Hague, are children of the 60s, products of a new, 
radical cultural democratisation, tutored in the vocabularies of cultural theory 
and consequently sophisticated manipulators of cultural narratives. Blair’s 
revision of the educational narrative of the Labour Party will be discussed in 
this chapter. Thatcher was an instinctive cultural manipulator but, though she 
was not versed in cultural theory, nor had she any patience with theory or 
theoreticians, yet she was to make a radical revision of the social and 
educational narratives of the Conservative Party. Blair, however, is much 
more adept. His seamless appropriation of the Conservative bourgeois 
narrative of education, exploiting the contradictions in it which so troubled 
the Major administration and the effect of this on the educational narrative 
and on any possible reconstruction of professionalism in teaching, is the 
subject of this final chapter.
^ibid. p. 24 
i^bid. p. 24
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1. Virtual Professionalism  
and the Discourse o f  Skills
‘Everything now depends on the willingness o f  teachers to contribute to the 
consultation. I  do very much look forward to receiving your views. ’ ^
Doug MacAvoy was to say that: ‘1993 was the year when teachers asserted 
their professionalism.. ’ ^ However his was a very narrow construction of 
‘professionalism’. Though ‘professionalism’ had often coded a demand for 
privacy and obscured a smug complacency about educational standards and 
purposes, and though it had often been expediently invoked in wage demands 
and calls for better conditions of service, as in MacAvoy’s usage, yet there 
does remain some hope - and this exercise is an expression of that hope - that 
it might come to retain more than vestiges of its implication of expertise and 
authority, particularly in its intellectual and moral demand for critical 
thinking about the purposes and the effects of education.
‘Professionalism’, and the expertise that such a claim may bring, might 
provide a discursive forum for open discussion, experimentation and the 
reassessment of the narrative even if such discussions might sometimes prove 
impractical. In order to do so, however, it would have to be in the context of 
what Rorty calls an ‘edifying discourse’: an open debate where argument 
inevitably involves passionate conflict based on contradictory ideologies. In 
line with the conformism and solipsism of the market narrative, however, 
such discussions are, it seems, at present reduced to whether or not the 
participants are - to use the current idiom - ‘on message’. In the 
‘post-ideological’ world, debate has been reduced to a discussion of means: 
the ends are, seemingly, incontrovertible and, in the enforced consensus, 
rendered invisible.
The bonfire of the professional’s vanities has reduced the discourses about 
education to ‘pragmatic’ questions - the ‘theory’ has been settled before any 
consultation and beyond their questioning. Any ‘professional’ claim to
^Chris Woodhead, on the revision o f the National Curriculum: writing as Chief Executive o f  
the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority in The Career Teacher No.98. newspaper o f  
NASUWT.
^Doug MacAvoy cited in: That was the year that was... TES 24/12/93
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influence policy, to alter the narrative or even to question it meaningfully, has 
become a pretence: a virtual discursive reality in which ‘professionalism’ has 
become a matter of ensuring that the ‘common sense’ of the narrative 
endures. The subject of the discourse has become its object: passive, silent 
and conformist. Baudrillard in The Consumer Society describes this process 
as the new form of resistance in the consumer society, quietism rather than 
consensus, an extreme form of alienation brought about by the helplessness to 
even see, never mind influence, the dominant narrative. The ambience of 
consumerism is, as Baudrillard remarks, repression. This is the central thesis 
of this study.
Professionalism in the now ‘post-ideological’, ‘deculturised’ narrative has 
come to represent a simulated world, a hyper-reality, where the ‘game’ is 
played out for symbolic exchange - the repositioning of the player in the 
matrix of power relationships of the institution becomes their prime 
motivation, the object of their desire. It is this manipulation of desire that 
Baudrillard maintains is the deepest form of control of the consumerist 
narrative. ‘Professional’ discourse has consequently become more and more 
about status and carving out niches in the educational world where power, 
albeit limited and sometimes illusory, can be exercised. Vocational education, 
TVEI and the rise of business-industry-school links is a clear indication of the 
entry of education into hyper-reality.
In deconstructing the educational narrative of the ERA, Stronach and 
MacLure locate it in the narrative linkage of education to the wider story of
future of the capitalist economy. They term this 'the discourse o f
7 . . .vocational ism’ . However, the traditional Respectable narrative opposition
of ‘academic’ and ‘vocational’ education had not been, anyway, a material
opposition - at least in the sense that an ‘academic’ education had profound
vocational significance - as in entry to the professions or as a route to a
white-collar job. The distinction, rather, was a coded reference to the
selective elitism of the system. Thatcher’s distrust of unproductive
‘academic’ studies was a signal for the re-description of schooling and the
school curriculum: it was a signal that teachers, schools and universities had
to take much more account of the ‘real’ world: of the utility of education in
the reconstructed narrative reality - bourgeois society and the market. That
n
Ian Stronach and Maggie MacLure: Educational Research Undone: The Postmodern 
Embrace (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997) Chapter 5 and passim.
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accounting was not, however, to be performed on the vocational discourse of 
education, but rather the discourse of skills. ‘Skills’ were to be what 
education was about: they were to become the marketable educational 
commodity.
The OECD ‘Jobs Study’ report in 1994 ^ was to become seminal in the 
introduction of the discourse of skills. It was an economic document which 
was to finally locate education and the economy indissoluably together. This 
document complained of the ‘skills gap’ which was to become the central 
justification of the Blair appropriation of the Conservative bourgeois narrative 
and ‘skills’ was to become the keyword of the New Labour version of the 
narrative. The report diagnosed the unemployment problem in advanced 
nations. The report acknowledged that 'many new jobs are likely to be 
low-productivity, low-wage jobs', but it argued that life-long learning must 
become a central element in a high- skills, high-wage jobs strategy'. It 
recommended reform in education 'to stimulate enterprises to undertake more 
skill development' to enable ‘advanced’ countries to compete by creating a 
flexible workforce, by providing better training and education. Gordon 
Brown, the then Labour Shadow Chancellor, welcomed the 'high skills, 
high-wage jobs strategy' of the report. The report was also welcomed by the 
Major government as a vindication of their reforms. They too began to 
emphasise the need for ‘skills’.
Vocationalism, the discursive identification of the purpose of education and 
employment, became even more fully institutionalised with the merger of the 
Departments of Education and Employment in 1995. This lent justification 
for close ‘hands-on’ government intervention in education, clearly now 
reidentified with training. Shephard, remarked: ‘education and training are 
for the individual a continuum ’ On the creation of the DfEE she spoke of it 
agriculturally. It was an example of 'productive cross-fertilisation... You can 
imagine the ‘bonus ’ the merger has been - for example the development o f 
Careers Education and Guidance - how good it has been to look at literacy 
and numeracy across the board, with TECs now involved. ’ This new cross 
breed ‘industry’ was to initiate a ‘qualifications drive \ not in the traditionally 
cultural educational expansionist tradition that motivated Butler but much
o
the European Elections: Political row erupts over OECD jobs study The Independent : 
8/6/94
^Gillian Shephard in conversation with Brian Sherratt in Ribbins and Sherratt (1997) p. 212
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more narrowly to expand the ‘skill base’ of the populace. She remarked: 
'...there is a very different culture... because education has always been run 
by others, not by government, and therefore the Department o f  Education had 
a policy role, a regulatory role, but not a hands-on role. That has changed a 
little over the years, but that has been its role, whereas o f  course the 
Employment Department has always had a hands-on role... ’
The discourse of skills was to supply the opportunity for that ‘hands-on’ role, 
providing now a fully coherent educational narrative, linking education 
directly and unapologetically to the economy, to the market and to the 
expectations of the bourgeoisie, making it visible, accountable and useful. 
Educational policy thus became even more controlled by those in the room 
with the buttons.
The policy community welcomed people from the business world: the 
consumers of the ‘skills’. Stronach and MacLure point out that vocationalism: 
'recruits agendas, interventions and audiences ’ It carves out a power base 
in the educational narrative for those speaking the ‘correct’ vocabulary. It 
limits the educational agenda: it excludes moral discourse in favour of the 
empirical and is silent to questions about whether its policies ought to be 
followed; it requires answers only to demands as to how policies can be 
implemented. It denies space to competing narratives, squeezing them out of 
the ‘real’ world of education it has created. Further it allows the voice of 
business and industry not just to be heard in the educational discourses but to 
be given substantial weight. Thus, the business world came not just to advise 
but also to control educational training schemes; ‘work experience’ schemes 
became more widespread and formed an important part of the purpose and 
function of schooling; and business was allowed to have a pervasive presence 
in schools with the introduction of TECs and TVEI, GNVQ and ScotVEC 
courses, and the development o f ‘partnership’ and ‘link’ schemes in schools.
Thus there had been created the discursive space for the transformation of the 
meanings of core educational terms. ‘Standards’ for instance, could no longer 
be considered as ‘academic’ markers coding the elitist functioning of 
schooling as in the Black Papers - increasingly now seen to be an atavistic 
concern - but rather as coding the effectiveness of education to the consumer,
l0 ibid., p. 212
 ^* Ian Stronach and Maggie MacLure (1997) p 87
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to business and to industry. Consequently the media is filled with the
complaints of the leaders of industry that the traditional education provided
was not, for them, useful. ‘Skills’ are paradigmatically useful; they are
marketable, and ‘transferable’ and ‘productive’ in ways that ‘education’ and
‘ability’ in the traditional vocabulary is not. Chris Patten asserted the
economic ’common sense' of the linkage of education and training echoing the
OECD report: 'What we have to do is raise the skill level o f  the urban poor.
Their best hope lies with better teachers and trainers, not with protectionist
trade officials.... With more manufacturing being sourced in poorer countries,
the supply o f  unskilled workers has enormously expanded. The result is
12falling wages or rising unemployment for the unskilled in richer countries'.
Eschewing the cultural and moral maze of justifying criteria for educational 
policies and pedagogies - creating indeed a narrative silence about them - in 
favour of a simple, clear and, above all, apparently measurable criterium has 
clear rhetorical advantages, particularly when advocating the reform of an 
allegedly failing system. The discourse of skills, consequently, became a 
discursive vehicle for perpetuating a sense of crisis in education, lending the 
reformist narrative discursive space to continue its rhetoric of the perversity, 
futility, jeopardy and betrayal of the educational professionals and 
institutions. This was to reinforce the already popularly perceived image of 
education - of incompetent teachers and the failure of schooling and schools 
to meet the needs of the pupils or, indeed, the country. ‘Crisis’ and ‘skills’ 
were rhetorically locked together, each feeding the rhetorical impact of the 
other, creating the new ‘reality’ of schooling. ‘Standards’ was to become the 
coding of the failure of schools and other educational institutions to meet the 
challenge of filling the skills gap. Nick Tate stated: ‘We will depend
increasingly on our expanding technician workforce for a successful 
economy... unless there is a real cultural change we will never reverse the 
economic decline (which) has been going on for 100 years. Crisis and the 
promise of future economic catastrophe was to maintain and justify the 
discourse - the common culture of the narrative was narrowed to the 
economic well being of the middle classes.
The middle classes has become the new concept of society: the ‘classless 
society’ which excluded ‘the poor’ and the shire aristocracy, except when
^The Telegraph 28/10/94 
13The Times: 25/8/95
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they became useful as a rhetorical device. Phillip Gould, for example, 
claimed that Labour lost the 1992 election because it was faced by the 
dilemma of hitting the poor or the middle classes in its manifesto tax policy. 
Gould advocated: 'If we don V do something fo r  the middle classes we shall 
lose the election. ' ^  Neil Kinnock, however, refused to ‘hit the poor', and 
promptly lost the election. Gould is a leading New Labour apologist and his 
analysis of events is perhaps simplified. He does, however, illustrate the 
narrowing o f ‘New’ Labour’s narrative vision.
This conception of education manipulates the hopes and ambitions of people 
caught in the indeterminacy of the market. The traditional Labour narrative 
had emphasised social justice and egalitarianism. New Labour interpreted this 
as a betrayal: ‘Old Labour took a machine gun to the hopes and aspirations o f  
the majority: the great swathe o f the working middle classes.' ^  The New 
Labour narrative included only the ‘working middle class’, those who John 
Major had characterised as the ‘classless’ society of the bourgeois narrative. 
The future of the ‘working middle class’ is characterised as essentially 
uncertain. Education is no longer to be anchored to the concept of a job for 
life but in a personal narrative where career changes would have to be made 
several times to keep up with the changing conditions and needs of the 
marketplace. This breeds anxieties which in turn maintain the ‘common 
sense’ of the discourse of skills and the demand for a culture of permanent 
reform in education, driven to keep pace with change.
‘Skills’ provides a concept that is much less ideologically charged than 
‘vocationalism’ and undercuts the conventional debate about education and 
training. It subsumes both of these into a single ‘ideologically free’ pragmatic 
discourse. Arguments about the need for a cultural dimension to education 
simply fail to register in the discourse. That under Major these still remained 
was to trouble the Conservative discourses, as will be discussed in the next 
section, but they did not hinder the hegemony of skills in the educational 
discourses. ‘Skill’ is activity related, a concept much more amenable to the 
application of empirical measurements like ‘performance criteria’ and more 
easily broken down into behavioural objectives. It means something that 
someone could do: and that is what is to become the only legitimate meaning 
of education in the new vocabulary. It makes ‘accountability’ and the ‘real’
^Phillip Gould: Labour's Tax Nightmare, New Statesman 30/10/98 
^Philip Gould, on Newsnight, BBC2, 22/10/98
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world, the competitiveness and uncertainty of the market, manifest in the 
educational narrative.
‘Skills’ are seen as an investment in the economy with a clear cash return, as 
well as a market value. Money spent in education is required much more 
narrowly to be seen to have a clear, unambiguous return and as a consequence 
the effectiveness and appropriateness of the traditional A-Levels and Highers 
has been brought under increasing pressure: Are they really appropriate for 
everyone? Are they an efficient use of resources? What is their value to the 
country and its economy? The new narrative of education is driven by the 
concept of ‘progress’. Competition would breed efficiency and improve 
quality and productivity. This in turn would give a greater edge to the 
institution to compete, to breed even greater efficiency and quality and so 
on... Skills are a measurable commodity, the marketable product which has 
become an integral part of this cycle.
Meanwhile, it is clear that the discourse of skills harmonises well with the 
consumerist narrative and has created a market demand for an increase in 
further and higher education - a demand the reconstructed education 
‘industry’ has to fulfil to survive. ’Skills’ make traditional regimes of 
selection outmoded: selection inevitably becomes less rigorous - a skill 
depends less on ‘ability’ than on the willingness of the student to ‘acquire’ it 
and the adequacy of the ‘enabler’. It makes the virtues of the bourgeois 
character the essential educational virtues: all comes to he or she who tries. It 
is a caustic irony that this redefinition of the teacher echoes the progressive 
educational story, decentring them from the educational processes and, in 
addition, that in providing ‘skills’, it was first necessary to deskill teachers.
James A vis^ maps out how characteristically progressive educational 
concepts, such as negotiation with pupils, pupil profiling, reporting policies, 
criterion referencing - and he might have added differentiation policies and 
the priority of addressing pupils' interests and meeting pupils' needs, which 
are all central features of the national curriculum - have been appropriated by 
the bourgeois educational discourse of skills. The strange fate of such 
progressive ideas in education is, according to Avis, their reinterpretation, not
^  James Avis: The strange fa te o f progressive education, in Education Group 2: Dept of  
Cultural Studies, University o f Birmingham : Education Limited: Schooling and Training and 
the New Right Since 1979. (Unwin Hyman: London, 1991) pp 114-139
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as important theoretical, political or philosophical issues, but as technical 
problems with technical, bureaucratic solutions within a narrow, vocationally 
inspired curriculum framework.
The positivistic empirical framework of the curriculum, with its stress on 
practical results and unambiguous behavioural outcomes and their assessment 
on narrow and rigid strands and levels of response leads inevitably to an 
epistemological hardness: learning becomes a closed activity - a finding out 
of what is already known. What is relevant is what is immediately accessible - 
through direct observation - to the pupil rather than what is important but 
perhaps abstract and complex. It is such curricular systems that liberal 
educators such as Arnold criticised as ’mechanical', a metaphor he obsessively 
uses and which, ironically as we have seen, is a label which the national 
curriculum wears with pride. Arnold abhorred the instrumental reasoning 
applied almost algorithmically to social institutions such as education. It was 
the rise of capitalist modes of production of Arnold's time, principally the 
dominant factory input/output model, which provided Arnold with this 
metaphor. In our time the dominant metaphors are those of commerce and 
business, particularly the managerial vocabularies of the post-industrial 
service industries. Business ethos and management systems, now, are seen as 
the way to model education and to provide the solutions to educational 
problems.
This discourse of skills has operated to open education to these, and only
these, vocabularies. This discourse, for example, breaks down the traditional
epistemological barriers of ‘subjects’ in the curriculum, the conventional
demarcation lines of the ‘professionals’. It has created a discursively more
flexible education service, geared on ‘modem’ lines. This remains, perhaps,
now the only potential arena of struggle between the teaching unions and the
government. ‘Flexibility’ is rarely good news for a workforce: While the
words \flexibility' and ‘deregulation trip glibly o ff the tongues o f ministers,
they have a sour taste for workers; for many employees know that ‘flexibility ’
means a short term contract... and ‘deregulation' means the removal o f
17redress against exploitation. It remains to be seen how the flexibility that 
the discourse demands will be implemented or how the unions will react. This 
thesis would predict, however, that the unions will almost certainly use
1 7John Monks, General Secretary o f the TUC, quoted in The Career Teacher No.98, 
newspaper of NASUWT: March/April 1994
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‘professionalism’ as usual in their reactionary rhetoric to accede to the 
reforms but to demand improvement in their wages and conditions of service.
Nothing remains of the concept of an ‘educated’ person in this new 
vocabulary. The complexities and ambiguities of educational theory are 
simplified, controversial issues are destimulated, and ‘common sense’ 
pragmatics takes the place of often messy, inconclusive theory and debate. 
The discourse of skills closes the narrative: there is nothing left to be said. 
Values in education become peculiarly redefined as ‘skills’: respect fo r  
persons becomes not a ethical concept but a ‘skill’ which can be gained 
though writing an essay about access problems for the disabled and a couple 
of days placement in a hospice - provided the acquisition of the ‘skill’ is 
‘accredited’ within the ‘framework’ of certificate-bearing ‘modular’ 
provision. In effect values education becomes meaningless as it enters this 
certification hyperspace: where it exists at all will be in the nebulous hidden 
curriculum of the school, unauthorised, unacknowledged and lacking 
substance.
Humes locates the de-professionalisation of teachers in the new focus on 
skills in the educational narrative and this, indeed, is perhaps to encapsulate 
the full realisation of the bourgeois narrative. While the A-Level has, at least 
so far, withstood threats to abolish or significantly alter it and has been 
preserved in England as the ‘gold standard’ of the educational story, in 
Scotland the equivalent, the Higher, has been the subject of significant 
change. Helen Liddell, the Scottish Education Minister for Education writes 
using the discourse of skills to introduce an alternative to the traditional 
Scottish Higher examination:
‘Higher Still is being introduced to meet the deficiencies 
identified by the Howie Committee. The two terms plus dash 
for the Highers wasn 7 working... the standard o f  achievement 
reached was below the standards o f  most European countries, 
and often did not develop the study skills needed in higher 
education. Nor in practice were Highers nourishing the 
traditional Scottish virtue o f breadth o f attainment. There was 
a damaging split between academic and vocational
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qualifications which led to vocational qualifications being 
18undervalued. '
The rhetoric used is of New Labour’s need to ‘modernize’ in order to 
‘compete’. There is heavy emphasis on vocational and practical end-use value 
of education. She continues: ‘Core skills will be developed to provide a sound 
basis for lifelong learning and the career changes many pupils will face in 
later life. There is continuous emphasis on these ‘core skills’: 'It is no 
accident that 'working with others' is one o f the core skills that are an 
integral part o f  Higher Still The vocabulary used to describe these ‘core
skills’ is the pragmatic vocabulary of the service providing manager:
‘The place o f  core skills in the Higher Still, UK and
international context are described and definitions o f core
skills and their component parts are provided. Implications for
whole school and departmental delivery are described.
Detailed appendices outline the core skill framework (the
policy upon which all core skills developments are and will be
based), draft unit specifications, the pattern o f  embedding and
partial embedding in mainstream subjects at Standard Grade
and in Higher Still courses and units. They also contain
examples o f core skills assignments (that will make it possible
for subjects to deliver the remaining parts o f core skills easily)
and an audit o f a school option choice form which establishes
the priorities and possibilities for practical implementation o f  
1 1core skills.' 1
Educational problems are addressed as managerial problems. The problem is 
not how to teach. The ‘framework’ will, it is assumed, meet the needs of 
pupils and of the economy. All that remains is to ‘embed’ these skills in the 
‘framework’. The emphasis is on ‘breadth of attainment’: the traditional
18Helen Liddell: in a letter issued to all Scottish secondary teachers, 12/10/98 under The 
Scottish Office banner.
I9ibid.
^^Helen Liddell: Minister Announces Additional Resources Higher Still Newsletter 
(SCCC/Higher Still, Edinburgh: Issue 10, September 1998) ppl/2 
Important information fo r  MANAGERS. Higher Still Newsletter (SCCC/Higher Still, 
Edinburgh: Issue 10, September 1998) p.4
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Higher has become seen to be inappropriate, too woolly and academic, to 
meet the need for ‘skills’ and far too selective to fill the ‘skills gap’.
‘Higher Still’ marks a narrative change that so far has not occurred in 
England, even though England’s educational system is otherwise much more 
‘on message’ with the entrepreneurial and consumerist narrative. Scottish 
education had not been quite so affected by the consumerism of the market 
narrative and, historically, the class distinctions in education were somewhat 
weaker than in England. Private education, especially outside the largest 
cities, is much less commonplace than in England and the Grammar school is 
not so iconically significant in the more democratic tradition of the Scottish 
narrative. The discourse of skills, however, assumes that the Scottish middle 
classes do not have so much of their narrative ambitions caught up in the 
traditional Highers as the English middle classes have in the ‘gold standard’ 
of the A-Levels. This interpretation has lent impetus to the curricular reform 
in Scotland. It will be vital to this reform, however, that it maintains the 
confidence of the middle classes. This is a challenge that Higher Still must 
face: if it does not provide the narrative expectations of the middle classes, 
clearly meeting their ambitions and desires, then it will surely fail.
There is, however, every sign that these ambitions and desires are indeed 
what it is designed to fulfil. The discourse of skills redirects the educational 
narrative away from the traditional bourgeois concern for values and 
academic studies towards the acquisition of marketable skills, widening 
access to the middle classes, redefined as the ‘working middle classes’, while 
still allowing the bourgeois its traditional educational advantages. ‘Higher 
Still’ is an example of New Labour’s attempt to rebrand education; to break 
with the traditional narratives and to widen the market appeal of educational 
policy and provision.
This rebranding, however, is the subject of the final section. In the meantime, 
it is clear that Higher Still continues the process - in its provision of 
‘frameworks’, its prescriptions and its rigid assessment regimes - of 
‘deskilling’ the teachers and rendering them more visible. The significant 
internal assessment element of the new Higher produces a scheme of 
certification on demand. Those who demand most, and can articulate their 
demand effectively, will gain most. Schools caught up in the competition of 
league tables must accede to customer demand or go under. In the Higher Still
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reforms, however, it remains to be seen whether the middle classes will see 
their advantage in this way and break with the traditional narratives which 
served them so well. They, like their counterparts in England, are essentially 
conservative about changes that seem to strike at the heart of their hegemony.
There remain consequently some tensions - or at least potential tensions - in 
the narrative. The educational world has not yet become entirely caught up in 
the discourse of skills. This discourse leaves unfulfilled the unreconstructed 
‘professional’ and bourgeois desire for stability and some sense of continuity 
of culture and tradition, some element of the transmission of Arnold’s ‘all 
that is good’ and, perhaps more expediently important, the traditional 
examination system provides a relatively simple, and exclusive, vehicle for 
the reproduction of bourgeois culture and cultural values. In Scotland the 
traditional ‘Highers’ and the ‘A Levels’ in England have produced this sense 
of continuity and this mechanism for cultural reproduction. Butler and 
Bantock recognised the importance of this, so did the Black Paper writers and 
even the egalitarian narrative did, though in different terms. The ‘skills’ 
discourse, however, refuses to recognise the importance of continuity: it is a 
discourse caught up in a sense of permanent crisis. This has the potential to 
create a clear dissonance in the purposes of education as viewed by parents, 
pupils, teachers and school managers. How this dissonance is managed in a 
discursively redefined political and social space is the subject of the final two 
sections.
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2 . Losing the Plot:
The End o f  Conservatism?
We have to appeal to different audiences, 
apparently saying different things.'
Michael Portillo^
Portillo locates the Major election defeat in the inability of that 
administration to narrate its story in a way that showed that it truly had both 
strands of bourgeois desire - ambition and continuity - at heart. Thatcher had 
presented an intensely ideological story but had double-coded it: to the 
established bourgeois - often termed the neo-traditionalists - she had offered 
moral rearmament, a justification by faith in their moral order, a return to the 
Victorian values of distinction between the ‘deserving and undeserving poor ’ 
, and to the arriviste ‘working middle classes’ - often termed the 
neo-liberalists - she had offered the solipsistic individualism of the market as 
the route to achieving their ambitions. There was only one narrative, the 
bourgeois narrative, the distinction between the established bourgeois and the 
arrivistes was a matter of emphasis rather than a material difference: both 
represented their identity, paradigmatically, in consumption of both material 
and cultural artefacts.
Thatcher had refused to disguise the ideological base of her version of the 
bourgeois narrative - indeed she revelled in ideological confrontation. Her 
heroic approach had been successful in laying the narrative foundations of a 
new consensus but heroism alone had not been enough to establish it. Her 
secretaries of state for education all complain, if only by implication, of her 
lack of understanding of the need to persuade and cajole the educationalists: 
their approach was a softly, softly one, hers was by ‘handbagging’s, threat and 
dictat.
She had, however, maintained an uneasy narrative equilibrium through her 
double-coding of the Conservative bourgeois narrative: the hard
instrumentalism of the market was counterpointed by the rhetoric of 
traditional cultural values and moral regeneration. John Major, however, was 
unable to maintain this equilibrium. He was uncomfortable as an ideologue,
"^Michael Portillo: Portillo's Progress. Channel 4 TV 20/9/98 
^Thatcher (1993) op.cit. p.627
295
constitutionally preferring a ‘softly, softly’ approach. That he had won the 
election was not because he had offered the electors anything new or different 
except in his less confrontational image. His policies were a re-iteration of 
Thatcher’s though uttered at times with less confidence. His victory was 
perhaps more a result, as Phillip Gould ^4 discusses, of the ineffectual 
response to Conservative tax reforms by the Kinnock opposition, laying the 
Labour Party open to charges that it was essentially anti-middle class. 
Kinnock was unable to double-code his story and present himself as providing 
principally for the aspirations of the middle classes and yet at the same time 
not ‘betraying’ the traditional Labour narrative. He was unable to ‘spin’ the 
right message and Labour was successfully presented by the Conservatives as 
the essentially anti-middle class party of increased taxation.
Yet neither was Major able to maintain the correct ‘spin’. It was not, 
however, his educational policies that led to his demise, but rather his 
inability to cope with his disruptive and rebellious backbenchers and the 
‘bastards’ in his cabinet over Europe and its influence on economic policy. 
On educational matters he broadly maintained the Thatcher double-coding, as 
discussed in the last chapter, and with Ofsted and his Citizen’s Charter, 
completed the surveillance stage of the building of the educational 
panopticon.
These two competing interpretations of the bourgeois story were to converge 
in the Blair narrative but, until then, the apparently competing discourses 
added somewhat to the narrative chaos of the nineties. The result was an 
educational narrative then in constant flux, which was to give rise to what 
critics such as Ball and Stronach and Maclure have described as 'policy 
hysteria ’. In spite of neo-traditionalist scruples, however, the emphasis in the 
new narrative was almost wholly instrumental: ‘consumption’ remained the 
central metaphor of the Conservative educational narrative, as indeed it was 
the key metaphor of all their social narratives. Educational identities and 
relations had, by the nineties, become re-identified in terms of product and 
producer, customer and provider. The succeeding educational debates were 
about the means to achieve success, not on whether the ends of the bourgeois 
educational story were worthwhile in themselves - that the bourgeois story 
was correct was never in question.. The emphasis was on people - parents,
^Phillip Gould: Labour’s Tax Nightmare, New Statesman 30/10/98
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teachers and pupils - not as ends in themselves but as means in the wider 
economic story of the country.
This instrumentalism was a symptom of the new ‘post ideological’ political 
world. The denial of ideology, breaking the hold of the old grand narratives, 
was to signal the end of ideologically based party politics. It was his failure to 
see that clearly which, perhaps, was Major’s greatest fault. The ghost of 
Thatcher still haunted the Conservative Party: her strident call for an ideology 
- 7 think they've got the sex wrong, they've got the willpower wrong, the 
reasoning wrong... his is a conversion o f  convenience. 1 had to make a 
revolution. I  had a convic tion .^  - coloured Conservative thinking, 
especially the ‘dry’ Conservatives like Portillo. They had not quite realised 
that the revolution had occurred, that the social narratives had changed, that 
they had won. They carried on the battle yet what they had to do was not fight 
but to show their effectiveness in the economy and thus be seen to meet the 
aspirations of the middle classes. Major’s was not a material defeat but a 
public relations defeat: he had not been able to provide the right image.
Cairns Craig describes the tensions between the arriviste and established 
bourgeois strands of the narrative which Major found so untractable.
'The new conservatism o f the '70s and '80s may have drawn its 
political dynamic from the hard-nosed grammar school 
escapees from the lower middle classes, but it drew its cultural 
energy, as opposed to its economic theories, from the 
reassertion o f an ideology o f  England..."
Major found himself, as a consequence, locked into a defence of England 
against Europe, yet at the same time he, as Thatcher had before him, brought 
Britain closer and closer to Europe, more and more under its influence. It was 
a contradiction he could not manage. The double-coding of the narrative, to 
satisfy potential dissension, was largely ignored and tensions were allowed to 
fester. In education this contradiction expressed itself in different terms.
25 Margaret Thatcher, on being compared to Tony Blair, reported in The Guardian. 10th 
April, 1997
26 Cairns Craig, Out o f History: Narrative Paradigms in Scottish and British Culture 
(Edinburgh: Polygon, 1996) 140.
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The educational equilibrium was always uneasy. The national curriculum, for 
example, was seen by neo-libertarians like David Sexton - the spokesperson 
of the arriviste tendency - as state interference in the ‘natural’ operations of 
the market. Neo-traditionalists, like Roger Scruton for example, saw that this 
concern with people as means rather than ends as profoundly disturbing. 
Scruton’s philosophy, or at least something very much like it, was to prove to 
be important in ultimately establishing the cultural changes brought about by 
the bourgeois story - but ironically not as a Conservative discourse but as part 
of the Blair appropriation of the bourgeois narrative.
Roger Scruton had offered a way out but - though Major sympathised with the 
critique of the ‘bastards’ in the arriviste, market strand - the time never 
became favourable enough to allow him any real influence over policy 
making. Yet Roger Scruton is the philosopher of the English bourgeois, in 
many ways the unacknowledged founder of what was to become Blair’s 
‘Communitarianism’. He offered a means to code the narrative to satisfy 
everyone, even if he did harbour a grave distaste for the arrivistes of the 
market strand. He offered a coding that escaped from the contradictions of the 
narrative. He provided a philosophical base - though not intentionally and 
certainly not acknowledged - for Blair’s ‘post ideological’ educational 
narrative though he was to be ignored by the Conservatives. Such was to be 
the strange fate of the Conservative story: they had undercut the 
egalitarianism of socialism in their construction of a bourgeois educational 
meritocracy but, as the Conservatives lost the plot, their bourgeois narrative 
was to be appropriated by Blair and culturally established by him.
Scruton attempted to build a respect for persons morality - what Blair was to 
re-describe as ‘Third Way Communitarianism’ - into the foundations of the 
Bourgeois story. Blair’s Communitarianism allows the double-coding of the 
bourgeois narrative of education: as the discourse of the acquisition of skills 
and as the discourse of ‘Values Education’, and uniting these codings is that 
Values education is ultimately a kind of skill acquisition in itself.
Scruton’s primary concern was with ‘Values Education’: the bourgeois story’s 
ability to create and maintain a common culture. He recognised the need for 
the narrative to become an integral part of people’s own individual stories and 
he doubted that this could be a product of crude liberalism and the market
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though, like Blair, he recognised the domination of the market narrative and 
its instrumentalism.
Though acknowledging, as did Frank Field, Blair’s Social Security Secretary, 
the ‘pivotal role o f  self interest'?^ Scruton asserted that some individual 
freedom is rationally and necessarily given up, and acceptance of the 
'constraints o f a common culture are adopted and its rewards enjoyed' . 
Those constraints and their concomitant rewards are the inheritance of the 
people, and it forms their respective identities in a kind of cultural map which 
gives a direction to their desires, duties and privileges: not a socialist doctrine, 
but the Third Way, emphasising individual responsibility to maintain the 
narrative and the interests of the community.
Scruton is concerned to see that culture and morality are not seen as 'some 
quirk o f private life' but of central concern to the politician. Scruton is 
narrowly reactionary: he sees the need for ’progress'. This is the central 
problem for the neo-traditionalist strand of the narrative: how can an 
educational system adapt to changing economic and social forces and yet still 
maintain the traditions of the 'common culture'? It was this problem that 
exercised Butler and which was to further excite the educational policies of 
the sixties and seventies. 'Unnaturalness' and betrayal - of the country, of the 
national traditions and heritage, of moral and political principles, of the aims 
and purposes of education - became the most prominent discursive motifs of 
the subsequent educational narratives.
Indeed it could be argued that the Respectable Conservatives in their moral 
panic about lack of values and disintegration of order, authority and tradition 
are only being mawkishly sentimental and nostalgic about a myth; 
comfortable fictions of a time gone by that never really existed and a 
character - the true Englishman - that never existed. They are themselves 
believing a comfortable fiction that they, or people such as they, had created 
to control, 'to preach contentment to the toad as Kipling puts it. The myth 
became their 'Mask of Anarchy’ and was, for a time, more effective and more 
insidious than the crude violence of Castlereagh at Peterloo.
27The Guardian 30/7/98
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It is precisely preserving something like Hogg’s 'mystique' of 'good myths' - 
though modernised - that the Communitarian is concerned to uphold. 
Scruton’s argument begins with the typical Conservative, though it has now 
become the de-politicised, post-ideological Communitarian, myth of human 
nature: that the person is essentially a social and political animal. The basis of 
the argument is the Hobbesian or Lockean myth of the Social Contract: that in 
order to flourish and to obtain the maximum good, rational beings will agree 
to limit some of their desires, give up some of their freedoms and co-operate 
in some form of society, with which they will metaphorically make a 
contract; the alternative being anarchy in which they would find it impossible 
to maintain any ’natural' right to property or privilege. Politicians oversee this 
fictional contract, are concerned to balance the desires of people with their 
responsibilities, and the stability of the state with its ability to maximise 
benefit. The Communitarian political and aesthetic discourses seem 
concerned merely to magnify the sacrifices made by the bourgeois to maintain 
the fiction of community which, ironically, maintains their hegemony. It is 
this self-indulgent bourgeois angst which, for example, drives the economic 
discourse.
The Communitarian is concerned that any shifts in the balance are not such as 
to change radically the Active power of the 'good myth' of the social contract 
which Scruton identifies with a traditional social order, values and institutions 
which are, he further claims, the national heritage, the foundation of the 
common culture. Blair’s Communitarian has more regard to a ‘modem’ 
re-invention of these institutions to meet changing economic and social needs, 
but the logic is identical. It is only in this meta-fictional common culture, they 
and Scruton argue, that the notion of being human has meaning: "Man's 
nature is constituted by the specific cultural context within which it is 
ineluctably to be found"
For the inequality inherent in his view of society, Communitarianism makes 
no apology. Differential attainment in education, and in acquiring the 
common culture, is a necessary part of the whole story of Communitarian 
society. That some people are more 'cultured' than others is, perhaps, 
unfortunate, but it is a 'natural' function of the social order, in particular the 
'natural' institution of property. Education is a kind of property. Scruton, for
9 0
Christopher Berry, Human Nature (London: MacMillan, 1986) p. 73.
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example, citing Locke on property, claims that just as a man has a natural 
right to the products of his labour, so he has a natural right to whatever he 
may obtain from education. Though the ownership of one's rightfully obtained 
property is an 'natural' institution of the state, what one owns is not equally 
distributed and nor are the goods obtainable from education equally 
distributed: like property, they depend on a persons 'natural' ability to obtain 
them and on 'prior social standing'.
On economic matters, Scruton maintains an uneasy silence. He does not 
discuss directly the acquisitive materialist capitalism of Conservatives such as 
Hogg; he does, however, justify structural inequality in wealth on the basis of 
merit or inheritance and he rather naively, perhaps intentionally naively, 
ignores the more intransigent and, in his view coarser, ethics of free market 
capitalism. The Communitarian argument perhaps might be, that while 
admitting that the economics of this social order could justify "an ungodly 
and rapacious scramble for ill-gotten gains, in the course o f  which the rich 
appeared to get rich and the poor poorer" ^  such excesses would be 
disciplined within the moral sensibility of the narrative.
Scruton, for example, uses his Communitarian theory to attack 
Neo-Liberalism. He considers insidious and dangerous the increasing 
popularity of von Hayak's and Milton Friedman's neo-liberal philosophy of 
unfettered individualism and the denial of society, seeing in it a paradox:
1culture is a process which endows the world with meaning' ^  Scruton 
iterates the classic Communitarian argument, the world comes ready made 
with the marks of appropriate actions, desires, choices and responses to it. 
Above all the world is essentially social or nothing has meaning or value, 
even the individual. As a rational person, one needs a measure by which to 
assess one's reactions and responses to the world and events in the world that 
impinge on one, and that it is in this social context that personal identity 
resides: take away the social context then there is nothing of value, nothing of 
meaning.
The stories that make up the bourgeois common culture allow for the 
individuality and essential subjectivity of the agent, but escape solipsism 
because while the perception of experience is essentially subjective, the
^  Quintin Hogg (1952) p.52. 
•^Roger Scruton (1979) p.64
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meaning of experience is objective because culture is immanent. It is in this 
relation between subjectivity and objectivity that identity lies. What is wrong 
with crude individualism is not that it is some kind of moral disease; 
individuality is an essential condition of human nature, but solipsism is not 
and the 'health' of the individual is not separable from the 'health' of the 
community as a whole, or a least the major parts of it.
"..we shall have to abandon the attempt to erode whatever is 
'established', whatever has a vested power to overcome 
opposition, which is the single most striking feature o f  liberal 
thought. Which is not to say that we must accept all that is 
established, or refrain from establishing an order that is new.
But we must never lose sight o f  the fact that, whatever we 
postulate by way o f an ideal, the ideal itself may have no life 
outside the social arrangement which provided the concepts 
and perceptions o f those who pursue it. "
The Communitarian state exists to form the 'correct' desires. While Scruton is 
reluctant to define the function of the state this candid way, he does demand 
that the state will 'limit' desire by determining which desires are 'legitimate' 
and which 'illegitimate'. And it is the primary duty of the state to see that 
'correct' desires - identified in terms of consumption and a crude nationalism - 
are instilled in the people through the processes of education.
'Culture' is a product of upbringing and education in its widest sense, not 
through narrow vocational training. It is a matter of acquiring the 'correct' 
sensibility, of the 'correct' emotional as well as intellectual response. It is 
knowing how to feel. Culture is commitment to the bourgeois way of life. It is 
knowing what to do, what to say, what to choose in given situations. But this 
commitment is not to be understood as an existential leap of faith, rather, 
Scruton argues, as a rational and compelling choice. Scruton is not a moral 
relativist: he rejects the view that there is no objective right or wrong, simply 
the authenticity of experience as mediated by our intuitions. Nor will he seek 
justification for the 'correctness' of this sensibility from what he regards as 
crude and naive 'scientific' positivist epistemology which can only validate 
simple truisms and either declare meaningless or suspend judgement on moral
ibid. p.6 6
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and aesthetic propositions. Rather Scruton takes a Kantian analytic approach 
to discover the a priori, objective truth of the ’correct’ emotional response.
Communitarian ‘Values Education’ is a matter of acquiring the 'appropriate' 
reaction to a situation. It is 'learning the arts' ^  of the emotions and it has 
knowledge as its aim, not knowledge of ends or even of means but the 
practical knowledge of a way of life, knowing who one is and how to feel, 
and consequently demanding the political imperative of maintaining this way 
of life. The argument for this is very much like Kant's for the moral law: 
emotional response and moral choice are not clearly separated. Scruton is not 
an emotional or moral situationist; a specific emotional response to an event 
is not in itself right or wrong, nor does it give any guide future events. Scruton 
brings in the notion of universalisability - "In educating such emotions one is 
educating a man's values, and providing him with a sense o f what is 
appropriate not just here and now but universally”
And it is not just values, but, more importantly, identity which is learned: 
there is an intimate connection between what one feels and who one is. 
Scruton’s argument continues on the lines of the Kantian Categorical 
Imperative: I feel what I feel "in obedience to an imperative which is
applicable beyond my present situation, in accordance with universal law 
It is an essential part of the Communitarian human condition that in similar 
situations everyone would have felt the same. Though the rational person 
gives this law to oneself, the law is both determinate and necessary.
Kant illustrates the categorical imperative by discussing promise keeping^. 
Promise keeping is a rational institution, a critical foundation of bourgeois 
society. It is irrational to say that I should not keep a promise and hold that 
not keeping the promise can be right, for promise breaking only makes sense 
if promise keeping is the universal rule, otherwise no promises would be 
made. Only universalizable moral dictums are rational in this way. The 
Categorical Imperative recognises both the fallibilities of human nature, the 
need to allow for the satisfaction of desires and the need for stable social 
organisation to guarantee social transactions. It is laws like keeping promises
3 i^bid. p.58 
33ibid.p. 59 
34ibid. p.59or *
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork o f  the Metaphysic o f  Morals in H.J. Acton, The Moral Law 
(London: Hutchison, 1948/76) p.85/6.
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which cement people together; if they are not universally held to be true, even 
if they are at times broken, then society will descend into anarchy. Kant 
claims that when rational people consider what they ought to do, they are not 
guided but rather commanded by practical reason to choose to act 
independently of their particular desires. What is at stake is the very 
foundation of the society they live in, its established values and institutions 
which hold it together
It is odd to think that emotional responses can be chosen in this same way. 
However, perhaps that is not really what Scruton is proposing, although it 
might form part of a powerful argument against his view. Scruton is 
empiricist enough to consider that emotions and desires are the basis of action 
and of moral choice. He sees emotional responses in much the same way as 
Kant sees his moral laws, they are the cement that binds society together 
''..the education o f these universalised emotions is an essential part o f  moral 
development." ^  It is, then, the formation of desire that becomes the 
principle duty of the state and its educational philosophy. The emotions are 
'natural' products of the social situation, in the same way Kant derived his 
laws, and, although they are personally felt, the appropriateness of the 
emotional response is determined by the principle of universalisability.
The principle of universalizibility, Scruton goes one step further, demands 
that the response is obligatory, not simply in order to ensure the continuity of 
the social structure but to ensure personal identity which is not separable from 
the social world: " ..if a man tries to shift it (the obligation^ then
7automatically he puts his personality at risk” Since man is a social 
animal, the constitutive premise of Scruton's argument, to fail to make the 
appropriate response is to deny something essential about one's own 
humanity. It is somehow irrational and dangerous not just to oneself and one's 
own sense of identity but it also may threaten the very fabric of society itself 
because it denies society, the essential community of interests and the 
continuity of the traditional values of the common heritage: "..a common 
culture provides two things... a way o f understanding o f the world in terms 
that invite emotion , together with a recognised pattern o f appropriate 
behaviour." ^
36 Scruton(1979): p.59
3^ibid.p.59
3^ibid. p.60
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Values Education is important to the Communitarian as initiation into the 
'proper1 sensibility and the 'appropriate' desires: "..to be educated in the 
constraints and perceptions which it (the common culture) embodies, to 
transform knowledge into certainty. Emotional responses and moral 
actions are metaphysically and epistemologically connected in a transitive 
relationship: in the absence of particular emotional or moral experience, 
having been taught what to do at the same time teaches someone what to feel; 
being taught how to feel will in turn determine how to act. The continuity of 
the common culture depends on what Scruton calls 'ceremonies o f  universal 
application'-, grief over a death, for example, reminds the subject of his 
’participation in the common lot* To be part of a common culture is to 
have the 'certainty' of one's feelings as right, as the same feeling that another 
would have in the same situation - ‘certainty’ about the objective correctness 
of the emotion or action because of the strategic, material necessity of social 
order and a common way of life. Scruton is clearly vitally concerned to make 
a clear justification for the bourgeois social order as the basis of human 
society.
It is an objection to Kant's argument that though his logic is, perhaps, 
compelling, the first principles he starts from are particular ideological 
constructs of society. His vision of particular social institutions - a particular 
version of a common culture - prefigure his moral laws and consequently this 
law is not absolute or objective but culturally and ideologically relative. There 
are many other, alternative visions of different societies and social institutions 
that might be equally valid: the procedural logic of Kant is equally applicable 
to them and the laws so derived equally valid. Further, given that a society 
values particular institutions, it does not follow that they are therefore morally 
right nor that the law derived from them is right. The moral rightness of the 
institutions is another, and separate, question which cannot established by 
Kant's a priori logic.
Such arguments do not morally justify any particular social practices, their 
real purpose is to mask the creation of a nationalist cultural hegemony. 
Scruton, for example, points out that a common culture could exist in a 
society with very different beliefs and practices, but he is primarily concerned
■ i^bid. p. 63 
40Berry (1983) p 61
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with the continuity of what he sees as the "customs and observances o f  
English life" ^  or as Hogg commented: ’Being Conservative is only another 
way o f  being British' ^2 Scruton never considers that the 'customs and 
observances' of the true Englishman can be anything but right. There is here 
in Scruton, as in Hogg, a narrative which is permeated by the sense of the 
immanence of an unbroken, organic English tradition, stretching back to the 
Glorious Revolution and Magna Carta which guarantees the correctness of 
their interpretation of the Conservative economic and social order and 
justifies it. In it the specialness of the English, their traditions and institutions, 
are revealed. Raymond Williams describes this:
’..the history o f  England was that o f a deeply, almost, it 
seemed, providentially favoured country, favoured by 
circumstance, by the spirit o f  its people and institutions from  
an early date, and by its history (it) was qualified to be the 
tutor, not the pupil o f a distracted world.' ^
Or, without Williams’s sense of irony, the Conservative MP David Willets 
writes:
'In Britain at its best, the common sense is so deep and 
powerful as to become true wisdom.' ^
It is only in the social context - the ‘common’ English, bourgeois, socially 
ambitious culture - that any conception of personal identity makes sense. 
Christopher Berry notes that: "A radical break (in the traditional English 
social order) will have to de-nature individuals, that is, will have to strip them 
o f the sources o f  their identity." Scruton’s common culture would not, in 
spite of its liberal pretensions, allow free dialogue, what Habermas has called 
‘domination free conversations’: too much is at stake. While perhaps not 
going as far as Worsthome’s, ‘The principal purpose o f  politics (is) the 
evolution and maintenance o f a securely established ruling class with a 
justified sense o f  its own honourable superiority.’ yet Scruton would
4 * Scruton (1979): p. 67
4  ^cited in Davies (1995) op. cit. p. 348
43 J.W. Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 35.
44 David Willetts, Modem Conservatism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992) p.6.
4■’Christopher Berry, 'Conservatism and Human Nature’ in Forbes and Smith (eds) Politics 
and Human Nature (London. Frances Pinter, 1983) p.62 
^Peregrine Worsthome, cited in Davies (1995) op. cit. p. 62
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exclude ‘foreign’ radical and dissident narratives which threatened the fabric 
of his community.
Scruton, for example, is a notoriously spirited apologist for fox-hunting and 
writes with ’certainty’ that his is the correct view. About blood sports, for 
example, he writes of 'the ethic o f combat, which arises spontaneously in the 
contest with the quarry’ and of giving the hunted animal ’respect' and a 'fair 
chance', and of 'chivalrous behaviour' ^ o n  the part of the human hunters . 
Fox hunting is described as, "a rich source o f  human social life and 
happiness" ^  and he lyricises it as "an innocent joy"  Those who object 
are suffering from "the vice o f  sentimentality" ^  - they have been 
miseducated.
It is not the intention here to discuss the morality of blood sports, but to ask 
who is it who is to judge 'appropriate' emotional responses? It is not clear that 
considering fox-hunting wrong is irrational or misplaced; it is not 'certain' that 
Scruton's emotional responses or moral judgements are correct. It is not clear 
that appeals to a common culture or a shared heritage would convince those 
who would oppose such judgements, or who would regard those emotions as 
barbaric, that they were wrong. Communitarianism is perhaps too sanguine in 
its assumption that its version of the common heritage is so widely shared and 
that the appropriate emotional response - characterised by Scruton or Blair 
and those like them - is so easily policed.
Scruton uses his 'common culture' as a rhetorical device; it is a myth by means 
of which he attempts to evangelise for a particular, and relatively narrow, 
form of life - embodied in the Communitarian reinterpretation of the 
bourgeois narrative. It is inherent in his 'certainty' that only he, and people 
who have been educated and initiated like him, have the entitlement to judge. 
Like Bantock's, though without the frankness of Bantock, Communitarian 
culture is an exclusive club. This Scruton is not likely to deny. He has 
candidly stated : '..in all healthy societies, it must be the needs and values o f  
the strong which should ...dominate.' ^
4^Roger Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs (London: Demos, 1996) p.91/2 
48ibid. p.93 
4^ibid. p. 35 
^®ibid. p. 99
^  Roger Scruton, cited in Davies (1995) op. cit. p. 62
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What Communitarianism and its ‘Values Education’ seeks to maintain is not 
an objective reality which underlies appearances, which Kant and Hegel 
attempted in order to legitimise their moral and social discourses. It admits 
that we live in a world which we cannot experience directly and in which the 
only objective value judgement possible is that there are no value judgements; 
for Scruton the narratives of science have exposed objective reality as a bleak, 
deterministic, value-free, cause and effect realm governed by relentless 
biological and physical laws. The narratives of science ultimately scrape away
c'y
the 'thin lopsoil o f human discourse' leaving nothing.
Communitarianism’s purpose is to 'save the appearances' which scientific 
narratives seem to dismiss, the fictions which keep us human - freedom of 
action, beauty, God, morality, love - through a justification by faith alone. Its 
intent is not to locate these in an objective reality but rather to maintain the 
realms of appearances, the fictions: and while these fictions may not be 
rooted in reality, in the world of truth and falsity, yet they are important in 
that they keep us human: we act as if they were true. But for 
Communitarianism, not all fictions are admissible. Egalitarianism is excluded 
as ‘unnatural’- the only legitimately ‘natural’ fictions, the only ones worth 
preserving, are the ‘common sense’ traditional stories of the bourgeois order.
Clearly, the achievement of Scruton's version of 'common' sensibility is not 
universal, and its exclusivity is concealed by Scruton though he does assert 
that the 'uprooted, alienated and disenchanted' do not partake of this 
culture, this 'shared humanity' as Scruton puts it, which does open Scruton to 
some serious objections. Are these people less human? How disenchanted 
must one be before being exiled from humanity? What implications do this 
charge of being less human have for the way these exiles are to be treated by 
the society? Scruton offers no answer to the problem of such 'marginal 
humans' as he calls them, with obvious frustration that anyone could 
choose not to share his sensibilities. They are: 'difficult cases... an intractable 
problem when our instinctive reverence for human beings is thwarted by their 
inability to respond to it.' Communitarianism’s bourgeois culture is a 
culture of canonical sentiment for re-invented ‘traditional values’; of the
C9
Roger Scruton, An Intelligent Person's Guide to Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1996),
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53 Scruton ( 1979): p.62
^  Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs. (1996) pp. 47-9. 
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nature of these values it generally maintains an uneasy silence. As evidenced 
in his discussion of the virtues of fox-hunting, when Scruton does try to flesh 
out these values his common culture becomes more than faintly ridiculous.
Ted Honderich ^  points out that Conservatist moral discourse is not quite 
moral discourse even when it has, like Scruton's, been borrowed from Kant. 
He argues that it has been generally accepted in moral philosophy that the 
idea of universalizability is basic: no moral principle is truly moral if certain 
groups or classes in society are considered exempt from the duties and 
obligations imposed by it. The implied universalizability of Scruton's 
common culture and cultural values - and indeed Blair’s community - masks 
their essential specificity, to a particular, constructed social context.
Cairns Craig in his discussion of the work of Raymond Williams, 
describes what he sees as Williams' strengths and weaknesses. As a strength 
he cites Williams' determination to escape the confines of a typically Left 
emphasis on a narrow class analysis of English culture. He writes:
The basis o f  Williams's approach lay in an insistence that 
’culture' should not be defined simply in terms o f  the aesthetic 
values o f the middle classes - that it should include the 
signifying activities o f all classes and that the expressions o f  
different classes should be examined in terms o f  the historical 
realities o f their class situation rather than in terms o f some 
abstracted definition o f what constitutes 'good' or 'high'
art '58
As a weakness, however, Craig describes how Williams's analysis is locked 
into the class structure of English society:
'In accepting the language o f  class as the sole medium o f his 
argument, Williams allows himself to become part o f the 
internal operation o f English culture and English history and
^  Ted Honderich, Conservatism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990).
57 Caims Craig, Out o f History: Narrative Paradigms in Scottish and British Culture 
(Edinburgh: Polygon, 1996). 
ibid. p. 147
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English self-perception, even as he seeks out a universal 
statement about class relations in a developed society.' ^
The Communitarian discourse has little of William’s strength and much of his 
weakness. Scruton’s vocabulary has become curdled round the specificity of a 
historical social class - or rather his petit-bourgeois re-invention of the 
tweedy, chocolate box, fox huntin’, shootin’ and fishin’ shire aristocracy. He 
had, himself, shallower roots in the working classes: his culture is a quest 
narrative, a justification of social climbing, to seek the grail of aristocratic 
good breeding. His 'universalisability' is a sham: his analysis of a common 
culture does not attempt to escape the borders of England, nor does it go 
much beyond the comfortable existence of the bourgeois and the country 
homes of the English landed aristocracy in the Tory Shires.
This kind of narrative is not exclusively English. In 'Imagining Scotland' ^  
Fintan O’Toole describes how nationalism needs a story to tell itself if it is to 
survive, preferably a simple story, which he characterises as 'a narrative o f  
conquest and resurrection'. The typical plot of the story tells of a once proud 
race defeated by foreigners. It will relate their history from a Golden Age 
when they were independent, through the trials of invasion, the gradual 
subversion of their culture and their forced adoption of an alien way of life. 
The ending of their story, indefinitely deferred, will be the restoration of their 
mythical past. In hyper-reality, the ’real’ and the ’imaginary’ collapse into each 
other and form what Baudrillard calls a ’simulation’. Baudrillard comments, 
for example, that Disneyland masks the reality that the ’real’ America is itself 
Disneyland - in its fantasy architecture, gun lobbies, rampant and ludicrous 
materialism, rank sentimentalism and nostalgia for a time that never existed. 
Simulation, he argues, resurrects myths of origin and authenticity - like the 
’unbroken English tradition’ - as panic stricken productions of the ’real’
Scruton’s story, like the Black Paper writers, exhibits elements of this type of 
plot: his naive romanticised view of educational history, re-invented as a 
mythical Golden Age; his characterisation of England as a once great nation 
humbled; his culturally atavistic obsessions; his panic stricken rhetoric of the
~^ibid. p. 147ZTA r
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subversion of the educational discourse by foreign ideas and the betrayal of 
the enemy within, the progressive educationalists and egalitarians 
characterised as a 'parcel of rogues'; and their struggle for restoration. His 
narrative is sustained by his tragi-comic sense of England's unfulfilled 
destiny. Communitarianism, the Third Way, is a ‘good myth’ in Hogg’s terms, 
justifying, in the end, only the bourgeois order.
Scruton's common culture hinges on Burke’s rebarbative idea of a ‘better
fOclass o f  persons from the swinish multitude' : the bourgeois audience is 
addressed exclusively. The quiescent majority, the apathetic as well as the 
recalcitrant and the deviant, the dispossessed and the nonconformist are 
silently labelled 'marginal humans' who, since they do not partake of this 
exclusively bourgeois 'common' culture, have by definition no place in the 
moral order and no justification or authority for their opinions. Instead of 
addressing the poor, those without a job or even the hope of a job, the 
dispossessed and the low self esteem of those living in the inner city slums, 
they are packaged and re-described in Blair’s Communitarianism as 4the 
excluded\ a euphemism that hints that they live on the margins intentionally 
and which suggests that spending money on them would be inappropriate: that 
their inclusion is a matter of them making a better choice, of them grabbing a 
stake. Their exclusion from the discourses of power is reinterpreted as their 
own choice, therefore legitimised and, ultimately, they have no voice or even 
any significant social identity despite the rhetoric of inclusion to which 
Scruton and Blair aspire.
The bourgeois story, though, has become the most powerful in political 
discourses. Bernard Ingham, Thatcher’s Press Secretary, for example, was not 
a Tory: he had been a prospective Labour candidate, losing to a Tory at the 
1965 Election. He had, however, suffered from being passed over in his 
career as a journalist at the Guardian and as a press officer in the Labour Party 
by what he saw as his social, not intellectual betters. He was hard working, 
ambitious, clever and blunt. He was frustrated by being unable to break the 
old school tie glass ceiling and his clear resentment of ‘cronyism’, to borrow 
a current Conservative soundbite spin, drove him to serve Thatcher because 
she, in his terms, was not a Tory. Coming from a similar background to him, 
she too was an outsider. She sought to break down the old social institutions
ff)
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France . cited in Honderich (1990), p. 47
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that were a bar to bourgeois ambitions. When offered the job as her Press 
Officer he said: 7 think I'll do it. The thing is, we are both radicals' . He,
with the zeal of the convert, was concerned in his career more to preserve 
Thatcher and her bourgeois narrative than the Tory Party - many of whom he 
found contemptuous. John Biffen was to find this unswerving loyalty to 
Thatcher and her story unnerving: 4One would begin to imagine that we have 
in Mr Bernard Ingham some sort o f  rough-spoken Yorkshire Rasputin who is 
manipulating government and corroding the standards o f  public morality' 
That Thatcher was to become such an icon in the bourgeois story was in large 
part due to Ingham’s ‘spin’ but the success of the spin was in Ingham’s and 
Thatcher’s ability to catch the popular mood of the ‘decent, working middle 
classes’ and to manipulate their ambitions and desires so effectively that all 
political stories since then have found themselves constrained to follow the 
same plot.
This too is the essential premise of Communitarianism. Zygmunt Bauman ^  
writes - for DEMOS, the New Labour ‘thinktank’ - of society after moral 
certainty, where there is post-ideological ‘emptiness of political space’. He 
notes, without cynicism, that the instrumentalism of business is what 4makes 
it tick ' and that the ethical considerations appropriate to the individual would 
be counter-productive in the market: his ethics are for the individual in the 
community, and he presents ethics divorced from the means and forms of 
production of society. MacIntyre in After V irtue^ supplies a critique of 
managerial instrumentalism: effectiveness as a substitute for ethics. In the 
market, he argues, the criterion of success is the ultimate test of conduct and 
traditional morality is reconstructed as a 4theatre o f illusions' ^ .
MacIntyre is describing, in effect, what has become the Communitarian 
post-modern ethic of sentiment, of feeling rather than belief. The individual 
has an ethical role only in her democratic relationship as an individual with 
the community, not as a part of an organisation. While the community 
supports the behaviour of the institutions and corporations which form its
^  cited in Robert Harris, Good and Faithful Servant (London: Faber and Faber, 1990) p.72 
64Hansard 7/2/83
^Zygmunt Bauman Alone Again: Ethics after Certainty. (London: Demos 1994) 
^Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory (Duckworth; London, 1981, 
1985).
67ibid. p. 77
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economic and social life, the individual must concur. Bauman rejects 
Habermas’s combative, emancipatory critical theory which interrogates 
discourses to expose the forms of domination which underpin them. Rather he 
espouses the ethics of post-modernism, placing his faith, like Richard Rorty, 
in the liberal imperialist tradition of ‘western civilisation (which) seems to 
have found the philosopher's stone all other civilisations sought in vain, and 
with it the warranty o f  its own immortality: it has succeeded in reforging its 
discontents into the factors o f  its own reproduction. ' ^
Bauman does not, however, utter these words with Willets’s
Anglo-triumphalism, rather they are expressed, almost reluctantly, an
ambiguously eulogistic comment on how liberating and yet also how bleak
the post-modern vision can be. Those on the ‘margins’ of this common
culture, Bauman asserts, find their identity in their ability, sanctified by the
liberal democratic tenet of free speech, to express their discontent in
single-issue politics - in ‘the privatisation o f grievances'. The problem
oriented, pragmatic dynamism of western culture and the ‘alluring power ’ of
7 0consumerism - 'the market sponsored production o f needs' - eventually 
absorbs the malcontents and politics consequently becomes a matter not of 
providing a unifying, ‘common’ grand narrative but of maintaining power 
through the calculation, manipulation and exploitation of the popular mood. 
This is what Communitarianism is, not a narrative but rather an advertising 
campaign to give the correct caring image to New Labour.
Bauman’s Communitarianism, like Scruton’s, is a convenient, expedient 
morality: it permits the ‘appropriate’ expression of individual moral distaste - 
the privatisation of conscience - without carrying the imperative to do 
anything about it. It predicates the reduction of citizenship to consumerism 
where even ethics is a consumer product, a brand identity. It creates a 
feel-good, self-indulgent ethics of sentiment, a moralising rather than a 
morality, which leaves the potential injustices of the market untouched.
Yet, later, he calls for a 'reason-guided society', where a 'moral s e lf  may 
develop ‘take root and grow'. A society ‘that engages its members... in.. the
zo
Zygmunt Bauman: Intimations o f Postmodemitv (London. Routledge 1992) p.217 and 
passim 
ibid. p. 182 
70ibid. p i83
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task o f  caring for and running common affairs so that the common life could
observe the standards o f justice and prudence - such a society requires
neither disciplined subjects nor satisfaction-seeking consumers o f  socially
provided services, but rather tenacious and sometimes obstinate, but always
responsible, citizens. What he is describing, however, is not right reason,
but right feeling: a society of people who all have the same basic feelings
about things, have the same broad desires, the same narratives about
themselves and their community. What comes first is the feeling of the
continuity of a common culture and a common way of life, not the creation of
a narrative but the creation of an emotional state. As Blair puts it: ‘The
Labour Party believe that we are one community, one people and citizens o f
77one society. We make our future together or not at all.. ’ . Thus the
hysterical popular reaction to the death of Princess Diana or to the evil empire 
of Saddam Hussein - or even more tellingly to the imprisonment o f Deirdre 
Barlow, a fictional soap character - is manipulated by the politicians and their 
media in the new commonwealth of emotion.
What Bauman and Blair offer is not philosophy - Scruton makes an attempt at 
that at least - but the soundbite. Post-ideological politics has suffered, in 
Baudrillard’s terms, a ‘loss of the real’, an implosion of image and reality. 
What ‘Communitarianism’ provides is not a narrative, nor a philosophy but 
simply a vehicle for the discourse of ‘Values Education’, double-coding the 
New Labour narrative to manipulate the popular mood: ‘Decent people. Good 
people. Patriotic people. When I hear people urging us to fight for lour 
people ', I want to say: these are our people. They are the majority. And we 
must serve them, and build that new Britain, that young country, for their 
children and their families.... One Britain: the people united by shared values 
and shared aims...' . Blair’s rhetoric mixes the cultural values of his
audience, the ‘working middle classes’, with corporate managerial vocabulary 
and crude nationalism to rebrand Britain.
Major, too, had attempted to evoke traditional values: 'Fifty years from now, 
Britain will still be the country o f long shadows on county grounds, warm 
beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers, and - as Orwell said - old maids
71lZygmunt Bauman Alone Again: Ethics after Certainty. (London: Demos 1994) pp44/5 
^Address to the Labour Party Conference, 30/9/93 
^T ony Blair (1996) New Britain op. cit. p. 53
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bicycling to communion through the morning mist. ^  Major’s is the
sentimentality of the chocolate box. Davies comments that Conservative
descriptions of social order typically employ such kitsch rural imagery,
Christmas card scenes of Merrie England - though never Scotland, Ireland or
Wales whose pastures are presumably neither as pleasant nor as green as
England's which were: "... replete with cosy nostalgia for a mythical time
when everyone knew their place, masters were kind and never sacked anyone,
75and the workforce touched their forelocks and never went on strike." Their
rhetoric of the 'green fields' of England, the singing of 'Jerusalem' at Tory 
party rallies, cricket matches on the village green and so on, act as a kind of 
mirror in which the Tories see themselves, with a willing suspension of 
disbelief, as they ideally wish to be. They provide an exclusive cultural 
habitation in which to feel secure, comfortable and privileged.
Blair’s project is to seize ownership of this host narrative, to promote the
image that New Labour now is the gatekeeper of the bourgeois green and
pleasant land. Blair’s is the soundbite rhetoric of the ‘stakeholder society',
7 f\'modernising Britain' of 'youth': 'The party renewed, the country reborn ’
and 'a new young Britain - a young, self-confident and successful country
which uses all the talents o f its citizens and gives them a stake in the 
77future' . But this is sentimentality too, less descriptive perhaps, and directed 
to the future, but just as evocative. Blair too quotes one of Orwell’s 
romanticised pictures, this time of technology driving the future as in those 
Soviet Union propaganda posters for their post-war Five Year Plans: '...the 
“skilled workers, technical experts, airmen, scientists, architects and 
journalists, the people who feel at home in the radio and ferro-concrele age ”
70
who would lead Labour's drive for change after the war' He presents a 
romantic picture of technology and ‘skilled’ technologists as the ‘modem’ 
force for good, in the end no less kitsch, contrasting Major’s ‘retro’ vision of 
Merrie England with the ultra modem bridge of the Starship Enterprise.
All such ‘post-ideological’ political discourse, in its soundbite, cultural 
coding, is forced, in the drive to power, to aspire to ‘the condition o f muzac', 
as Michael Moorcock satirically re-described the aphorism of Walter Pater.
74 John Major, as reported in The Daily Telegraph. 23rd April, 1993 
7** Andrew J. Davie (1995) p. 51.
76Blair (1996) p.53 
77ibid. p.86 
78ibid. p. 14
315
Political discourse is reduced to populist propaganda, to bottle-bank 
disposable objects of consumption. Milan Kundera laments the ultimate 
meaninglessness, sentimentality and narcissism of the political discourses of a 
world devoid of anything but consumption:
"Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first
tear says: How nice to see children running on the grass!
The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all
mankind, by children running on the grass!
It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.
The brotherhood o f man on earth will be possible only on a 
79base o f  kitsch "
Milan Kundera defines 'kitsch' as 'the aesthetic ideal o f  all politicians and all
o n
parties and movements' . This 'kitsch' attitude is not poor taste, but the 
enemy of art, and also of truth and morality. Kundera writes: "it is the need to 
gaze into the mirror o f  the beautifying lie and to be moved to tears by the 
gratification o f  one's own reflection." ^  Scruton and Blair would be 
appalled to be accused of kitsch but they would be more appalled if their 
description of a common culture should be accused of authenticating anything 
other than the bourgeois society of the decent, ambitious, ‘working middle 
classes’. The direction of their rhetoric is to justify a 'beautiful lie' and to see 
themselves reflected in it. In the end, removing the metaphysical pretensions 
that is the central feature of these ‘philosophies’; it is this kitsch spirit which 
infuses their moralities and their discourses.
79 Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness o f Being (London: Faber and Faber, 1984) p. 
251.
80ibid. p. 251O 1 r
Milan Kundera, "Sixty-three words," The Guardian June 3rd, 1988.
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3. The Rebranding o f  Education:
Virtual Education for a Virtual Society
'The Nineties are the perfect decade for John Major: they don't seem to be
about anything at all.... The fascination with foody ism, the commercial
success o f 'Hello! ' magazine, the institutionalised whingeing o f  the Citizens'
»82Charter and the political philosophy o f New Baywatch..
And the perfect decade for Blair to begin his project of rebranding Britain. 
Ted Honderich in his attempt to define what Conservatism is reaches the 
conclusion: fit) is not that Conservatives are selfish. It is that they are 
nothing else. Their selfishness is the rationale o f  their politics, and they have 
no other rationale. They stand without the support, the legitimation, o f  any 
recognisably moral principle. It is in this that they are distinguished 
fundamentally from those who are opposed to them. While ‘One Nation’, 
Respectable politicians might argue, with some justification, that such a 
judgement is too harsh, it certainly does seem to reflect the amorality of the 
market and the bourgeois narrative. But what if there is no opposition and no 
legitimate narrative left to oppose this narrative? What if Thatcher’s narrative 
has been appropriated by the Labour Party and there really does not seem to 
be any alternative? What if all that remains is a consumer society driven by 
the market, soundbite politics and kitsch sentimentality? The end of the story, 
the narrative, may be in sight.
What is important in creating this content-free pseudo narrative of sentiment
and ambition is, 'education, education, education ’ - with education reduced
to the indoctrination of consumerist ‘ethics’ and the discourse of skills.
Michael Barber writes that Blair must carry through a ‘learning crusade':
'Blair must maintain his high-profile support by weaving education into his
speeches whatever their primary purpose. The message that learning is at the
heart o f  Britain's social and economic transformation must remain a central 
. 84one
The discourse of skills has conceptually re-described the vocabularies of 
education - to render meaningless the ‘old’ narratives and to replace them
^Andrew Roberts: Signs o f  the Times The Observer 31/12/95 
^  Ted Honderich, Conservatism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) 238/9. 
^Michael Barber Ixibour, education anddeja  vw, New Statesman 18/10/96
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with a new, but empty, story. Egalitarianism, for example, has become 
submerged in this consumerist discourse. The bourgeois story is the story of a 
‘classless’ society, at least insofar as everyone is considered to be middle 
class and, since everyone who mattered was now of the same class, with the 
same opportunities, then egalitarianism is rendered meaningless. Its use in 
current political discourse, when it is used at all, is either to code some 
vestigial dissatisfaction with the Blair revolution or simply a vacuous 
soundbite.
‘Opportunity’ has taken its place: we are all equal in the bourgeois society, 
the only society that has a voice. Major had made a determined attempt to 
create this reality of a ‘classless’ society and this has continued in the current 
educational policies of ‘New’ Labour. In the discourse of skills, the 
distinction between Comprehensive schools and Grammar schools has been 
blurred: each offer the same thing in the new vocabulary, inequalities are 
made invisible in the talk of opportunities, the ‘marginalised’ people who 
cannot yet grasp these opportunities are ignored, at best. They eventually 
become redefined as ‘skillseekers’ and subject to increasingly oppressive 
social policy as they perversely fail to grasp the opportunities offered.
Teaching and schooling have succumbed to the ‘post ideological’ pragmatic 
business and consumerist vocabularies of Education Enterprise Zones, to 
school and individual ‘contracts’ with its ‘consumers’, to learning plans and 
partnerships, in quasi-legal, ‘service pledges’ about ‘quality delivery’, and 
‘Excellence Funds’ to reward the schools which become most complicit in 
their market re-orientation. In Blair’s Third Way Communitarianism, 
behaviourist, narrow, goal-directed ‘team spirit’, its game imagery redefining 
participants as players, as means rather than ends, has taken the traditional 
place of society, even of ‘community’, in the political discourse. The 
traditional ethical centre of teaching, that it is a profoundly moral activity, 
and one which requires the most careful critical consideration, has largely 
disappeared in the crisis thinking of the discourse. There is no time for such 
critique, and anyway, the teachers are told, we have done the thinking for you. 
Be quiet. Just get on with it. Follow the development plan.
Barber’s book, for example, speaks of the importance of the ‘individual 
learning promise ’ in the ‘millenium curriculum' of a reconstructed 
educational narrative with the ultimate purpose of creating 'the learning
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society' He places his faith in technological advances in communication, 
believing that with greater access to information people will become more 
active citizens, more responsible for their own futures, their welfare and 
education. The new Teaming’ society - with the soundbite philosophy of 
’education, education, education' at its heart - will embrace the Internet as its 
totem: information will provide the basis of the new hegemony for the 
millenium. The current dichotomous, problematic relationships in society, 
between the market and the welfare state, between the people and the state, 
between libertarianism and socialism will be resolved not in the domination 
of one but in a new, ‘liberated’ information society where all schools, and 
ultimately all citizens, will be connected in the Internet. The new Leviathan is 
the interconnection of citizens in a hyperspace community. The contradictory 
grand narratives, subject of much of this exercise, will wither in the ‘new’ 
reflective information society. Its pious belief is that people are thrown back 
on their own resources as individuals and are denied the comfort of fictions, 
firmly locked into the ‘real’ world, they will grow to create a healthy political 
community, free from Barber’s ‘passionate credulities’ that have so dogged 
the twentieth century.
The metaphors are of development and maturation: the old narratives are the 
fairy tales of childhood, replaced by the cold market ‘realism’ of the 
consumer society re-invented as the information economy. Barber does 
recognise that the education of the young cannot be entirely driven simply by 
reaction to the market - to the changing demands of fashions or to the 
changing technologies and economic imperatives. Education cannot ‘keep 
pace’ with the mercurial market. But the market dominates social life - it is 
the ultimate justification for reform, it is the sole legitimate vocabulary. In 
this new society - free from the taboos of the old grand narratives - all 
educational problems have a managerial or a technological solution, 
accredited by their ‘modernity’ and their place in the story of the information 
society, rather than any theory of educational practice: if the children cannot 
write, give them a laptop computer; if they cannot spell, give them a 
spellchecker; no books, nor properly qualified teachers nor indeed a school, 
use video conferencing... Being part of the ‘information revolution’ is, in New 
Labour’s ‘modem’, ‘youthful’ vision, the ultimate answer to everything.
8 5 ibid.
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Information is become the essential commodity of this re-invented market 
economy. Charles Handy ^  writes of Microsoft as ‘the parable o f our 
times \ creating wealth out of nothing but the ideas of two people. 4Modern 
economies will be not be constrained by lack o f resources but only by lack o f 
imagination, o f  creativity and ideas.' He calls for a redefinition of the 
enterprise culture in which ‘Hierarchies will have to be built on respect 
rather than on power.' The challenge is, he says 'the bonding o f  the 
individual to the organisation ' and the ability of education to ‘create 
knowledge rather than to collect i t '.
Handy is more than a little disingenuous in citing Microsoft as the model for 
our times. Bill Gates is fighting an anti-trust legal case in the USA for his 
attempt to comer the ‘information’ market and his activities in promoting his 
case are hardly edifying. If Microsoft’s greed and opportunism is Handy’s 
vision of the future then we have a narrative which has moved away from any 
sense at all of a just society. Further, and more seriously, Handy speaks of 
there being no need to worry about ‘lack o f  resources'. This suggests a 
narrative which has abdicated from any responsibility or concern for the 
environment or for the real lives of people. Bread will still have to be on the 
table, clean air and water will still be required: even Handy’s hyperspace 
inhabiting consumers will need something more substantial that what they can 
download from the Net. They may be virtual citizens but virtual food will not 
nourish them, in fact or metaphor. Also he seems not to worry too much about 
the quality of information to be ‘traded’ on the Net: the currently most visited 
sites are the pornographic ones and, in particular, there is a thriving exchange 
of child pornography. Yet, in the strict market terms of Handy’s discourse, 
this would be ‘good’ because it was profitable. The number of ‘hits’ on a site 
is a measure, in his discourse, of its value.
Yet this ‘information society’ is the central metaphor of the Blair narrative. 
Thus the ‘three R’s’ are to be replaced in the educational hyperspace by the 
four ‘S’s, according to Demos’s Geoff Mulgan ^ : 4Sim ulationSelection'
‘Sharing' and ‘Service'. These are to be the ‘key skills’ of the information 
revolution as the three R’s were of the industrial revolution. All systems can
oz
° references are to Charles Handy’s introduction to Mulgan et al (eds) The new enterprise 
culture fLondon: Demos, Issue 8, 1996) 
all references to the Four R’s are from GeoffMulgan: The new basic skills: from  the 3R ’s 
to the 4 S ’s in Mulgan et al (eds) (1996 ) op. cit. p.34
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be simulated on a computer to be understood. There is, apparently, no 
pressing need for any ‘real’ contact with the world: everything can be 
modelled and thus may provide the learner with ‘a good mix o f  learning and 
doing'. ‘Selection' is important so that in the mass of information available 
the learner can 1sift the wheat from the chaff. ‘Sharing' represents the need 
for team-work: *The capacity to share questions, ideas and ‘knowledge is now 
a basic competence, and can be learnt through new tools such as groupware '.
The fourth ‘S’, ‘Service', is Mulgan’s unifying metaphor: information 
technology exists to serve. Service, Mulgan insists, has too long been seen as 
a negative term. The idea of service has been, in his view, too long coloured 
by Upstairs, Downstairs connotations of domination and subservience. Rather 
‘service ’ is to be understood as the understanding and fulfilment of people’s 
needs. Technology will improve, he claims, 'the fundamental quality o f  
service... but with leaner managements and central control functions'. IT 
skills will be the foundation of the new economy and the new focus for 
education as higher wages are offered to attract highly skilled staff. Service, 
as the central metaphor of this vocabulary, ‘will require models o f  learning 
that inculcate the habit o f service from an early age. And it will require a 
cultural shift to see service not in terms o f servility but in terms o f a 
commitment to an ideal o f  quality...'. People will inhabit ‘a society o f  
networks... a global learning infrastructure... where GNVQs have been taken 
up around the world.. ’ creating a ‘knowledge infrastructure based on 
personal means o f access ’ which will be the foundation of ‘a new enterprise 
culture'.
Mulgan becomes a little over-stimulated. His vision of society is not of real 
flesh and blood people but of virtual people in a virtual society, exchanging 
virtual commodities for virtual reward. He has confused the map with the 
place. Everything is reduced by simulation to ‘models’ of ‘systems’: yet the 
world is a real place and inhabited by real people who will not be simplified 
or reduced by the limitations of computer simulations. Education is more than 
just the acquisition of the skills needed to surf the net - it is a social activity as 
much as it is narrowly vocational, and children need real people and real 
interaction to develop their whole potentials. They need the often messy and 
contradictory successes, pressures and pains of the classroom and the 
playground, both the overt and the ‘hidden’ curricula, to become ‘real’
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people. Mulgan offers a simulation of education, with simulated learning by 
simulated people and, ultimately, simulated certification.
Further, sifting the ‘wheat from the cha ff requires a value system which is 
transcendent: how will this be taught in the absence of any traditional sense of 
community? The market will establish the value in his individualised 
‘information society’: so will child pornography be wheat or chaft? His 
narrative requires answers to some hard questions but he remains stubbornly 
silent about what ‘information’ has value or the means by which value is 
established. His bankrupt vision of ‘sharing' is exemplified by the importance 
of ‘groupware V his learning society is as morally and culturally nourishing as 
its computer programme: there is no room here for human interaction except 
on a virtual level. His society and its learning are ultimately impoverishing as 
he and his ilk lose sight of any underlying reality, any humanity, in the smug 
computerised complacency and the solipsistic isolation of their virtual world.
And Mulgan’s world is exclusive. What of those on society’s margins who 
cannot, or do not, choose to be ‘connected’? What of those who are ‘offline’, 
who are not ‘on message’? The ‘New Labour’ story has been heralded by the 
rhetoric o f ‘social inclusion’. However, rather than to make material changes 
in educational provision through policies of positive discrimination, as in the 
traditional egalitarian Labour narratives, Blair has attempted merely to 
re-brand education, just as Labour had re-branded itself under Blair, changing 
its image with immediate and spectacular success. To re-brand is to re-market 
a product, under a different name perhaps, as reaction to market decline. It is 
often a result of a take-over of a failing company, and acts as a means to 
assert the control of the new owners over the production processes and 
personnel through their exploitation of the anxieties created by market 
insecurity. It places image above everything else. There is a greater emphasis 
on presentation of company policy and of the product - through market 
research and ‘focus groups’ - to manipulate consumer demand through a new, 
vigorous marketing campaign. ‘Consumer reaction’ becomes the driving 
force behind company policy; its need is to create ‘customer satisfaction’ and 
increase its market share.
Education has moved beyond policy. Winning elections requires not better 
policies but the manipulation of image. Educational policy, like any other 
policy, has become a matter of branding and re-branding - providing an empty
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narrative which yet provides *a storyline that plays up continuities and gives 
the inattentive voter something to identify with. A different type o f think-tank 
has sprung up to fill this need, concerned less with concrete policy, more with
oo
social description and brand creation ' .
Mulgan, for example, invented the Ufl, the ‘University for Industry’, that has 
been taken up by Gordon Brown and the Treasury, not by the DfEE, as the 
foundation for Britain’s economic success: ‘The Ufl is at the heart o f the 
government's vision for life-long learning. It will be a public-private 
partnership to boost the competitiveness o f  business and enable individuals to 
improve their employability... It will broker high quality learning products 
and services and make them available at home, in the workplace and at
o n
learning centres countrywide.' It exists, however, only in hyper-reality: it 
has no actual location though its administrative headquarters are to be in 
Sheffield; it has no teaching staff; it will create ‘learning sites' around the 
country but will not actually deliver any service other than to facilitate 
access '. It is neither a university nor is it wholly for industry: it is rather an 
information clearing ‘site’ for giving advice and the location of training 
courses, consultancies and institutions, in particular, it states, ‘at the lower 
end o f the skills market '.
Ufl is, it acknowledges, a ‘brand’: a concept not a thing - a virtual institution 
leading to a ‘revolution in aspiration'. It exists only in the educational 
hyper-market. It has been so registered, leading to the DfEE to ban its use by 
any other training or educational institution or quango under its aegis. Celia 
Weston suggests that this branding by the Treasury is the realisation of the 
shift in the control of the educational narrative from the DfEE to the 
discourses of crisis, skills, bourgeois ambition and economic recovery of the 
Treasury, through Gordon Brown’s fear that the education professionals - 
who have failed on numerous previous occasions to deliver the adult and 
life-long learning goods - will simply amoeba-like absorb the Ufl and the 
money it represents and carry on failing to deliver.' ^
In Scotland, educational certification too will become a ‘brand’:
oo
Gerry Holtham in his valedictory address to the Institute o f Public Policy Research, cited in
New Statesman 30/10/98 
89This and subsequent references taken from the Ufl Prospectus, as published in New 
Statesman, 13/11/98.
^C elia Weston: A new acronym on the block, New Statesman, 13/11/98
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“SQA (Scottish Qualifications Authority) will brand the new 
qualifications as ‘National Qualifications'. This name will 
also cover (as well as Higher Still) the existing Standard 
Grade, National Certificate and Short Course provision. ” ^
This branding is necessary as part of the ‘overall marketing strategy' to 
promote the desirability of SQA qualifications to its consumers: ‘employers, 
parents, centres and candidates.' ^  Since SQA has no Scottish competitors 
it must be assumed that they seek to defend their market share from English 
competition or to expand their business into England. Alternatively, it is 
possible that this use of marketing language, in the absence of a market, 
actually means nothing at all, simply a rhetorical mechanism to drive 
educational certification as well as schools further into a simulated world. 
The vocabularies of the market thus portray education in metaphors which 
have no ‘real’ referents - sense without reference, the simulated meaning (or 
meaninglessness) of Baudrillard’s hyper-reality.
‘Values’ are reduced to becoming a promotional ploy of the educational 
simulation, the brand image. As the engagement between education and 
reality is weakened, so the values promoted by education become less 
committed, less securely embedded into the fabric of the school and the 
curriculum, less concerned with life and much more concerned with 
‘lifestyle’, in particular the materialistic brand consumption of the image
go
conscious, socially ambitious, consuming classes. Quentin Skinner ° 
describes how the state no longer sees itself as the servant of the weak but as 
the instrument of the bourgeois narrative: its vocabularies, constitutive of 
bourgeois democracy, construct and exploit the foundations of any perception 
of a 'real' world.
Consumerism might once have been defined as commodity fetishism, in 
hyper-reality this fetishism has moved from the object to the entirety of the 
closed signifying system, the metaphorical structures of the bourgeois 
narrative which encodes it. Douglas Coupland satirised this in Generation X 
where he writes of ‘MacJobs’: not ‘real’ jobs which provide a sense of moral
^Q uestions and Answers, pamphlet issued to schools and colleges by the Higher Still 
Development Unit and the SQA (Scottish Qualifications Authority) (Edinburgh, November 
1988), p.3 
i^bid. p. 14 
^  New Statesman, 9/3/96 p.30
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or cultural satisfaction or of the fulfilment of social responsibility or even of 
providing a sense of social position. ‘MacJobs’ are essentially transient, 
discardable, non-engaging activities endured solely to pass the time and earn 
some money in order to pursue a ‘lifestyle’. These jobs are not even 
alienating since the workers are not so much denied but actively refuse to 
seek any sense of ownership of the means of production or the fruits of their 
labours. In Generation X the work ethic has been replaced by vacuous 
consumer chic: I am therefore I shop. Coupland’s people have no defining 
identity: they exist only so that brand names have something to attach to.
What education faces is the prospect of becoming ‘MacEducation’: an 
unengaged, uncommitted activity for both pupils and teachers, a simulated 
profession for a simulated society where one’s education is defined simply by 
the ‘National Certificates’ one has obtained, electronically engraved on a 
smart card.
Education must not, surely, become so simply defined. If anything, this 
encapsulates the thesis of this study: educational debate must remain open 
and passionate in a healthy society. While the ‘passionate credulities’ of the 
conflicting traditional grand narratives may have created confusion yet at the 
same time they also were both firmly grounded in notions of social justice and 
in the importance of education in reproducing culture and values. While the 
competing grand narratives - Bantock, Elliot, Scruton, Butler, Hogg, the 
Black Paper writers, the egalitarians, the progressives and the Unpopular 
Education cultural theorists - may together have created a complex, 
confusing, contradictory and ambiguous narrative, yet it was a narrative rich 
in possibilities and characterisations.
It was a real world they discussed, an irritatingly, sometimes apparently 
irrational, open, pluralist, paradoxical world: one not so readily understood or 
so comfortably closed. Dissent, debate and critical thinking were possible 
and retained meaning even if debates did sometimes become incoherent. The 
Blair Communitarian revolution threatens an empty consensus which, with 
the Orwellian newspeak of consumerism, smothers dissent and with that the 
richness of debate. As Wittgenstein said in his Tractatus\ ‘Whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent \
This study is an attempt to bridge that silence.
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